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This thesis examines the development of Roman Illyrian policy, from the late 
Republican hegemony over the region to the establishment of permanent imperial 
frontiers on the Danube and the beginning of the process that would integrate 
Illyricum (the area between the Adriatic Sea and the River Danube) into the Roman 
Empire. This thesis has two principal aims. Firstly, on the regional, ‘microscopic’, 
level it defines and explains the development of Roman policy in Illyricum. 
Secondly, on the global, ‘macroscopic’, level it examines some of the mechanisms of 
Roman policy-making, and fits Illyrian policy into the wider picture of Roman 
foreign and later provincial policy. Ultimately, the thesis recognizes and explains the 
reasons for a major change in Roman strategic interests from the Eastern Adriatic 
coast to the interior of the western Balkans in the late Republic and early Empire. 
Despite the problems of deficient sources, this thesis observes Roman Illyrian policy 
as essentially a political interaction between Rome and the entire regional geo-
political system of Illyricum, rather than defining it through Roman interactions with 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction  1
 




1. 1 Introduction 
The conquest of Illyricum in the general context of Roman expansion has 
been examined previously, as has Roman interaction with Illyricum from the 
perspective of Dalmatian or Pannonian provincial history.
1 However, no modern 
study devoted solely to Roman Illyrian
2 policy in this transitional period has yet been 
attempted. This thesis will examine the development of Roman Illyrian policy, from 
the late Republican hegemony over the region to the establishment of permanent 
imperial frontiers on the River Danube and the beginning of the process that would 
integrate Illyricum into the Empire. Illyricum is both a good but also an atypical 
example of Roman policy because of its peculiar cultural and geographic position 
between the Hellenistic world and continental, ‘barbarian’ Europe, and its strategic 
significance as one of the gateways into Northern Italy. This thesis has two principal 
aims. Firstly, on the regional, ‘microscopic’, level it will define and explain the 
development of Roman policy in Illyricum. Secondly, on the global, ‘macroscopic’, 
level it will examine some of the mechanisms of Roman policy-making, and fit 
Illyrian policy into the wider picture of Roman foreign and later provincial policy. 
Ultimately, this thesis will explain the reasons for a major change in Roman strategic 
interests from the eastern Adriatic coast to the interior of the western Balkans in the 
late Republic and early Empire. Although there are problems regarding deficient 
sources, we will see Roman Illyrian policy as essentially a political interaction 
between Rome and the regional geo-political system of Illyricum (Chapter 1.4.2). 
 
The consequences of the conquest of these lands are visible to any historian. 
The efforts of Roman generals in the first centuries BC/AD enabled Rome to extend 
its influence across the Danube and to control huge areas of the Pannonian basin. 
                                                           
1 Republican policy: Zippel (1877); Wilkes (1969) 29-36; Badian (1962); Bandelli 
(1983) (with detailed overview of bibliography on the topic up to 1983). 
General context up to AD 14: Syme (1934b); Wilkes (1965a); Gruen (1996). 
Provincial history: Wilkes (1969) 37-152; Mócsy (1962) 527-550; (1974) 31 ff.; Alföldy (1965a) 166 
ff.; Zaninović (1976b); Šašel (1976); Šašel-Kos (1997b). 
2 The term ‘Illyrian policy’ can be questioned, as this thesis deals with the territory embraced by the 
later Roman provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia. In our opinion Illyricum represented a regional geo-Chapter 1: Introduction  2
This achievement created a significant buffer zone between the imperial frontier and 
the Italian homeland, and gave Rome the military and economic advantages of 
controlling the Danube. Illyricum, although an underdeveloped and relatively poor 
area compared with, for example, Gaul or the Eastern provinces, provided soldiers 
for the legions, metals for Roman workshops such as gold, silver and iron, and gave 
the Empire a land link, from Italy to Macedonia.
3 Security of navigation in the 
eastern Adriatic waters was one of the first important strategic aims achieved by 
Roman Illyrian policy. This strengthened maritime links between North Italy and the 
continental hinterland with its rich eastern markets, and extended the so-called 
eastern maritime route all the way to the mouth of the Adriatic.
4
 
1. 2   Rome and Illyricum (a short story)
Illyricum
5 was named after the group of ethnically related peoples who lived 
on the Adriatic coast, south of the lake of Scodra.
6 Greeks came first into close or 
more frequent contact with the natives of Illyricum, but their conception of  Ἰλλυρίς 
differed from Roman Illyricum. It encompassed only the peoples who lived on the 
borders of Macedonia and Epirus. For a couple of centuries before and after the 
Roman conquest in the late first century BC, the concept of Illyricum expanded 
towards the west and north. Finally, it encompassed all native peoples from the 
Adriatic to the Danube, the later Roman provinces of Dalmatia, Pannonia and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
political unit, or system, and an understanding of Roman policy towards this area can be complete 
only if the whole system is considered, rather than its parts, see Chapter 1.2. 
3 Syme and Wilkes placed strong emphasis on the significance of the conquest for geo-strategic 
purposes such as the link between the Eastern and Western provinces; Syme (1934b); Wilkes (1965a) 
13-14; (1969) 46-47; (1996b) 547-548. On the other hand, Roddaz (1984) 484, is deeply suspicious of 
this idea while Gruen (1996) 172 sees the geo-strategic significance of the land-link between northern 
Italy and the Balkans-Danube area. 
4 Jurišić (2000) 47-51. Favourable natural characteristics enabled the eastern coast to continue its role 
as the main naval traffic corridor through the Adriatic, while the western, Italian, coast was used only 
for local navigation until the modern age; Kozličić (2000). See Škegro (1999) 211-223 for the 
synthesis of previous works on maritime links in the Eastern Adriatic. 
5 See Rendić-Miočević (1980) 15 n.3 for different spellings of the words Illyricum and Illyrii in the 
Latin sources. 
6 Pliny, HN 3.144; Pompon. 2.3.55 lllyrii proprie dicti; their possible location: Hammond (1966) 241; 
Alföldy (1965a) 49-50. Suić and Katičić question the existence of a separate people of Illyrii. For 
them Illyrii proprie dicti are peoples inhabiting the heartland of the Illyrian kingdom, the southern 
Adriatic coast between Epidaurus and Lissos; Katičić (1964a); (1965a); Suić (1976d); Pąjąkowski 
(1980) 91 ff. (between Lissos and Neretva). Therefore “Illyrii improprie dicti sind eben alle Stamme 
denen historisch oder aber auch nur werwaltungstechnich die gleiche Benennung zu kommt.”; Katičić 
(1964a) 95. Papazoglu (1989) 46-47 objected to locating Illyrii proprie dicti so far north and argued 
that they were located close to the Macedonian border in later-day Epirus. 
Most probably the form ‘Illyricum’ derived from regnum Illyricum analogous to Noricum from 
regnum Noricum; Šašel-Kos (2000) 284. Chapter 1: Introduction  3
Moesia, regardless of their ethnic and cultural differences.
7 The term Illyricum was 
applied indiscriminately, not only to the ethnic Illyrians like the Ardiaei, but also to 
the Celts who remained there after the fourth century BC migrations, and to the 
Venetian Liburni or the northern natives akin to Illyrians, known as the Pannonii.
8 
Accordingly, following this evolution and extension of what was called Illyricum, 
Rome developed an Illyrian policy, which extended its range from the south Adriatic 
coast and its immediate hinterland to the whole area between the Adriatic and the 
Danube. 
 
It is a historical curiosity that such a vast territory just across the sea from 
Italy remained almost untouched by Roman expansionism until the end of the first 
century BC. Geography is certainly one reason for the delayed conquest, as rough 
terrain discouraged the plans of any would-be conqueror to expand from the eastern 
Adriatic coast further into the continent. A long-term policy of conquest required 
primarily a change in the Roman attitude to strategic thinking, which developed after 
the so-called Roman Revolution reshaped the very essence of the res publica, placing 
the whole power of the Roman military machine into the hands of a single person. 
After that change, the conquest of areas inside the European continent depended on a 
carefully planned military campaign executed in several stages. It also returned 
Roman geo-strategical priorities to where they felt most comfortable – into 
continental settings – and brought to an end two centuries of the chronic uneasiness 
of sea-centered warfare. 
 
Regardless of the developing Roman concept of Illyricum as a separate geo-
political entity, the geographic proximity of northwest Illyricum to northern Italy, 
and southeast Illyricum to Epirus, Macedonia and Greece in the late Republic, often 
linked together their destinies, especially in the first stages of Roman Illyrian policy. 
The political patchwork of Illyricum was a very important factor in the formation of 
this policy. However, even in the more advanced political organizations that 
developed in Illyricum, such as the Illyrian kingdom, ethne was a dominant factor 
                                                           
7 Strabo, 7.5.1 (C 313) τὰ  Ἰλλυρικά; App. Ill. 1, 6; Pliny, NH 3.139 nunc totum uno nomine 
Illyricum vocatur generatim. 
8 App. Ill. 3; Suić (1955) 136-149; Alföldy (1965a) 33 ff.; Hammond (1966) 241; Wilkes (1969) 153 
ff.; Suić (1976d) etc. Cabanes (1988) 17-20 who considers Illyricum to be a geo-political concept that 
shrinks through time, is rightly criticized by Papazoglu (1989) 32-34. See Chapter 2.5 for the political 
and ethnic geography of Illyricum. Chapter 1: Introduction  4
and a key element of statehood,
9 as it had been in Gaul or Germany. Romans 
therefore dealt with individual polities and their political and ethnic interests, which 
made their Illyrian policy heterogeneous and sometimes difficult to follow and 
understand. 
 
Roman foreign policy touched the Illyrians for the first time in the 3
rd century 
BC in the south Adriatic where the Illyrian kingdom of the Ardiaei made piracy a 
kind of state enterprise.
10 This endemic Ardiaean piracy interrupted the Adriatic 
trade of Rome’s allies, and the Romans attempted to put it under control in the First 
and Second Illyrian war 229 and 219 BC. By the late 3
rd and early 2
nd century BC, 
Ardiaean kings collaborated with Rome, but the last king, Genthius, opted for 
Macedonia and it is no wonder that his kingdom shared the fate of Macedonia, 
conquered and divided into three formally independent parts by the “dictate of 
Scodra” in 167 BC.
11 Even so, after this event the Romans did not make any 
annexations, but controlled the area through their allies - the Greek-led Issaean 
commonwealth and friendly Illyrian peoples such as the Daorsi or Liburni. Through 
the 2
nd and 1
st centuries BC there were no continuous large-scale involvements of the 
Roman army in Illyricum, but the Romans did engage occasionally in several 
conflicts, especially with the warlike Delmatae in the central Adriatic hinterland.  
 
The Roman Republican attention was limited to the Adriatic coast and its 
immediate hinterland. Romans had no reason to risk large-scale military involvement 
in the dangerous terrain of the Dinaric Alps because military losses could easily 
outweigh any possible gains in booty and tribute. Another reason was the mutual 
rivalry between the families of the Republican oligarchy, and lack of cooperation 
between the governors of different provinces. This thesis will question the prevailing 
definition of Illyricum as an area which Republican generals used to earn their 
triumphs rather easily and where the Roman position gradually weakened (Chapter 
3.1). It will try to prove that, at this stage, Romans reacted only when their interests 
were threatened, or to ensure easy communications or to create essentially defensive 
buffer zones of friendly states in the north Adriatic basin. Although lacking abundant 
                                                           
9 Cabanes (1988), see below p. 48. 
10 See Chapter 1.6.1 for primary and 1.6.2 for secondary sources. Chapters 3 – 8 deal with these 
Roman – Illyrian interactions at greater length. 
11 “Aницијев скадарски диктат”; Garašanin (1974) 14-15. Chapter 1: Introduction  5
written and material sources, it is possible to recognize the origin of the elements of 
what was later to become a unified policy in Roman dealings with Illyricum. 
 
  When Caesar administered Illyricum (59 – 50 BC), and during his later civil 
wars with Pompey and the Pompeians, a coherent Roman Republican policy 
gradually broke down throughout the Mediterranean. The Roman position weakened 
in Illyricum, but it was as a consequence of Roman internal problems and changed 
circumstances in Illyricum after the Issaean commonwealth lost its political 
significance. However, as we will attempt to show in Chapters 4 and 5, Caesar’s 
administration and the civil wars of the 40s and 30s were the period when 
Republican policy was transformed and a different policy began to appear, followed 
by the establishment of a proto-provincial administrative structure in coastal 
Illyricum. Italian migration and the establishment of a basic administrative 
organization through the municipia and colonies was a key element of this changed 
policy, which aimed at the final incorporation of the eastern Adriatic coast into the 
Roman state.  Octavian’s expedition should be seen as the last stage in this 
transformation. He successfully pacified the dangerous Iapodes and Delmatae, and 
thus created the necessary environment for the establishment of Illyricum as a 
separate province under senatorial administration in 27 BC. 
 
The conquest of Illyricum has been celebrated by modern scholarship as one 
of the most solid and enduring achievements of Augustus,
12 and obviously his policy 
will be crucial in this research. The successor of Iulius Caesar made contact with the 
area three times in both of his political incarnations: directly through his expedition 
as Octavian in 35 – 33 BC; and through his legati in the Augustan Bellum 
Pannonicum of 13 – 9 BC; and the Pannonian rebellion, Bellum Batonianum in AD 6 
– 9. We can recognize two different phases of Illyrian policy in these early years of 
the Principate. Initially a senatorial province, Illyricum was limited to the Adriatic 
coast and there were no visible political or strategic attempts to expand Roman 
power further inland. However, from 16 BC a generally aggressive Roman policy 
developed in Europe, resulting in the conquest of the Alps, Germany as far as the 
river Elbe and also leading to the conquest of Illyricum as far as the Danube. The 
main element of Augustan Illyrian policy was to break with the Republican tradition 
                                                           
12 Syme (1971) 13-15; Wilkes (1965a) 8 ff. esp. 13; Gruen (1996) 178. Chapter 1: Introduction  6
of keeping control only over the Adriatic coast, and it resulted ultimately in the 
expansion of Roman power behind the Dinaric Alps into the Pannonian basin. 
However, before Illyricum was fully incorporated into the Empire, Rome was 
compelled to deal with a dangerous uprising of the Pannonii, known as the Bellum 
Batonianum, which lasted from AD 6 – 9.  
 
The aftermath of the Bellum Batonianum is quite poorly covered by the 
written sources, so it will be necessary in the eighth chapter to rely heavily on 
epigraphic and archaeological evidence in order to determine more accurately how 
the successors of Augustus pursued their Illyrian policy. In this period Illyricum was 
divided into provinces Pannonia and Dalmatia, and Illyrian policy was transformed 
from foreign into provincial policy. With the pacification of the area and the 
cessation of armed struggle with the native population, Roman policy put more 
emphasis on administrative matters and on using the new provinces for the economic 
benefit of the Empire. It seems that the evolution of the Illyrian policy was 
completed in the reign of the last Iulio-Claudians, Claudius and Nero, when 
Illyricum effectively ceased to be regarded as a temporary boundary and the Empire 
established a more permanent frontier on the Danube, which would last without 
much change until the fourth century AD. 
 
1. 3   Methodology 
The examination of Roman Illyrian policy requires a balanced and 
heterogeneous methodological approach. New methodological avenues must be 
explored, as the most important modern works on ancient Illyricum by G. Alföldy, J. 
Wilkes, A. Mócsy, J. Šašel, etc. were mostly written in the 1960s and 1970s. Since 
then some new approaches have appeared and prevailing scholarly opinion has found 
other foci. An especially significant methodological problem in previous scholarship 
appears to be exaggerating the influence of individual men on history. Some crucial 
periods of Roman Illyrian policy have been explained almost exclusively by the 
personal influence and activity of Roman heavyweights like Caesar or 
Octavian/Augustus.
13 There are other methodological traps waiting for the historian 
dealing with such limited sources, such as unconscious assumptions, 
oversimplifications and stereotypes (ancient and modern alike). In order to 
                                                           
13 E.g. the assumptions that Caesar created conventus in Illyricum and that Octavian directed his 
expedition 35-33 BC in Illyricum for purely personal reasons, see Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 1: Introduction  7
understand fully the Illyrian policy of Rome we should take into account as much as 
possible the political motives of both sides, the Romans and the peoples of Illyricum 
themselves.
14 Roman policy was not just shaped by the Romans, but was also 
influenced by changes in the situation in Illyricum, often by the actions of the 
locals.
15 The Romans were not always arrogant, greedy and bloodthirsty conquerors, 
and the locals were neither consistently innocent victims nor freedom fighters, as in 
some modern stereotypes, nor, to go to the other extreme, pirate and savages, as the 
ancients usually saw them.
16
 
An examination of Roman Illyrian policy needs a new approach; an 
understanding of ancient Realpolitik,
17 free of Roman propaganda, as well as an 
understanding of the political aims and aspirations of local peoples. In order to 
understand the situation in Illyricum better, it is necessary to change the way local 
proto-state formations are viewed. Previous scholarship has never made a clear 
distinction between the Iron Age cultures in Illyricum as determined by archaeology, 
and the political proto-institutions in Illyricum as they appear in classical sources.
18 
However, it seems more and more important to explain political matters in Illyricum 
by also taking into account the organization and activities of those native political 
proto-institutions,
19 or at least their basic shapes in so far as they can be salvaged 
from the obscurity of our sources.
20
                                                           
14 This thesis prefers the term ‘peoples of Illyricum’, rather than ‘Illyrians’, and so emphasizes the 
ethnic diversity that existed there before the Roman conquest, see Chapter 2.5.2. 
15 It seems appropriate to quote Momigliano (1960) 23 on this “To give a good account of the origins 
of a war one must know something about geography and about ethnography, one must have lived with 
the people of the other side.” Our sources never bothered with these issues too much and modern 
scholarship has recognised Roman Illyrian policy only through the acts and aims of Rome. Only 
recently, in the groundbreaking works of Slobodan Čače, is modern scholarship starting to take into 
account the political organization and political aspiration of local proto-state formations. See 
bibliography under Čače. 
16 Dell (1969) is useful on some ancient (and modern) stereotypes of Illyrian piracy, see below p. 18. 
Examples of modern stereotypes will be discussed throughout the thesis.   
17 In ancient times as today, state interests and political necessity, the raison d’état, makes the 
backbone of any foreign policy; Waltz (1979) 117. 
18 There is an emerging view amongst the social archaeologists that different archaeological cultures 
do not always reflect different ethnicity and vice versa; see the contributions of Graves-Brown and 
Jones, Hides, Díaz-Andreu, Jones and Bursche in Graves-Brown et al. (1996); Jones (1997) 106-127, 
esp. 119 ff; Hall (1997). 
19 Proto-state seems an appropriate definition of native social and political institutions in Illyricum in 
the 2
nd and 1
st century BC. Anthropological taxonomy such as band, chiefdom, tribe or state creates 
unnecessary confusion; Webb (1975). The native political institutions such as Illyrian kingdom either 
completed, or were very close to completing a process of forming state institutions in the time span of 
this thesis like the Liburni, Iapodes, Delmatae, possibly even Pannonii (see below p. 48). For the term 
‘tribe’ in an ethnic sense, see Chapter 2.5.2 n. 83. 
20 Papazoglu (1967) and especially Čače (1979). Chapter 1: Introduction  8
 
Chronic poverty of source material, a fact (“a continuing curse” as Moses 
Finley called it once),
21 which will be stressed many times in the thesis, requires us 
to take into account every possible piece of evidence, whether we decide to use it or 
to discard as historical rubbish. Lack of source material compels us to give cautious 
but resolute precedence to the slow ticking clock of the Braudelian histoire sociale 
over the eye-catching historical disturbances that emerge in the swift passage of the 
histoire  événementielle.
22 Unfortunately, our written sources were primarily 
concerned with military matters, so that any analysis of Illyrian policy depends 
heavily on our knowledge of Roman military operations in the area. The sources deal 
with appearance but not substance. They mention individual wars or campaigns, but 
not the reasons for them and their place in Roman policy. They assume war to be a 
natural and inevitable social phenomenon.
23 However, in determining what Illyrian 
policy was, we need to keep asking why things happened. We have to explore the 
changing interests of Rome, and the changing general circumstances in and around 
the geo-political system of Illyricum. For that reason this thesis will not be limited to 
military matters. 
 
The lack of literary sources, the lack of even a report of military operations, 
in some periods, such as the post-Augustan period, necessitates other approaches to 
the topic, whenever we have the opportunity. Some more modern methodological 
approaches must also be considered, as they cannot and sometimes should not be 
applied selectively. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apply some modern 
methodological approaches such as those of Millar and Campbell, i.e. to disregard 
secondary literature based on epigraphy and archaeology and rely on the primary 
written sources when those primary sources are so scattered and incomplete.
24 A look 
into other contemporary economic and social matters such as trade, coin minting, 
                                                           
21 Finley (1985b) 10. 
22 Braudel (1966) 16-17. ‘Social history’ is the history of decades and centuries, (also called the 
conjuncture; Braudel (1980) 29 ff.) placed by Braudel between the history of the events and la longue 
durée.  
23 Momigliano (1960) 13-27. 
Cf. Harris (1979) esp. 54-104; Finley (1985b) 70-87; Rosenstein (1999); Campbell (2002) 1-20 (just 
to mention some) who look into the significant reasons (mainly of an economic nature) behind the 
phenomenon and the origin of war in antiquity, and especially in the Roman Republic and the empire. 
24 Cf. the manifesto of this approach in Millar (1977) xii; Campbell (1984) viii. Campbell (2002) 6 n. 
33 and 158 n. 15 is a splendid example of primary sources used out of their context (Octavian did not 
conquer the whole of Illyricum in 33 BC, and Caesar did not have plans for Illyricum in 50 BC), see 
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mining and the early Roman colonization of the area, when available, will be as 
important as military matters in the determination of Roman policy in Illyricum. 
 
1. 4 . 1    The Illyrian policy of Rome in the context of 
world-system analysis: Policy as an interaction between 
systems
In order to understand such an obscure and complex matter as Illyrian policy 
a sensible theoretical approach is a necessity. This thesis will try to examine it from 
two points of view that have not been used previously in this context. Instead of 
considering the Roman interaction with individual polities in Illyricum, Illyrian 
policy will be seen as the interaction of two systems: firstly the social and political 
system that was Rome and its empire; and secondly the geo-political system that 
Romans saw and recognized as Illyricum. The interaction of Rome and Illyricum will 
therefore be seen as one of the many cultural interactions between the core (centre) 
and semi-periphery of the Mediterranean world, resulting in the gradual development 
of core areas in Illyricum, which in time created their own peripheries. 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein pioneered the view of world history as the history of a 
succession of large social units – world-systems – that finally integrated into the 
single world-system after AD 1500. The view applies the hierarchy of centre and 
periphery to the network of international economic and political relationships 
regarding territorial division of labour on areas of the core and the periphery and 
their mutual interaction as the exclusive factors of historical change. Various 
interpretations emphasized different aspects of Wallerstein’s work, but it is 
surprising that historians rarely turned their attention to his notion of historical 
systems. Wallerstein recognized a system - not individual states or polities - as the 
fundamental unit of historical analysis. The world-system can be defined as “… all 
of the economic, political, social and cultural relations”,
25 and interactions inside the 
system or between different systems recognized as an integration of different aspects 
of social interaction such as ecology/economy, power/politics and culture/ideology.
26 
According to Wallerstein, before the single world-system was established, there were 
three types of world-systems determined by a hierarchical division of labour and 
                                                           
25 Chase-Dunn/Grimes (1995) 389, elaborating original ideas of Wallerstein. There is small confusion 
in terminology as the term ‘World-system’ for some scholars does not always imply a system on the 
world scale, see Wallerstein (1993). 
26 Frank (1994). Chapter 1: Introduction  10
organized on political basis as redistributive ‘world-empires’ or on economic basis as 
the capitalist ‘world-economies’, as well as stateless, reciprocal ‘mini-systems’ 
isolated from the rest of the world.
27
 
The development of Wallerstein’s approach was always heavily influenced 
by the significance of economic relations as key factors within the system. However, 
his emphasis on the role of economy and the division of labour does not always give 
satisfactory results when too rigidly applied to the pre-capitalist world, and 
especially if it attempts to see the classical world as an integrated economic system 
where peripheries were exploited by the core.
28 Chase-Dunn and Hall have widened 
the world-system concept, acknowledging that the importance of different types of 
inter-societal interaction (cultural, political, trade, etc.) varies in different systems. 
They have introduced a so-called ‘nested networks’ theoretical model that returns 
economic factors back to equal footing with other types of interaction.
29  
 
As said before, centre – periphery antagonism and interaction is one of the 
pillars upon which Wallerstein’s thesis rests, but the whole concept is much older. It 
is originally a western spatial concept that divides space into a central dominating 
area and periphery that is subjected to the centre. The concept is very useful because 
it can be used in different contexts, especially suiting social, geographical and 
political, as well as cultural and economic contexts. This is particularly the case since 
the earlier intellectual emphasis on the significance of the centre gave way to 
research into the peripheries.
30
                                                           
27 Wallerstein (1974) esp. 3-18, 63 ff., 347 ff.; (1984) 148-156. 
28 Waltz (1978) 38 pointed out that international economic theory, such as Wallerstein’s, cannot be 
regarded at the same time as the theory of international politics; cf. also criticisms of Ragin/Chirot 
(1984); Millett (1990a) 36-40; Melko (1994); Dietler (1995) esp. 94-95. Wallerstein himself admits 
that the economy plays a secondary role to politics in the functioning of his pre-capitalistic world-
empires; Wallerstein (1974) 15; cf. Finley (1985a) 150-176; Woolf (1990) 47 ff. seeing the economy 
as a matter of secondary importance in the politics of the ancient world. Some scholars applied the 
somewhat rigidly economic aspects of Wallerstein to pre-modern societies Ekholm/Friedman (1982); 
Gills/Frank (1993a); (1993b). 
29 Chase-Dunn/Hall (1993) 858-860, present the Roman empire as a system based on interrelated but 
spatially dispersed networks of bulk goods, political/military interactions and prestige goods. This 
approach enabled Wallerstein’s theory, which initially excluded stateless societies (Wallerstein (1984) 
148-150), to include proto-state formations, such as those in pre-Roman Illyricum, in the world-
system framework. 
30 Strassoldo (1980). ‘Centrism’ in world-systems theory is strongly criticised by Dietler (1995) as 
biased by the Graeco-Roman and modern European colonial point of view. Unfortunately, there is no 
space here to argue with this interesting, but in some ways too exclusive opinion. Certainly, grafting 
Mediterranean culture onto indigenous cultures in Europe gave different initial results, but in the case Chapter 1: Introduction  11
 
World-systems theory has been modified in various ways to suit the 
circumstances of the pre-modern world, and also incorporated in theories that are 
concerned with establishing a centre-periphery model in ancient world.
31 In classical 
history and archaeology, the world-system theory and the concepts of core and 
periphery are becoming more familiar issues. Some works explore the functioning 
and interaction of the regional systems in Continental Europe, mainly in the sphere 
of exchange and trade between core and periphery, as well as analysing the process 
of the transformation of periphery into a new core which in turn creates new 
peripheries.
32 When dealing with the political aspects of world-system theory and the 
centre-periphery model, some scholars analyse the functioning of the Roman 
Republic and Empire as a political and economic macro-system composed of a 
centre and different layers surrounding it.
33
 
1. 4. 2   The Illyrian policy of Rome in the context 
of world-system analysis: Working hypothesis 
This thesis assumes that the ancient Mediterranean world in the period under 
discussion, existed as a complex multi-societal system (macro-system) on all levels 
of social interaction (Figure 1.1). In its geo-political aspect, the Mediterranean 
functioned as a network of regional systems, as Braudel pointed out: “The plural 
always outweighs the singular. There are ten, twenty or a hundred Mediterraneans, 
each one subdivided in turn”.
34 Regional systems are in many ways artificial because 
they are human-made and human-perceived, so the nature and the extent of those 
regional systems changes throughout the history. As stated above, two levels of the 
interaction will be discussed - political interaction and cultural interaction.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
of Illyricum, the indigeneous cultures were ultimately incorporated in the significant degree into the 
Roman cultural system, see below p. 173. 
31 Rowlands et al. (1987); Champion (1989a);  Chase-Dunn/Hall (1991); Frank/Gills (1993). See 
Rowlands (1987); Champion (1989b) 2-4 on the development and other aspects of the centre-
periphery model. 
32 E.g. Hingley (1982); Haselgrove (1987); Nash (1987); Hedeager (1987); Cunliffe (1988); Bloemers 
(1988). 
33 Hopkins (1980) (with the interesting suggestion that resources eventually flew from center towards 
periphery in imperial times); Garnsey/Saller (1987) 95-97; Nash (1987); Woolf (1990) 48-50. 
34 Braudel (2001) 23. Horden/Purcell (2000) carry this subdivision even further, seeing the 
Mediterranean as unit composed out of micro-regions connected by the sea. 
World-system theory scholars have difficulties in dealing with the ‘sub-unit problem’, i.e. the way to 
divide world-systems into their structural components, Chase-Dunn/Hall (1991) 15-18. However, this 
does not seem to be a problem in the classical world. The Roman empire had a visible cellular Chapter 1: Introduction  12
 
Firstly, on a political level regional systems are composed of different entities 
or units. In time, some of these smaller units became powerful enough to dominate 
their region and even impose their hegemony outside their regional system, and even 
to become Wallerstein’s ‘world-empies’.
35 Some units can belong to two or more 
systems and can shift from one system to another, or even create a system of their 
own. Secondly, this thesis also assumes that some parts of the Mediterranean macro-
system can be defined as core and some as periphery according to their degree of 
inclusion in the broad cultural values that characterize the macro-system, like 
urbanization, political system, mode of production, ideology/religion.
36 It will see 
core and periphery as broad cultural categories, rather than defining them solely in 
terms of military power, economy or trade. Regional systems are not necessarily 
unified, and their individual units can be included in different degrees in the broad 
cultural values. Therefore, this study will examine Roman Illyrian policy in the light 
of two different but overlapping inter-societal networks that existed in the 
Mediterranean macro-system one based on broad cultural values with a developed 
hierarchy of core and periphery; and the other a geo-political network of power. 
 
The argument here is that Roman policy-makers recognized and sometimes 
even created the existence of regional political systems and dealt with them in two 
overlapping ways.
37 They formed a general, broad political approach towards the 
area, but also were compelled to interact with the political units inside the system in 
order to adjust and fine tune a generally planned regional policy (Figure 1.3, Chapter 
2.2). In order to examine the interaction between geo-political systems it is important 
to determine the state of the systems in interaction. A geo-political system may be 
either in stable  /  working (minor wars, unchanged or slightly changed political 
situation in any given period) or unstable / transitional state (major wars, changed 
political situation, political and economic instability). Instability occurs for internal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
structure; Woolf (1990) 48. Those cells or regional systems also represented self-integrated economies 
after becoming part of the Roman imperial world; cf. Woolf, (1992). 
35 Gills and Frank see historical change through hegemonic transitions inside a world system and 
assert the view that hegemony is a pattern of world history; Gills (1993); Gills/Frank (1993a). 
36 Woolf (1990) 54-55 points out the significant categories of world-symbols and symbolic power as 
elements of cultural integration. 
37 Roman perception of regional systems was in many ways affected by their own ‘conceptual 
geography’, such as, for example, Cisalpina; Purcell (1990), or Gaul; Timpe (1965) 209-211; 
Goudineau (1996) 467; Woolf (1998) 48-54 (Gaul an artificial spatial concept made by Roman power Chapter 1: Introduction  13
and/or external reasons and lasts until a new stability is found by means of a new 
political framework imposed internally or externally. 
 
Rome – Illyricum is a clear example of a ‘world-empire’ – a regional system 
relationship in a geo-political aspect,
38 and core – periphery, or rather a semi-
periphery,
39 in a cultural aspect. Thesis argues that Rome, as one of Wallerstein’s 
archetypal ‘world-empires’, influences the regional systems by imposing a political, 
and in more advanced stages of expansion, a constitutional framework on the 
regional system in order to suit its own interests. The imposition of a political 
framework can be achieved through aggressive (major wars of conquest) or passive 
(diplomatic) means, like creating a network of clients/allies, minor wars and the 
pacification of hostile neighbours. However, this is not a one-sided relationship, as 
units inside the regional system react to changes in the political/constitutional 
framework and may also influence the stability of the whole regional system. The 
specific geographical setting, in which the Mediterranean macro-system existed, with 
the sea as its central structural axis, visibly affected all policy-making in the ancient 
world. The geo-strategic emphasis of Roman interests is also part of the relationship 
and it can be recognized as maritime (interest in the coastal belt and the immediate 
hinterland) and continental. 
 
Illyricum was a heterogeneous system, consisting of different ethnic and 
proto-state social groups. Thus, Rome was compelled to deal with many different 
small political and ethnic units inside Illyricum in various ways in order to make 
lasting political frameworks favourable to its interests. This element of the policy we 
can define as an ethnic policy. Certainly, there were other factors such as dealing 
with the individuals and native elites, but inadequate evidence prevents a more 
sophisticated elaboration of that aspect of ethnic policy. It does not seem that Roman 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Roman subjective perception of geography). For the Roman conceptual perception of Illyricum, 
see above pp. 2-3. 
38 Wallerstein’s original approach is that ‘world-empire’ swallows smaller systems in periods of 
expansion and creates them in periods of contractions; Wallerstein (1987) 317-318. 
39 Wallerstein (1974) 63, 67-129, 349-376; Chase-Dunn/Hall (1993) 865-866; Wilkinson (1993) 229-
233 corresponding with the ‘third zone’ defined by Nash (1987) 88-89, 97-100. See criticism of the 
semi-periphery concept by Woolf (1990) 48. Chapter 1: Introduction  14








FIGURE 1.1 The Mediterranean world as a network of 
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40 See Sherwin-White (1957) 44-45; Drinkwater (1983) 93-94; Wightman (1985) 55-56; Woolf (1998) 
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1. 5  The stages in the Roman-Illyrian relationship (the 
development of a political/constitutional framework) 
This thesis will try to follow and to explain the development of changes of 
Rome’s relationship with Illyricum between 167 BC and AD 68. The choice of these 
starting and finishing points is determined by their significance, because these years 
were decisive in the relationship. 167 BC has special significance because that year 
marked the end of complex native pre-Roman state institutions
41 in Illyricum such as 
the Ardiaean (Illyrian)
42 or Histrian kingdoms, and enabled the Romans to develop a 
consistent and unified Illyrian policy. AD 68 is arbitrarily picked because the end of 
the Iulio-Claudian dynasty coincides with the development of Danubian limes and 
the end of Illyrian policy as such (Chapter 8). 
 
 
                                                           
41 “unità politica”; Bandelli (1983) 174; “stare tvorevine”; Čače (1991) 56 n.4. 
42 It depends whether one supports the argument of Hammond (1966) or Papazoglu (1965), see 
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The evolution of Roman relations with Illyricum can be divided into 
chronological phases. Marin Zaninović spoke of four basic phases in the Roman 
penetration in Dalmatia. They are appropriate to Pannonia in the first three periods,  
i.e. they can be applied to the whole region of Illyricum in the time span we have 
chosen: 
 
1.  The rise and fall of the Illyrian (and Histrian) kingdom (229 – 167 BC) 
2.  The conquest and formation of the province of Illyricum (158 – 33 BC)   
3.  The period from the rebellion to the final departure of the legions (AD 6 – 90) 




J. Wilkes did not define phases in Roman Dalmatian (Illyrian) policy specifically, 
but from the organization of chapters in his Dalmatia we can recognize the following 
chronological phases: 
 
1. As  above 
2.  The late Republican era (167 – 59 BC) 
3.  Caesar and the Civil War (59 – 39 BC) 
4.  Augustus and Illyricum (35 BC – AD 9) 
5.  The Iulio-Claudians in Illyricum (AD 10 – 68).
44
 
While Zaninović’s division is a rather rough overview, Wilkes makes a more 
sophisticated division taking into account (but not defining) the development of the 
political/constitutional framework imposed by Rome. We propose some additions 
and corrections to the division of Wilkes, and for convenience organize chapters 
according to this amended division. The reason for the division will be to emphasize 
the evolution of the political and constitutional position of Illyricum in relation to 
Rome, and throughout the thesis we will try to see how the change of the framework 
affected the regional system. Certainly, this division (and use of abstract terms such 
                                                           
43 Zaninović (1976b) 169-170. Suić (1976d) 185 and ff. divided the phases of Roman policy into the 
old (acquisto vecchio), new (acquisto nuovo) and newest (acquisto novissimo) corresponding with 
‘proper’ Illyricum (i.e. the most southern part of Illyrian kingdom), Illyricum after 168 BC and the 
Great Illyricum of Appian and Pliny (=our fifth phase). The greatest weakness of his division is the 
assumption that the Romans immediately acquired land and established the administration of the 
province after the division of the Illyrian kingdom, see Chapter 3.2. 
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as ‘Coastal’ or ‘Lesser’ Illyricum) should be handled with care, as every division of 
history into historical periods is an essentially artificial invention of the modern 
historian. Historical transitions nearly always take a long time and clear divisions in 
history are rare. This new scheme, therefore, is as follows: 
 
1. As  above 
2.  The late Republican or Bifocal period (167 – 60 BC) 
3.  The period of the proto-province (Coastal Illyricum) (59 – 33 BC) 
3a.   The establishment and strengthening of coastal Illyricum (59 – 44 BC) 
3b.  The pacification of the interior (44 – 33 BC) 
4.  Illyricum as a senatorial province (Lesser Illyricum) (33 – 11 BC) 
5.  The imperial province (Greater Illyricum) (11 BC – c. AD 10) 
6.  The two Illyricums (c. AD 10 – 68).
45
 
The initial or first period is easy to recognize, and it is part of a wider 
Macedonian and North Italian policy, concerned partly with the Illyrian and the 
Histrian kingdoms and the elimination of piracy in the Adriatic but without 
permanent military commitment across the Adriatic.
46 167 BC witnessed the end of 
the Ardiaean kingdom, which used to be a focal point throughout the initial stages of 
Roman policy. After that event, Roman Illyrian policy is then characterized by a 
bifocal approach, focusing its attention on the south and north Adriatic as separate 
zones of operations, but still avoiding permanent military commitment and the 
administrative organization of the province. The proconsulship of Caesar is taken as 
the start of the transition, and it is marked by the formation and defence of a unified 
zone of operations or as a proto-province on the Adriatic coast and the pacification 
of its immediate hinterland. In this period, the encouragement of Italian migration 
and the formation of colonies and municipia on the eastern Adriatic coast shows a 
change of attitude and the increased strategic need to include Illyricum into the 
Roman world. The success of Octavian’s expedition in 35 – 33 BC finally enabled 
                                                           
45 It is uncertain when the division of Illyricum actually took place, see Chapter 8.2. 
46 The first phase of Roman Illyrian policy dealt only with isolated parts of Illyricum such as the 
Illyrian and Histrian kingdoms, which existed in totally different geo-political contexts, so it is 
doubtful whether we can describe it as a phase in Illyrian policy. For that reason (as well as for lack of 
space) it is not discussed at greater length here, see Chapter 3.2. 
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the establishment of an administrative, senatorial province of Illyricum, limited to the 
coastal belt and the immediate hinterland. 
 
A general change of policy and an aggressive expansion into Europe in the 
last 10 years of the 1
st century BC increased the military and political domination of 
Rome all the way to the Drava and the Danube. The Bellum Pannonicum brought 
about the formation of the imperial province Illyricum (or ‘Greater’ Illyricum as it is 
called above), in 11 BC in order to more easily coordinate military operations in the 
middle Danube region. ‘Greater’ Illyricum, encompassing the lands from the 
Adriatic to the Danube, proved difficult to administer as a single province, and after 
a series of strategic errors, an uprising in AD 6 – 9 marked the final failure of the 
policy and resulted in the division of ‘Greater’ Illyricum into two parts, the future 
provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia. This phase finishes roughly with the reigns of 
Claudius and Nero. AD 68 is an approximate date but it seems to be the period when 
the transformation of Pannonia into a permanent imperial frontier province was 
completed, and Dalmatia was fully incorporated into the administrative system of the 
empire; it became part of its inner core. More time was required for the start of 
Romanization. The term ‘Illyrian policy’ starts to lose its original meaning, and is 
replaced with a Danubian frontier policy to the north and a provincial policy applied 
in Dalmatia and Pannonia. 
 
1. 6  Themes and approaches: Illyricum in Roman 
historiography 
The history of Illyricum remains a comparatively neglected area in the 
modern study of Roman history. There are some valid reasons for that, as the scarcity 
of ancient sources often reduces the interest of modern scholars. Ancient historians, 
geographers, philosophers and poets were never really interested in this rough and 
isolated country on the fringes of the Hellenic and Roman world. In fact, from the 
start, Illyricum provided an example of barbarian ‘otherness’ in Hellenic intellectual 
thought. Illyricum was contrasted with Hellenic civilization, as the barbarian 
negative of Greece.
47 Romans maintained the same attitude, giving only secondary 
attention to the conquest of Illyricum when compared with the achievement made by 
                                                           
47 Wallace (1998) 213-216 and ff. Still, the situation was not always so black and white. Hellenized 
Illyrians from the fringes of Hellenic world (Ἰλλυρίς) were regarded by the Greeks as half-barbarian 
but a still relevant part of an international community; Rendić-Miočević (1981) 11 ff. 
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their conquest of Gaul or Germany. Nothing substantially changed throughout 
Imperial times. The words of Cassius Dio still convey to the modern reader a note of 
contempt mixed with the horror and desperation felt by an intellectual from the 
classical era placed in these remote and barbarian parts of the world by the hands of 
cruel Fortune.
48 Modern scholarship is still pretty much uninterested in this field, 
(with the exception of J. J. Wilkes’ or G. Alföldy’s magna opera), despite significant 
archaeological developments in the last 60 years. In vain R. Syme complained three 
decades ago that his work in this field failed to attract either praise or censure, or 
even a bare mention. Illyricum and its ancient inhabitants are today still represented 
by little more than brief footnotes in general works of ancient history.
49
 
Is it worth examining the Illyrian policy of Rome, and should we consider 
Illyrian policy as something separate from, say, the larger Balkan or Central 
European policy of Rome? Modern scholarship is skeptical about any notion of an 
Illyrian policy, and regards it as at best chaotic and inconsistent.
50 In general, there is 
still an uncomfortable divide in modern scholarship between the centralist, Tacitean 
style of imperial history of the core and the highly localized history of the provinces 
at the periphery. This is how A. Mócsy recognized this problem in 1974: 
 
“ A daunting gap separates the study of central Roman imperial 
history from local, often highly developed archaeological research. 
This gap may be bridged only by the use of a method which 




Research on Illyrian policy may be a case study for understanding the wider context 
of Roman expansion in central and northern Europe in the early principate. 
 
                                                           
48 Dio, 49.36.2-4. See Salmon (1988) for the Roman attitude towards the peoples of Illyricum. Still 
Vell. Pat. 2.110.5, gives a much more optimistic view of Pannonian culture in his period (see 
Mócsy’s, perhaps too harsh criticism, of this statement; Mócsy (1983)). 
49 Syme (1971) 24; Wilkes (1992) 4. A large corpus of Albanian and ex-Yugoslav scholarship remains 
unavailable (although things have got better in recent decades) and is generally unknown to the world 
community of scholars, except through the works of G. Alföldy, J. Wilkes, or N. G. L. Hammond. 
50 E.g. Wilkes (1969) 27-28, 36. 
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The nature of Roman Illyrian policy divides scholars. The major problem 
seems to be in their different assessments of the economic significance of Illyricum 
for Rome. Some scholars, particularly scholars from the former Yugoslav area, see it 
as an act of continuing Roman aggression and the expression of Roman imperialism, 
which was looking for additional tribute, new markets for Italian traders and rich 
sources of iron ore.
52 The other view of Roman Illyrian policy sees it as primarily 
dictated by the strategic interests of Rome. Major argument for this view is at odds 
with the previous one, which holds that Illyricum had no attraction for Romans on 
account of its minor economic significance, and that economic factors played a 
secondary role in the policy.
53 These conflicting views on the basic purpose of 
Illyrian policy can be placed in the wider context of scholarly debate between ‘the 
expansionists’ and the defenders of the hegemonistic view of Roman Republican and 
early imperial foreign policy and strategy, which is discussed in Chapter 2.3. 
 
Certainly, it is not possible to explore Illyrian policy in isolation from the 
policies regarding other provinces, especially when taking into account the 
inadequate sources. For this reason Chapter 2 will deal with Roman foreign policy in 
general, especially the changes that occurred from the Late Republic to the Early 
Principate. An important question is whether there was any Illyrian policy in the 2
nd – 
1
st century BC, and if there was, what are the reasons for any change in the early 
Principate. Romans often based their foreign policy on day-to-day changes in the 
situation rather than following some previously determined policy. Still, one would 
be mistaken to argue that Roman foreign policy was a chaotic chain of unconnected 
events. Naturally, these changes of policy did not exist isolated from the 
contemporary socio-political disturbances or from the fundamental change in the 
Roman political system and society that inaugurated the Principate. They were part 
of the general process of social transformation: the disappearance of the oligarchic 
Republic and the gradual establishment of an autocratic regime. 
 
                                                           
52 E.g. Bojanovski (1988) 36-54, but generally the same opinion is sometimes expressed for the 
Republican policy; cf. Harris (1979) 54-104. Pašalić (1975) 21-26 sees Roman Illyrian policy through 
the eyes of Marxist theory, defining the ancient economy primarily as a slave-owning economic and 
social system. We should not forget Polybius’ remark that the crossing of the Adriatic was the start of 
Roman imperialism; Polyb. 2.2.1-3. 
53 Zippel (1877) 4; Gabričević (1988/89) discussing the causes of the First Illyrian war. Chapter 1: Introduction  21
 Roman foreign policy was not so Rome-centered as it might seem at first 
sight. Indeed, foreign (and provincial) policy was made in Rome by the Senate and 
later by the Princeps, but it was also modified on the spot by local governors and 
commanders, when slow communications pressed local governors to make urgent 
decisions without waiting for advice from Rome.
54  However, this thesis will try to 
show that the Roman conquest of Illyricum was not a matter undertaken only for the 
ultimate protection of Northern Italy or as a strategic necessity for Roman expansion 
or a mere sideshow to the conquest of Germany and the middle Danube.
55 The 
conquest and annexation of this region was independently influenced by unique 
imperialistic motives, such as the acquisition of rich metal deposits,
56 manpower and 
tribute-paying subjects, and it was also influenced by regional geo-strategic 
requirements that had to take into account the heterogeneous ethnic character of the 
area. 
 
1. 7. 1   Literature review: primary sources
What are the primary sources available to the modern scholar attempting to 
do research into the Rome’s Illyrian policy? Key sources are the 2
nd and 3
rd century 
AD Greek historians, Appian of Alexandria and Cassius Dio, as well as the Italian 
Velleius Paterculus, who was not only a contemporary of many of the events, but 
also an eyewitness to the Pannonian rebellion in AD 6 – 9. 
 
The Illyrike of Appian is the only surviving specialized monograph that deals 
with the history of Illyricum focusing on Rome’s wars with the peoples of Illyricum. 
It begins with the first Illyrian war in 229 BC and concludes with Octavian’s 
expedition in 35 – 33 BC.
57 That the Illyricum topic was not attractive to classical 
historians such as Appian himself bears witness, who admitted to having a problem 
in locating material for his Illyrike.
58 Appian supplied many essential details about 
early Roman encounters with Illyricum in the 3
rd and 2
nd century BC, so that he is 
                                                           
54 Foreign policy in the Republic: Badian (1958a); (1968); Harris (1979); Sherwin-White (1984) 1-17; 
Eckstein (1987); in the principate: Millar (1983); Mattern (1999) 1-23; transition from the Republic to 
the Principate: Millar (1984a); Raaflaub/Tober (1990); imperial provincial policy and administration: 
Millar (1977) 375-455; Bowman (1996); Hanson (1997), see below pp. 30 ff. 
55 Syme (1971) first recognised and fully acknowledged the importance of this conquest for the 
Roman state. 
56 See Mitchell (1983) 95-97. 
57 Unfortunately, it has not attracted significant attention from modern scholars. Key works are Dobiáš 
(1930) and Marasco (1993). 
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(together with Polybius and Livy) a major source for the history of Illyricum. Appian 
preferred a geographical and ethnological rather than a chronological approach, and 
he has been criticized by modern scholars for his limitations, unevenness and 
omissions, especially for the period between the mid-second century BC and the 
campaigns of Augustus.
59 In the part of the book dealing with the campaign of 
Octavian, he relied exclusively on the now lost autobiography of Augustus who was 
an eyewitness, but an eyewitness who had no personal or political interest in 
publishing objective history. The first princeps was apparently interested in clearing 
his name from accusations of cruelty and treachery during the Civil War. In the 
passages of the Autobiography concerned with his expedition in Illyricum, he 
described only his own deeds, and left unmentioned the efforts of others.
60 Appian 
was not particularly critical in his assessment of Roman Republican foreign policy, 
and he describes every Roman interaction with Illyricum as bellum iustum, 
regardless of the real causes and motives for these wars.
61  
 
The other important source is the Roman history of Cassius Dio.
62 His work 
covers not only the campaigns of Octavian but the Danubian campaigns of Crassus in 
29 – 28 BC and the Illyrian rebellion, all of which are treated in some detail, while 
the Bellum Pannonicum is mentioned sporadically only in the context of the general 
history of the Empire. Dio had the advantage of knowing the area, being governor 
there in the early third century AD.
63 However, he is not always aware that he often 
applies the terminology of his own age to the first century BC/AD.
64 It is unclear 
which sources Dio actually used for his accounts of the reign of Augustus, including 
the conquest of Illyricum.
65 For Octavian’s campaigns (books 49 – 50) his account is 
generally not so far from that of Appian who follows Augustus. However, some 
details are obviously different from that of Appian, which suggests the possibility 
                                                           
59 Wilkes (1969) 34 n.2; Marasco (1993) 485. As Marasco pointed out, Appian was accustomed to 
dealing with large unitary Hellenistic kingdoms, so that he was confused by the political patchwork of 
Illyrian peoples. 
60 App. Ill. 15; on Augustus’ autobiography; Charlesworth (1934) 868; Yavetz (1984) 1-8; Mellar 
(1999) 177-179. 
61 Marasco (1993) 487-489, arguing that Appian’s writing was influenced by the foreign policy of his 
age, which dealt with the defence of empire and did not understand expansion, see Chapter 2.2-3 and 
especially Chapter 3. 
62 See general works of Millar (1964); Harrington (1970); Šašel-Kos (1986) (an extremely important 
examination of Dio’s treatment of Illyricum). 
63 Legatus Augusti in Dalmatia, 49.36.4; and Pannonia Superior 80.1.3.  
64 Dio, 49.37.6; Syme (1971) 131-132; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 191-192 (Dio calls Segestica Siscia, while 
Appian, who is not so well acquainted with the area keeps the old name).  
65 See Millar (1964) 83 ff.; Harrington (1970) 16 ff. Chapter 1: Introduction  23
that Dio was using some other source(s).
66 His sources for the Bellum Pannonicum 
and the Pannonian rebellion are impossible to determine as yet, but it appears that he  
had a good source on the Pannonian revolt, which resulted in a rather full treatment 
of the events.
67 Dio rarely goes into details, but he can give a general idea of the 
order of the events, especially in regard to the rebellion in AD 6-9, and of course he 
is a useful check on other sources. Modern scholars have criticized Dio as too 
general, annalistic and dry, and often making obvious geographical errors.
68
 
An important source is the eyewitness account of Velleius Paterculus, who 
was Tiberius’ legatus Augusti in Illyricum during the great rebellion of AD 6 – 9. In 
his history he is dealing with the rebellion only, and he promises to deliver a more 
detailed account of native peoples in Illyricum later,
69 but that work is unfortunately 
either lost or, more probably, was never done. Velleius is often the only source for 
certain events, so that it is necessary to take his account into consideration. 
Unfortunately, the historical credibility of his work is often seriously undermined by 
his amateur approach, his lack of objectivity and a lack of recognition of matters of 
historical importance.
70 Still, despite the generally negative attitude of modern 
scholarship towards him, it is possible to see positive qualities in Veleius’ work, 




 Important additional sources are Pliny the Elder and the geographer Strabo. 
Pliny preserved a description of the Roman administrative organization of the 
Dalmatian province from the late 1
st century BC, or 1
st century AD. He uses at least 
three different sources for his description of the administrative provincial 
organization of Dalmatia. The oldest is the late Republican administrative structure 
described by M. Terentius Varro (the antiquarian), the formula provinciae and the 
inventory of three judiciary conventus,  possibly compiled after the division of 
                                                           
66 Reinhold (1988) 17-19, 68; Šašel-Kos (1986) 142-144; Gruen (1996) 172. Šašel-Kos (1986) 120 
suggests Cremutius Cordus and remains of Asinius Pollio’s history as the sources in question. 
67 Millar (1964) 91. 
68 Reinhold/Swan (1990) 171-173. 
69 Vell. Pat. 2.111.4 (legate); 2.106.2-3 (promised work on Pannonians and Dalmatians). 
70 Harrington (1971) 18-21. 
71 Woodman (1977); Craus/Woodman (1997) 82-84. Chapter 1: Introduction  24
Illyricum (Chapter 8.2), and finally the list of conquered Illyrian peoples as given in 
Augustus’ autobiography.
72 Besides these, Pliny used the description of the coast  
from the unidentified periplus from the second century BC, possibly the very same 
one used by Strabo.
73
 
 Strabo of Amasia provides useful geographical information about Illyricum 
from his own era (1
st century BC and AD).
74 Strabo’s sources for Dalmatia are much 
more complex and chronologically more multi-layered than Pliny’s. He uses Greek 
sources from the 2
nd century BC, such as Polybius, Posidonius and an unidentified 
periplus from at least 100 BC, very possibly by Arthemidorus, but it is also possible 
that he combined a couple of different periploi in his description of the eastern 
Adriatic coast. He also relied on much earlier material such as that of Theopompus. 
In Strabo’s account it is possible to recognize works of his contemporaries, such as 
Augustus’ autobiography, or sources as recent as the Pannonian rebellion.
75
 
There are also some useful although sometimes confusing bits and pieces in 
the epitomes of Livy covering the period to 9 BC, as well as Suetonius’ Lives of 
Caesar, Augustus and Tiberius. Polybius is the chief source for the first phase of 
Illyrian policy. In this thesis, his report on the first Roman war with the Delmatae 
will be very important. Caesar mentions Illyricum a few times in the Gallic and Civil 
Wars, giving a good report on the fighting in the civil war in Illyricum. There are 
also works of compilers from the later period, such as Florus, Rufus Festus, 
Eutropius and Orosius, who mainly draw on the other sources, without adding much 
new knowledge. Unfortunately, many of the mid- and later Republican period 
sources for Illyrian history are based on the epitomes and fragments and it is 
necessary to exercise the utmost caution when dealing with them.
76 Some important 
works are lost. Asinius Pollio’s history would be very valuable in providing another 
view of the civil wars, as he wrote a history focusing on the period between 60 BC 
                                                           
72 Pliny, HN 3.122-152; Čače (2001); Alföldy (1961) 60-61; (1965a) 36-37, 70-71 for the sources of 
Pliny. See the critical view of Pliny’s terminology in Vittinghoff (1977) 24-30. 
73 Čače (2001) argues that Pliny also used a pre-Augustan and still unidentified periplus dated after 
the end of the Civil war. 
74 Strabo, 7.5. See Marković (1985); Baladié (1989) 113-127; Kozličić (1990a) 221 ff.; Dzino (2007) 
for general comments on Strabo, 7.5 and Čače (1994/95); Šašel-Kos (2002a) for the regional aspects 
of Strabo’s account of Illyricum. 
75 See Baladié (1989) 13-41 for Strabo’s sources for his book 7. 
76 Brunt (1980) is a marvellous piece of work which emphasises all the dangers of using epitomes and 
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and (opinions differ) either the battle of Philippi or possibly Actium.
77 The history of 
Posidonius continued where Polybius stopped and it would have provided useful 
insights into the obscure second century BC. It is very possible that Posidonius wrote 
about the expedition of Metellus Delmaticus in 118 BC.
78 Amongst the lost works 
that discussed Illyricum, Strabo’s history should be included as well as Augustus’ 
autobiography. 
 
In addition to written sources numismatics, epigraphy and the results of 
archaeological excavations can supply further information. To remedy the lack of 
material throughout most of the period (especially in the Adriatic hinterland), 
numismatics is not so informative here as it can be in some other parts of the 
classical world. The shortage of coins and coin hoards in itself can suggest some 
conclusions. Still, on some particular topics numismatics provides significant help 
such as in reconstructing the political map of southern Illyricum after the division of 
the Illyrian kingdom in 167 BC. Furthermore, individual coin finds and the 
distribution of coin hoards give some helpful hints about Italian and Greek trade and 
trade routes with Pannonia, and economic relations between Greek cities in the 
Adriatic and Italy and the Adriatic hinterland. 
 
The epigraphic evidence from the Republican period is very slight and gives 
no real insight into Roman relations with Illyricum.
79 The frequency and importance 
of inscriptions increases after Augustus. Except for some places in the Res Gestae of 
Augustus and a couple of military inscriptions there is really nothing significant from 
the Augustan era that can be used to determine Roman policy. However, for the 
reigns of Augustus’ successors, the inscriptions and other finds of archaeology are 
often the only way for the historian to understand the establishment of military 
strongholds, a network of military roads and early Roman colonization of the 
interior. Prosopography, both native and foreign names (Italians and others who 
settled in Illyricum) is one of the most significant tools for any study of social history 
in Illyricum.
80 An important source of information for provincial administration in 
                                                           
77 André (1949) 47-51; Badian (1958b) 161-162; Morgan (2000) 54 n. 18 – Philippi; Gabba (1956) 
242-243, 248-249 and Pelling (1979) 84 n. 73 – Actium. See André (1949) 41-66 on the History of 
Asinius Pollio. 
78 Kidd (1988) 318-320 (F 70). 
79 The inscription from Salona is a rare exception, see Chapter 4.2. 
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Dalmatia is the inscriptions dealing with boundary settlements between different 
native communities.
81 Part of volume III of the CIL, thanks to the work of Th. 
Mommsen, covers the inscriptions from Illyricum, and there are important local 
collections of inscriptions from the territories of the former Yugoslavia and Hungary. 
Moreover, a large amount of recent work has been done in this field, which improves 
our basic knowledge of the population and economy of Roman Illyricum.
82
 
Archaeology is almost the only tool for research into the different native Iron-
Age cultural groups. It helps us to understand their geography and cultural 
characteristics before they became part of the Mediterranean world.
83 The most 
important for this topic will be the archaeological excavations of urban centers on the 
Dalmatian coast and Roman military camps in Illyricum and their early development, 
as well as some economic matters such as patterns of trade in the region. Changes in 
archaeological theory and interpretation, such as the development of the ‘new 
archaeology’ have not often been applied to the study of ancient Illyricum, and even 




1. 7. 2   Literature review: modern works
The thesis will deal with two not so different areas of historiography: Illyrian 
studies, and the study of Roman foreign and provincial policy in the late Republic 
and early Principate. Because of the scarcity of written classical sources, Illyrian 
studies from their humble beginnings have heavily depended on archaeology. Local 
antiquarians, Austrian enthusiasts and other Western travelers who wandered in these 
troublesome and remote areas in the 19
th century were the first to carry out Illyrian 
studies. Serious archaeological, historical and philological work only really began 
after 1945. These led to important results, especially regarding the material and 
spiritual culture of the Illyrians, as well as their language(s), onomastics and 
ethnogenesis. Greek and Roman sites were excavated, especially cities and military 
                                                           
81 Wilkes (1969) 456-459. 
82 Wilkes (1977) 744-760; (1996b) n.1 (overview of the epigraphic evidence). 
83 Benac (1987a) is a good synthesis on this topic. Cf. also Benac (1964a); (1975); Čović (1976). New 
archaeology is still in its infancy in modern-day Illyricum, but more and more significant works have 
appeared in the previous decade such as: Chapman et al. (1996). 
84 “New” archaeology: Binford/Binford (1968); Renfrew/Bahn (1991) 405-434. There are pioneering 
works using the ‘new archaeology’ approach in Dalmatia; Čače (1982); Chapman et al. (1996); 
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sites, and important work was done on the Roman economy, road building, 
epigraphy, cults and provincial art as well.
85 Civil war in the former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s slowed the process but in spite of that, important new excavations in 
Dalmatia have been done, enabling more reliable evidence for the more thorough 
reconstruction of the economy and society of Roman Dalmatia and its regions.
86
 
Because modern Roman historiography outside the former Yugoslavia and 
Albania has never really considered Illyricum as an important area, there are not 
many works that go beyond the basic reconstruction of events from the ancient 
sources. It is difficult, however, to find any area of Roman history which was not 
treated in the work of Theodore Mommsen, who dedicated some space to Illyricum 
in his Roman history. Mommsen was in fact the first scholar to understand that the 
policy of Augustus in the Balkan Peninsula, the Danube and Germany had some 
degree of basic geo-strategic unity.
87 Scholars in the late 19
th and early 20
th century 
followed in Mommsen’s footsteps trying to reconstruct the order of events and 
geography of the Roman conquest of Illyricum.
88 R. Syme did important work in 
determining and assessing the scope and purpose of Octavian’s/Augustus’ conquest 
of Illyricum. He apparently won a tough debate with scholars who overestimated the 
scope of Octavian’s campaigns during 35 – 33 BC and the territorial extent of his 
conquest.
89 More recently, his work was expanded and developed by J. J. Wilkes, 
whose works could be regarded without exaggeration as the essential comprehensive 
modern study of Dalmatian and Illyrian history and culture, with contributions to the 
field of the Roman army and epigraphy in Dalmatia.
90 G. Alföldy did comprehensive 
work on the population of Pannonia and Dalmatia, and he had a significant influence 
upon Wilkes.
91 The historiography of Pannonia was improved in the mid-20
th century 
                                                           
85 Wilkes (1992) 3-13; Stipčević (1989) 7-14 give excellent overviews of the historical development 
of Illyrian studies up to the early 1990s. There have been some comprehensive publishing projects in 
the former Yugoslavia such as Benac (1987a) or Čović (1988), covering prehistoric and proto-historic 
archaeology in Illyricum, and its parts. 
86 Chapman et al. (1996). 
87 Mommsen (1882) 7-8 and ff. 
88 Zippel (1877) is the first significant, and still influential, comprehensive work on the history of 
Illyricum and the Roman conquest. Cf.
  bibliography of Charlesworth (1934) 903-904, and Syme 
(1934b) 938-940 for an overview of older literature on Illyricum. This thesis will mainly rely on the 
more recent literature, but some older works such as Zippel (1877); Kromayer (1899); Veith (1914), 
or the opus of Syme, Vulić and Patsch are sometimes impossible to avoid. 
89 Syme (1933a) (the review of Swoboda (1932)); Schmitthenner (1958), contra: Swoboda (1932); 
Vulić (1934); Miltner (1937); Josifović (1956). Cf. Schmitthenner (1958) n.1 for full overview of the 
polemic. 
90 Wilkes (1969); (1992); see also bibliography under Wilkes. 
91 Alföldy (1965a) as the most significant work, see also bibliography under Alföldy, G.. Chapter 1: Introduction  28
due primarily to the fundamental works of the Hungarian scholars G. Alföldy and A. 
Mócsy, and more recently E., Tóth, J. Fitz and T. Nagy. There is also a large corpus 
of work by former Yugoslav scholars who have painstakingly assembled many 
pieces of the Pannonian and Dalmatian archaeological and historical puzzle.
92
 
There are many specialized studies in this field. Roman relations with 
Illyricum after the third Illyrian war up to Caesar’s pro-consulship did not attract 
much attention until recent times, because of the inadequate sources.
93 Caesar’s 
command in Illyricum and the civil war fighting in Illyricum have attracted more 
significant attention from modern scholars (mostly because of Caesar).
94 A 
significant body of work exists especially on Octavian’s expedition in 35 – 33 BC, 
mostly written before 1960.
95 The Pannonian war of 13 – 9 BC was neglected by 
modern historiography because of incomplete and very inadequate primary sources,
96 
but the Pannonian rebellion, Bellum Batonianum, in AD 6 – 9 at least attracted some 
attention because of its significance in slowing down aggressive Roman expansion in 
Central Europe. But no significant discussion has been written in the last decades.
97 
The Iulio-Claudian period after Augustus is one of the least understood in the history 
of Illyricum. Archaeology has helped to reconstruct the position of military camps 
and the placement of legions in this period as well as the building of military roads 
linking the Adriatic coast with the legions on the Danube.
98 Nevertheless, the lack of 
literary sources really limits the scope of any intensive research into the general and 
                                                           
92 Alföldy (1936); Mócsy (1962); (1974); Lengyel/Radan (1980). See also comprehensive 
bibliography in Čović (1988). 
The post World War II generation of Croatian and Slovenian scholars (D. Rendić-Miočević, M. Suić, 
M. Zaninović, J. Šašel, P. Petru, etc.) was succeeded by S. Čače, B. Kirigin, M. Šašel-Kos, P. Kos. 
Unfortunately there are yet no internationally significant successors to the work of M. and D. 
Garašanin and F. Papazoglu in Serbia & Montenegro (some developments in archaeology appear, 
Zotović (2002)) nor any continuation of the talented generation of archaeologists (A. Benac, I. 
Bojanovski, B. Čović, Z. Marić) grouped around the Centre for Balkanological Studies in Sarajevo 
before the civil wars in the 1990s. 
93 Skefich (1967) 1-41; Morgan (1971); (1973); (1974); Čače (1991). 
94 Skefich (1967) 42 ff.; Čače (1993); Freber (1993) 121 ff.; Marasco (1997); Šašel-Kos (2000); Bilić-
Dujmušić (2000). 
95 Kromayer (1898); Dobiáš (1921); Swoboda (1932); Vulić (1907); (1926) 39-54; (1934); Josifović 
(1956); Schmitthenner (1958); Mirković (1968); Malevany (1977); Šašel-Kos (1997b). Very recently 
the PhD thesis of S. Bilić-Dujmušić dealing with the Octavian’s campaigns was accepted at the 
University of Zadar so we should expect new publications on the topic.  
96 Wilkes (1965b); Gruen (1996) 174-175. 
97 Vulić (1911) 200-247; (1926) 55-72; Rau (1925); Pašalić (1956); Köstermann (1953); Dyson 
(1971) 250-253. 
98 Mócsy (1974) 40-79 (Pannonia and Upper Moesia); Wilkes (1969) 78-152, 442-480; (1996b) 553 
ff.; (Dalmatia); Bojanovski (1974) (the roads in Dalmatia); Jagenteufel (1958) (the governors of 
Dalmatia); Dobó (1968) (the governors of Pannonia). 
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particular elements of Illyrian policy in this period. A more comprehensive 
exploration of the economy, urbanization and population of Roman Illyricum was 
not attempted by modern scholars until the 1950s and 1960s. It is proceeding despite 
all obstacles.
99
                                                           
99 Wilkes (1977); Kurilić (1994/95); (1999) (Population of Roman Dalmatia and Liburnia); Pašalić 
(1967); Šašel (1974c); Zaninović (1977); Škegro (1991); (1999) (economy of Roman Dalmatia); Suić 
(1976b) (cities and urbanization on eastern Adriatic cost); Pašalić (1954); Dušanić (1977); Bojanovski 
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2.  Illyricum in Roman foreign policy: historical outline, 
theoretical approaches and geography 
 
 
“La géographie à ce jeu, cesse d’être un but 
en soi pour devenir un moyen. Elle aide à 
retrouver les plus lentes des réalités 
structurales, à organiser une mise en 
perspective selon la ligne de fuite de la plus 
longue durée” 
Braudel (1966) 21 
 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
Roman - Illyrian political interaction could not exist in isolation from the rest 
of the ancient world, so before examining Illyrian policy in itself, it is necessary to 
outline the different historical, political and geographical contexts in which it existed. 
This chapter will outline both systems and their surroundings and discuss existing 
modern views on the nature of Roman Republican and Imperial policy and its 
dealing with frontiers, as well as attempting to determine those instruments. The 
position of Illyricum in the political geography of the 2
nd century BC Mediterranean 
world will be briefly touched upon, and an outline of Republican interaction with the 
other regional geo-political systems in order to recognize the peculiarities and 
commonplaces of Illyrian policy. Also, this chapter will briefly recount the ethnic 
and political geography of Illyricum, its peoples and their political organization as it 
was in the 2
nd century BC. The purpose of this chapter is to provide sufficient (in the 
given circumstances) insight into the ‘rules of the game’ and introduce the main units 
that constituted Roman-Illyrian interaction. 
 
2. 2  Roman foreign policy: Who made it, how and why 
was it made, and where did it stop?
It may be asked: was there any Roman policy at all? Roman strategy and 
policy-making has come under renewed scrutiny recently, focusing on whether the 
Romans could develop consistent policy and engage in strategic thinking, or if their Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  31
imperialism was piecemeal, uncoordinated and reactive.
1 Certainly, Roman policy-
making should not be seen through the eyes of modern foreign policy advisers, or 
research centres for regional or global politics. Neither can we claim to understand 
their decision-making mechanisms, as too many pieces are missing from the picture 
(except on rare occasions) such as the records of Senate debates or private letters that 
would help reveal the views of individuals and debates amongst the people involved 
in the decision-making process.
2 However, it would be a major error to disregard 
completely the existence of a broader Roman foreign and provincial policy, in either 
the Republic or Principate. If policy is the ability of the rulers to use all political tools 
and resources in the best interests of their state and in to preserve that state,
3 then 
Roman foreign policy undoubtedly existed. The economic, political and private 
interests of Roman rulers, and of those who had influence over them and sought 
eventual benefits, such as new resources or the security of the res publica, drove 
policy and, on occasions, transformed it. 
 
The ways in which Romans implemented their foreign policy during the 
Republic are well known, yet some important questions still remain unanswered by 
modern scholarship. Especially unclear remains the attempt to define and explain 
fully the driving forces that were behind the policy, and to assess the ability of the 
Romans to plan and implement a cohesive foreign policy. It would be difficult to 
maintain the view that the Romans were fully conscious of the consequences of their 
policy-planning, at least to the extent suggested by Harris,
4 but it is also impossible 
to believe that the Roman Senate put up with chaotic day-to-day mood-swings in 
their foreign dealings, or that commanders in the field had complete freedom of 
                                                           
1 Mann (1979); Whittaker (1994) esp. 62-70; Isaac (1992) 2-6; Campbell (2002) 16-21 criticizing the 
fundamentals of Luttwak (1976), concentrating their criticism on imperial frontier policy. See the 
strong criticism of Whittaker and Isaac by Wheeler (1993a) and (1993b) and basic support for the 
thesis of Luttwak in Ferrill (1991), and the overview of the debate in Whittaker (1996) where he still 
opposes the idea of the ‘Grand Strategy’ but admits that the Romans were capable of limited strategic 
planning esp. 28-31, 38-39. 
There is nothing to disagree with that revised opinion that the Romans were able to develop 
elementary strategic thinking and regional policy-making as it would be impossible to acquire and 
manage a Mediterranean empire without those abilities. This thesis will show that Romans used a 
combination of both: general strategy and a peripheral, piecemeal approach in their interactions with 
Illyricum. 
2 Finley (1978) 2-3 suggesting a ‘behavioural’ approach to research into ancient politics, consisting of 
examining the action-consequence-subsequent action pattern of the events, as the decision-making 
process remains obscure. 
3 Kennedy (1991b) 5. Modern political theory regards foreign policy as a realm of anarchy that 
compels individual polities to use all available resources in order to survive; Waltz (1978) 102 ff. 
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action. It is also difficult to accept that either the individual pursuit of glory or 
commercial interests alone could be decisive factors in driving the common policy of 
the Senate.
5 Scholarship must be content with a broad explanation that a complex 
mixture of influences, factors and interests drove the policy.
6 When this thesis begins 
(168 – c. 70 BC) the Roman Senate had an almost unquestioned control over matters 
of state, including foreign policy. Internal division and civil struggle in Rome 
intensified after the Gracchi but rarely affected the consensus of the elite in Roman 
foreign policy.
7 This is how Sherwin-White summarizes the essence of Roman 
foreign decision-making in the 2
nd century BC: 
 
“The foreign policy of the Roman state in the century before 
the Social War was regularly determined by the Roman Senate 
within the limits that the Republican system imposed… Hence it is 
legitimate to speak of senatorial policy, not in the sense that there 
was a uniform body of opinion within the Senate, but that 
senatorial decrees about foreign policy represent the view of the 




The Republican political system was beginning to collapse in the late 2
nd 
century BC and, regardless of the Sullan reforms, it was doomed to evolve into 
something different. Great military commands for Pompey and Caesar in the 60s and 
50s BC, and subsequent decades of civil unrest, affected the very nature of the 
Roman political system. Possibly not the best but certainly the most efficient solution 
to the crisis was, apparently, the Principate. Collective decision-making was 
                                                           
5 We certainly should not forget influential groups in the Senate, who for their own interests, pursued 
continuity in Roman politics towards particular areas, (cf. Bandelli (1981) 17 ff.), but only as one of 
the factors determining the policy. 
6 Cobban (1935) 42 ff (old-fashioned but still sharp in this respect) “… factors of slight import in 
themselves, but decisive in their cumulative effect…” 
7 There was a struggle of factions, but not a struggle of views on foreign policy; Finley (1978) 5; 
Sherwin-White (1984) 14-15. 
8 Sherwin-White (1984) 2-15, quotations from 2 and 14, see also Dyson (1985) 277-278. It is possible 
to argue the extent of Senate policy making, but not to question it generally. 
Richardson (1986) 119-180; Eckstein (1987); Lintott (1993) 44-45, 53-54 make a strong point in 
favour of the important role of local commanders, but that does not diminish the general importance 
of policies created by the Senate. Bloemers (1988); Willems (1989) 37 go one step further, seeing 
Roman expansion as peripheral imperialism not controlled by the core and caused entirely by factors 
in the periphery that gave a dominant role to generals in the field. Millar (1984c) 3-6; Gabba (1984a) 
point to the role of the populus Romanus in creating foreign policy and support for the expansionism – 
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abolished in favor of individual power-holding. Politics moved from the Forum to 
behind the closed doors of the imperial palace.
9 The basic feature of the policy-
making in the Principate could be recognized in its increased emphasis on the person 
of the emperor. The princeps and his inner circle of family, friends and advisers 




The apparent reluctance of Roman policy-makers to expand their territory in 
the second century BC, after the elimination of all the other significant political 
powers in the Mediterranean, has triggered fierce debates amongst scholars.
11 A good 
deal of modern scholarship has been concerned to define the nature of Roman 
Republican foreign policy as either one of two theoretical frameworks depicted as 
‘defensive’ or ‘aggressive’ imperialism. Proponents of ‘aggressive imperialism’ 
argue that force of tradition, individual prestige and thirst for military glory drove the 
Roman nobility into aggressive wars. Other important driving forces behind this 
model of ‘aggressive imperialism’ are said to be the economic interest of the ruling 
class, rising trade opportunities and the need to exploit new provinces, as well as the 
Roman perception of threat, whether it was real or not.
12 On the other hand, 
proponents of ‘defensive imperialism’, argue that the Roman Republican elite was 
generally opposed to expansion. Any expansion, in this view, was undertaken mainly 
for security reasons and in defence of Roman interests.
13 Diplomatic control of 
conquered states was preferred to direct territorial annexation. Fear of the 
consequences of Roman expansion, such as financial burdens, inadequate 
administrative machinery or the increased influence of an successful imperator, as 
well as the lack of potential recruits for the legions before the military reform of C. 
                                                           
9 Dio, 53.19. 
10 Millar (1982). Cf. also Millar (1977) giving important insight into the role of the emperor. 
11 The debate is so famous that itself attracts scholarly attention. See the overviews in Frézouls (1983); 
Linderski (1984); Hermon (1989). 
12 Harris (1979) 54-104; Brunt (1978); Rich (1993) 63-64 (the perception of threat); Shatzman (1975) 
53-67, 167-176; Pašalić (1975) 25-26. See Richardson (1986) 1-10, 172-180; Hermon (1989) 415-416 
and Rich (1993) supplementing and upgrading the one-sided approach of Harris into a more 
heterogeneous view of Roman republican policy. 
Badian (1968) 16-21 puts strong arguments against economic imperialism in general, Millar (1984b) 
15-18; Gruen (1984a); Finley (1985a) 153 ff. arguing that trade opportunities were not driving Roman 
imperialism, and Gabričević (1988/89) plausibly argues that economic factors were not the causes of 
the 1
st Illyrian war. 
13 E.g. Cic. Prov. Cons. 13, 32 Semper illas (the Gauls) nostri imperatores refutandas potius bello 
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Marius, led to a ‘defensive imperialism’.
14 The change towards more aggressive 
expansionism is, in this view, visible only after Sulla. Individual generals rather than 
a group now determined foreign policy.  
 
This split in modern opinion reflects the dual nature of Roman Republican 
political practice. On one hand, there is the traditional military nature of imperium 
and the assignment of a provincia as a military command; and on the other is a need 
for proper administration and exploitation of the vast territories left under unchecked 
Roman domination.
15 The debate is also influenced by Polybius’ ambiguous view of 
the Roman politics of his age. He represents the Roman eastern expansion as a 
preconceived plan of conquest, while recognizing that there was virgin territory 
available for new conquests. However, there is no agreement about whether Polybius 
applied Greek political theory to Roman political practice, and thus misrepresented 
the real political situation, or whether he gave an accurate view of the Romans and 
their political aims at that time.
16
 
Augustan foreign policy is not free of this controversy either, although the 
context is essentially different. It too has attracted a lot of scholarly debate as to 
whether its essence was defensive or expansionist. The old-fashioned supporters of a 
defensive policy argue that Augustus’ expansion in the Alpine area, the Balkans and 
Germany was actually just a search for stable and easily defensible northern borders 
of the empire, borders which were ultimately found on the banks of great rivers: the 
Danube and the Rhine. According to this view, Augustus practiced ‘defensive 
imperialism’ making pre-emptive conquests of Illyricum and Germany in order to 
create a huge buffer zone between the imperial frontiers and the Italian heartland of 
the empire. On the other hand, the ‘expansionists’ argue that Augustus had in mind 
nothing less than world domination, or at least the extension of Roman rule to the 
shores of Ocean. This policy was in practice abandoned only after the defeat of 
                                                           
14 Stevenson (1951) 437-452; Badian (1968) 29-43; Sherwin-White (1980); (1984) 9-10, elaborating 
old views of Mommsen. Roman Republican expansion was hegemonic rather than territorial; Luttwak 
(1976) 49.  See Brunt (1987) 71 ff., for lack of potential recruits in the Italian population.  
This point of view is still able to survive criticism, due to the inadequacy of alternative explanations 
for Roman reluctance to exploit areas conquered in the first half of 2
nd century BC; Sherwin-White 
(1980) 178-179; North (1981) 2-3. 
15 Hermon (1983) 178-179 sees the problem in the ambiguity of the terms imperium and provincia and 
their different relationship through different stages of their historical development. 
16 Wallbank (1963); Harris (1979) 107-117; Derow (1979); North (1981) 5-6; Richardson (1979b). 
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Varus in the Teutoburg Forest and the exhausting pacification of the Pannonian 




Roman foreign policy was closely connected with the Roman understanding 
of borders. In general in Republican foreign policy the borders were undefined. 
While borders in the eastern part of the Empire followed the old borders of 
conquered kingdoms and states, in the West they tended to be in a fluid state, 
especially the frontiers bordering barbarian gentes. Different treaties with Rome 
bound different peoples and it was impossible to draw a line between the domain of 
the res publica and the lands of barbarians who did not originate in the classical 
world. The expansion of Roman direct control very often depended on gradual 
military pacification (but not necessarily occupation) of troublesome neighbouring 
peoples who were, to varying degrees, culturally and economically incorporated into 
the classical world, even before the actual Roman conquest.
18
 
After the fall of the Republic, the treatment of the imperial frontiers changed 
radically, although the change of attitude began earlier, and possibly, it was an 
inevitable and unavoidable process.
19 In Republican times the Roman border was 
defined vaguely through the power of the Roman sword, while the Empire saw the 
development of a more precisely defined limes separating the Empire from the 
outside world.
20 It was foreign to Roman political thinking of the 3
rd and 2
nd century 
BC to distinguish a provincia as a strictly defined administrative area separate from a 
military zone of operations. In that context the nature of the Republican provincia 
changed from being a military command limited to some territory, to an organized 
                                                           
17 The proponents of ‘defensive expansionism’: Syme (1934b) 351-354; Adcock (1934) 596-602; 
Alföldy (1952b). 
The ‘expansionists’: Wells (1972) 1-13; Lintott (1981); Moynihan (1985); Brunt (1990) 433 ff.; 
Nicolet (1991) 15-56; Whittaker (1994) 33 ff.; Mattern (1999) 89. 
The ‘flexible middle approach’ between aggressive and defensive expansionism of the early 
principate: Roddaz (1984) 479-484; Gruen (1996) 194-197. 
18 Haselgrove (1984) 17-48 (Britain); Nash (1978) (Central Gaul); Haselgrove (1987) (Central and 
Belgic Gaul). 
19 Willems (1983) 105-107; (1989) 33-35 regards hegemonic control (which he calls ‘imperialism’) 
and direct occupation (he describes as ‘colonialism’) as temporary phenomena in the case of an 
expanding empire, which inevitably lead to the integration of individual regions into the empire. 
20 Cic. Pis. 16, 38 as contrasted with RG 30.1, or Tac. Agric. 41.2. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  36
provincial administration of the Principate, especially after Augustus.
21 The 
Augustan Principate also carried out a massive program of expanding Roman 
political influence especially in Central Europe, affecting in every way the 
ambiguous position in which Illyricum stood in the Late Republic.  
 
2. 3 The  instruments  of  Roman foreign policy
The essence of Roman foreign policy in the late Republic and early 
Principate remains controversial for the modern observer, held in the balance 
between political theory and practice, propaganda and historical reality. The 
complexity of its real nature is concealed by means of the repetition of ancient 
catchwords, and sometimes over-simplified modern explanations. On the other hand, 
the instruments of Roman foreign policy are always simple to see and recognize. If 
we oversimplify them, we can talk in terms of sticks and carrots. The brute force of 
the Roman legions, the opening of doors for political integration into the Res publica 
and the desire for wider social integration into a globalized society of the classical 
Mediterranean world were powerful instruments of Roman policy. 
 
We can divide the instruments of Roman policy into two equally important 
groups: the instruments of integration and the instruments of power.
22 The 
instruments of power, and we primarily think here of the Roman armed forces, 
neutralised dangerous and warlike opponents and ultimately acquired new provinces 
for the state and secured them.
23 The instruments of integration are much more 
heterogeneous. They enabled Rome to keep areas under control without committing 
occupation forces to the area, helped newly conquered territories to become integral 
parts of the empire; they then became catalysts for the integration of the 
neighbouring peoples going further from the Mediterranean core.
24 It is true that the 
instruments of integration worked slowly and sometimes were deliberately slowed 
                                                           
21 Ebel (1976) 42-43; Richardson (1986) 1-10, 174-180; (1994) 564 ff.; Lintott (1993) 22-27; Kallet-
Marx (1995) 18 ff. Augustan principate: Syme (1934a) 123 (running way ahead of his contemporaries 
in his usual manner). 
22  Debellare superbos,  parcere subiectis and win over the ambitious with Roman citizenship; 
Wallbank (1972) 163. 
Luttwak (1976) 195-200 distinguishes between the force and the power defining them as a force and 
the threat of force, the dynamic and the passive aspect, mutually opposite. We understand the 
instruments of power as both of these, essentially military, aspects. 
23 Whittaker (1997) 144-148 defines a city as the instrument of power. Without discussing this matter 
in depth, this thesis understands Roman cultural imperialism to be the instrument of integration. 
24 Haselgrove (1984) 16-17; (1987) presenting Gaul as an important example of how peripheries were 
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down if, as occasionally happened, they diminished the economic gains of Rome and 
Italy. In the long run, however, they inevitably produced results and strengthened the 
cohesion of the Empire.
25
 
A strong and efficient army was an important pillar of the Res publica and an 
even more important political instrument of Roman foreign policy. It started as a 
citizen militia but in time was transformed into the most formidable military machine 
of antiquity.
26 Whether the Romans applied any long-term strategy to military affairs 
of the Empire is a matter of dispute and author is not trying to engage in the 
discussion.
27 However in Illyricum, as we will see, it appears that there was some 
limited strategic planning on a regional level. The conquest of Illyricum was not 
possible before the Augustan period, which witnessed the rise of the “new purpose 
army” and its capability for complex military operations in continental Europe.
28 
One of the most significant reasons for the delayed conquest of Illyricum was the 
nature of the terrain, which gave too many advantages to the defending army and 
required too many casualties from the attacking army. Unfortunately, nothing is 
known about Illyrian armies; guerrilla warfare and primitive military strategy too 
often and are too easily assumed.
29 The description of say, Delmataean or Pannonian 
tactics suggests that they were capable of fighting Romans in open battle, conducting 




                                                           
25 Miles (1990) 638-645 points that the assimilation of local elites and provincial communities 
prevented their alienation and the development of potentially threatening ethnic divisions in the 
empire, unlike European colonial policy in the 19
th and 20
th century. See also Brunt (1974a). 
For example Alföldy (1965b) describing the provincial policy of Tiberius as deliberatively obstructive 
towards the expansion of Roman citizenship in the provinces for the purpose of economically 
benefiting Italy, or Carandini (1989) who argues that expansion of the Empire in the long run 
destroyed the wine industry in Italy. 
26 These are just some of the numerous works on the Roman army and its social role in the period we 
are concerned with: Brunt (1987); Raaflaub (1980); Keppie (1984b); Patterson (1993); Peddie (1994); 
Goldsworthy (1996). 
27 For the controversy about the thesis of Luttwak, see Chapter 2.1 n. 1. 
28 Cf. Syme (1933c) for the making of and Wilkes (1965a) for the use of the “new purpose army” of 
Augustan principate, see Chapter 6.3. 
29 Malevanyi (1963) 160; Köstermann (1953) 353 ff. A closer examination of Illyrian military strategy 
would require much more space than we have here. It is difficult to say whether amongst the peoples 
of Illyricum there existed a specific and differentiated warrior-class, and, if it existed, what was its 
extent. See Wilkes (1992) 235-236. 
30 Frontin. Str. 2.1.15 (the Pannonii fighting in open battle); for the offensive capabilities of the 
Delmataean alliance, see Chapter 4.4; Pannonian cavalry, Vell. Pat. 2.110.3. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  38
The fine art of diplomacy was an important and complex instrument of 
Roman foreign policy, especially in Republican times and it was a necessary 
supplement to both the elements of force and the elements of integration.
31 The 
diplomatic manoeuvres of the Romans are difficult to discern in Illyricum. Except for 
the communities of Adriatic Greeks whose diplomatic activities are reasonably well 
attested,
32 we do not have evidence for diplomatic conduct with the natives. Some of 
them certainly were sent on embassies to Rome, or to the magistrate in charge such 
as the Daorsi in 156 BC or the Liburni in 50 BC. The Ardiaei were more 
sophisticated in diplomatic matters, trying to postpone or even prevent Roman 
intervention in 135 BC. The Delmatae developed their skills after the diplomatic 
‘blunder’ of 156 BC, so that when they sued for peace from Caesar in 44 BC, they 
employed a much more diplomatic tone (the individual examples are discussed 
throughout this thesis). 
 
Policy was also to a large extent executed through political friends and allies 
of the Romans: independent communities (free cities or peoples) and so-called client-
kings took care of local security and upheld Roman interests in regional systems, and 
were slowly incorporated into the Roman state. Parts of the Hellenized Illyrian 
kingdom and Greek settlements in the southeast Adriatic were included in this 
complex net of relationships with Rome, concluding different kinds of treaties with 
Rome in the period of initial Roman trans-Adriatic expansion (229 – 168 BC).
33 The 
nature of their relationship with each other is still not completely clear. One school of 
thought accepts that the client-patron relationship, developed in early Roman history 
as a relation between individuals, was in some aspects carried over into the conduct 
of Roman foreign policy in Republican times. According to this view, Rome 
regarded her friends – amici, and allies – socii, essentially as clients of the state. The 
client-patron relationship between senatorial families and the provincial elites was 
considered to be an essential part of this system.
34 However, this view has been 
recently challenged as being essentially a metaphor on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence. Instead it is suggested that the Roman state did not regard foreign states, 
                                                           
31 Gruen (1984b) 13-95 gives a comprehensive overview of Republican instruments of diplomacy. 
32 Polyb. 2.11.5-12; 2.12.2-3; CIG II 1837b; Hammond/Wallbank (1988) 602, 607-608; Sherk (1969) 
139-142 (no. 24). 
33 Hammond/Wallbank (1988) 602-610 (App. 5) no. 1, 16. 
34 Badian (1958a); Rich (1989); Lica (2000) 25 ff. See Luttwak (1976) 20-40 for the role of client-
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and especially kings, as clientela in any formal or systematic way.
35 After c. 150 BC 
there is no sign of an equal relationship with the majority of foreign states in the 
Mediterranean world and Rome was established as the only relevant political power. 
As a result of this transformation, Roman law dealing with foreigners and its 
relationships with externae gentes, such as the inhabitants of Illyricum, changed and 
became simplified. In essence almost all previous allies and friends of Rome became 
subordinate to the will of the Republic, retaining only nominal independence.
36
 
The granting of Roman citizenship and the municipalization of the provincial 
communities were essential for the successful integration of other communities into 
the imperial system. It might have been deliberate policy or even the result of a 
whole cultural revolution happening in the whole empire; in any way it certainly 
needed to be accepted by natives, and especially native elites in order to function 
properly.
37 In the period under discussion, enfranchisement and colonization 
concentrated mainly on the coastal areas of Illyricum, which were for much longer 
exposed to the cultural influences of Graeco-Roman civilization, and thus more 
ready to be integrated into the global Mediterranean cultural system (Chapter 6.2). 
The colonization of the interior, especially the plains of Pannonia, started in the last 
phase of Roman Illyrian policy, during the reign of Augustus’ successors, but we do 
not know from the evidence of any more significant enfranchisement of the natives 
in the interior before Flavian times (Chapter 8.3). 
 
2. 4  The place of Illyricum in the Mediterranean 
political landscape
The geographical position of Illyricum lay conspicuously between two major 
parts of the Mediterranean: the Hellenistic East and the barbaric West. Long ago 
Badian recognized and defined the two different faces of the Republican approach to 
                                                           
35 Sherwin-White (1973) 187-188; Lintott (1981) 61-63; (1993) 32-40; Braund (1984) 23-24, 29-30 
n.1; Burton (2003). 
36 Badian (1958a) 113-114; Sherwin-White (1973) 182-189; Lica (2000) 25-34; Matthaei (1907). See 
also Timpe (1972) for legal forms of Roman foreign policy in Caesar’s time. Whether allies and 
friends became clients or not is questionable, but no doubt a large number of them were placed in a de 
facto subordinate position. 
37 Millett (1990b) 65-101, summarized 99-101; also the (1990a) sees Romanization as a process 
happening without deliberate Roman action. It was possibly even a kind of a cultural revolution 
happening in the 1
st century AD in the whole empire; Wallace-Hadrill (1989b); Nicolet (1991); 
Woolf, (1995); (1998) 60-76, 240-249. On the other hand, Hanson (1997) recently returns to the idea 
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foreign policy, which arose from this somewhat simplistic geographical division.
38 
The eastern approach towards the Hellenistic world and North Africa appears to be 
based on some general principles. It was hegemonic, indirect rule, based on informal 
treaties with allies, vulnerable to the constant threat of Roman military action, yet 
without a permanent garrison of Roman occupation troops. Direct annexation was 
deliberately avoided.
39 On the other hand, it is not really possible to speak of unified 
common principles in the western policy of the later Republic. The approach towards 
regional systems such as Spain, Gaul, North Italy and bordering areas, was much 
more heterogeneous than the high level diplomacy used in the East. Sometimes the 
Republic was willing to impose direct rule in the west through brutal and thorough 
elimination of resistance. On other occasions it left large pacified areas untouched 
and ruled it through friends and allies, even when these areas were strategically 
crucial, like Transalpine Gaul.
40 At first sight it is easy to recognize that policy was 
primarily shaped by imperialism and individual triumph-hunting.
41 Yet, closer and 
more thorough investigation reveals a general stability in the Republican west, no 
migratory pressure from outside after the Celtic settlement on the fringes of North 
Italy, and no pressure for colonization from within Italy. Therefore there were no 
pressing reasons for Romans to extend their influence much outside the familiar 
Mediterranean zone.
42 Basically, Romans did not care too much about the externae 
gentes if they were not a threat to their interests.
43 As Dyson noted: 
“Most changes in the western frontiers were either a 
Roman response to alterations in inherited arrangements or the 
logical extension of an initially modest commitment.” 
44  
 
Roman policy makers treated the Illyrian kingdom and Macedonia as 
essentially one large geo-political unit (Chapter 3.2). The first time a Roman 
                                                           
38 Badian (1952) 125 ff. esp. 139-140; (1968) 4 ff.; Richardson (1986) 179-180. 
39 Cf. Sherwin-White (1984) 58-70; Lintott (1981) 61-63 for Roman Eastern allies and friends. Badian 
(1958a) 15-140, esp. 45-47 on the southeastern Illyricum. 
40 It is not possible any more to see annexation as the dominant method of republican imperialism, in 
either the West or the East; Richardson (1986) 178-180; Ebel (1976) 41-95; Dyson (1985) 
summarized 270-281. 
41 Badian (1968) 4 ff.; Harris (1979) 131-162. 
42 Dyson (1985) 270 ff. The influence of the Celtic settlement for mid- and late Republic North-Italian 
policy; Šašel (1976) 74-76; Twyman (1992). The Cimbri and Teutoni were isolated exceptions to the 
rule. 
43 However, despite all the prejudice, Roman attitudes towards externae gentes was never so exclusive 
and isolationist as Greek attitudes, especially as the Empire expanded; Saddington (1969); Wallbank 
(1972) 156-159. 
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magistrate was entrusted with imperium for Illyricum was when the Illyrian kingdom 
was destroyed in the 3
rd Illyrian war.
45 The settlement in 167 BC was applied to 
Macedonia and a year later Illyricum in a more or less similar way. They were both 
declared free and forced to divide into several semi-independent republics. However, 
because of its political instability Macedonia became a permanent base for Roman 
legions in 151 BC and a provincia in 148 BC, and thus differed from Illyricum where 
no permanent garrisons can be detected.
46 Troubles on the northern borders of 
Macedonia with the Scordisci, Thracians and Dardani required a permanent Roman 
military presence. Some modern scholars regard the Roman presence in Macedonia 
in this period as being limited to defence and not extending to the full administration 
of the province.
47 They argue that pressure from the northern borders made Roman 
policy in Macedonia different from their eastern policy elsewhere, for the simple 
reason that the strategic link between Italy and Asia Minor was too important for 
Romans to remain under a possible threat without a good defence. The breakthrough 
which was achieved by several able governors in the 70s BC led to more lasting 
pacification and opened the doors to an aggressive advance towards the Danube.
48
 
An unexpected prize from the Punic wars, Spain was gradually and slowly 
pacified through a series of wars in the mid 2
nd century BC by the Republican armies 
in two distinct phases. The first phase finished with the Gracchan settlement in 178 
BC and was aggressive in its nature and appearance. The second phase, beginning in 
the 150s, fits more into the defensive pattern of Roman imperialism. The Roman 
presence in Spain was under threat by natives. Still, Spain was not properly pacified 
before Augustus, partly because of the unrest caused by Roman internal civil strife in 
the 80s – 70s and 40s. Sometimes painfully, but overall very patiently, Romans built 
up their position there, slowly pushing the boundary of their control towards the 
Atlantic coast. Spain was, as Richardson pointed out, an example of  ‘peripheral 
                                                           
45 Livy, 44.21.4, Roman magistrates who operated against Illyrian kings held imperium for 
Macedonia; Papazoglu (1976) 202. 
46 For the Illyrian settlement in 167 BC, see Chapter 3.2. Sherwin-White (1973) 175-181 discusses 
and defines the Roman declaration of freedom in the Greek world as a political device, which in fact 
regulated the status of populi deditii. 
47 Kallet-Marx (1995) 11-41; Gruen (1984b) 433-436; Syme (1999) 151-163; Papazoglu (1979) 308-
325. 
48 Patsch (1932) 34-42; Syme (1999) 151 ff.; Lica (2000) 40-42. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  42
imperialism’ where the personal initiative and freedom in decision-making of 
individual Roman commanders in the field played a very important role.
49  
 
Gaul was treated differently from Spain in many ways. Strategically 
important as a land link with troublesome Spain, it was controlled through the Greek 
colony of Massilia. The Senate did not try to impose direct rule there, and even when 
it was necessary to create the province of Transalpine Gaul in the 120s, there was no 
attempt to impose rule away from the coast or to penetrate deeper into continental 
Gaul until Caesar’s proconsulship in 59 – 50 BC. Romans intervened mainly in 
response to requests from Massilia and they used Massilian supremacy to maintain 
their influence until the Civil War, when Massilians in 49 BC opted for the losing 
side – Pompey. However, Massilia was not able to satisfy Roman expectations alone, 
so in order to maintain the security of this strategic coastal strip, the Senate arranged 
more elaborate diplomatic links with leaders of the Gauls in the hinterland and 
accepted some civitates such as the Aedui or Arverni into an alliance.
50
 
North Italy was by its geographic position, strategically the weakest and most 
exposed portion of the Italian homeland. The early 2
nd century brought an expansion 
of Roman and Italian colonies in North Italy, and culminated in the foundation of 
Aquileia and the pacification of its neighbors, particularly the Histrian kingdom, and 
later the Carni and Taurisci. Aquileia served as a regional centre of Roman influence, 
military, economic and political. Initially, it had a defensive role, which acted to 
prevent potential threats from the North, as well as to take control over a potentially 
dangerous strengthening of foreign influences amongst the Gallic peoples settled in 
the neighborhood.
51 On the other hand, the position of Aquileia at first was too weak 
and needed to deal with neighboring peoples to create security arrangements on a 
wider scale, and to intervene when it was necessary, as happened in Histria in the 
181 – 177 BC campaigns. Throughout the whole 2
nd century, Romans exercised their 
rule there with the help of client peoples and allied kingdoms such as Noricum. Short 
                                                           
49 Richardson (1986) 177-178; Dyson (1985) 174 ff. 
50 Ebel (1976) 5 ff. esp. 26-40; Dyson (1985) 126-173; Hodge (1998) 128-129, 94-127; Last (1951) 
110-113; Calderini (1972) 1-28; Stevens (1980). 
51 Šašel (1976) 73-76 showed the importance of Gallic settlement for the development of Roman 
policy in North Italy and the eastern Alps. Still, “minacce reali”, for Roman North Italy were not to 
came from the Gauls, but from a potential hostile force from the hinterland who could use them 
against Rome; Šašel (1976) 76; Calderini (1972) 11-12 and more recently Twyman (1992), seeing the 
Celtic strategic threat as an important influence on the whole of Roman policy. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  43
military involvements, almost police actions, strengthened their influence in the 
Alpine regions.
52 An important trade route with Pannonia stretched from Aquileia, 
Tergeste and the Ocra pass where the significant Celtic portorium, Nauportus, was 
positioned.
53 The troubles with the Cimbri and Teutones in the late 2
nd century BC 
showed the vulnerability of Italy from the north. Regardless of internal purposes, the 
formation of the province of Cisalpine Gaul in the late 2
nd – early 1
st century BC 
(after the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones) signified a permanent Roman 
commitment to keep this area under tight control, thus preventing all possible threats 
from the north or at least minimizing them.
54  
 
The end of the Republic brought changes to all previous policy. A monetary 
crisis and increased pressure on the treasury resulting from civil struggle in the 80s, 
as well as the loss of tribute from the east during the Mithridatic war, forced Roman 
policy-makers to adopt another approach to the provinces. The Regnum Sullanum is 
widely recognized to be a key moment, triggering a change towards the 
establishment of direct rule in both parts of the Roman world and a more efficient 
exploitation of provincial resources.
55
 
2. 5  The geography and ethnography of pre-Roman 
Illyricum
Physical geography divided Illyricum into three zones: a narrow Adriatic 
coast-belt that together with the Italian coast was a distinctive geographical unit; in 
fact it is difficult to argue with Braudel’s understanding that “L’Adriatique est peut-
être la plus cohérente des regions de la mer.”
56 Because of its privileged position, 
this zone remained strongly linked with the rest of Mediterranean world. In the 
                                                           
52 Dyson (1985) 73-74 and ff.; Eckstein (1987) 24-70; Harris (1989) 107-118; Toynbee (1965) 252-
285; Salmon (1969) 106-108; Šašel (1987); Šašel-Kos (1997b), see Chapter 3.4. Regnum Noricum 
was an important partner in trade with North Italy and many senatorial and equestrian families had 
investments there; Kolosovskaya (1974); Piccottini (1977) 289-295; Winkler (1977) 193-195. 
53 Strabo, 4.6.10 (C 207), 7.5.2 (C 314); Pliny, HN 3.128; Šašel (1966) esp. 202-203; Šašel-Kos 
(1990).  
54 See Šašel-Kos (2000) 281 n.16-20 for influential modern opinions expressed on the date of the 
formation of Cisalpine Gaul. 
55 Kallet-Marx (1995) 261 ff. esp. 335-342; Badian (1968) 33 ff. puts this change after Sulla. See also 
Cobban (1935) 56-57. Cf. Hopkins (1980) 111-112, fig. 2, on fiscal crisis and Richardson (1994) 593-
598 for a change in the Roman perception of provincia in this period. 
56 Braudel (1966) 113-122, the quotation is from 113. Bertrand (1987) argues that the Adriatic was in 
fact the area that divided rather than connected Italy and the ‘Outre-Mer’ that started in Illyricum and 
Greece. His point of view is based entirely on interpretation of literary sources, rather than the 
maritime and archaeological facts concerning the Adriatic; see Brusić (1970); Škegro (1999) 211-223. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  44
hinterland begins the intermediary zone of the Dinaric Alps, a physical obstacle 
standing between the Mediterranean and the continent, but remaining very open and 
receptive to the influences radiating from the coastal belt.
57 Finally, there were the 
Pannonian plains, opening towards continental Europe but also linked with Italy via 
the Ocra pass and with the Black Sea and southeastern Balkans through the valleys 
of the Danube and Morava. It is therefore not a new conclusion that geography in 
many ways dictated the economic development and a degree of cultural development 
in the native peoples before their political and economic inclusion in the classical 
world.
58 Whom did Romans encounter in Illyricum? The three main ethnic groups 
were: the mixture of ethnically close but also very heterogeneous peoples known as 
the Illyrians; the Celtic peoples of the Boii, Taurisci and Scordisci; and the Greeks in 
their Adriatic colonies.  This is an extremely brief and abbreviated overview of 
political forces existing in Illyricum of that time. 
 
2. 5. 1   The Greeks and Celts in Illyricum
Economic and political power in the Eastern Adriatic before the Roman 
arrival lay with Greek settlements on the Adriatic islands, such as the Issaean 
commonwealth or Pharos.
59 The Issaean commonwealth was the most significant of 
them all, and it became a reliable Roman ally in the 3
rd century BC, asking for 
protection against Ardiaean political pretensions in the central Adriatic and in turn 
supporting Roman interests and supplying ships for Roman wars in the East.
60 It was 
regarded as an amicus but it still remains unclear if it ever concluded any formal 
foedus  with Rome.
61 The Greeks generally supported Roman expansion over the 
Adriatic because their trade had an interest in the destruction of Ardiaean piracy and 
                                                           
57 Braudel (1966) 22-47 is a useful general trans-historical overview of Mediterranean mountains and 
its peoples. Horden/Purcell (2000) 80-82 recently opposed Braudel and see these mountains as more 
connected and closely related to their surrounding regions. These two opposing views do not 
necessarily exclude each other. 
58 Wilkes (1969) xxi-xxvii; (1992) 38-40; Šašel (1974c) 4 ff. (=Šašel (1992) 507 ff.). Šašel recognizes 
only Mediterranean and continental zones. 
59 In fact, the cultural influence and economic power of Apollonia and Dyrrachium lasted much longer 
and had much more impact on Illyricum than on Issa, but in the period under discussion, the political 
power of these cities was insignificant for Roman Illyrian policy. 
Depicting these cities as Greek does not describe accurately their population, as onomastic evidence 
shows strong Illyrian presence in the population. Demetrius of Pharos is a good example of this mixed 
ethnic picture; cf. Rendić-Miočević (1950/51b) 28 ff. 
60 For modern scholarship on Issa, see comprehensive bibliography in Kirigin (1996). Cf. Suić (1973) 
182-184; (1996) 274-277 and Kirigin (1996) 85-92 on the nature of the Issaean commonwealth and its 
political system. 
61 Gruen (1984b) 17; Wallbank (1979) 528. Naval support for Rome: Livy, 31.45.10; 32.21.27; 
37.16.8; 42.48.8. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  45
the Illyrian kingdom, which also threatened Issaean hegemony in the central Adriatic 
and even its political independence.
62 There are many similarities between the 
συµπολιτεία of Issa and that of Massilia in Gaul, including their ultimate destiny.
63 
Both Greek colonies were faithful Roman allies for whose protection Rome 
intervened.
64 Both were left with some independence in charge of a narrow coastal 
strip with a hostile hinterland, and both opted for the losing side in the civil war and 
so lost their hegemony and independence.
65 Massilia, however, was much stronger 
and more influential than Issa ever was. 
 
 The Issaeans never seriously penetrated the hinterland, which was inhabited 
by various native peoples. Issa was founded primarily as a trade settlement and a 
political outpost of Syracuse, but when the need for stronger agricultural production 
arose, it expanded on the mainland and founded its colonies Epetion
66 and Tragurion 
in the mid-3
rd century BC, or even earlier.
67 Thus they were coming into conflict 
with the Delmataean alliance, which was expanding towards the coast. The strategic 
and political insecurity of these colonies is confirmed by traces of the strong walls 
built around Epetion.
68 However, the largest and the most significant city in 
Illyricum became a small port-of-trade, the emporium of Salona, founded between 
Epetion and Tragurion as a trading post for Issaean exchange with the natives.
69 The 
Issaean commonwealth was not an exclusive ethnically Greek entity. Some native 
coastal communities such as the Hyllaei, Nestoi or Bulinoi
70 were either part of it or 
                                                           
62 Wilkes (1969) 13-26; Kirigin (1990) 291 ff.   
63 Cf. the comparisons made by Suić (1996) 292-293. 
64 Kuntić-Makvić (2002) 147-150 suggest that written sources (including Polybius, for example) in a 
real historical ‘conspiracy’ hide all traces of a negative side in Roman-Greek Adriatic relations, 
overemphasizing the Roman role as Greek protector. She quotes the examples of Pharos in 217 BC 
and Issa. Issa in 49 BC did not rebel against Rome but actually opted for one side in the civil war. The 
Greeks in the Adriatic were too weak and had too much in common with the Romans so that their 
political friendship was the only possible relationship in the circumstances. 
65 Suić (1959/60) 149-150; (1996) 275-276 n.22 is right to acknowledge that regardless of the side 
taken in the Civil War the Issaean κοινόν was doomed to disappear because of outside factors. 
However, he sees these factors only locally (the rise of Italian settlement in the eastern Adriatic), 
omitting to acknowledge the main global reason – the completion of the Roman ‘Revolution’ and the 
destruction of the Republic. 
66 Maršić (1996/97), has recently questioned whether Epetion was Greek colony, or in fact a native 
settlement. It is interesting to note that Polybius, the earliest source that mentions Epetion and 
Tragurion, calls them cities in league with Issa, Polyb. 32.9.1-2, and Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) notes only 
Tragurion as a settlement of Issa. 
67 Gabričević (1973) 166-167. Zaninović (1976a) 304 puts their foundations much later, in the first 
half of the 2
nd century BC. For dating the foundation of Epetion and Tragurion, cf. the overview of 
influential opinions in Faber (1983) 18-21. 
68 Faber (1983) 21 ff. 
69 See Chapter 3.2 n. 44 for the origins of Salona.  
70 See primary sources on the Hyllaei in Katičić (1970) 116-118. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  46
joined with Issa in alliance against the common enemy from the hinterland – the 
Delmatae.
71 Pharos is the other significant Greek settlement, economically based 
much more on agriculture than on trade.
72 It regained autonomy from Rome after the 
Illyrian wars, and remained an important ally and logistic base for Roman military 
interventions in this area until the end of the Republic.
73
 
The Celtic peoples - the Boii, Scordisci and Taurisci - arrived late in Ilyricum 
as part of the Celtic migrations in the 4
th century BC, and they settled in its north-
western and north-eastern parts. The Taurisci inhabited a strategically important area 
in the Eastern Alps, and controlled the trade route from north-east Italy to Pannonia 
via their settlement and the portorium Nauportus. At the same time they threatened 
the security of North Italy, and made frequent raids in that direction. The Taurisci did 
not establish a monarchy like their neighbors in Noricum. Scholars agree that it was 
an alliance of several Celtic peoples, referred to by our sources under the name 
Taurisci.
74 They were economically sophisticated, controlled important mining 
resources such as iron and gold,
75 and minted their own currency in the 1
st century 
BC, the so-called East Norican coinage.
76 They represented the most significant 
political force in the eastern Alpine area. North of Taurisci the Transdanubian plains 
were also inhabited by the Celts. The most important were the Boii, whose power 




78 inhabited an area around the mouth of the rivers Sava and 
Drava, but their power stretched much further south, as they were able to threaten 
                                                           
71 They are often assumed to be part of the Delmatae; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) ∆αλµατέων παραλία. 
However, although culturally close to the Delmatae (Zaninović (1966) 33 ff.), these natives were not 
politically and culturally part of the Delmataean community, being by geography much more exposed 
to Greek influences; Čače (1998) 80-81; (2001) 99-100. They became part of the Delmataean alliance 
at times of civil war after the Issaean commonwealth was dissolved, see Chapter 4.4. 
Suić (1955) 136-149 proved that these communities were considered non-Illyrian and non-Delmatae 
as late as the beginning of 1
st century BC. 
72 Gabričević (1973) 166-167. 
73 Zaninović (1988a) 38-40. 
74 Named after the leading people of the alliance; Fluss (1934); Petru (1968); Božič (1987). Nauportus 
as initially the Tauriscan portorium Strabo, 7.5.2 (C 314) Ταυρίσκων κατοικίαν; Šašel (1966). 
75 The gold mines of the Taurisci are mentioned by Polybius in Strabo, 4.6.12 (C 208) (=Polyb. 
34.3.10-14), but archaeology does not confirm his statement; Božič (1987) 889. Šašel-Kos (1998) 
216-219 assumes that gold deposits were discovered in the river Drava. 
76 Still, it was only a locally used currency; Kos (1985) 20 ff. esp. 23-24. 
77 For the population of pre-Roman northern Pannonia; see Mócsy (1962) 527 ff; (1974) 53-73; Petres, 
(1976). Also, cf. below p. 79. 
78 The most significant works on the Scordisci are: Todorović (1974); Papazoglu (1978) 271-389; 
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seriously the security of Macedonia and Greece many times. They were not a purely 
Celtic people. Illyrian and Thracian ethnic elements are visible but the Celtic element 
seems to be the most significant. They appear in the sources only after the Celtic 
movements in 3
rd century had finished, and the sources divide them into the Great 
and Small Scordisci.
79 It is not known how far their dominion stretched and what was 
the nature of their dominion over the Pannonii in the valley of the Sava. However, it 
is certain that the Scordisci played an important political role in the affairs of 
Pannonia before the rise of the Dacian kingdom and the Roman political extension to 
Pannonia (Chapter 3.4). Some communities in the north-east of the province of 
Dalmatia (the middle course of the Drina and Western Morava valley) were grouped 
into a civitas, the Dindari, by the imperial administration and possibly represent part 
of the dissolved Scordiscan alliance.
80
 
2. 5. 2    The Illyrian peoples
The Greeks ruled the sea and the islands, but they were a tiny minority 
compared with the native population on the mainland. Excluding some remnants of 
the Celts passing through the Balkan Peninsula in the 4
th century BC, such as the 
Scordisci and Taurisci, the Adriatic hinterland and the wider Balkan area, including 
the territory of the later province of Moesia, were inhabited by peoples known under 
commonly as ‘Illyrians’. Their ethnogenesis remains one of the most fascinating and 
still unsolved archaeological and historical problems in this area.
81 Archaeology 
recognizes the native Iron Age cultures of Illyricum in three areas: the Southeast 
Alpine area with western Pannonia; the Adriatic-West Balkan area, and the Central 
Danubian area.
82 Scholars divide the native non-Celtic population of pre-Roman 
Illyricum into five or six distinctive groups based on shared cultural and ethnic 
                                                           
79 Strabo, 7.5.12 (C 318). 
80 Archaeology and epigraphic material confirm strong Celtic influence in this area; Alföldy (1964a) 
96-98, 103; (1964b) 109, 123-127; (1965a) 54-56; Wilkes (1969) 171-172. The view is contested by 
Katičić (1965b) 63-69 and Papazoglu (1978) 171-178. 
81 Benac (1964b); (1987b) 754 ff.; Garašanin (1988b); cf overview in English by Wilkes (1992) 38-
40. 
82 The Southeast alpine area consists of: Carniola (Dolensko), St. Lucia, Notransko, Ljubljana, 
Marijanec-Kaptol and Donja Dolina-Sanski Most group. Celtic movements heavily affected and 
disrupted the development of these groups. 
Adriatic-West Balkan area: Histrian, Liburnian, Iapodean, Central-Dalmatian and Central-Bosnian 
group. 
Central Danubian: Dalj, Bosut and Srijem group; Benac (1987a); Wilkes (1992) 40 ff. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  48
characteristics: the south Illyrians, the Delmatae, the Liburni, the Histri, the Iapodes, 
the Pannonii and, possibly, the so-called east Dalmatian group.
83
 
Politically, the organization of those native ethnic groups in Illyricum was 
deeply rooted in its ethnic and kinship structure, rather than in the development of 
the more sophisticated institutions of the polis or kingdom. The only exception is the 
Illyrian kingdom, which underwent significant social transformation in the 4
th – 2
nd 
century BC, influenced by the impact of the Hellenic and Hellenistic world. The 
southern Illyrians were “une société complexe et en voie de transformation” in the 
words of Cabanes.
84 This transformation also extended to other communities on the 
coast, so that the Histri and particularly the Liburni developed an urbanized society 
and political proto-institutions of their own. The intensity of this transition affected 
the process of social stratification and hierarchical settlement patterns in the 
hinterland as well, so that the Iapodes and Delmatae and to a lesser extent the 




nature of those formations was in essence a common ethnic and cultural background, 
but the alliances were also between heterogeneous groups of individual communities. 
In some instances, the composition of those formations did not correspond with the 
ethnic ones, so there were single communities standing outside their ethnic proto-
state formations, or different proto-state formations were formed inside a single 
ethnos.
86 In a way, we can say that the peoples of ancient Illyricum shaped their 
                                                           
83 Major factors in determining those ethnic groups are archaeology and onomastics; cf. Katičić 
(1964b) 15-30; (1965b); Alföldy (1965a) 17 ff. esp. 40-67; Wilkes (1969) 157 ff.; Čović (1976). 
Katičić (1964b) argues the existence of a common Dalmatian-Pannonian group, including the central-
Dalmatian, East Dalmatian and Pannonian sub-areas. 
The so-called East Dalmatian group including the Pirustae and Glintidiones are listed as a separate 
ethno-geographic group by Wilkes (1969) 171-176; cf. Alföldy (1965a) 56-60. See Katičić (1965b) 
63-69 who places this group inside the Dalmatian-Pannonian complex. They show influences from the 
Celts, Delmatae and the southern Illyrians, and Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314), groups them amongst the 
Pannonii. This thesis will not discuss them separately. 
This thesis will avoid use of the tem ‘tribe’ in the ethnic sense as it gives a vague and outdated 
impression of ethnic identity. Modern anthropology has distanced itself from applying the term to 
contemporary ‘tribal’ societies preferring instead the term ‘ethnic groups’; 
Chapman/McDonald/Tonkin (1989) 11-17; Leach (1989); Banks (1996) 11 ff. 
84 Cabanes (1988) 191. The intrigues of πολιδυνάστας (Polyb. 5. 4. 3) confirm the presence and 
survival of tribal institutions in the Illyrian kingdom. However, the urbanization of tribal centres was 
already influencing the development of more sophisticated political institutions in southern Illyria and 
the Illyrian kingdom; cf. Papazoglu (1989) 35-37, 48-53. 
85 Contacts with the Mediterranean world played a crucial role in the development of more centralized 
and hierarchical social structures in Continental Europe; cf. Nash (1978) 459 ff. (Central Gaul); 
Haselgrove (1984) 17 ff. (Britain); (1987) (Gaul). 
86 Good examples (discussed throughout) are the coastal Hyllaei, Nestoi or Bulinoi, who although 
ethnically akin to the Delmatae joined the alliance very late. The Daorsi supported Rome against the 
Ardiaean kingdom. The Liburnian civitates supported both sides in the civil war. The Iapodes divided Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  49
ethnic identities through the instruments of political institutions. Together with the 
development of proto-political institutions in the late Iron Age Illyricum, its 
population also developed ‘political ethnicity’.
87
 
FIGURE 2 Pre-Roman social and political institutions in Illyricum and 
the hierarchical settlement pattern
88
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into two different alliances: Cisalpine and Transalpine, and the Pannonii had different political entities 
such as the Breuci, Mezaei and Daesitiates etc. Examples of a single people splitting into two political 
entities are known from Gaul; Nash (1976) 111. 
87 Certainly this concept needs more elaboration, something that needs to be explored in a separate 
work. The term ‘political ethnicity’ was originally developed by anthropologist Abner Cohen who 
studied the contemporary urban population of Nigeria; Hauser (1969) 3-4, 27, 198 ff. It is interesting 
to note that Roman ethnicity was also significantly affected by political factors; cf. Woolf (2001) 317-
318. 
88 This figure is relying in some details on Suić (1976b) 47 ff. esp. 74 (= Suić (1975c), esp. 30 and 
(1976c), both in French) and his study of development and classification of native types of settlement 
in Illyricum. The comparison with oppida in Gaul is obvious but this will be dealt with on some other 
occasion. 
89 Čače (1979) 47-48 calls this category narod (people) defining it as a politically homogenised ethnos 
or part of one. Alföldy (1965a) 168-169 calls it der Stamm (the tribe), although in some instances he 
applies the term to the whole ethnos such as the Pannonii; (1965a) 168. 
90 Building of gradine (hill-forts, casteglieri) characterises all the peoples from the area. For the 
gradine in general, see individual contributions in Benac (1975) 9-222. Gradine had several purposes, 
as a refugium, a fort and a settlement; Drechler-Bižić (1975) 73; Suić (1975c); (1976b) 63-81. 
91 There is no good English translation of civitas as the smallest unit of political autonomy centred in 
the oppidum except perhaps ‘municipality’. Croatian općina (as in Gabričević (1955); Čače (1994/95) 
111-112 n. 28), or župa look like appropriate terms for civitas in Illyricum. Alföldy (1965a) 167-169 
uses term die Sippe (the clan), but the term ‘clan’ would be much more applicable lower down the 
scale, in the category of pagus or vicus. The same tendency is seen in Stipčević (1989) 128 who 
equates civitas with fratria. 
92 The pagus was a social sub-unit of the civitas in Gaul; cf. Sordi (1953); Wightman (1985) 24-25; 
53-56 for Belgic Gaul. It does not seem that the situation was much different in Illyricum; cf. Frontin. 
Str. 2.5.28. 
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The South-eastern Illyrian communities
93 were under stronger Hellenistic 
influences, more engaged in maritime trade, culturally, politically and economically 
more advanced than the peoples in the hinterland, and they enjoyed the highest level 
of urbanization in pre-Roman Illyricum apart from Liburnia.
94 The nature of the 
Illyrian kingdom is disputed as some scholars, such as Hammond, see it as the 
dominion of the most powerful people over the others, and Papazoglu sees it as a 
strongly centralized kingdom with an unbroken tradition from the 4
th century BC.
95 
Some of the stronger and culturally more developed south Illyrian peoples, such as 
the Daorsi
96 or Taulantii, had an interest in alliance with Rome and in escaping the 
dominion of the Ardiaei (thus indirectly supporting the view of Hammond). Their 
power was ultimately shaken in 167 BC. The interest of the newly developed polis in 
south Illyricum clashed with the needs of the centralized Hellenistic monarchy,
97and 
resulted in the destruction of the later. 
 
The Delmatae were politically and militarily the most significant native 
people in the mountains of the mid-Adriatic hinterland and the most formidable 
opponent of the Romans.
98 They show a very distinctive ethnic and cultural 
character, displaying characteristics of both Illyrians and Pannonii.
99 Their economy 
was pastoral and depended on the small quantity of usable land in the rocky Dinaric 
                                                           
93 The Ardiaei, Daorsi (rather than Daorsii as suggested by some authorities; cf. Marić (1973) 110-
111) Pleraei, Narensii, Taulantii, etc., so called political Illyria; Cabanes (1988) 20. For the location of 
individual south Illyrian peoples, see Wilkes (1969) 18 fig. 3; Pająkowski (1980) 114 ff; Benac 
(1987b). 
94 The political organization of the Illyrian (Ardiaean) kingdom: Papazoglu (1967) 18-20; (1988) 185-
189; Wilkes (1969) 188-190. Urbanization and its consequences: Papazoglu (1979) 354-355; Ceka 
(1985); Cabanes (1988) 207-233. 
95 Hammond, 1966 considers the Illyrian kingdom in the late 3
rd century BC to be actually the 
kingdom of the Ardiaeans rather than a kingdom of Illyrians. Contra Papazoglu (1965); (1967) 15-17 
who sees it as continuous state-formation from the 4
th century BC. Hammond’s opinion seems to be 
more accepted; cf. Carlier (1987); Cabanes (1988) 87 ff., but Papazoglu responded vigorously 
defending her argument; Papazoglu (1988) 183 ff.; (1989) 37-46. 
96 Hecateus wrongly regarded the south-Illyrian Daorsi as Thracians, Fr. 130; Marić (1973), esp. 115 
ff.; Bojanovski (1988) 93-94. Some authorities repeat his error e.g. Alföldy (1965a) 47; Wilkes (1969) 
156 n.3. 
97“Les intérêts de la ville, fondée à l’image de la cité antique, étaient en contradiction avec les 
besoins de l’Etat qui cherchait ses formules et modèles dans le monarchies hellènistiques.”; Popović 
(1987) 94; Papazoglu (1989) 48-51. See Cabanes (1988) 232-233, who denies the development of the 
polis institutions in the Illyrian kingdom. 
98 The most significant work on the history, material and spiritual culture of the Delmatae is Zaninović 
(1966); (1967); cf. also Rendić-Miočević (1955); Čović (1976) 239-267; (1987). 
99 Older historiography regarded them as Illyrians; Alföldy (1965a) 44-45. However, onomastic 
research (Katičić (1964b) 18-21, 28-29;  Marić  (1996) 77-79) finds important links between the 
Delmatae and the Panonnii. Cf. also Zaninović (1966) 58-59 n. 86 and a general overview in Benac 
(1987b) 779-781. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  51
Alps. They were trying to expand towards the Adriatic but came into conflict there 
with the Issaean commonwealth. The Delmatae, who first recognized the supreme 
power of the Illyrian kingdom, gained full independence some time before its 
destruction and tried to fill the vacuum of power after the Illyrian kingdom was 
destroyed. It seems from the historical sources and archaeological evidence that the 
civitas of Dalmion, located in the plains surrounding modern-day Tomislavgrad 
(Duvanjsko polje), was initially the political core of the alliance.
100 The Delmatean 
alliance expanded and absorbed the smaller, ethnically akin communities 
surrounding Dalmion and, in time, the name of the alliance was applied to the 
smaller (and weaker) neighboring civitates, although they had not been linked with 
the Delmatae in the past.
101 Difficult terrain and a sophisticated system of hill-forts – 




The Iapodes are the next important cultural group.
103 The Iapodes lived in 
territory similar to that of the Delmatae, bordering the Iulian Alps and the Istrian 
peninsula in the mountains behind the Liburnian coast (modern Lika). After the 5
th 
century BC they expanded towards the valley of the river Una acquiring arable land 
there and easier access to metals.
104 Strabo wrote that they had a significant Celtic 
heritage, but onomastic arguments are inconclusive. As it is impossible to find more 
than a few Celtic names amongst them, so modern scholarship mainly disregards 
Strabo’s report. Some archaeologists suggest strong ethnic and cultural similarity 
between the Iapodean cultural group and the Pannonii, especially amongst those 
                                                           
100 Čače (1994/95) 107, 114-120. The exact position of Dalmion as well as later Roman Delminium 
(they were different cities; Patsch (1904) 171-172 and ff.) is unknown. See Bojanovski (1988) 216-
231 for an overview of the approaches to the problem of locating Dalmion and Delminium. 
Benac (1985) 190-194 summarised the archaeological evidence (the number of gradine and 
permanent settlements) and confirmed the dominance of Duvanjsko polje over the other areas in 
Delmataean territory. See also Benac (1975b). 
101 Zaninović (1966) 80-82; Čović (1987) 443 n.2, 476-477; Čače (1994/95) 118-120. 
The nature of the Delmataean alliance is disputed. Papazoglu (1967) 21-22 argued that the Delmatae 
united only in times of war, retaining full independence of individual communities in times of peace. 
On the other hand, Čače (1979) 101 ff. esp. 105-116 cautiously (for the lack of sources) sees the 
alliance as a more permanent political formation dominated by the principes of individual civitates, at 
first dominated by Delmion, but after its destruction in 155 BC, based on more decentralised 
foundations. 
102 The gradine of the Delmatae; Benac (1975b); (1985). 
103 General works on the Iapodes: Čović (1976) 133-167; Drechsler-Bižić (1975); (1987). 
104 Čović (1976) 133-168. Marić (1975) esp. 42 argues that the Iapodes only very late (early 1
st BC) 
expanded across the Una towards Raetinium (modern Bihać) which became an important centre in the 
Roman period. 
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Iapodes who inhabited the valley of the Una.
105 This corresponds with the division 
given by the sources, which distinguish between the two political organizations 
existing amongst the Iapodes: the Cisalpine and Transalpine alliances.
106 The 
political organization of the Iapodean alliances is not entirely clear, but from the 
available sources both state institutions of the Iapodes seem to be a much looser 
formation than the Delmatae were; the Cisalpine Iapodes were led, or at least 




108 were ethnically closer to the Veneti of North Italy than to the 
Illyrians. They were part of the common Attestine or Este culture, strongly linked 
culturally and economically with northern Italy.
109 The Liburni inhabited the north-
east Adriatic coast and the islands between the rivers Titius and Tedanius.
110 They 
were engaged in more intensive maritime trade with the Greeks, Picenum and Sicily 
as well as with their neighbours, especially the Iapodes and Delmatae. The Liburni 
appear to be the most urbanized people in Illyricum before the Roman conquest, 
apart from the peoples from the south-eastern coast.
111 There was no easily 
detectable common political unit amongst them. Most probably the Liburni created 
some kind of loose alliance or confederation similar to the Etruscan league between 
individual civitates, but we have no valid source, which might enable us to discuss 
                                                           
105 Katičić (1965b) 55-63; Marić (1971) 77-78; Rendić-Miočević (1975b).  The  links with the 
Panonnii: Marić (1971) 75 ff.; (2002). Historic Iapodes were a complex mixture of “… der 
Alteingesessenen und westpannonischen Zuwanderer gewesen die vielleicht irgendwelche 
Verwandtschaft mit den Liburnern und Histrern aufwies und die wegen des Ursprungs des substrats 
in der ferneren Vorgeschichte gewisse Verwandtschaft mit den Illyriern hatte.”; Marić (1971) 78. 
Kurtz (1967) remains alone in his argument that the Iapodes represented a Celtic-Illyrian ethnic 
symbiosis. 
106 Ἰάποδες οἱ ἐντὸς  Ἄλπεων and Ἰάποδες οἱ πέραν  Ἄλπεων; App. Ill. 16, 17, 21. It is not 
clear when this division amongst the Iapodes took place, but it is certain that it happened before 200 
BC; Čače (1979) 67. 
107 Alföldy (1965a) 168; Papazoglu (1967) 21-22, contra Čače (1979) 55-81, conflicting views on 
whether the Iapodean alliances were of a permanent nature or not. Čače’s view that the existence of 
the council-chamber βουλευτήριον (App. Ill. 21) in Metulum suggests the more complex and 
permanent nature of Iapodean alliances. 
108 General works: Fluss (1931); Čović (1976) 121-132; Čače (1985); Batović (1987). 
109 The Liburni as the part of Veneti: Alföldy (1964a) 66-75, 102; (1965a) 42-43; Katičić (1964b) 24-
25. Contra Untermann (1970), opposed to the idea that Liburni belong to the Veneto-Histrian 
onomastic group. The Liburni and Picenum: Suić (1953). 
110 River Titius (Krka) was not the exact border of Liburni, as some Liburnian communities are 
located across the river; Čače (1989) esp. 61 ff. Cf. Suić (1960/61) 190 ff. Contra Zaninović (1966) 
41-42; (1968) 124 n.21. 
111 The differentiation of the local élite and the development of the monetary economy (in the late 3
rd 
century BC) in Liburnia is obvious after the 4
th century BC, causing rapid social change and 
urbanization; Batović (1974); Čače (1985) 614-619. The Italian expansion of Rome, especially in 
Picenum, put the Liburni in strong and intensive trade and cultural contact with Romans; Čače (1985) 
252-254. Chapter 2: Historical outline, theoretical approaches and geography  53




The Histri inhabited the Istrian peninsula stretching to the neighboring 
Triestine Gulf and bordering the Iapodes in the hinterland of Tarsatica. Their 
language was also close to that of the Veneti and Carni, although Appian and Strabo 
wrongly call them Illyrians.
 Their geographical position enabled them to have more 
intensive trade contacts with central and south Italy, and cultural exchange with the 
Mediterranean world through those contacts. Thus, it is no surprise that the Histri 
were relatively quickly and successfully Romanized, and Histria was included in 
Italy as early as the Augustan era.
113 In the 3
rd century BC Histrian tribes united 
under the leadership of principes from the most significant pre-Roman civitas of 




115 inhabited the hinterland between the Adriatic and the rivers 
Sava and Drava, and they divide the Celtic Taurisci from the Scordisci in Pannonia. 
The sources stated that the most significant amongst the Pannonian peoples in the 
historical period were the Segestani, Breuci, Mezaei, Daesitiates, Andizetes, etc.
116 
Many of those people lived in areas with rich iron ore deposits, so that iron mining 
and production was an important part of their economy before and after the Roman 
conquest.
117 They were peoples ethnically akin to Illyrians, but at the same time 
                                                           
112  Čače (1982); (1985); Batović (1987); Suić (1981) 107-109 comparing the Liburni with the 
Etruscan confederation. The Liburnian alliance fought the Greeks in 4
th century (Diod. Sic. 15.14.2; 
CIG II 1837c), so some authorities date its foundation in the late 5
th early 4
th century BC; Čače 
(1987/88) 81. Perhaps they can be compared with the κοινόν of the Illyrian Byllioni bordering 
Epirus, see Anamali (1975); Ceka (1984) on the Byllioni. 
113 Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314); Degrassi (1954) 14 ff.; Gabrovec/Mihovilić (1987); Starac (1993/94). 
114 Bandelli (1981) 15 argues that Romans initiated the foundation of the Histrian kingdom after the 1
st 
Histrian war in 221 BC, contra Čače (1988/89). Cf. Čače (1979) 81-101 on the nature of the Histrian 
kingdom. 
115 For reasons of clarity, this thesis will refer to the Pannonian ethnos as the Pannonii, and the 
Pannonii north of Sava as Pannonians. The Delmatae as a particular people will be distinguished from 
Dalmatians describing the inhabitants of the province of Dalmatia south of the Sava. App. Ill. 14 
(Παίονές); RG 30.1 gentes Pannoniorum; Strabo, 7.5.10 (C 317) (Παννόνιοι) use ethnic terms. 
However, some sources like Cassius Dio introduce this confusion, referring to the Pannonians and 
Dalmatians as inhabitants of these Roman provinces, rather than as ethnic or tribal groups. See also 
Vulić (1933) 84-86; Alföldy (1965a) 50-51.  
116 Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314); App. Ill. 14, 22; Čović (1976) 169-186; Zličić (1978) 351-356; Benac 
(1987b) 795-799; Bojanovski (1988) 31-35. 
The Daesitiates: Čović (1976) 187-238; Bojanovski (1988) 143-154; Paškvalin (2000). The Mezaei: 
Bojanovski (1988) 266-300. Benac (1987b) 797-798 describes the Daesitiates as an ethnic mixture 
between the Pannonii and Illyrians. 
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archaeology and onomastic researches show many differences between them. 
Whether the Pannonii belonged or did not belong to the Illyrian peoples remains in 
dispute.
118 There were also Celtic influences on these peoples.
119 Their names are 
very similar to those of the Delmatae, so that, according to Katičić, they made up a 
joint Pannonian-Dalmatian onomastic group.
120 In the historical record they arrive 
relatively late as a politically amorphous mass,
121 and only during the Pannonian 
rebellion of AD 6 – 9 do they appear as a relatively coherent and organized political 
and ethnic structure.
122 Archaeology shows that the Central-Bosnian archaeological 
group, corresponding with the historical Pannonii, had a strong internal cultural unity 
and a couple of well-organized political centers.
123
 
Having briefly overviewed the circumstances in which Roman Illyrian policy 
existed it is time to start with an examination of the policy itself.
                                                           
118 Marić (1964b) 178 ff. sees the Panonnii as Late Bronze age arrivals in Illyricum (the Urnfielders) 
because archaeological evidence places the Urnfielders in areas inhabited by the historical Pannonii. 
Onomastics supports these differences; Katičić (1964b) 17, 20; (1965b) 69-73 links the central-
Dalmatian onomastic group with the Pannonii. Contra Zličić (1978) 356. 
119 Marić (1963). Celtic influences can be recognized in the minting of copies of Hellenistic coins by 
the Mezaei; Basler (1973), although he does not see Celtic influences here (1973) 269. 
120 Katičić (1964b) 18-21, 28-29; (1965b) 69-73. Alföldy (1964a) 92 ff. separates the Delmatae and 
Pannonii as ethnically different. Mócsy (1967) doubts the existence of a separate Pannonian language. 
121 App. Ill. 22; Mócsy (1974) 21. 
122 The unity of Pannonii, including the Delmatae in the AD 6-9 uprising, and their isolation from the 
rest of Illyricum (no other ethnic group joins the uprising, Chapter 7.4) suggests their ethnic coherence 
in the 1
st century BC/AD and gives an important argument in favour of Katičić’s and Marić’s theory. 
123 Čović (1987). Chapter 3: The realm of bifocality  55
 
3.  The Illyrian Policy of Rome 167 – 60 BC: 




Tune igitur demens, nec te mea cura moratur? 
an tibi sum gelida vilior Illyria 
Propertius, Elegies 1.8.1-2 
 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
The relationship between Illyricum and Rome, especially the legal position 
and status of Illyricum in the later Roman Republic is not entirely clear due to 
inadequate sources. It is often assumed by modern scholarship that Illyricum was 
either a province with ‘vague boundaries’, being outside a provincial zone as an 
independent protectorate or administered from other provinces.
2 J. Wilkes is the only 
modern scholar who has attempted to define Roman Republican policy in Illyricum 
after 167 BC more comprehensively. He denied the existence of any meaningful 
Roman Republican policy in this period, after the potentially dangerous Macedonian 
kingdom had been destroyed. Illyricum is represented as a strategic backwater where 
Romans fought only to train armies and provide triumphs for the imperatores, a 
place from which Romans were actually in retreat in the 2
nd and early 1
st century BC. 
As Wilkes noted: 
“The causes and motives of the different ventures by Roman 
commanders into the area are instructive in their variety, 
combining one basic element: events within Illyria had usually 
nothing to do with the projects undertaken.
”3
 
This chapter will argue against the prevailing orthodoxy depicting Roman 
Republican Illyrian policy as essentially ad hoc, undefined and unconnected with the 
political situation in the field. While agreeing with Wilkes that there was no unified 
                                                           
1 In a slightly changed version the chapter is published as Dzino (2005). 
2 Mommsen (CIL III p. 279); Betz (1938) 2; Skefich (1967) 30-41; Wilkes (1969) 29 ff.; Lintott 
(1981) 60; Sherwin-White (1980) 17. 
3 Wilkes (1969) 36; cf. Wilkes (1965a) 4-5; Badian (1968) 23; Bandelli (1983) 174-175 and Lintott, 
(1982) 24 for a similar view of Roman conduct in Transalpine Gaul. In fact the majority of modern 
scholars see global Republican geo-strategic policy as ad hoc. See the voice of dissent in Ferrill 
(1991) 74. 
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single Illyrian policy (although some common elements existed), this chapter will 
show that there was an Illyrian policy between the Illyrian wars and Caesar’s pro-
consulship and that it was essentially bifocal.
4 It focused on two different but 
interrelated zones in the Eastern Adriatic so that two contrasting Roman approaches 
to foreign policy emerged: expansionism and hegemonism overlapped and 
complemented each other. Illyricum stood outside the Roman state; it was not a 
province and it was not administered from other provinces, but Romans intervened 
there when their or allied interests were threatened. Also, this chapter will try to 
shake the prevailing opinion that Illyricum was a mere training ground for the 
Republican armies and try to demonstrate that Republican armies reacted only in 
response to existing or potential regional crises. 
 
The attention of Rome shifted across the Adriatic relatively late in the late 
third century BC, as a byproduct of Rome’s two different policies: Macedonian 
policy in the south and expansion into North Italy. As a consequence and 
continuation of this initial approach in new circumstances after the fall of the Illyrian 
and the Histrian kingdom, military operations in the late Republic were performed in 
two different but interrelated zones in the Eastern Adriatic. The South-Adriatic zone 
comprised the southern Adriatic coast from the border of Epirus up to the border 
between the Delmatae and Liburni on the river Titius (Krka) with the immediate 
hinterland, corresponding to Pliny’s Liburniae finis et initium Dalmatiae,
5 including 
the independent Issaean συµπολιτεία in the Central Adriatic. The north Adriatic 
sector was initially Histrian territory, but later included the Liburni, Cisalpine 
Iapodes and Taurisci. These two interrelated operational zones slowly merged into a 
single one in the early to mid-first century BC. 
 
3. 2  Prelude: the making of bifocality 
The seeds of bifocality were sown in the initial phase of Roman Illyrian 
policy focused on the Ardiaean kingdom in the southeast and the Histrian kingdom in 
the northwest. Roman policy in this phase was relatively inconsistent and conducted 
                                                           
4 Bandelli (1983) 174-175 argues that 167 BC marked the end of bifocal policy and the start of a 
policy aiming to transform the eastern Adriatic coast into a unified political unit. 
5 Pliny, HN 3.141; Ptol. Geog. 2.16. This understanding of the term Dalmatia reflects an earlier source 
in Pliny, the periplus from mid-1
st century BC; Čače (2001) 93-94. This notice also reflects the 2
nd 
century political situation when the river Titius (Krka) marked the division between these two zones 
of operation. 
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at a distance whenever possible, but it was still based on some general principles, 
such as keeping the Adriatic safe from piracy and the imposition of similar political 
solutions on both sides of the Eastern Adriatic.
6 The most obvious reasons for the 
beginning of Roman interest in the southeastern Adriatic were the rising influence of 
the Ardiaean kingdom and their endemic piracy in the southern Adriatic and Ionian 
Sea. This piracy interfered in the trade of Rome’s Italian and Greek allies who 
demanded protection from Rome, but a seemingly even more important factor was 
the possible influence of the Ardiaean kingdom on the general strategic situation in 
Macedonia and Greece. In three encounters, in 229, 220 and 168 BC, Romans 
permanently established their influence, but not their military presence, on the other 
side of the southern Adriatic.
7 In 167 BC the Illyrians were ‘liberated’, the Ardiaean 
kingdom was dissolved and divided in a similar manner to the division of 
Macedonia, and Roman hegemony
8 was established through the imposition of tribute 
on the defeated Illyrians.
9 This success was strategically very important because once 
they established permanent rule in Macedonia in 148 BC the Romans built the Via 
Egnatia in the 130s, thus connecting Italy through Epirus and Macedonia with Asia 
Minor for military purposes.
10
 
In 167 BC the Ardiaean kingdom was divided into three parts according to 
Livy.
11 The first part covered the coast between the cities of Lissus and Scodra. The 
second comprised the Labeatae around the Lake of Scodra, and the third the 
Olciniati, Acruviati and Rhizoniti in the Gulf of Boka Kotorska and modern day 
                                                           
6 Wilkes (1969) 13-28; Gruen (1984b) 435-436. 
Roman policy towards the Illyrian kingdom is outside the scope of this thesis. However, we would 
like to note that it does not seem inconsistent, especially taking into account the continuing Roman 
view of a political solution for the kingdom in its division from 229 to 167 BC. According to Bandelli 
(1981) 18 and Čače (1988/89) 12-13, 16 (with some differences in details) in this phase the Romans 
applied similar political solutions in their dealings with the Illyrian and Histrian kingdoms, looking 
after strong and reliable partners, and removing extreme warlike elements. 
7 See Zippel (1877) 43-98; Wilkes (1969) 13-28; Gruen (1984b) 360-436; Holleaux (1928); May 
(1946); Badian (1952); Cabanes (1988) 255-334; Petzold (1970); Gabričević (1974); Domić-Kunić 
(1994). 
8 The word ‘protectorate’ is a reflection of early 20
th century politics; Cabanes (1988) 278. Hegemony 
seems as much better description. 
9 Livy, 45.26.14; 29.4; cf. Hammond/Wallbank (1988) 562-563. Gruen (1984b) 423-429 stressed the 
importance of reducing the economic resources of Macedonia and Illyricum in the settlement; cf. 
Papazoglu (1979) 355-356 on economic problems in the region after 167 BC. The large number of 
coins minted in Illyricum after 168 BC casts some doubts on Gruen’s statement; Marović (1976) 234; 
Visona (1985) 121. 
10 For the dating of the Via Egnatia, see Kallet-Marx (1995) 347-349. It was a continuance of the Via 
Appia that terminated at Brundisium; Rougé (1987) 256. 
11 See the analysis of Livy’s sources for this event in Weber (1998) 296, and detailed analysis of the 
manuscript in Weber (1983) 113-144. 
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Montenegrin coast. As reward for supporting Rome the Daorsi, Taulantii and 
Pirustae of Dassaretia were exempted from tribute and remained independent state 
units.
12 H. Ceka suggests a possible division based on coinage minted after 167 BC. 
According to this explanation, three Illyrian republics minted coins with the 
inscriptions ΛΙΣΣΙΤΑΝ, ΛΑΒΙΑΤΑΝ and ∆ΑΟΡΣΩΝ. They corresponded to the 
three republics given above in the same order, with the addition of the free cities 
Apollonia, Dyrrachium and the people of Amantines.
13 Perhaps we can cautiously 
agree with the idea of Garašanin that the Daorsi constituted an independent (fourth) 
unit and the historically unknown King Ballaios was a ruler of the third part, which 
also included Pharos.
14 Parts of the dissolved Illyrian kingdom south of Lissus were 
possibly annexed to the province of Macedonia in 148 - 147 BC.
15 Romans did not 
establish a province in Illyricum in 167 BC, as they did not in Macedonia in 168 
BC.
16 The main upholders of Roman interests in the area were the faithful allies, the 
Issaean commonwealth
17 and the Illyrian civitates who deserted king Genthius, such 
                                                           
12 Livy, 45.26.13-15 ; Zippel (1877) 96-98 ; Papazoglu (1965) 172-176; Wilkes (1969) 26-28; Suić, 
(1976d) 186-188. The text in Livy is corrupt, so the problem of determining the area of the first part is 
unsolvable; Papazoglu (1976) 202 n.28. The argument of Weber (1983) 208-210 that the part in 
question represents inland of Illyricum because Livy wanted to create the appearance of organized 
Roman expansion, is strange. 
Weber (1989) 81-93 plausibly argues that the Dassaretarum Pirustae is an error of Livy and not 
accurate information for the 2
nd century BC. Even if there were such people as the Pirustae of 
Dassaretia, they should not be confused with the Pirustae of Velleius Paterculus; Wilkes (1969) 173; 
Weber (1989) 92. 
13 Ceka (1972) 103-120 (Dyrrachium and Apollonia), 127-131 (the Amantines); (1976) 290-293.  
14 Garašanin (1974) 25-27 (Wilkes (1969) 29 is not too far from that idea). Ballaios in not mentioned 
by the sources but coinage with his name was minted in Rhizon and Pharos, and found in different 
places including several locations in Italy, cf. Rendić-Miočević (1964); (1976) 191-194; Marić (1979) 
185-195; Marović (1976) 231-244; (1988); Visona (1985). Popović (1987) 95-96 sees the authority of 
Rome behind the success of Ballaios’ currency; cf. also Wilkes (1969) 29. 
Ceka (1972) 162-165 argued that he was the Illyrian negotiator Bellus mentioned in Livy, 44.31.9. 
Zaninović (1973) 200-203 is alone in putting his rule around 3
rd Illyrian war or a couple years later on 
Pharos. 
15 The area south of Lissos; Ceka (1972) 134, 149-150. 
16 That opinion is still sometimes accepted; Alföldy (1965a) 25-26 (leaving the question open until 
Caesar as the latest date); Suić (1976d) 185-192; Weber (1989) 70; Domić-Kunić (1994) 221-222. 
There was no governor appointed for Illyricum, nor any Roman army positioned there. The provincia 
Illyricum entrusted to Anicius was nothing but a command, and formula dicta by Anicius in Scodra 
was a peace settlement, not a formula provinciae. Cf. Papazoglu (1976) 202 n. 27. 
17 Visona (1985) 121 n. 9 suggests that Issa was in financial difficulties after the Illyrian wars. 
However, that conclusion is doubtful. It is hardly possible that after the elimination of the Illyrian 
menace (and an extremely brief conflict with Genthios), which threatened Issa and her interests 
directly, anything but an economic boom could happen in the mid-Adriatic. Contemporary monetary 
emissions of Ballaios’ coinage may be a reflection of the political and economic stability of his reign; 
Rendić-Miočević (1976) 194. They also suggest the stability of the whole area. 
It is difficult to accept the view of Domić-Kunić (1994) 220-223 that Genthius took possession of 
Issa, and accept Issenses in Livy, 45.26.13 as Isseans, instead correcting the word into Lissenses; cf. 
Weber (1983) 121-124, 146-152; (1989) 69 who makes the same error. Issa was a Roman ally 
independent of the Illyrian kingdom and there is no reason for Livy to place it with other parts of the 
dissolved kingdom; Novak (1952) 37-38; Wilkes (1969) 27 n. 4. 
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as the Daorsi or Taulantii. The position and role of King Ballaios in the post-
Genthius order in Illyria is uncertain, but it is reasonable to assume that he was an 
upholder of Roman interests. Anicius’ ‘dictate of Scodra’ declared freedom to the 
Illyrians but ceded to the Republic full control of the south Adriatic with minimal 
commitment of material and military resources.
18
 
In the north, the security of an important Italian colony and port, Aquileia, 
established in 178 BC, as well as the general security of northern Italy before the 
Aquileian foundation seems to be of key strategic importance for the Romans.
19 In 
dealing with hostile peoples such as the Carni, the Taurisci and the peoples who 
constituted the Regnum Noricum, Roman diplomacy needed to make arrangements in 
order to secure the position of Aquileia. The Veneto-Illyrian Histrian kingdom 
created the greatest problems for the expansion of Roman influence and only after its 
gradual pacification finished in 177 BC was Aquileia secured. It is highly possible 
that after this victory the Romans removed the Histri from the area between Timava 
and Formio, and settled the Carni there, thus establishing a protective buffer zone 
between the Histri and Aquileia.
20 It is not clear what the final political arrangement 
with the Histri was after their defeat, but it may well be that the Roman 
administration divided them into separate tribute-paying tribes, thus weakening their 
power.
21 Perhaps these Histrian tribes were for a brief period regarded as an 
independent autonomous area,
22 and later (most certainly after Tuditanus’ expedition 
in 129 BC) they were incorporated into Cisalpine Gaul.
23  
 
                                                           
18 Sherwin-White (1973) 177 “The Roman declaration of freedom thus preserved the rights of 
conquest, without involving Rome in the encumbrance of provincial government.” See Sherwin-White 
(1973) 175-181 and Gruen (1984b) 145-157 on the political effects and aims behind the Roman 
declaration of freedom. 
19 Livy, 43.1.5-7, 9; Toynbee (1965) 284. 
20 Starac (1993/94) 10-11; (1999) 9, map 2. 
21 Cf. Petru (1977) 476-477 maps 1-2. 
22 Starac (1999) 18 “samostalna upravna oblast” but there is no firm proof for that. Šašel (1996) 26 is 
precise in his statement that there was no Roman occupation of Histria in 177 BC and that Romans 
avoided all unnecessary struggle with the Histri in trying to incorporate them peacefully. 
23 Šašel-Kos (2000) 286-288 insists on the special status of Histria as neither part of Illyricum or of 
Cisalpina, but it seems more likely that Tuditanus linked the Histri more closely with the Cisalpina, 
see Chapter 3.4. According to the straightforward logic of Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 25-26, if Histria had 
any special status then by the lex Vatinia Caesar would receive imperium over it as well, so we must 
assume that it was part of either Cisalpina or Illyricum and had no special status whatsoever.  
Starac (1993/94) 12, 19; (1999) 18-19 ff., 55 is wrong in placing Histria in the province of Illyricum 
before Caesar. Even if for the sake of argument we accept that there was a province of Illyricum in the 
2
nd century BC, as Zippel (1877) 189 suggested, it was established only in the southern Adriatic and it 
did not cover Histria. 
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3. 3  The South and Central Adriatic 
 
 In the early 150s the Delmataean alliance, newly established in the hinterland 
of the Dalmatian coast under the leadership of the civitas of Dalmion,
24 attacked the 
possessions of Roman allies and personally insulted the Roman emissaries sent to 
investigate the allies’ complaints. After the initial failures of the cos. C. Marcius 
Figulus in 156 BC, in the following year the cos. P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica 
destroyed the resistance of the Delmatae and burned Dalmion, directing his attack 
from the valley of Naron (Neretva).
25 This Roman reaction was clearly initiated by 
an attack by the Delmatae on the mainland agricultural colonies of Issa: Epetion and 
Tragurion, and on the territory of the Daorsi east of the river Neretva.
26 Polybius was 
utterly contemptuous in assessing the reasons for this war. He described it as a useful 
opportunity to keep Roman armies fit in times of general peace.
27 As an additional 
reason, he also mentioned the need for a re-affirmation of the Roman position in the 
Mid-Adriatic basin after a decade of neglect from 167 BC.
28 The Delmatae were 
formidable opponents and their alliance gained much influence after the fall of the 
Illyrian kingdom so that they threatened the new order of 167 BC with collapse. The 
                                                           
24 ∆άλµιον destroyed by Nasica 155 BC was not the same city as Delminium in the Roman era; Čače 
(1994/95) 107, 114-120, see Chapter 2.5.2. Čače also assumes that the Delmataean alliance was a 
recent political formation, named after the leading tribe settled in Delmion (1994/95) 118-120, cf. an 
early stage of that idea in Čače (1979) 133-135. This would explain why the Delmatae first appear in 
the historical records only in events from the 2
nd century BC. 
25 Polyb. 32.9; 13; App. Ill. 11; Livy, Per. 47; Flor. 2.25; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315); Frontin. Str. 3.6.2. 
Zaninović (1966) 39-40 is wrong in assuming that Salona was in the hands of the Delmatae even in 
156 BC. He supports that with the fact that Figulus attacked from Narona not Salona. But logistic 
support from Narona and Daorsi gives a much better position for attack than if he had attacked from 
isolated Greek settlements. 
26 Livy, Per. 47 cum quibus bello confligendi causa fuit, quod Illyrios socios populi R., vastaverant ; 
Polyb. 32.9; Scullard (1951) 228-229 is clearly wrong in considering these raids to be piracy because 
the Delmatae never engaged in piracy as did the Ardiaei, nor were they distinguished seamen like the 
Liburni. We should assume that this represented their ’push to the Adriatic’, which filled the political 
vacuum after the disappearance of Ardiaean kingdom, rather than any large-scale migration towards 
the sea; Zaninović (1966) 38; (1967) 19-20; Gruen (1984b) 431. For Epetion and Tragurion, see 
Chapter 2.5.1. 
27 The theory that peace was in fact negative if it went on for a long time was nothing unusual in 
ancient historiography; Woodman (1977) 157. Polybius was directly involved in these events, 
lobbying for south-Italian Locre to be freed from the obligation to send ships for the Dalmatian war; 
Pol. 12.5.1-3, so it is possible that he was personally not supportive of this intervention.  
28 Polyb. 32.13.4-9. Polybius, 32.13.6 is referring to 60 years of neglect, but war in 168 BC, although 
waged in the south Adriatic, certainly strengthened the Roman position in the mid-Adriatic and cannot 
be regarded as neglect of the area. Some scholars, are perhaps too quick to dismiss the complaints of 
Roman allies as a direct cause of this war; Wallbank (1979) 535; Harris (1979) 233-234. These 
complaints C. Fannius and other legati discussed with the Delmatae (Polyb. 32.13.1), and only after 
their mission failed, did the Senate decide to use the occasion for strategic reasons including the 
pacification of the Delmatae; Polyb. 32.13.4 ff.. Cf. similar scepticism for this judgement of Polybius; 
Wilkes (1969) 30-31; Gruen (1984b) 430-431. 
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reaction was relatively swift and efficient, and the army fully confirmed Roman 
hegemony over the central Adriatic for some time. The complete destruction of 
Dalmion caused large internal perturbations inside the Delmataean alliance; Dalmion 
lost its leadership of the alliance, and in the subsequent period the alliance was 
reorganized on a more decentralized basis.
29 In this war the valley of Neretva for the 
first time appears as an important base for the Roman army.
30 It is possible to see this 
period as a terminus post quem increased settlement and infiltration of Italians made 




The next political crisis happened in 135 BC when cos. Ser. Fulvius Flaccus 
was dispatched with 10,000 soldiers and 600 cavalry against the Ardiaei and the 
Pleraei who had attacked Roman Illyria, despite the diplomatic attempts of the 
Ardiaei to postpone or even prevent the intervention.
32 What the ‘Ρωµαίους 
’Ιλλυρίδα of Appian was has not been answered properly by modern scholarship.
33 
This crisis seems to have been triggered by the continuation of the piratical raids of 
the Ardiaei, who were attracted by the increased trade of Italian and Roman 
tradesmen, recently settled more numerously in Narona, as well the trade interests of 
Issa and the Daorsi in this area.
34 There is a problem in locating the homeland of the 
Ardiaei and their lands in 135 BC. Regardless of Strabo who located them on the 
right bank of Neretva,
35 it seems much more plausible to put them in the vicinity of 
                                                           
29 Čače (1979) 114-116. This is a speculative, but highly possible theory. 
30 App. Ill. 11. 
31 Narona (and Salona) perfectly fit into Polanyi’s port-of-trade concept, as gateway communities. A 
gateway community is understood to be a settlement, which controls points of contact between 
different social, economic and ecological systems; Polanyi (1963). See Horden/Purcell (2000) 391-
400 for more modern treatment of the subject. 
Narona as a Roman foothold is a concept developed in Zaninović (1980). The apparent lack (but not 
complete absence; Patsch (1907) 97-101 – coinage, 107-108 figs. 57-59 – the artefacts) of Hellenistic 
inscriptions and archaeological remains in Narona makes the problem of its foundation and founders 
problematic; Cambi (1980) 130-134; Gabričević (1980). Recent archaeological finds confirm its 
Hellenistic origins; Marin (2002) 418-421. 
32 App. Ill. 10; Livy, Per. 56 Fulvius Flaccus consul Vardaeos in Illyrico subegit. 
33 Papazoglu (1976) 203 argues that it was the coast belt between Neretva and Lissos that recognized 
Roman suzerainty. 
34 Novak (1952) 39; Wilkes (1969) 245-247 (Issaean interests behind the intervention).  
Cf. CIL I
2 2288-93 Republican inscriptions from Narona. Italian and Roman traders in the Illyrian 
kingdom are attested as early as Genthius’ reign 180-168 BC; Livy, 40.42.4. Cf. Škegro (1991) 61-63; 
(1999) 144-150, 174-175, 229-231 for Republican (Italian and Greek) olive oil and especially the 
wine trade in Narona. See Gabričević (1980); Katić (2002) 430-432 on the Greek and Daorsian trade 
in the valley of Naron. 
35 Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315). Some scholars still support this view; cf. Alföldy (1965a) 46-47; Zaninović 
(1966) 43, 70-76; Bojanovski (1988) 133; Cambi (1989b) 42-43. 
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the Rhizonic Gulf, so as to control the coast southeast of Neretva and the peninsula 
of Pelješac together with the Pleraei.
36 The position of the Pleraei and Ardiaei was 
such that from Pelješac they easily controlled all the navigation going to Narona, 
especially if the view, discussed above, is right that Pharos was joined in the same 
state unit with the Ardiaei. This crisis might have been the result of changed 
circumstances in the Ardiaean state unit (the death of Ballaios?) but as there are no 




It was a successful reaction of the Roman army to the threat from the 
continent that resulted in the complete elimination of the Ardiaei from history. The 
Romans resettled the Ardiaei away from the coast into the continent (eastern 
Hercegovina)
38 where they were forced to cultivate soil instead of making their 
living from piracy, as they had been used to do in the past.
39 It was a unique example 
of resettlement in Roman Republican times in Illyricum and there are no other 
occasions when it was used there before the end of the Republic. There are some 
echoes of Roman conduct in Transalpine Gaul a decade later for different strategic 
reasons, and in Pompey’s settlement of Cilician pirates in 67 BC.
40 The event shows 
Rome’s continuing commitment to the policy of guarding the trading (and other) 
interests of their allies and the security of navigation in the Eastern Adriatic, to which 
                                                           
36 Papazoglu (1963) corrected previous authorities on the location of the Ardiaei, which placed them 
in the Rhizonic gulf (Boka Kotorska); cf. Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 90-93; Garašanin (1974) 11-16; 
Marić (1989). There is also the compromise theory of Lučić (1966) who agreed with the location of 
the Ardiaei in the southeast before 167 BC, but he suggested that they then moved to the coast west of 
Neretva. 
For the location of the Pleraei: Alföldy (1965a) 47; Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 93. Cf. older 
bibliography cited in Zaninović (1970) 494 n. 12. 
37 If the Pharian inscription is correctly dated by Robert to c. 150-133 BC. Robert (1935) 505-506 
dates the inscription CIG II 1837b restoring Roman privileges to Pharos in the second third of 2
nd 
century BC. Thus it can be considered in the context of 168 or 135 BC. Some doubts on this dating 
were recently cast by Derow who puts it back to 219 BC; Derow   
(1991) 266-267. The Romans made Pharians amici after the defeat of an unknown Illyrian ruler in 135 
BC (whether Ballaios or an unknown ruler with initials ∆ΙΜ). Cf. Zaninović (1988a) 38. For ∆ΙΜ 
coinage see Rendić-Miočević (1965) 84-85. 
38 Novak (1952) 39; Garašanin (1974) 16. 
39 Strabo, 7.5.6 (C 315). There is a possibility that this re-settlement of the Ardiaei happened in 167 
after the defeat of Genthius, so that this could be a rebellion against this measure. Still, the settlement 
of 167 was duly mentioned in Livy, 45.26, and it is difficult to suppose that he did not know about it. 
Appian is silent, but he already admits to having difficulties in locating sources for the end of the war 
in 135 BC; App. Ill. 10. The Ardiaei are still attested in the early principate, but only as a shadow of a 
once powerful people; Pliny, HN 3.142. 
40 Strabo, 4.1.5 (C 180) C. Sextius Calvinus drove Gauls off the shore in 124 BC, but not for piracy. 
Pompey resettled Cilician pirates on the mainland for exactly the same reasons as Flaccus resettled the 
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Ardiaean piracy had been a serious threat in the past. Thus Rome secured the 
southern and central Adriatic coast for some time, especially the coastal area south 
from Narona and Narona itself, and its faithful allies were certainly rewarded with 
pieces of Ardiaean land.
41 Possibly after this war, Pharos was separated from the 
Ardiaei as an independent state entity, and the Romans restored all the privileges 
Pharos had previously enjoyed.
42
 
In 118 BC cos. L. Caecilius Metellus attacked the Delmatae, celebrated a 
triumph and afterwards assumed the honorific name Delmaticus. According to 
Appian there was no apparent reason for this campaign except Metellus’ desire for a 
triumph at any cost.
43 The negative bias of Appian’s source is even more visible in 
his statement that there was actually no real campaign and that Delmaticus was 
accepted as a friend in Salona,
44 where he spent the winter amongst the Delmatae and 
afterwards returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.
45 It is difficult to believe that 
even a Metellus in the 110s could achieve a triumph without a campaign, or that the 
problematic and warlike Delmatae would accept him so warmly. Again, a lack of 
source material makes certain conclusions impossible. The expansionist policy of the 
Delmatae aimed at establishing their control over the Issaean controlled part of the 
coast seems the most probable cause of tensions, following the pattern of the events 
in 156 BC. On the other hand, the campaign was certainly not particularly difficult 
and apparently there was no need for long sieges of the numerous Delmatean inland 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ardiaei, cf. Plut. Pomp. 28; Vell. Pat. 2.32.4; Flor. 1.41.14; Dio, 36.37.5; Livy, Per. 99; App. Mith. 
14. 
41 Zaninović (1966) 43 thought that the Daorsi received Ardiaean territory after they were expelled. 
Regardless of his error in positioning the Ardiaei west of Neretva, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the Daorsi received pieces of Ardiaean or Pleraean land southeast of Neretva; cf. Bojanovski 
(1988) 93, 100-101; Marić (1989) 59 describing the coast around modern-day Slano as Daorsian in 
the later period. 
42 See this section n. 37. The finds of Roman republican coinage increase rapidly from the period 140-
132 BC; Bonačić (1990).  
43 App. Ill. 11; Livy, Per. 62; Eutr. 4.23.2. The source Appian used was undoubtedly hostile to 
Metellus; cf. Dobiáš (1930) 161-162, 281; Marasco (1993) 478; Wilkes (1969) 33-34, 34 n.1. Perhaps 
it was Posidonius of Apameia, because his attitude towards Roman expansionism after 148 BC was 
very critical; Strassburger (1965) 46-47. 
44 Later Roman Salona (or Salonae) was a product of the amalgamation of several settlements, Greek, 
Roman and native; Cambi (1989a) 37-41; cf. Rendić-Miočević (1975a) 29-30. In this period our 
sources refer to the Greek-founded coastal emporium Σάλων, which belonged to the Issaean 
commonwealth. Cf. Clairmont (1975) 2, and recent archaeological evidence from the Manastirine 
locality in Marin (2002) 415-416. We cannot completely exclude the possibility however that 
neighbouring native settlements were not originally part of the Issaean commonwealth either. 
45 Clairmont (1975) 6 takes “wintering amongst the Delmatae” literally: if Metellus wintered in 
Salona, he was in fact wintering amongst the Delmatae because Salona was facing the Delmataean-
controlled hinterland. 
   Chapter 3: The realm of bifocality  64
hill-forts as there had been in 156 – 155 BC. Appian’s source, which mentions a 
friendly reception in Salona for the future Delmaticus, is correct as Romans were 
allies coming to relieve the citizens of Salona from Delmatean pressure.
46 His route 
to Salona is unknown and the most plausible suggestion seems to be that he sailed 
directly from Ancona,
47 possibly via the friendly islands of Issa and Pharos. The 
trans-Adriatic transport route seems the most logical one in all Roman interventions 
in the southern sector, as opposed to north Adriatic operations, which used Aquileia 
and Cisalpine Gaul as bases. The consequences of Delmaticus’ campaign include the 
absence of troubles in Dalmatia in the following decades and the increase of Greek 




In 78 BC C. Cosconius was sent with pro-consular imperium against the 
Delmatae.
49 There is not much in the sources about this expedition, except that he 
recaptured Salona and defeated the enemy in two years of campaigning.
50 There 
seems to be an attempt by the Delmataean alliance to exploit Rome’s internal 
instability, which was sparked by the civil war between Sulla and the Marians. This 
follows the pattern of the other contemporary conflicts, facing Sulla’s successors in 
78 BC, such as Lepidus’ rebellion, the Sertorian insurrection in Spain, the war in 
Thrace, or the rise of endemic piracy in the Mediterranean. Another reason for the 
rebellion could be the imposition of new taxation on allies in this period, as 
mentioned by Appian, which was extended to tribute-paying peoples such as the 
Delmatae.
51 This caused serious trouble to the entire Roman Illyrian and Eastern 
Adriatic policy. For the first time the Delmatae penetrated the coastal heartland of 
                                                           
46 Morgan (1971) 292 n. 26 rightly points out that Salona (in fact the Issaean commonwealth) asked 
the Romans for help.  
47 See Brusić (1980) 555 figs. 1-2; Kozličić (1990a) 155-158 fig.4; (1990b) 54; on sea routes across 
the Adriatic. Morgan (1971) 275 ff., dismissed views that Delmaticus travelled by the Dalmatian coast 
from Aquileia or that he reached Salona through the overland route from Segestica. 
48 Zippel (1877) 189 followed by Malevany (1975) thought that Delmaticus’ expedition resulted in 
“Illyrien zuerst als eigene Provinz organisirt ist.” There is nothing in the sources to support this 
opinion. 
49 It was a rather unusual grant of imperium for the period; Brennan (2000) 424-425, giving the 
impression of pressing necessity. Cosconius proved himself a very capable commander in the Social 
War, sources in Broughton (1952) 36, 39 n. 21; (1986) 77. 
50 Eutr. 6.4; Orosius, 5.23.23; cf. Cic. Clu. 97. Syme (1999) 167-169 argues that Cosconius received 
only imperium without a province. Contra Broughton (1952) 86. 
51 App. B Civ. 1.102; Sall. Hist., 2.44.6-7 (references from Sallust Hist. are from the McGushin, not 
the older Maurenbrecher edition); Orosius, 5.23.1. 
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the Issaean commonwealth, and showed up the Issaean inability to resist pressure 
from the Delmatae.  
 
Some scholars support the opinion that Salona was for the first time 
permanently captured by Cosconius from the Delmatae, who at some point in the late 
2
nd century overran the Issaean colonies Tragurion and Epetion, mentioned in 
connection with the 156 – 155 war against the Delmatae, and located close to 
Salona.
52 There is nothing in the sources to suggest the need for Roman action in this 
area between the expedition of Metellus Delmaticus in 118 – 117 BC, which checked 
the aggressive designs of the Delmatae for a while, and the campaign of Cosconius. 
We should allow the possibility that the Delmatae took control of Salona in the 
period between 85 and 78 BC.
53 It is difficult to believe that the Romans would allow 
an offensive act of the Delmatae, such as an attack (not to mention full conquest) on 
the coastal heartland of the Issaean commonwealth – a key Roman ally in the whole 
region, to pass unpunished for long.  
 
Nevertheless, the success of Cosconius was in many ways far-reaching for 
the destiny of Illyricum.
54 He did not establish the province
55 but his success 
finalised the opening of the whole coast to Roman influence. It encouraged the 
settlement of Italian traders in the areas of Salona, and enabled the Romans to pursue 
a new stage in Illyrian policy – a unified ‘coastal’ Illyricum in the time of Caesar. 
 
                                                           
52 Wilkes (1969) 33-35, 220; Zaninović (1977) 777-778; Alföldy (1965a) 99-100 arguing that the 
Delmatae conquered Salona before 100 BC. Zaninović (1966) 30 dates the Delmataean occupation of 
Salona in 78 BC. It is not possible to determine whether Epetion and Tragurion were also overrun by 
the Delmatae. 
53 There is an unclear (and possibly wrong) connection between Sulla and the Delmatae in 85 BC; 
Eutr. 5.7.1, as well as the unsuccessful transport of Roman troops into Liburnia in 84, discussed 
below. The evidence from Orosius, 5.23.1 suggests that the trouble in Dalmatia was not prolonged. 
54 Čače (1989) 87 n.75, although we disagree that the victory of Cosconius was so decisive, or that the 
Delmataean alliance was seriously affected, since in 50 BC they continue with an offensive, this time 
towards the Liburni; App. Ill. 12, see below p. 82. 
55 There is an argument that Cosconius established the province, because his alleged legate Terentius 
Varro (the antiquarian) refers to the 89 civitates seeking justice in Narona; Pliny, HN 3.142; Cichorius 
(1922) 191-192; Šašel (1970/71) 301 (Varro as a legate of Cosconius); Wilkes (1969) 485 (the 
establishment of the province). This argument stands on shaky ground. Varro is attested in Spain with 
Pompey in 76-75 BC (Varro, Rust. 3. 12. 7; Cichorius (1922) 193-194), and his knowledge of 
Illyricum refers to Liburnia where he had been the quaestor of Cinna in 85-84 BC; Rust. 3. 10. 8-10; 
Badian (1962) 60. Varro’s remark is a description of the administrative structure of Illyricum under 
Caesar in the 50s, or even as late as 35-27 BC, as Bojanovski (1988) 47 said. 
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3. 4  The North Adriatic 
In the 120 – 110s a stronger Roman political and military interest can be 
detected on the northern Adriatic coast and its hinterland. In 129 BC the consul C. 
Sempronius Tuditanus campaigned in the wider north Adriatic area. The campaign 
was centered on the Cisalpine Iapodes, but Tuditanus celebrated a triumph over the 
Taurisci, Histri and Carni.
56 Tuditanus and his legate Ti. (Latinius) Pandusa engaged 
the enemy and, after encountering initial difficulties, with the help of D. Iunius 
Brutus overcame them. The campaign was conducted on at least two fronts so that 
Tuditanus was able to return victorious to Italy, after only a couple of months, 
despite his initial setback.
57 We can assume that Pandusa fought the Taurisci and 
Tuditanus and Brutus engaged the Iapodes, because the epitomator of Livy connects 
Tuditanus and Brutus with the Iapodes. It is doubtful whether Tuditanus actually 
fought the Liburni on his way.
58 A more likely reconstruction is that the expansion of 




The sources give us no direct reason for this campaign. The Iapodean or 
Tauriscan threat to the security of North Italian trade with the Eastern Alps and the 
Sava valley and Pannonia could be seen as an important reason for the expedition of 
Tuditanus to secure Roman interests there. The expulsion of Italian traders from the 
Tauriscan gold mines could also be a direct reason for this war.
60 Following Appian, 
some scholars have suggested that Tuditanus departed on the campaign in an effort to 
                                                           
56 Livy, Per. 59; App. Ill. 10; B Civ. 1.19; Pliny, HN 3.129 Tuditanus qui domuit Histros; CIL I
2 652. 
The inscription CIL I
2 652 mentions only the Taurisci and C[arnosque], but not the Liburni (the Histri 
are confirmed by Pliny). The campaign focused on the Cisalpine Iapodes as the chief threat Čače 
(1985) 270-271; (1991) 63-65, although the Taurisci also might appear as worthwhile opponents. 
57 Morgan (1973) 31-32. Appian records Pandusa, Livy mentions Brutus. Brutus was the legate and 
Pandusa was either pro-praetor in Cisalpine Gaul (Zippel (1877) 136-137; Morgan (1971) 298-299; 
(1973) 32; Broughton (1986) 117), or the other legate of Tuditanus; Brennan (2000) 217-218. 
Münzer’s idea that Pandusa was pro-praetor in Macedonia was refuted initially by Wilkes (1969) 32-
33. 
58 Morgan (1973) 39-40 argues that he did, in order to fight Liburnian piracy, connecting it with the 
tough Roman stand on Ardiaean piracy in 135 BC (Alföldy (1974) 34 even regards the Liburni as 
primary targets of Tuditanus together with the Iapodes). Morgan also thinks that the alleged Liburnian 
campaign was an entirely distinct operation from the Iapodean. This was effectively refuted by Čače 
(1985) 270-271; (1991) 59, supported by Cerva (1996), who challenged the stereotype of Liburnian 
piracy in that era. Cf. also Dell (1967) on stereotypes of Adriatic piracy in general. 
59  Čače (1985) 273-275; (1987/88) 78-90; (1991) 63 ff; (2001) 93-94 showing that Ἰαποδικòς 
παράπλους in Strabo and Pliny represents an unidentified 2
nd century BC common source. 
60 Polyb. apud Strabo, 4.6.12 (C 208) (=Polyb. 34.10.10-14); Šašel (1974/75) 147-148. Alföldy (1974) 
34, n. 43 refutes the view that this war was connected with the ‘gold affair’. Cf. Strabo, 4.6.10 (C 207) 
for a trade route with Pannonia via Nauportus, and Šašel (1966) 203 for the importance of Nauportus 
for Roman interests. 
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avoid domestic political troubles in Rome.
61 Nothing in Appian suggests that the 
campaign was conducted solely for Tuditanus’ political reasons. There is no reason 
to believe that some other general would not have been appointed if Tuditanus 
wanted to stay at Rome. Moreover, the fact that he left Rome in the midst of  a 




The results of the campaign are not immediately apparent, but the fact that 
the Romans were able to launch successful campaigns into the Adriatic hinterland 
only a decade later, suggests lasting results from Tuditanus’ campaign. His campaign 
resulted in the conquest of the Histri and the Carni,
63 the removal of the Cisalpine 
Iapodes from the coast, and it also brought the Liburni into the Roman sphere of 
interest on a more permanent basis. After this campaign the Liburni gained privileges 
from Rome and possibly were even allowed to annex the Iapodean coast or its larger 
part.
64 The success of Tuditanus opened the whole east Adriatic coast to Rome and 
secured the already existing important trade links of Aquileia and north Italy with 
Noricum, Pannonia and Salona.
65 The expedition of Tuditanus, or less possibly, the 
later war waged by M. Aemilius Scaurus against the Taurisci in 115 BC,
66 resulted in 
significant political changes in the Eastern Alps. Part of Tauriscan territory the 
                                                           
61 App. B Civ. 1.19; Last (1951) 42. Accordingly, we can assume that the sources of Appian knew 
more about the reasons for this campaign and the campaign against Segestani in 119 BC; Marasco 
(1993) 487-488. 
62 Skefich (1967) 15-16 also assumes aggressive designs of the Iapodes. 
63 Čače (1979) 69-70 (also Starac (1999) 10) suggested on the basis of Cic. Balb. 14, 32 (naming the 
Iapodes – we do not know which ones, probably the Cisalpine – but not the Histri and Carni amongst 
Roman foederati) that these peoples were fully conquered after this campaign and become peregrini. 
Tuditanus had no time to fight all those peoples on the list despite the help of his legati, so we assume 
that the major aim of his campaign was the Iapodes and Taurisci and that the campaign against the 
Carni and Histri was nothing but straightforward annexation without significant resistance. Contra 
Morgan (1971) 298-299 suggesting that Pandusa started the war against the Histri a year before from 
Cisalpine Gaul, and fought them without success. 
64 Those immunities were the exemption from liturgies; Čače (1985) 329-330 n. 50, and the status of 
peregrini; Medini (1974) 28. Tarsatica and Senia on the Iapodean Riviera are not mentioned amongst 
the privileged Liburnian communities, so it is also possible that they kept their independence; Čače 
(1985) 277-278. 
65 Čače (1991) 67. The Central Adriatic coast at this time was still potentially, threatened by the 
Delmatae. 
There are more and more proofs of significant Italian trade with Pannonia and the Eastern Alps from 
the 5
th-4
th century BC. The artefacts and Late Republican coinage found in Pannonia suggests the 
existence of a western trade route Aquileia-Nauportus-Segestica-valley of the Sava and further 
towards the lower Danube; Strabo, 7.5.2 (C 314); Marić (1964a) 47, 49; Šašel (1977); Parović-
Pešikan (1982/83); Popović (1987) 105-113 fig. 30; Katić (2002) 428-429. 
66  CIL I, p. 49; Aur. Vic. De vir. Ill. 72.7. The triumph de Galleis Carneis suggest that either 
C[arnosque] from the eulogium of Tuditanus is the wrong reconstruction, or more likely, that the 
Taurisci and Carni openly resented the ‘new order’ of 129 BC. 
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hinterland of Tergeste all the way to the Emona basin, including the important 
portorium Nauportus, were taken from them and either annexed by the Roman res 
publica (afterwards included in Cisalpine Gaul) or, less certainly, given to the 
Norican kingdom as a reward for support.
67 An indirect result of this annexation was 
the foundation of a late Republican Roman trade settlement (vicus) in Nauportus in 
the early-mid 1
st century BC, pre-dating Caesar’s administration of Cisalpine Gaul.
68
 
In 119 BC, the cos. Lucius Aurelius Cotta and his legate L. Caecilius 
Metellus Diadematus
69 attacked the Segestani who lived on the continent with its 
principal city Segesta (later Siscia - Sisak near Zagreb).
70 It is strange that this 
important breakthrough into the Adriatic hinterland was not given more recognition 
by the sources. It is possible, however, that Appian used a source heavily biased 
against the Metelli,
71 and this is even more apparent in his account of Metellus’ 
campaign in 118 BC. Appian hints at the initial success of Cotta and Metellus, but in 
another place in his Illyrike it appears obvious that they could not force the Segestani 
to pay tribute even after a couple of years.
72 This campaign seems to have been a 
strategic continuation of Tuditanus’ campaign in 129 BC, which aimed to use a local 
                                                           
67 Šašel (1976) 416, 422, 426-427; (1985) 547-555 describes this as Roman annexation after 
Tuditanus’ campaign, while Šašel-Kos (1986) 159 places the event in the wider late 2
nd – early 1
st 
century BC context, leaving both possibilities open. See also Šašel-Kos (1995) 230-231; (1997a) 30-
31 (preferring Roman annexation), esp. n. 56, with an overview of archaeological evidence supporting 
the idea of Roman extension in this direction. The recent discovery of a late Republican/early 
Principate boundary stone between Aquileia and Emona near Bevke (13 km southwest of modern 
Ljubljana) confirms that the territory of Aquileia stretched deeply into the hinterland; Šašel-Kos 
(2002b). Finds of Republican coins in this area also supports this possibility; Kos (1986) 25-31 as well 
as finds of Roman slingshots in the area dated late 2
nd and early 1
st century BC; Horvat (1993).  
68 Šašel-Kos (1986) 147-159; cf. Zippel (1877) 195-196; Šašel-Kos (2002b) 377. 
69 Morgan (1971) very convincingly showed that Appian mixed up two different sources and that 
Metellus Delmaticus was not involved in both campaigns, 119 and 117 BC; contra: Last (1951) 108; 
Wilkes (1969) 33-34; Broughton (1951) 525. The idea of Diadematus as Cotta’s subordinate is her 
conjecture. 
Brennan (2000) 371 suggest that Diadematus was sent as a praetor to ‘Illyria’ (?) a year before and 
later continued to serve under Cotta, because “it would be odd for Diadematus, in the year when his 
brother was consul, to serve as legatus under that man’s consular colleague.”; cf. Broughton (1986) 
38. There is no reason to make these already complicated matters more complex without more hard 
evidence. In this period Romans used consuls for emergency interventions, there are only 5 special 
praetorian provinciae overseas attested from 165 to 82 BC (three in the Carthaginian crisis 149-146 
BC when consuls were engaged in Africa, M. Antonius (cos. 99 BC) 102 BC and the one under 
question for Ti. Pandusa in 130); Brennan (2000) 215-221, 371. 
70 App. Ill. 10. 
71 Wilkes (1969) 33-34 n.2, presuming that Delmaticus was present in both campaigns against the 
Segestani and the Delmatae. Regardless of which of the two Metelli were in Segesta, if Appian’s 
source was biased against Metelli, it would probably be biased against other conservative senatorial 
families such as the Cottae.  
72 App. Ill. 10, 22. Illyrike is a frustrating source and is not always to be believed. Appian is notorious 
for using inadequate sources; cf. his account of the 135 BC war where he does not bother to consult 
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crisis, unknown to us, to complete the establishment of a new political order in the 
southern Alps.
73 The expansion of Cisalpina in 129 BC required a protective layer of 
satellite states, which is exactly what this campaign aimed at. If Romans had wanted 
a significant and permanent advance towards the Sava, they could have attacked the 
Transalpine Iapodes as well, just as Octavian did in 35 BC. It would have been quite 
impossible to penetrate so deeply into the Adriatic hinterland if the Liburni or the 
Iapodes were not pacified in the rear of Cotta’s army and logistical support had not 
been received from North Italy via Nauportus. The expedition of Aemilus Scaurus 
against the Carni and Taurisci in 115 BC finalized Roman operations in the eastern 
Alpine area for a while. It strengthened their position and enabled a much more 
efficient defense of northern Italy against possible attack from that side.
74
 
Appian introduces another puzzle into the history of Roman encounters with 
Illyricum. He states clearly that the Romans twice attacked the land of the Segestani 
before Octavian did in 35 BC,
75 and that the expedition of a certain Cornelius against 
the Pannonians, amongst whom the Segestani were classed by ancient sources, 
finished so disastrously that no Roman commander attempted to attack them for a 
long time.
76 When did the Romans attack Segestica on the other occasion, and who 
was the unhappy Cornelius? Mócsy made an interesting assumption that the 
Segestani were actually a part of a larger tribal alliance dominated in that period by 
the Celtic Scordisci.
77 The prevailing opinion amongst scholars is that the Cornelius 
in question was either Cn. Cornelius Dollabella (cos. 159) or L. Cornelius Lentulus 
Lupus (cos. 156 BC) who unsuccessfully attempted to take Segestica.
78 There is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Livy or Strabo (or Strabo’s source) who all knew the final result and the consequences of Flaccus’ 
campaign, see Chapter 3.3 n. 39. 
73 Skefich (1967) 17-19 sees the Segestani as a clear and present danger to Roman interests (though 
connecting this campaign with the campaign of Metellus). 
74 Morgan (1971) 300-301 concludes that Roman control of the area was beginning to collapse in the 
110s BC. All the archaeological evidence given before contradicts this conclusion. If the Roman 
position in the eastern Alps was so weak, why did the Cimbri not use it for their own advantage in 113 
BC after the victory at Noreia? 
75 App. Ill. 12. 
76 App. Ill. 14; cf. Polyb. fr. 64 and Wallbank (1979) 748 for the Pannonian war. Morgan (1974) 208 
puts it in the wider context of the Dalmatian war 156-155 BC.  
77 Mócsy (1962) 535-536; (1974) 12. Cf. Livy, 40.57.7 on the idea of Philip V of attacking Italy per 
Scordiscos. 
78 Zippel (1877) 133-135; Scullard (1951) 228-229; Mócsy (1962) 537-538; Šašel-Kos (1990) 157 
n.102; (1997a) 29. There is nothing in the sources to support this conjecture; Broughton (1951) 447; 
Münzer (1901) 1386-1387. Morgan (1974) suggested that the Cornelius in question was P. Scipio 
Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) and that he was defeated on the Macedonian borders by the Scordisci, in 
their more natural setting, but that idea is contested by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 29 as being based on 
hypothetical premises. 
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indeed an interesting connection between the raids of the Scordisci in Macedonia and 
Roman engagement in the eastern Adriatic coast in 155 BC.
79 It is still difficult to 
believe, however, that the power of the Scordisci reached as far towards the north-
west as Segestica, nor is there credible evidence of an supposed alliance of the 
Delmatae and Scordisci in 156 and 119, as suggested by Zippel, bearing in mind 
especially that all their raids were concentrated further south against Macedonia.
80  
 
In 84 BC the consuls, Cinna and Carbo, planned to transfer soldiers from 
Ancona into Liburnia in order to have a base against the approaching army of Sulla.
81 
It has been widely suggested that the populares planned to make a short-term 
campaign in Illyricum in order to train newly conscripted soldiers there for the war 
with Sulla, rather than to take the field in what was a strategically meaningless 
area.
82 No other troubles are reported in Illyricum and if this reconstruction is true 
(which we doubt) it could be a Roman response to the fall of Salona to the Delmatae. 
It is plain, regardless of the view taken, that the populares could not plan to transport 
an army into hostile territory so that it is almost certain on this occasion that the 
Liburnians were at least on friendly terms with Rome, continuing their amicitia 
established in 129 BC.  One more campaign against the Iapodes can be detected but 
on very vague evidence, based on a fragment from Sallust’s Histories.
83 It has been 
suggested that this was part of, or the continuation of, Cosconius’ campaign against 
the Delmatae in 78 – 76 BC, which spread to the Iapodes,
84 but lack of other 
evidence leaves this argument without decisive support. 
 
                                                           
79 Obseq. 16 Dalmatae Scordisci superati (155 BC). 
80 Morgan (1971) 276 n.17; Zippel (1877) 131-132 is still being followed by some authorities like 
Barkóczi (1980) 86; Suić (1981) 135-136. Papazoglu (1978) 248-255 suggested only the alliance 
between the Segestani and Scordisci, and Mócsy (1962) 528 believed that the Scordisci ruled over the 
Segestani. 
Mirković (1970) reads Scordis in Obseq. 16 as corrupted Scodra (instead of Scordis(ci)) and suggests 
very plausibly that Obsequens actually mixes up the events form 168 and 155 BC. 
81 App. B Civ. 1.77-78. 
82 Badian (1962) 58-59; Wilkes (1969) 35; contra Baldson (1965) 232 and Seager (1982) 184 
assuming that Cinna and Carbo wanted to spare Italian soil from fighting. Šašel-Kos (1990) 157 
argued (without much proof from the sources) that the populares counted on the support of Italians 
settled there and the client-system which had been developed meanwhile. 
83 Sall. Hist. 2.38 … primam modo in Iapydiam ingressus. 
84 Adcock (1951) 715-716; Broughton (1952) 86-87; McGushin (1992) I.203; Contra: Zippel (1877) 
179; Skefich (1967) 26-27; Wilkes (1969) 35 n. 6 naming an otherwise unknown P. Licinius 
mentioned by Frontinus Str. 2.5.28 as Roman commander against the Iapodes, which is a much more 
plausible suggestion, taking into account that no Roman commander appointed against the Delmatae 
operated so far to the northwest. 
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One more Roman interaction with Illyricum is suggested in the sources, and 
surprisingly not many modern authors take it into account. Cicero briefly mentioned 
Illyricum in the context of Pompey’s sweeping the sea of pirates in 67 BC.
85 
Unfortunately, we can only guess what happened from the context and presume from 
Cicero that some squadrons under the command of Pompey patrolled and fortified 
coastal cities, as he does not mention any significant combat. Perhaps that was the 
time when Pompey established important connections through his legati, especially 
on Issa, and made clients who would support him later in the Civil War.
86
 
3. 5  Republican policy in Illyricum before Caesar 
the assessment 
As argued in the previous chapter, the two most significant general aspects of 
later Roman Republican imperialism were a generally more aggressive policy in the 
west and hegemonic supremacy over the more politically sophisticated states in the 
Hellenistic East. The treatment of southeast Illyricum shows characteristics of the 
eastern approach. The imposition of a new kind of political settlement on Macedonia 
and the former Illyrian kingdom in 167 BC enabled the Romans to exercise control 
without involving large military resources in the establishment of direct trans-
Adriatic rule.
87 The southern coast was divided in a manner similar to Macedonia 
and left under the control of Rome’s allies, the Issaean commonwealth and friendly 
native  civitates like the Daorsi. From the available evidence it is obvious that Roman 
Republican armies were sent across the Adriatic to defend the interests of Roman 
allies in 155, 135 and 78 BC in the south-central Adriatic. The consequences of 
Roman actions in the central-southern sectors included permanent removal of the 
troublesome Ardiaei and a check on the aggressive designs of the Delmatae, which 
resulted in their temporary removal from the coast as a political and military force in 
the war of 78 – 76 BC.
88 There were no further preventive actions in the Adriatic 
hinterland in this sector and Roman armies limited themselves to dealing with 
immediate danger to their (and allied) interests and showed interest in establishing 
direct control.  
 
                                                           
85 Cic. Leg. Man. 35 … missis (naves) item in oram Illyrici maris, noted only by Skefich (1967) 27. 
Starac (2000) 18 notes that Pompey’s imperium under the lex Gabinia included Illyricum as well, but 
she does not mention this brief note of Cicero. 
86 Čače (1985) 287-289. 
87 Sherwin-White (1973) 174-181, esp. 179-181; contra Harris (1979). 
88 Zaninović (1967) 20. 
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In the northwest, the strategic importance of Aquileia for the wider issue of 
North Italian security dictated the necessity of defence in depth far beyond the 
Roman frontiers, and the Romans took a more aggressive approach. This resulted in 
both short and long-term pacification of the neighboring tribes and direct annexations 
of critical zones.
89 Profits from the important trade route with Pannonia perhaps 
influenced a more aggressive Roman policy in the northern sector.
90 This was an 
easier and shorter link, which opened new markets to Italian merchants and enabled 
them to be more competitive in their struggle with the Greek and South Illyrian trade 
with the valleys of the Sava and the Danube.
91 Romans were visibly more decisive in 
this sector, making expeditions in the hinterland against the Cisalpine Iapodes, the 
Carni, Taurisci and Segestani, trying to build a ring of allied satellite states who 
could protect northern Italy from this side.
92 This was a tactic that worked in ordinary 
situations but gave no lasting security to North Italy on the exceptional occasions 
when there were sudden large movements of northern peoples, such as the Cimbri 
and the Teutoni.
93 Northwest Illyricum was part of these wider North Italian strategic 
schemes. All that the Romans needed at this time in the northwest sector was peace 
and security on the frontiers of North Italy and increased economic prosperity there, 
which the Republic achieved with these military operations.
94  
 
                                                           
89 Cf. Šašel (1976) 77. 
Perhaps the term ‘buffer-zone’ is misleading. According to Braund (1984) 93 ff. esp. 95 friendly kings 
and other state entities regarded as socii populi Romani on Roman frontiers, played the role of 
intermediary between Romans and peoples outside their influence, rather than performed only the 
protective task of providing a buffer zone. 
90 This is only a speculation as we cannot determine the influence of trade on contemporary Roman 
politics, nor we can fully assess the extent or volume of Italian-Pannonian trade in this period. 
However, available evidence suggests this interpretation. 
91 Cf. Popović (1987) 96-115. It is difficult to agree with him that Roman trade followed Roman 
conquest; (1987) 125. In fact Roman trade preceded and initiated political expansion. Also, there is no 
reason to believe that Rome directly stood behind the success of the Apollonian and Dyrrachian 
drachma. It is certain that there was no need to supplement an already established currency with the 
Roman denarius (1987) 98-99. Apollonia and Dyrrachium managed their trade with the hinterland for 
a while, (Malevany (1963) 164; Mano (1976)) producing their drachmae until the Roman civil war 
(Ceka (1972) 103 ff., 179-180) keeping between themselves “... un accord economique tacite qui 
reglait la question du monnayage des drachmes”; Ceka (1972) 179, 97-103. 
92 This looks as a clear example of Luttwak’s Republican/Iulio-Claudian strategic system; Luttwak 
(1976) 20-40. 
Šašel-Kos (2000) 286-288 does not see Histria as strategically important for the defence of northern 
Italy, and was not annexed until the 1
st century BC. The strategic importance of Histria should be 
considered in the maritime context – the fight against piracy and the control of the sinus Adriaticus. 
93 Actually the Boii, Scordisci and Taurisci defeated the Cimbri, Strabo, 7.2.2 (C 293), proving that 
the system worked even in extraordinary situations. Danger for Rome was checked outside Italy, and 
the Romans had the opportunity to fight the battle outside the Italian mainland in Noricum. 
94 Šašel (1996) 28 “Sve što je Rim tada trebao bio je mir na sjevernim granicama i jačanje 
gospodarstva u pograničnom pojasu, a to je vojnim operacijama bilo osigurano.” 
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Romans did not keep garrisons in Illyricum at this time and, if examples of 
these in the 50s were not a recent innovation, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
local Roman allies such as Issa, or the Liburni, were in charge of everyday security 
(Chapter 4.2). The Romans did not pursue exclusive pro-Greek or pro-native policies 
in this period. They chose the most suitable allies who were interested in the 
expansion of trade, well-urbanized and more or less integrated into the 
Mediterranean system. The first obvious choice was the long-standing ally, the 
Issaean commonwealth. The economic and political power of Issa and its 
significance for Italian trade interests was indeed an important factor in Roman 
policy,
95 but Romans did not hesitate to include natives such as the Liburni or Daorsi 
in the circle of their allies and friends as well.
96 The role of the Liburni as regional 
upholders of Roman interests was very significant, not only for the functioning of the 
North Adriatic policy, but also for whole Adriatic policy, as it enabled a land-link 
with the Issaean commonwealth and the southern Adriatic.
97 The main 
troublemakers, the Delmataean alliance, were a strong and well-organized military 
and political force, which attempted to assert itself as a regional power in the vacuum 
that appeared after the dissolution of the Ardiaean kingdom.
98 There they clashed 
with the interests of the Issaean commonwealth, so that Rome was forced to 
intervene three times in this period in order to preserve the position of its ally and the 
whole ‘order of Scodra’. 
 
Nothing in the sources suggests the existence of a separate province of 
Illyricum until at least 59 BC. Roman magistrates operating in this sector received 
special  provinciae  while in office, and were not based in Cisalpine Gaul or 
Macedonia. In emergency situations, the magistrates were entrusted with special 
                                                           
95 Issa was the regional economic leader in Dalmatia, Pharos and Korkyra followed; see Derow (1973) 
125-126; Zaninović (1977) 770-771, 774-776; Dukat/Mirnik (1976) 182-184; Crawford (1985) 220-
221, App. 50. The coins of central Adriatic Greeks had limited internal use, because their trade with 
the Illyrian hinterland was based mainly (but not exclusively) on exchange; Popović (1987) 87-91; 
Zaninović (1976a) 307.  
After 200 BC, Italian exports to Issa significantly increased, (Bonačić-Mandinić/Visona (2002) 327-
330) so we can assume that interest in trade additionally influenced the Senate to support Issaean 
interests. 
96 The Daorsi also maintained intensive trade with the Hellenistic world and minted their own coins; 
Dukat/Mirnik (1976) 184; Marić (1976) and Hellenistic influences and developed trade in Liburnia 
are archaeologically well attested; Batović (1974). For native urbanization, see Suić (1976b) 63-81. 
97 Suić (1981) 137-138; Čače (1991) 55-71 recognised the essentially friendly nature of the Roman-
Liburnian relationship and their common interests. It is possible that Liburnian trade (rather than 
political) influence was reaching the Central Adriatic as suggested by Čače (1991) 79-80; (1998) 78-
81. 
98 Zaninović (1966) 38; Čače (1979) 101-116 esp. 113-116. 
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imperium  for Illyricum,
99 but there is no evidence that they conducted any 
administrative tasks there.
100 The argument of Brunt
101 that all consuls who operated 
in Illyricum used Cisalpine Gaul as a base is applicable only to the campaigns of 129 
and 119 BC, conducted in the North Adriatic sector, while for other campaigns direct 
sea transport from Italy via the friendly island of Issa is much more likely.
102 There 
are a couple of valid reasons why Romans did not wish to occupy completely and 
administer Illyricum, and the most important of them seems to be the fact that 
occupation would be fruitless and too expensive.
103  
 
There is no strong evidence to suggest that the principal motivation behind 
Roman policy was the pursuit of military glory. If Illyricum was a hunting ground for 
triumphs, as has been suggested, it seems reasonable to ask why the Romans were so 
passive in Illyricum in the Late Republic. Morgan properly characterized these 
actions as ‘police’ actions, taking into account their briefness and efficiency.
104 
Romans had only seven, possibly eight, documented encounters with the two parts of 
Illyricum for 109 years between 168 and 60 BC, and only once in the sources is it 
suggested, but not proven, in the case of Metellus Delmaticus that a Roman 
imperator earned an easy triumph. Illyricum does not show the pattern of the other 
areas where Romans were militarily involved in this period, such as the pattern in 
Spain or periodically in Gaul. Political contacts are rare, military involvement was 
caused mainly by requests of the allies, and their extent is limited to either the north 
or south-central sector, never along the whole coast. 
 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that there was no distinct 
unified Roman Republican Illyrian policy before 59 BC. Initially, the Romans saw 
Illyricum not as a single system but as a part of the regional systems North Italy and 
Macedonia and accordingly applied their policy for these areas onto the neighboring 
                                                           
99 Wilkes (1969) 36 noted that all the magistrates acting in Illyricum in this period, except Cosconius, 
were consuls in office. It was usual practice to send consuls in office to deal with emergency 
situations; Rich (1993) 50-53; Brennan (2000) 215-221, 371. This is significant as it proves that 
Illyrium was not a province, and it also makes clear that Roman involvement in Illyricum was only in 
an emergency. 
100 Syme (1999) 164-173; Wilkes (1969) 37-38 also does not rule out that possibility. Illyricum as an 
attachment to Cisalpine Gaul is suggested by the sources for the year 59 BC. Cf. Plut. Caes. 14.6-7 … 
προσθεìς τὸ  Ἰλλυρικόν; Suet. Iul. 22.1 Galliam Cisalpinam Illyrico adiecto, see Chapter 4.2 n. 6. 
101 Brunt (1987) 566-568. 
102 It was the main trans-Adriatic route from Neolithic times; Brusić (1970) 555 and figs. 1, 2. 
103 Čače (1985) 294-295; Šašel (1996) 28. 
104 Morgan (1971) 293; “spedizioni punitive” Šašel (1976) 77-82. 
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parts of what would in the future be Illyricum. Roman allies who were not strong 
enough to be rivals to Roman domination themselves and who were interested in 
general peace and security in the Adriatic area for the expansion of trade were left in 
charge as Roman regional sheriffs. The Romans used force to intervene on more 
difficult occasions but the political situation did not present Rome with any 
significant problem at all, judging by the few interventions attested in the sources. 
The focal point of political disturbances was control over the gateway communities 
of Salona and Narona.
105 Illyricum was a stable system in this period. The political 
frameworks imposed on its south and northwest did not create opposition but enabled 
the system to function without more significant political turbulences.  
 
The central geographical position of the Issaean συµπολιτεία in the eastern 
Adriatic certainly influenced the development of this unusual bifocal Republican 
politics in Illyricum, and its friendly policy and allied status made development of a 
unified coastal Illyricum in the late Republic unnecessary. The north witnessed 
generally a more aggressive Roman approach because it was potentially the weakest 
spot in the defense of North Italy and the Italian homeland. In addition Aquileian 
trade interests demanded peace and Roman domination in this area.  
 
It does not seem from the evidence that Roman influence in Illyricum 
diminished; in fact, it seems that Roman influence increased in the 2
nd and first half 
of the 1
st century BC. There was no danger to Roman interests from peoples in the 
hinterland, and the rather rare engagements indicate stability in the area as well as 
increased settlement of Italians and Roman citizens. On the other hand, it is obvious 
that at this time the Romans were not interested in entering the Balkans and did not 
want to risk fighting in difficult terrain.
106 The political concerns of Rome were 
based on very broad principles here, and except for the security of Aquileia or the 
interests of Roman allies, Illyricum was really outside the immediate political 
concerns of Rome. Its geographical proximity to Italy required that the area should 
be kept under control, and that is what we see from the Roman record in Illyricum. 
                                                           
105 See Chapter 3.3 n. 31.  
106 Schmitthenner (1958) 220 “ … wie es die Art der römischen Politik immer gewesen war nur die 
gefährlichen Löcher verstopft nie eine umfassende direkte Einbeziehung des Balkans in den 
römischen Machtraum angestrebt.” 
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Romans did not send generals to hunt for triumphs, but sent armies only when the 
political situation demanded military action. 
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4.  Change on the Horizon: Caesar in Illyricum and the 
Civil War 59 – 44 BC 
 
 
4. 1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss Roman policy towards Illyricum in those decisive 
years when the Roman Republic was in the final stages of its collapse during 
Caesar’s pro-consulship, 59 – 50 BC, and the civil war that followed. The earlier 
bifocal approach discussed in Chapter 3, which divided the area into a northern and 
southern sector, was abandoned during Caesar’s pro-consulship, or less probably, a 
short time before then, and Rome imposed a new political/constitutional framework 
on the regional system of Illyricum.  Illyricum was still not a separate province at 
this time; perhaps the undefined and vague term proto-province would best describe 
the ambivalent position of Illyricum in this phase. This thesis will examine reasons 
for the changed political framework and its effect on Illyricum. This political 
framework, termed ‘coastal’ Illyricum, lasted from 59 to 33 BC and can be roughly 
divided into two chronological sub-phases from 59 to 44 BC and from 44 to 33 BC. 
They are discussed in this chapter and the next. 
 
Illyricum’s strategic importance for Rome suddenly, perhaps unexpectedly, 
increased, especially in view of the rising power of the Dacian empire, its political 
influence in Pannonia, and its presence in the Black Sea area. Illyricum was also a 
significant battlefield during the civil war in 49 – 45 BC. The civil war brought 
general insecurity to the Mediterranean world, and this is reflected in the weakening 
of the Roman position for a short time in Illyricum. The succession of Roman 
generals in the 40s who attempted to pacify the area, especially the ambitious and 
aggressive Delmataean alliance, failed to achieve lasting success. A threat to the 
influence of the Romans also came from the Transalpine Iapodes, who used the 
opportunity to threaten North Italy with the two raids in and 36 BC.
1
 
                                                           
1 Yet, there are valid grounds for questioning the scale of the alleged instability in Illyricum in this 
period; cf. Schmitthenner (1958) 224. 
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For this period our sources are much more abundant than for the mid- to late 
Republican period. Caesar and Hirtius are contemporaries (and agents) of the events 
and without doubt our best sources for the period. A couple of brief notes from 
Caesar’s Gallic and Civil Wars provide some insight into the political situation in 
Illyricum as well as the conduct of Roman magistrates there. Some useful 
contemporary information may also be deduced from Cicero’s written 
correspondence with Vatinius who fought the Delmatae near Narona in the mid-40s. 
Later sources, like Dio, Appian and Plutarch, unfortunately make many obvious 
errors and provide an often confused chronology of the events, so they are not 
especially reliable for the period of the civil war.
2 Lucan’s poem also provides some 
information, and there is even some epigraphic evidence from this period, such as the 
inscription from Salona. 
 
4. 2  Illyricum as a proto-province: strategic and military matters 
In 59 BC C. Iulius Caesar was appointed pro-consul of Cisalpine Gaul and in 
addition he received command over Illyricum by means of the lex Vatinia de imperio 
Caesaris.
3 The ultimate significance of this fact for the destiny of the Republic 
overshadows another important thing – the state of affairs in Illyricum, which 
becomes clearer in this period thanks to more abundant sources, focused on Caesar. 
The law of Vatinius raises two major problems. The first concerns the political 
motives behind Caesar’s command over Illyricum and the second concerns the 
constitutional position of Illyricum in 59 BC. Some authors think that Illyricum was 
already a province just before Caesar’s pro-consulship in the late 60s,
4 and others 
                                                           
2 Marasco (1997) 313 ff. Marasco is directly contradicting Pelling (1979) 84-85 esp. n. 73. Pelling 
argues that these authors directly followed Asinius Pollio. As it is hardly possible to believe that 
Pollio would make so many errors, Marasco’s argument seems more convincing. 
3 Sources: Broughton (1952) 190; Skefich (1967) 139-142. Caesar additionally received command 
over Transalpine Gaul after Metellus Celer died before departing to his province. See Gelzer (1928); 
Baldson (1939) and Skefich (1967) 64-101, 143-190 for the chronology, the political background, the 
purpose and older literature on the subject of this law. 
4 Broughton (1952) 183, 191; Shackleton-Bailey (1977) I.353; Brennan (2000) 424-425, 493-494. 
Cic. Fam. 13.41-42 asked the pro-consul L. Culleolus to press the Illyrian Byllinoi to pay back a loan 
to L. Lucceius. This letter is dated before 58 BC (Shackleton-Bailey (1977) I.353; contra McDermott 
(1969) 239-240 dating it in 48 BC) and Culleolus is assumed to be governor of Illyricum as he cannot 
be placed in either Macedonia or Cisalpine Gaul in that time. There is a slight problem to this 
argument, however. The Bulliones lived southeast of Apollonia and Apollonia is attested as part of 
Macedonian province in 50 BC; Cic. Pis. 86, 96; Papazoglu (1976) 204. Thus, the whole argument 
about Illyricum being a province before Caesar is invalid, as Culleolus was governor of Macedonia, 
regardless of when this letter is dated; Skefich (1967) 28-29. 
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think it became de facto a province with the passage of the lex Vatinia in 59 BC.
5 
The sources reporting Caesar’s appointment differ in their details but no source 
suggests that Illyricum was in any way separate from the administration of Cisalpine 
Gaul as a different province; it was only an attachment to his imperium over 
Cisalpine Gaul.
6 In fact, the only contemporary source we have on this matter, 
Cicero, in his speech De provinciis consularibus in 56 BC, refers only to the Galliae 
duae under Caesar’s command, and clearly understands Illyricum to be part of the 
Cisalpine provincia.
7 The reason for the attachment of the command of Illyricum to 
the administration of Cisalpine Gaul is not stated by the sources. It seems to be of a 
preventive nature, to enable the provincial governor freedom of action if there was 
need for operations in north-western Illyricum. The rising power of the Dacians 
under King Burebista in Pannonia, or fear of the Helvetii, which both potentially 
threatened the security of North Italy, could be considered serious enough to attach 
Illyricum to the Cisalpina.
8 On the other hand, some scholars argue that Illyricum (or 
at least the northwest zone as defined in Chapter 3.4) was routinely attached to 




The rise of the Dacian state and the military successes of Burebista in 
northern Pannonia might cause some political turbulence on the northern frontiers of 
Illyricum in the first years of Caesar’s imperium. Burebista’s army, helped by the 
Scordisci, defeated the alliance of the Boii and Taurisci led by Cristasirus, which had 
                                                           
5 Rendić-Miočević (1980) 17 and Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 21 (59 BC). Contra Freber (1993) 125-127; 
Syme (1999) 169-173. 
6 Plut. Caes. 14.10: Illyricum added; Pomp. 48.3: two Gauls and Illyricum; Cato Min 33.3: rule over 
Illyricum and two Gauls; App. B Civ. 2.13: two Gauls, no mention of Illyricum; Dio, 38.8.5: Illyricum 
and Cisalpine Gaul; Suet. Iul. 22.1: Illyricum added to the Gauls; Vell. Pat. 2.44.5: two Gauls. Only 
Orosius, 6.7.1 explicitly states that Illyricum was an independent province in 59 BC. Cf. Papazoglu 
(1976) 205 n.38. 
7 Cic. Prov. Cons. 2, 3; 15, 36. 
8 Gelzer (1968) 86-87 and 87 n.1; Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304) (Burebista); Baldson (1939) 183 (the 
Helvetii), but the view is seriously undermined by Timpe (1965), see Chapter 4.2 n. 16. 
9 Wilkes (1969) 37-38; Freber (1993) 168-169. Wilkes also rightly denied the possibility that Caesar 
planned to make a conquest of Illyricum before rising unrest in Gaul prevented him from doing so. 
There is no evidence for that claim. Skefich (1967) esp. 70 ff., (cf. Sherwin-White (1957) 36-39) who 
bases his whole thesis upon the premise that, before he got the imperium over Transalpine Gaul, 
Caesar initially planned to focus upon campaigning in Illyricum. His point is not convincing enough 
as it speculates too much without evidence and ultimately fails to explain Caesar’s obvious lack of 
interest in Illyricum. 
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been hastily forged in the wake of the Dacian danger in c. 60 BC.
10 It is possible that 
the Norican kingdom, or some of its reguli used this opportunity and, with the 
blessing of the Romans, annexed those Tauriscan communities who were living on 
their southern borders. For that reason Pliny ambiguously called them quondam 
Taurisci appellati nunc Norici.
11 Nevertheless, the Dacians presented only a potential 
and very remote danger to Roman interests in Illyricum in 59 BC.
12 Burebista’s 
power did not extend to Pannonia or Central Europe.
13 His attention was visibly 
focused on Thrace and the Black sea region, so that any suggestion that he was 
stirring up trouble in Dalmatia lacks credibility, as there is no evidence for it.
14 
Caesar’s appointment to Cisalpine Gaul was more a matter of domestic politics than 
of immediate threat to the Roman frontiers.
15 However, the migration of the Helvetii 
and military success of the Dacians (if 60 BC is the precise date) caused at least 
some political instability in western Pannonia and the eastern Alps. The consequence 
of this instability was that the Boii besieged Noreia, the capital of Noricum, in 58 BC 
as the allies of the Helvetii, according to Caesar.
16
 
Caesar mentions Illyricum only twice in the Gallic Wars. In the winter of 57 
– 56 BC he intended to go there personally quod eas quoque nationes adire et 
regiones cognoscere volebat, but the suddenly worsening situation in Gaul prevented 
                                                           
10 Strabo, 5.1.6 (C 213), 7.3.11 (C 304), 7.5.2 (C 313); Crişan (1978) 113-122. This event is usually 
dated to 60 BC, but the chronology of Burebista’s rule was recently questioned, and this battle dated 
even after the death of Caesar by some authors; see Dobesch (1994); Lica (2000) 65 ff. esp. 68-70. 
11 Pliny, HN 3.133; Strabo, 4.6.9 (C 206); Šašel (1976) 79; Kos (1986) 21 dating the annexation in the 
mid-1
st century BC. Šašel-Kos (1998) 212-216, esp. 215 is essentially in general agreement with this 
view but dates this annexation to the late 2
nd century BC. See also Šašel-Kos (1986) 159; (1995) 230-
231; (1997a) 30-31. The other approaches to the problem of the Norican Taurisci in Alföldy (1966); 
Petru (1968) 362-364; (1977) 482-486. 
12 Timpe (1965) 193-194. 
13 Crişan (1978) 143-146. 
14 It would be very rash to see the troubles with the Delmatae in 50-48 BC as starting with the Dacians 
(as Condurachi, quoted and accepted by Dacoviciu (1977) 905 n. 54 and Freber (1993) 169-170 n. 
845). Burebista’s policy perhaps had more things in common with the policy of Mithridates VI; 
Condurachi (1978); Crişan (1978) 122-131. This particular view has been questioned by Lica (2000) 
82, but Burebista’s political focus on Pontus remains an unquestioned fact.   
15 Cf. Gelzer (1968) 87; Cary (1951) 519; Timpe (1965) 192 ff.  
16 Caesar, B Gall. 1.5.4. Whether Burebista defeated the Boii and Taurisci in 60 BC or later remains 
an open question, but it seems that the political situation in the wider Alpine region was unstable 
when Caesar received imperium over Illyricum. Timpe (1965) makes out strong argument against this 
view. He argues that Caesar himself invented the perception of the threat (cf. Gardner (1983)) and 
carried the Gallic war entirely on his own initiative, and that the situation on Roman frontiers was 
nothing out of the ordinary in 59 BC. 
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him from reaching his destination.
17 In 54 BC he was forced to take counter-
measures against the troublesome Pirustae who were attacking the ‘remotest parts of 
the province’; he ordered a mobilization of Roman allies before reaching Illyricum, 
but seemingly that was enough to calm the problems and permit the solution of the 
crisis through diplomatic means.
18 It is not entirely clear what targets the Pirustae 
attacked or threatened. Scholars agree that they inhabited the mountainous and mine-
rich area around modern Pljevlja (Northern Montenegro / South-eastern Bosnia).
19 If 
this location is right, it is highly possible that the security of Narona, or that of the 
Roman allies in the area such as the Daorsi or the Taulantii, was under threat.
20 
Caesar's actions prove that Illyricum existed as a unified zone of operation at this 
time because the Pirustae dwelt in the area that had never been a responsibility for 
Roman magistrates operating in the northwest zone in the 2
nd century BC (Chapter 
3.4). 
 
In 51 BC the Iapodes (it is not clear which ones, probably the Transalpine 
Iapodes) threatened the security of Aquileia and Tergeste.
21 It appears to have been a 
serious incursion. Its consequences show the potential weakness of the Roman 
defense system, or possibly it appears to have been a result of Caesar’s complete lack 
of interest in Illyrian matters. No reasons for this incursion are given in the sources, 
but it has been suggested that there is a possibility that the recent foundation of the 
municipium of Tergeste made the Cisalpine Iapodes feel threatened and for that 
reason they broke their agreement with the Romans.
22 Strabo’s more recent source 
                                                           
17 Caesar, B Gall. 3.7, cf. 2.35. Caesar does not say whether he reached Illyricum or not in 57-56 BC. 
We know for certain that he was at Aquileia at that time, where he met the delegation of the Issaean 
commonwealth, see below p. 83. Gelzer (1968) 116; Skefich (1967) 107-113; Papazoglu (1976) 205 
and Šašel-Kos (1986) 104 suggest that Caesar was in Illyricum in the winter 57-56 BC, while Wilkes 
(1969) 38-39 wisely leaves this question open. 
18 Caesar, B Gall. 5.1. Caesar does not mention any Roman army units with him, but it is clear that he 
would have led the attack on the Pirustae in person. The Pirustae were mentioned by Vell. Pat. 2.115 
as a dangerous and formidable enemy in the AD 6-9 rebellion. 
19 Alföldy (1965a) 56-59; Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 96-97; Wilkes (1969) 173-174; Bojanovski 
(1988) 90-91. The Pirustae were named by Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314) as the Pannonii and it is possible that 
they were successors of the Autariatae who inhabited this area in earlier times; Wilkes (1992) 205. 
20 Skefich (1967) 11-120 assumes that targets were more to the south, the civitates of Labeatae, 
Taulantii and those civitates later united by the Roman administration in the civitas Docleatae, Pliny, 
HN 3.143, see Chapter 8.4. 
21 Caesar (Hirtius), B Gall. 8.24. Suić (1967) 47-48; Calderini (1972) 29 make this reconstruction. 
They connect this raid of unnamed attackers with App. Ill. 18, who mentions two undated attacks of 
the Iapodes before 35 BC. 
22 Zaccaria, quoted in Šašel-Kos (2000) 292 n.65. The foundation date of the colony in Tergeste is 
disputed, as it is possible to date it later in the 30s BC, and establishment of the municipium in 49 BC; 
Keppie (1983) 201-202. 
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for the description of this area clearly implies that the Iapodes extended their power 
almost to the pass of Ocra.
23 The citizens of Aquileia built a protective wall after this 
raid and Caesar sent the legate T. Labienus and the XV
th legion into the threatened 
area for its protection and to prevent further attacks.
24
 
The Promona affair happened in 50 BC, when the Delmatae attacked and 
took possession of the Liburnian-held border stronghold of Promona.
25 After the 
Liburnian appeal, Caesar sent strong forces; they were defeated by the Delmatae and 
their allies, who tried to use the prospect of a new Roman civil war to make some 
territorial gains.
26 Some scholars believe that there were no Roman troops committed 
in this engagement, but that Roman allies supplied troops possibly under the 
command of a Roman officer, as they had done when the Pirustae earlier threatened 
the security of the area.
27 This event also shows the importance of a local self-
defense system, although it is unclear how that might pacify troubles arising in the 
hinterland, because Roman allies such as the Issaeans or Liburni had stronger naval 
than infantry capabilities. The Promona affair reveals the growing strength and 
vitality of the Delmataean alliance in the late 50s. There was a visible change in their 
strategic aims, from earlier unsuccessful pressure on Salona and the Manian Bay. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Still there were other obvious reasons like the opportunity for rich plunder, or maybe the Transalpine 
Iapodes who did not have a foedus with Romans, made this incursion; Šašel-Kos (2000) 292. 
23 Strabo in two places 4.6.10 (C 207) and 7.5.2 (C 314) describes the same area, but his accounts 
derive from two different sources. 7.5.2 is older because it regards Nauportus as a Tauriscan 
settlement, and the Iapodean-controlled territory is larger in 4.6.10 as compared with 7.5.2; Šašel 
(1966) 199 n.5; (1977) 158; Šašel-Kos (1990) 144-145; (2002a) 146-148. 
24  CIL I² 2648. The XV
th legion had been recruited just a year before and lacked experience in 
fighting; Caesar, B Gall. 6.1; Šašel (1985) 547-548. 
25 Whose possession was Promona before 50 BC? Suić (1960/61) 195-196 thought that Promona was 
part of the Liburnian Varvarian municipality. A different opinion is expressed by Čače, who argues 
that Cocsconius took Promona from the Delmatae in 78-76 BC and gave it to the Liburni as a reward 
for their support; Čače (1989) 87 n.75. The population of Promona was culturally close to the 
Delmatae; Zaninović (1966) 47-55. Suić looks more persuasive here. The coastal communities of the 
Nestoi, Hyllaei or Bulinoi were not part of the Delmataean alliance, although culturally akin to them, 
see Chapter 2.5.1 n. 71. So it seems more probable that Promona belonged to the independent or 
Liburnian-allied Varvarini than to the Delmatae who had only recently expanded towards the 
northwest. It is doubtful whether they permanently controlled any part of it, especially north of 
Tragurion in that time. 
26 App. Ill. 12. The names of these allies remain unknown. Čače (1993) 7-8 (after App. Ill. 12 καì 
ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἰλλυριϖν) suggests action by the larger Illyrian alliance composed of the Delmatae, 
their clientes and allies. He also points out that it is very possible that numerous people of the Ditiones 
(239 decuriae Pliny, HN 3.142) who bordered the Liburni in the upper flow of the Titius joined the 
Delmatean alliance. See Bojanovski (1988) 262-265 for the location of the Ditiones. 
27 Skefich (1967) 123-125; Wilkes (1969) 39-40, see above p. 81. 
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They attacked for the first time in the west and threatened Liburnian territory. Still, it 
was probably an operation with limited aims as the Delmatae were not militarily able 
to handle the siege of numerous Liburnian strongholds in the Liburnian heartland - 
the Ravni Kotari area.
28 It is unclear what happened to Promona later. It was 




4. 3 Proto-administration  of the proto-province
Caesar apparently had more administrative and diplomatic than military 
duties in Illyricum as the situation remained stable during his magistracy, and he was 
more often engaged in the affairs of Gaul.
30 Lack of sources prevents us from 
determining what Roman administrative structures, if any, existed before Caesar. 
Varro’s report of 89 civitates coming into, i.e. being administered from Narona may 
suggest that some basic administrative structure existed in Illyricum before Caesar’s 
time, but this information supplied by Varro should be dated later.
31 In fact, it is very 
possible that Caesar during his imperium did not bother to make any more significant 
intervention into the administrative division of Illyricum, and was content with 
existing geographical-ethnic divisions in the area.
32
 
There is a damaged inscription from Salona, which mentions an embassy 
from the Greeks and Romans settled in Dalmatia to Caesar, while he was in 
Aquileia.
33 Unfortunately, the preserved text is confusing and difficult to interpret; 
                                                           
28 Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 173-174, from a military and archaeological point of view. We do not know 
the Liburnian capabilities or the political situation inside the Liburnian league at the time. 
29 App. Ill. 25. The campaign of Asinius Pollio, see below p. 99, may well be the reason why Promona 
was returned to the Liburni. Contra Čače (1993) 9 (but still leaving the possibility open in n. 21) and 
Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 173-176, putting it during the civil war, and Nagy (1991) 58 expressing the 
opinion that it was taken by Octavian or his legate in 39-38 BC. 
30 It has been suggested that the prospect of profit and glory in Gaul determined his preference for 
Gaul over Illyricum; Šašel-Kos (2000) 301. While this was an important secondary reason, we cannot 
forget that there was initially genuine fear (well manipulated by Caesar though, Gardner (1983)) of the 
consequences of Helvetian migration to Northern Italy, Cic. Att. 1.9.2 Gallici belli metus; Freber 
(1993) 168. 
31 See Chapter 3.3, n. 55. 
32 See similar point made by Čače (2001) 93, 100. Caesar’s laissez faire approach in Gaul is well 
known; Drinkwater (1983) 18-19. 
33 Three inscriptions have been found on separate locations, originating from the same monument; 
Sherk (1969) 139-142 no. 24. Sherk regards this document (with or without reason, it is difficult to 
say) as a senatus consultum. 
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yet it is the only surviving document of this kind and therefore immensely important 
for any study of Roman Illyrian policy. The first part of the inscription is dated to 
early 56 BC and it mentions the embassy from Tragurion, an Issaean colony on the 
mainland. It was led by C. Gavenius, Roman citizen, who spoke about friendship 
between Issa and Rome. The second part provides Roman friendship and alliance 
with Issa. The last part, poorly preserved, give unclear references to the citizens of 
Tragurion and the Ἰα]δαστιν[οί who were for some time regarded as the native 
inhabitants of the immediate neighborhood of Tragurion until modern scholarship 
agreed that they are in fact the citizens of Liburnian Iader.
34
 
The tantalizing reconstruction of this important document leaves plenty of 
scope for speculation about its contents. The first part mentions diplomats from 
Tragurion, the second part is concerned with Issa and the document was found in 
Salona, so that confusion is complete. Whose interests were in question and what 
happened in Aquileia? Several opinions are offered by modern scholars. Without any 
essential knowledge of the area, Culham recently stated that the Illyrians first 
threatened Tragurion so that the Tragurians asked Rome for help through the mother-
colony. Salona was also an interested party to the problems with the natives, so that a 
copy was also kept there.
35 In the same manner the suggestion that it was Graeco-
Roman tensions in the area, which triggered the embassy rather than problems with 
the natives lacks any sound basis.
36 This problem is at present unsolvable and only 
                                                           
34 Rendić-Miočević (1935/49) argued in favour of the Iadasinoi. 
Sherk (1969) 141 reads Iader instead of Iadasinoi and the majority of scholars currently accept this 
reading; cf. the weighty linguistic evidence of Suić (1975a). Suić (1981) 142-143; Nikolanci (1989b) 
understood that the Iadasinoi were only the Roman citizens settled in Iader, and Čače (1993) 24-27; 
(1998) 76 ff. plausibly argues against Suić, pointing out that the Iadasinoi are the citizens of Iader, 
native Liburni. 
There is also an alternative, more liberal reading of the inscription, suggesting that it conferred 
freedom from taxes, and guaranteed freedom of navigation in the Manian bay for Salona, Issa and 
Iader, instead of settling a border dispute; Suić (1973) 190-191. 
35 Culham (1993) following the outdated reading of Rendić-Miočević (1935/49). It does not seem 
convincing that insignificant Iadastinoi from the neighbourhood of Salona (as in Wilkes (1969) 10, 
154, 220-221, 360 who also follows Rendić-Miočević) would make such trouble for regional 
heavyweights. 
36 Wilkes (1969) 38-39. Cf. the same opinion in Novak (1949) 73-74; Suić (1973) 184 ff.; (1981) 144-
146; (1996) 273-274; Kuntić-Makvić (2002) 149-150. It is not fully convincing in light of the 
continuing good relationship between Romans and Issa, as convincingly argued by Čače (1998) 80. 
The other flaw is Suić’s understanding that Romans had already established portoria in Illyricum, and 
so threatened Greek interests, whereas they are not epigraphically attested there before the early 
Principate, see below p. 87. 
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speculation is possible. The mention of Iader, Issa, Tragurion, the Manian Bay
37 and 
possibly Salona and Epetion together in the same document suggests its general 
importance and the complexity of the political situation inside Illyricum.
38 After 
Caesar had settled problems with the Issaeans, he sent Q. Numerius Rufus as his 




Early Italian settlement and the municipalization of cities on the Illyrian coast 
are two very important aspects of Roman Illyrian policy that became more apparent 
in this period. They directly influenced the important strategic shift in Roman policy 
towards a more resolute approach to Illyricum. The personal influence of Caesar is 
thought to be very significant in this shift in policy.
40 The settlement of a middle 
class,
41 the economically more significant Italians, in the coastal cities on the eastern 
Adriatic coast was apparently encouraged during this period.
42 Still, the number of 
settlers remains unknown.
43 In order to establish a firmer foothold in Illyricum the 
Romans needed the support of the local population, which might have been secured 
by some limited enfranchizement of the native nobility, and the allocation of 
municipal rights to some native settlements. For that purpose they needed already 
urbanized native centres and a population belonging to the Mediterranean cultural 
core, and of all peoples in Illyricum, only the Liburni and southern Illyrians fully 
satisfied those requirements.
44  
                                                           
37 Especially if we accept the opinion of Čače (1998) esp. 76-81 that Manian Bay includes not only 
Salona but extends all the way to the peninsula of Pelješac and the mouth of the Neretva, thus 
implicating Narona in this problem as well. 
38 Regardless of the opinion of previous scholarship, the inscription from Salona does not mention 
conventus civium Romanorum or the Greeks from Salona. The involvement of Salona is assumed only 
because the inscription was found there. The interested parties are socii, Tragurion, Issa and 
Iadertinoi, appealing for arbitration to the Roman magistrate holding imperium for that area. 
39 CIL III 3078 – Numerius Rufus at Issa; cf. Gabričević (1970). 
40 Alföldy (1965a) 200; Skefich (1967) 132-134; Freber (1993) 149-156. 
41 The question of the middle class, as a class below the knights in Roman society, is not yet solved. 
Cf. more recent discussions in Millar (1998) 203; Yakobsen (1999) 41-48; Mouritsen (2001) 133-134 
etc. 
42 Suić (1960/61) 188; Medini (1974) 29-30 n. 10. However, it is still difficult to show how that 
emigration was encouraged. One of the more common reasons for emigration was in fact political – 
flight from proscriptions in the 80s and 40s BC; Wilson (1966) 78-80. 
Cicero’s letters suggest a strong Roman economic interest in the south-eastern Adriatic coast in the 
50s and 40s BC, e.g. Fam. 13.41-42; 13.77.3; see Deniaux (1993). 
43 Settlers are generally more numerous in the western provinces, and perhaps settled in much larger 
numbers than we have evidence for; Wilson (1966) 9-12. The Roman conventus in Salona is estimated 
at c. 10,000 inhabitants in the early 40s BC; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 130 n. 46. 
44 Medini (1974) 29 ff. 
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Conventus civium Romanorum on the Dalmatian coast pre-dated Caesar, but 
only as self-organized communities of Roman citizens and without defined public or 
administrative status. Caesar made some conventus responsible for administration of 
the cities in which they existed (we have confirmation of this for Lissus at least), but 
without more evidence we should not confuse the conventus mentioned in the 
sources as communities with conventus as administrative units.
45 An early Italian 
settlement like Narona might have begun to appear as early as the 2
nd century BC, 
but it is impossible to be sure of this without more evidence. In the mid-first century 
BC,  conventus of Italian traders are attested in Lissus, Narona and Salona, and 
possibly in Epidaurum and Iader as well.
46 These conventus increase in importance, 
not so much because of their numbers as because of their wealth and influence on 
local governors
47 and they were to be an important element of support for Caesar in 
the Civil War.  
 
Dating the establishment of colonies in Illyricum is difficult because more 
important colonies like Iader, Salona or Narona are called coloniae Iuliae, which 
suggests that either Caesar or Octavian before 27 BC was their founder. It seems that 
a later rather than earlier date is more probable, although it is highly likely that 
Caesar gave municipal rights to some of these cities during his imperium over 
Illyricum.
48 Some more significant cities in Liburnia, such as Curicum, Varvaria or 
                                                           
45 Caesar, B Civ. 3.29 (Lissus). The Dalmatian conventus appear as recent, but in other places they had 
sprung up already in 2
nd century BC; Wilson (1966) 76, so it is possible that lack of evidence alone 
prevents us also from dating the establishment of the Dalmatian conventus to the 2
nd century BC. See 
also Wilson (1966) 13-17 on conventus civium Romanorum in general as communities and as 
administrative units. 
46 Lissus: Caesar, B Civ. 3.29 … conventus civium Romanorum, qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum 
eis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat … Cf. Wilson (1966) 16-17; Skefich (1967) 
118-119 arguing that Lissus became an administrative conventus after the problems with the Pirustae 
about 54 BC. Papazoglu (1986) 221 thinks that Caesar established an administrative oppidum c. R. in 
Lissus but the passage may also imply that Caesar entrusted rule of the oppidum Lissus to conventus 
c. R., rather than established the oppidum c. R. as an administrative unit. Cf. Čače (1993) 25 and 
especially Vittinghoff (1951) 462, who vigorously opposes the opinion that oppidum c. R. as 
mentioned by Pliny was a formal administrative category. 
Narona: CIL III 1820; Alföldy (1965a) 134; Salona: Caesar, B Civ. 3.9.2, Alföldy (1965a) 100. 
Epidaurum: Hirtius, B Alex. 44.5 is not evidence in itself, but some authorities accept that there was a 
conventus in Caesar’s time; Alföldy (1965a) 139; Iader: Suić (1981) 142-143. It is possible that Issa 
had conventus populi Romani as well, but as a settlement since Issaeans kept their independence until 
the Civil War; Suić (1959) 149. 
47 Brunt (1987) 220-221. 
48 Brunt (1987) 236-239. Wilkes (1996b) 574; cf. Watkins (1979) 83 who argues that it was as a 
reward for their support for Caesar in the Civil War. 
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even Asseria possibly acquired ius italicum in the 50s but that matter is disputed and 
can not be precisely determined without more evidence.
49 In this transitional 
municipal phase
50  praefecti civitatum were the only magistrates appointed to 
administer local rule in Liburnian cities, and according to the inscription from 
Curictae, they were, at least in one case, picked from the most distinguished 
members of the native elite.
51
 
 During his visit to Illyricum in 54 BC Caesar administered judicial conventus 
in the cities with significant communities of Roman citizens who were under the 
Roman judicial system.
52 Unfortunately, his account is very brief, and it is not 
possible to deduce anything more from it, either his route or the cities he visited. Suić 
suggested that Caesar, during that visit to Illyricum, founded new portoria for trade 
and the collection of taxes from the natives.
53 The existence of Roman portoria in 
Illyricum at this time is doubtful. They are attested only in the early Empire.
54 The 
administrative center of Illyricum in this period is not known. Narona looks the most 
obvious place, although there are some less convincing indications that Issa played 
that role before it opted for Pompey during the Civil War.
55
 
4. 4  The Civil War and dictatorship 49-44 BC 
The civil war between Caesar and Pompey plunged the whole Mediterranean 
into conflict. Illyricum suddenly and unexpectedly became a significant theatre of the 
war. Inside Illyricum the civil war created chaotic divisions. The Delmatae, part of 
                                                           
49 Curicum: CIL III 13295; Varvaria: Suić (1960/61) 186-187, 189; Asseria (1960/61) 187 n. 33, 190 
n. 42. A different opinion is held by Alföldy (1965a) 86;  Wilkes (1969) 492, who date the 
municipalisation of Varvaria and Asseria to the early principate. 
50 Alföldy (1961) 60 ff.; (1965a) 68 ff.; Medini (1974) 28 using Pliny’s account defines three stages of 
municipalization: peregrinal, the stage of ius italicum and/or exemption from taxes, and final 
municipalisation. If Vittinghof (1977) 24 ff. is right in pushing forward the date of final 
municipalization in Liburnia, it seems that the second stage was good enough for the Liburni so that 
they had no reason to insist on formal municipalization. 
51 CIL III 13,295; Medini (1974) 30-34. Wilkes (1969) 197 calls them “quasi-municipal magistrates.” 
52 Caesar, B Gall. 5.1. 
53 Suić (1973) 188-189; (1981) 145, after Suet. Iul. 43. 
54 CIL V 706 (Tergeste) CIL III 12,914-15 (Salona); CIL III 13,225 (Senia). There was an Aquileiensis 
portorium at this time; Cic. Font. 2. 
55 Caesar held judicial conventus in Illyricum afterwards, but it is not known where; Caesar, B Gall 
5.1. Most probably he went to Narona, (Patsch (1907) 24; Skefich (1967) 121-122; Bojanovski (1985) 
66) which was a significant centre for Roman citizens and native communities linked with Rome at 
the time; Pliny, HN 3.142 M. Varo LXXXIX civitates eo (Naronae) ventitasse auctor est. Issa as 
administrative centre was argued by Wilkes (1969) 39; Šašel-Kos (1986) 104. It is also possible that 
Caesar held assizes in other places; Skefich (1967) 120-122. 
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the Liburnian civitates and the Issaean commonwealth supported Pompey, while 
Salona and the most of the Liburni, notably Iader, stood firmly by Caesar. Even after 
the Pompeians were finally defeated, there was no peace in Illyricum. The 
Delmataean alliance continued to resist the Romans, and even to enlarge their 
territory. This study will try to discuss how this conflict reflected on Roman policy in 
Illyricum in these tumultuous times, and the military and strategic consequences.
56  
 
The success of Pompeian admirals in the Adriatic was a decisive factor in the 
decision of the Delmatae and Issa to support Pompey rather than Caesar.
57 Caesar 
built one of his two fleets in the Adriatic and that fleet employed Liburni or 
Liburnian-constructed ships.
58 On the other side, in Pompey’s camp, the Liburni were 
combined with the Achaeans as one of his five naval squadrons, commanded by M. 
Octavius and Scribonius Libo, and they used Issa as a base for Adriatic operations 
after taking control of the city.
59 Caesar’s Adriatic fleet was later defeated and one of 
its commanders, G. Antonius, captured by the squadron of Octavius and Scribonius, 
i.e. the same squadron mentioned above, made up of the Achaean and the Liburnian 
fleet.
60 The citizens of the Liburnian city, Iader,
61 helped Caesar’s legate Q. 
Cornificius to win a naval engagement against the Pompeians, and Salona stubbornly 
resisted although they were besieged by Pompeians for a few months until the winter 
forced Octavius to lift the siege.
62
 
A few interesting, almost paradoxical, situations arise from this turbulent 
period. The division amongst the Liburni whom we can detect on both sides in the 
                                                           
56 There are some splendid works which concentrate on fighting in Illyricum during the Roman Civil 
War: Veith (1924) 267-274; Marasco (1995); (1997); Bilić-Dujmušić (2000). Wilkes (1969) 40-43 is 
a useful narrative of the events in English. 
57 Marasco (1997) 315 argues that the success of the Pompeian fleet in the Adriatic brought the 
Delmatae to the Pompeian side rather than their fear of punishment for their attack on Promona in 50 
BC. The success of the Pompeians and pure opportunism influenced Issa to support them, rather than 
the animosity of Greeks towards newly settled Romans; Čače (1998) 80. Certainly, in the case of Issa 
we need to take into account that the Greek East generally preferred Pompey over Caesar; Šašel-Kos 
(1986) 122. 
58 App. B Civ. 2.41; Caesar, B Civ. 3.9.1. 
59 Caesar, B Civ.  3.5.3; Plut. Pomp.64; Luc. Phars. 4.529 ff. The objection that the sources refer to 
the type of light warship originated by Liburni (liburnica; λιβυρνίδα) should be discarded as the 
sources mention the Liburnian fleet, not the fleet of liburnicae, see Dzino (2003) 28. 
60 Dio, 41.40; Luc. Phars. 4.402 ff.; Livy, Per. 110. 
61 Hirtius, B Alex. 42-43. Čače (1993) 26 ff.; (1998) 76, 78-79 suggesting that the Iadertinoi were both 
the Liburni and Romans from Iader. Contra Suić (1981) 142-143, understanding that there were only 
Romans (and Italians) settled in Iader.  
62 Caesar, B Civ. 3.9; Dio, 42.11. 
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conflict, is certainly interesting and difficult to explain. Furthermore, it is interesting 
that Salona, a member of the Issaean commonwealth before the conflict took an 
independent course from the rest of the commonwealth and supported Caesar. 
Finally, it is more than surprising to find old enemies – Issa and the Delmatae – 
fighting on the same side. 
 
The appearance of Liburnian naval auxiliaries on both sides in 49 BC seems 
rather contradictory, but it is definitely confirmed by our sources and it was not a 
surprising division in a Roman world already divided into two sides.
63 It appears that 
Caesar was strongly supported by an urban element in Iadera, Aenona, Curicum and 
perhaps Pompey enjoyed support amongst a rural element in the Liburnian 
agricultural hinterland.
64 This does not explain the presence of the Liburnian fleet on 
Pompey’s side, but assuming that the Liburni were a heterogeneous league of 
independent civitates rather than a unified state, it is not difficult to understand how it 
happened that some Liburnian communities supported Caesar and some Pompey.
65 
Another reason for some Liburnian support for Pompey could be their long-lasting 
connection with Picenum in Italy, the ancestral stronghold of Pompey.
66  
 
According to the precisely carved argument of Čače, it was pure opportunism 
that caused the Issaeans to support the Pompeians, not some Greek-Roman quarrel, or 
any special animosity towards Caesar. Issa and Caesar were on friendly terms, his 
legate Q. Numerius Rufus had recently become the patron of the city. Bilić-Dujmušić 
speculates that the pro-Caesarian government of the Issaean commonwealth was 
overthrown and replaced by Pompeian supporters when the war started.
67 However, 
                                                           
63 It is not possible to agree fully with Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 88-92 that the Liburnian fleet (originally 
serving under the Caesarian admiral Dolabella) was forced to fight on Pompey’s side, as it is 
impossible to prove whether they had willingly joined Octavius or not. However, it is possible to 
accept the suggestion of Čače (1993) 28-29, that the majority of Liburnian communities supported 
Caesar. 
64 Zaninović (1988b) 56-57. It is difficult to believe that some south-eastern Liburnian communities 
close to Promona like Varvaria and Burnistae could be on the same side as their enemies the 
Delmatae, so it is reasonable to place them on the Caesarian side; Suić (1960/61) 188-189; Starac 
(2000) 17-18. 
65 Šašel-Kos (1986) 122. 
66 Links between Picenum and Liburnia in the earlier period: Suić (1953). The links between Liburnia 
and Picenum still existed in the classical period. L. Tarius Rufus (cos. 16 BC), of Liburnian origins, 
had extensive family estates in Picenum; Wilkes (1969) 330-331, see below p. 124. 
67 Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 115-118. This is an intriguing and indeed very possible speculation, but it is 
still only a speculation; there is no other evidence available. 
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as Salona had more pro-Caesarian elements,
68 it is possible that the city government 
simply refused to accept the change of government in Issa and continued to support 
Caesar. Salona grew significantly in the last decades before the war and it would be 
natural to suppose that there was rivalry between Issa and Salona for influence and 
leadership within the commonwealth. 
 
After Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, Illyricum increased in strategic 
importance even more, as it had been one of the battlefields of the civil war where the 
Pompeians were successful. Q. Cornificius was sent as quaestor pro praetore in 48 – 
46 BC to fight Pompeians who, helped by the Delmatae, threatened Caesarian 
interests in Illyricum. It seems that Cornificius was a very capable and careful 
organizer and commander, patiently taking the mountain strongholds of the Delmatae 
one by one.
69 In the winter of 48 – 47 BC the legate A. Gabinius (cos. 58 BC) was 
sent by Caesar to bring help to Cornificius but he was repeatedly ambushed and 
harassed by the Delmatae, and lost five cohorts together with their standards, until he 
finally died in Salona from the wounds incurred in this campaign.
70 Modern 
scholarship assumes that Gabinius travelled by land from Italy to Salona, but the 
objection of Marasco that there was no time for a long march through Italy and the 
north Adriatic and that Gabinius actually sailed straight to Salona has recently 
challenged the prevailing opinion.
71 In the following year the legate P. Vatinius 
helped Cornificius to extinguish the danger from the Pompeian fleet in the Adriatic. 
They defeated the Pompeian fleet under M. Octavius near the island of Tauris with 
the help of the citizens of Iader, and thus finally expelled Octavius from the 
                                                           
68 Otherwise they would not support Caesar. 
69 Hirtius, B Alex. 42-47. Hirtius, 42 does not mention specifically that Cornificius stormed 
strongholds of the Delmatae, but from the general context it appears obvious that he mainly fought 
them in a low-intensity campaign; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 159-165. Wilkes (1969) 41-42 is very 
sceptical about Cornificius’ achievement, but his achievements, assessed in Hirtius 42, actually appear 
very praiseworthy. 
70 Hirtius, B Alex. 42-43; App. Ill. 12, 25; B Civ. 2.58-59; Dio, 42.11; Plut. Ant. 7.1; Cic. Att. 11.16.1. 
Dio, Appian and Plutarch wrongly dated Gabinius’ expedition to before the battle at Pharsalus; cf. 
Marasco (1997) 311 ff. 
71 Travel by land: Wilkes (1969) 41; Morgan (1971) 277-278. Travel by sea: Marasco (1997) 321-327. 
Marasco’s idea seems perfectly plausible and logical in any other circumstance, but in this case when 
Pompeians controlled the sea and with Issa being on the side of Pompey, any crossing of the Adriatic 
seems a highly risky (but not entirely impossible) venture. 
   Chapter 4: Change on the Horizon  91
Adriatic.
72 The direct result of the Tauris battle was the unconditional and immediate 
surrender of Issa to Vatinius.
73
 
The elimination of the Pompeians did not discourage the Delmatae. It seems 
that they made good use of Roman internal fighting. They extended the area under 
their direct control, according to Vatinius’s letter dated 45 BC, from the initial 20 to 
60 civitates, i.e. fortified places.
74 It is very possible that with an internal crisis in the 
Issaean commonwealth, some native coastal communities turned away from the 




P. Sulpicius Rufus replaced Cornificius in 46 BC but still had many problems 
in his operations against the Delmatae. Our sources for his campaign are very 
limited.
76 In the next year P. Vatinius replaced him in command as a pro-consul. 
From his letters to Cicero, it seems that his camp was stationed close to Narona,
77 and 
that operations extended deeply into the Adriatic hinterland because his complaints 
about the harsh Dalmatian winter are more applicable to the hinterland of modern 
Hercegovina than to the coastal strip.
78 After the initial successes of Vatinius against 
                                                           
72 Hirtius, B Alex. 44-47. The island of Tauris is not precisely located, perhaps it is the island Šćedro 
near Hvar; Wilkes (1969) 42 n.2; Nikolanci (1989a), island Šipan; Lučić (1964) or the Pakleni otoci 
archipelago near Hvar; Bilić-Dujmušić (2000) 230-234. 
73 Hirtius, B Alex. 47.4. 
74 Cic. Fam. 5.10a.3; Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) 50 κατοικία of the Delmatae. See Čače (1994/95) 108-
113 on the nature of the settlements of the Delmatae mentioned in Strabo. 
75 This was not a war waged to recover lost possessions by the Delmatae as Marasco (1995) 288-289 
suggests, Vatinius clearly says that the Delmatae expanded their power to the civitates, which 
previously were not members of the alliance. Marasco’s suggestion that the Delmatae took over 
Salona is also wrong, as our sources would have reported the fall of such an important city, see this 
section, n. 77. 
The destruction of a large gradina (hillfort) on Veliki Biać near Tragurion is dated in this period. It is 
possible that it had been key stronghold of the Byllinoi who belonged, or were closely allied with, the 
Issaean commonwealth; Čače (1993) 10-12. 
76 Cic. Fam, 13.77; Wilkes (1969) 42-43. 
77 His camp can be located in Humac near Ljubuški; Bojanovski (1980); (1988) 41-42, 366-367. 
Bojanovski (1980) 5-6 also proposed an alternative reading of Cic. Fam. 5.9 ex castris (apud) 
Narona(m). 
Narona was a much better base for the campaign against the Delmatae than Salona because the Roman 
army had friendly territory on the left bank of the Neretva in their rear, and freedom to chose the 
course of attack. An attack from Salona would be forced to face an easily defensible pass near 
modern-day Klis and the army would need to rely on sea-transport for supplies, as the Delmatae were 
able to cut off supply routes along the coast. Thus, the note of Marasco (1995) 288 that Vatinius 
choose Narona for his base because the Delmatae allegedly had taken Salona is not valid. 
78 Cic. Fam. 5.9-11; Wilkes (1969) 43-44. Shackleton-Bailey (1977) II.425-426 suggests that there 
were two campaigns of Vatinius, one in late autumn, another at the beginning of winter of 45 BC. 
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the Delmatae and the temporary cessation of hostilities, Caesar’s murder sent the area 
again into turmoil. The senator Baebius was killed and his five cohorts defeated by 
the Delmatae.
79 Vatinius tried to act preventively against the tyrannicide Brutus, 
governor of Macedonia, but the majority of soldiers from his three legions deserted 
him and the Senate transferred command of the army (and Illyricum) to Brutus.
80 In 
this period we can place the destruction of the Daorsian stronghold, Daorson, which 
was burned and destroyed in the mid-1
st century BC, certainly by the Delmatae in the 
temporary absence of the Roman army.
81  
 
Caesar’s  plans for future military expeditions, interrupted by the Ides of 
March may suggest a planned change in his policy towards Illyricum. Ancient 
sources mention his plans for the Dacian and Parthian military campaigns as major 
future aims of foreign policy, and the sudden conciliatory mood of the Delmatae who 
asked Caesar for peace, suggests that he intended to pacify Illyricum as a prelude to 
his expedition to Dacia.
82 The majority of scholars believe that Caesar considered 
Parthia to be a much more important target.
83 However, R. Syme first concluded that 
Caesar was actually more modest in his designs, and intended to subdue Illyricum 
and destroy Dacian power in the hinterland, rather than to take the risk of attacking a 
strong and dangerous enemy such as the Parthian empire.
84 A decisive expedition 
against peoples in the hinterland would certainly be necessary to give more lasting 
security to the settlements on the eastern Adriatic coast, so it is not impossible that 
                                                           
79 App. Ill. 13. 
80 Cic. Phil. 10.13; App. Ill. 13; Dio, 47.21.6. This was just an extraordinary (but legal) command, an 
imperium maius over local magistrates without administrative functions; Girardet (1993) 216, so that 
the conduct of Vatinius was basically unconstitutional.  
81 The destruction of Daorson can be dated between 49 and 44 BC; Zaninović (1966) 28; Marić (1973) 
123-124. 
82 The sources are given in Syme (1999) 175 n.4. Peace-offer from the Delmatae: App. Ill. 13. 
Marasco (1995) 289-291 questions this surrender of the Delmatae as a pro-Caesarian piece of 
propaganda. 
83 Gelzer (1968) 322; Rawson (1982) 437-438. 
84 Freber (1993) 157 ff; Syme (1999) 175; Lica (2000) 87 ff. It is possible to discuss Caesar’s plans 
because both targets seem worthy of attention and equally tempting: on the one hand avenging the 
death of Crassus and following the steps of Alexander in the East, and on the other hand securing 
Rome’s northern borders. McDermott (1983/84) follows Suet. Iul. 44.3 as the more realistic 
possibility: Caesar only wanted to expel Dacians from the Black Sea and Thracia via Macedonia and 
then maybe to attack Parthia through Armenia later. Freber (1993) 182-183 compares Illyricum with 
Gaul where Caesar essentially secured coastal “italisch-spanisch Landbrücke” with his conquest of 
the hinterland and was expected to do the same thing in a geographically similar situation, securing 
the coastal link between Italy and Greece. 
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Caesar had such a thing in mind. Yet, regardless of what were Caesar’s true designs 
in 44 BC, his assassination prevented their realization. 
  
4. 5  The making and keeping of Coastal Illyricum
Entrusting to a Roman magistrate, whether he was Caesar or someone else, 
imperium over Illyricum with no visible imminent military threat, signifies, besides 
matters of domestic policy, a genuine Roman decision to introduce changes in the 
political framework of Illyricum in 59 BC. In a way, it was the birth of Illyricum, as 
from this occasion it becomes officially recognized as a spatial-political (but largely 
artificial from a geographical and ethnic point of view) entity, direct product of 
contemporary trends in Roman foreign policy.
85 Even as a spatial-political concept, 
Illyricum in this period was nothing more but the area that the Romans traditionally 
regarded as their sphere of interest - the coast and its immediate hinterland. 
 
Caesar and his legates developed Roman interaction with Illyricum into a 
loosely defined framework of proto-province, binding more tightly weaker 
independent allies to Rome and relying more on support from the conventus of 
Roman citizens. The nature and reasons for Caesar’s imperium over Illyricum remain 
a riddle. It seems, that his imperium has been introduced for preventative and long-
term purposes. Instability in the north (Pannonia, the Alps, Gaul) was a short-term 
reason for the change of political framework, but it is also possible to argue whether 
there was any serious instability. In the long run, changes in the framework show that 
the Romans finally acknowledged that the eastern Adriatic coast was ready to be 
politically included in the empire, as culturally it already was. However, ‘coastal’ 
Illyricum as a political framework was developed without foreknowledge of the civil 
war and the political disintegration of the Issaean commonwealth. In foresight we 
can see that the changed political circumstances of the 40s BC exposed ‘coastal’ 
Illyricum as an inadequate and unstable system.  
 
Illyricum between 59 and 44 BC was a unified zone of political and military 
operations. This does not imply the establishment of Illyricum as an independent 
province at this time. A succession of Roman commanders between 48 and 44 BC is 
                                                           
85 See Timpe (1965) 209-211 for Caesar’s new spatial-political concept of Gaul. 
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not necessarily a sign of the creation of a separate province of Illyricum, but rather 
indicates the need for separate commands in extraordinary circumstances, like that of 
Cosconius in 78 BC.
86 In the tumultuous year 44 BC, Illyricum was added to the 
command of M. Brutus who happened to be the governor of Macedonia, but only as 
a temporary and emergency measure. However, although Illyricum was not a 
province by definition, as there was no lex provinciae or developed provincial 
organization, it is obvious that at this time some elements of provincial organization 
were introduced. Caesar in particular never cared too much for legal definitions, and 
it is possible to link the origins of proto-province in Illyricum with his informal 
political approach. His “pacification” of Gaul was in practice not so different from de 
iure provincialization, regardless of whether there was formal act of provincialization 
or not, and, on the other hand, the subjugation of individual peoples was not always 
regarded as conquest by him.
87
 
The dissolution of the Issaean commonwealth as an independent political 
entity after the defeat in the civil war, which repeats on a smaller scale the fate of 
Massilia in Gaul, was perhaps the most important single political event in Illyricum 
at this time.
88 In the long run we may say that the end of the Issaean commonwealth 
was really the beginning of Roman Illyricum, but its immediate result was an 
escalation of the war with the Delmataean alliance. The support for Italian colonists 
signaled a shift in the Roman long-term interest, because the enlarged Italian 
settlement, clearly visible in the mid-1
st century BC, turned into a strategic 
stronghold for the future expansion of direct rule in the eastern Adriatic coast and the 
extension of Roman influence behind the Dinaric Alps.  
 
                                                           
86 Dio and Hirtius mention Vatinius and Cornificius as governors in Illyricum (Dio, 48.28; Hirtius, B 
Alex. 42; see discussion of Rice-Holmes (1928) 247-248 n.5). However, we are dealing with an 
extraordinary situation where they were sent with imperium to Illyricum to fight the Pompeians and 
their allies like the Delmatae and not to rule or administer the province; cf. Papazoglu (1976) 205 
n.28. This error is reflected by Mommsen (CIL III p. 279); Mommsen (1882) 540 who considers 
Vatinius to be the first pro-consul of Illyricum. 
87 “Unterwerfung und Provinzialisierung decken sich also nicht.”; Timpe (1972) 294-295. 
88 The southern city wall of Issa was removed in this time; cf. Gabričević (1973) 150 n. 10, but it does 
not seem that there were any other serious consequences for the Issaeans after they surrendered to 
Vatinius, except, of course, their loss of political independence; Hirtius, B Alex. 47. 4; Suić (1959) 
151-152. However, provincial arrangements after the establishment of provincia Dalmatia suggest 
that the Issaean commonwealth survived, but in the form of a Salonitan res publica, see Chapter 6.2 n. 
26. 
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In the 40s Roman control of the eastern Adriatic loosened briefly to a certain 
degree.
89 However, we should not overestimate the extent of this crisis in Illyricum. 
For the Roman trading community in Narona, it was business as usual even in the 
mid-40s.
90 Rome’s strategic aims in the 40s were very limited; it wanted to pacify 
troublesome opponents like the Delmatae rather than to extend political influence 
deeper inland and to conquer them fully. The Pirustae and Iapodes were not able to 
expel Romans from the coast by themselves, nor did they try to do that. Their raids 
were more concerned with plunder and local political gains. The Delmataean alliance 
appears to be the most serious opponent to Romans in this period. It attempted to use 
weakening and the abolition of the Issaean commonwealth in order to accomplish 
their long-time strategic push to the Adriatic. It seems that they waged their local war 
on the Liburni in 50 BC rather than purposely attacking Roman interests there. Later, 
in the civil war they opportunistically recognized their interest to be on Pompey’s 
side (as the Issaeans did). They expanded when the Issaeans were eliminated from 
the game in 46 BC, but after the Pompean fleet was defeated, the Delmatae 
essentially were in a defensive mode. 
 
Caesar’s mind and heart were not in Illyricum; Gaul was a much more urgent 
and rewarding task. Suetonius suggests that he perhaps planned to change his passive 
attitude to Illyricum if an agreement was reached with Pompey prior to the beginning 
of the Civil War.
91 There is no reason to accuse Caesar of underestimating the 
situation in Illyricum. The strategic situation never appeared serious enough to 
require a Roman presence (especially when compared with Gaul) and real troubles 
arose only when civil war appeared imminent. Caesar paid as much attention to 
Illyricum as was necessary for the moment; he conducted a policy of consolidation, 
not of conquest or planned conquest.
92 Caesar’s influence on the internal 
arrangements and municipalization in Illyricum is a matter where scholarship often 
places too much reliance on guesswork. It is not our intention to deny Caesar’s 
                                                           
89 It was possible for an escaped slave to hide amongst the Delmatae even when his angry master was 
no other than Marcus Tullius himself; Cic. Fam, 5.9.2. 
90 Deniaux (1993) 264-265 (Narona). 
91 Suet. Iul. 29.4. It is not necessary to see this as a genuine change of Caesar’s policy; it may be 
nothing less than a momentary bargaining for better position. 
92 Šašel-Kos (2000) 301-302. Skefich (1967) 102-137, esp. 136-137 on the other hand sees the Illyrian 
policy of Caesar as reasonably well developed and defined, initiated by opportunistic reaction to the 
enemy (the Pirustae in 54 BC) provocation. 
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personal influence on these developments in Illyricum, but only to assess its real 
extent on the basis of very limited sources. Except for Lissus, we do not know of any 
example where he entrusted the rule of the city to the community of Roman citizens. 
The support of some cities and communities, like Salona, for Caesar in the Civil 
War, does not imply that he made the administrative conventus and municipia before 
the war. They are just political players who chose one of the two sides. We should 
bear in mind that Caesar’s legate was the patron of Issa, but even so that city still 
supported Pompey. 
 
The control of the eastern Adriatic coast and islands remains a dominant 
element of the policy in this period, but the sources show that change of political 
framework intended the coastal strip to become a unified and territorially compact 
Roman possession, which might (in time) be incorporated into the empire. It was 
necessary to solve the awkwardness of the position where Illyricum stood as neither 
belonging nor not belonging to the Empire. Increased Italian settlement and political 
troubles in the Alpine – Pannonian sector were catalysts that moved the process 
ahead. The campaigns of the 40s do not show Roman aggressive intentions. They 
seem to be continuing attempts to pacify the area and to defend ‘coastal’ Illyricum 
from threats from the hostile hinterland rather than to risk a decisive military 
commitment to eliminate these threats. Peace and security in the area was also 
disturbed because of the temporary self-destructive engagement of the Romans in the 
civil war and political vacuum created by the Issaean commonwealth’s 
disappearance, as neither of which were not anticipated when the new political 
framework was imposed and Illyricum was born. Still, ‘coastal’ Illyricum was only a 
transitional, provisional political framework, as it was impossible to survive and to 
function as a stable system without thorough pacification of the hinterland, a fact that 
was finally understood by Octavian and his advisers when in 35 BC the whole 
system threatened to collapse. 
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5.  Pacare barbaros: Rome and Illyricum 44 – 33 BC 
(Change on the Horizon – the sequel) 
 
 
(to Asinius Pollio) 
Tu mihi seu magni superas iam saxa Timavi 
Sive oram Illyrici legis aequoris, en erit umquam 
Ille dies, mihi cum liceat tua dicere facta. 
Vergil, Eclogues 8.6-9 
 
 
5. 1  Octavian in Illyricum: introduction and sources 
The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the context of Roman 
campaigns in Illyricum during 35 – 33 BC, whether they followed the pattern of 
previous policy towards Illyricum, as discussed and defined in the previous chapters, 
or whether Rome took on a completely new approach in its political interactions with 
Illyricum. This chapter will also discuss in depth the reasons behind Octavian’s 
decision to engage in Illyrian affairs so thoroughly for so long, analyze the 
implementation of the policy and its immediate consequences. The prevailing 
opinion amongst modern scholars, which is that Octavian planned a relatively easy 
campaign in Illyricum only in order to train his troops and earn personal prestige, 
will be seriously questioned.
1
 
This chapter will argue that Octavian was forced into this expedition by a 
worsening situation in the northern Adriatic area and that his campaign followed 
earlier Republican policy towards Illyricum only on the surface, by repeating the 
interventionist pattern of the 2
nd century. Behind that first impression, something 
else, much more significant, was brewing in Illyricum. The political/constitutional 
framework of proto-province, as discussed in Chapter 4 needed adjustments, 
especially in light of general political instability in the Roman world and local 
problems with the Delmataean alliance. The significance of Illyricum in the 
Mediterranean context increased enormously because of its proximity to the key geo-
strategic axis Brundisium - Dyrrachium, around which the destiny of the whole 
                                                           
1 Schmitthenner (1958) 196-197; Wilkes (1969) 48-49. 
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empire rotated between 49 and 31 BC. For that reason the area visibly demanded a 
stronger military presence even after the Pompeians were defeated. In fact, ‘Coastal’ 
Illyricum as it was constructed and developed in the period 59 – 44 BC, would be a 
still-born and unstable system without thorough and full pacification of the peoples 
from the hinterland. 
 
For Octavian’s campaigns of 35 – 33 BC there are no surviving contemporary 
sources
2 Appian’s Illyrike and Cassius Dio are the only reliable sources we have 
today. Appian drew his information directly from Augustus’ memoirs
3 and Dio’s 
account, generally in agreement with Appian, in some places obviously used other, 
still unidentifiable, primary sources, probably Asinius Pollio or Cremutius Cordus.
4 
Agrippa also wrote memoirs and he certainly discussed these campaigns in detail, but 
it is difficult to believe that his account differed much from Augustus.
5 For that 
reason it seems reasonable to rely on these sources for the reconstruction of the 
events, as it is unlikely that Appian and Dio taken together omit any really significant 
event from this campaign. Appian should certainly be traterd with caution as he 
draws on the autobiographical work of a man who fully understood the importance 
and benefits of multi-media propaganda in politics and who was a naturally gifted 
self-propagandist.
6 With the help of additional sources like Florus, Strabo and 
Velleius Paterculus, Octavian’s campaigns can be reconstructed quite accurately, so 






                                                           
2 The silence of contemporary extant sources (except the Panegyricus Messalae, of Tibullus; Tib. 
3.7.106-117) for the Illyrian campaign of Octavian is strange; Schmitthenner (1958) 227-228. 
3 Zippel (1877) 226-227 makes the interesting point that Appian also followed Octavian’s formal 
report to the Senate. That would explain the unusual classification of defeated peoples into three 
groups; App. Ill. 16-17. 
4 Šašel-Kos (1986) 142-144; Reinhold (1988)  68, but only if we believe that Pollio’s histories 
continued after the battle at Philippi, see above p. 24. 
See Šašel-Kos (1997a) for detailed analysis of the differences between these sources regarding 
Octavian’s campaign. 
5 Roddaz (1984) 568-571. 
6 Šašel-Kos (1997a) esp. 197-198. 
7 Kromayer (1898); Veith (1914); Vulić (1907); (1926); (1933); (1934); Swoboda (1932); Josifović 
(1956); Schmitthenner (1958); Wilkes (1969) 46-58; Malevany (1977); Nagy (1991) 57-66. 
Regrettably, it was not possible to obtain and discuss M. Šašel-Kos ‘Octavian’s Campaigns in 
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5. 2  Rome and Illyricum 44 – 35 BC 
Roman relationships with Illyricum between 44 and 35 BC remain obscure. 
P. Servilius Isauricus was possibly proconsul in Illyricum after 41 BC, but nothing is 
known about his mandate except the damaged inscription from Narona.
8 Asinius 
Pollio was operating in the area, at war with the Illyrian Parthini and the Delmatae in 
39 – 38 BC. Subsequently, he achieved a triumph for his victory over the Parthini.
9 
The Parthini were the allies of M. Brutus,
10 who rebelled after his death, and the 
Delmatae were restless after the assassination of Caesar.
11 We cannot assess the 
extent of his military success in 39 – 38 BC. The Parthini are not mentioned any 
more as troublemakers, although the Περθεηνάτας of Appian, who were people 
defeated easily by Octavian in 35 BC, may have been Parthini.
12 On the other hand, 
Florus says that Pollio deprived the Delmatae of sheep, arms and land.
13 Perhaps it 
was a hastily made settlement, driven by Octavian’s need for troops from Illyricum 
for the war against Sextus Pompeius.
14 However, the standards of Gabinius captured 
in 46 BC remained in Delmataean hands, which meant that the Delmatae did not 
fully submit to Pollio and that his campaign in Dalmatia did not produce lasting 
results, but only an uneasy peace. 
 
There is some heated scholarly controversy about whether Pollio acted as a 
proconsul with imperium for Macedonia, Illyricum, or for both these provinciae. 
Contradicting previous scholarship, Syme emphasized the fact that the Parthini were 
located inside Macedonia, in Antony’s part of the empire, and that Pollio as Antony’s 
supporter could not be appointed to the command of Octavian’s Illyricum. According 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Southern Illyricum’ in P. Cabanes (ed.), L’Illyrie méridionale et l’Épire dans l’Antiquité III, (Paris, 
1999). 
8 CIL III 1858 is unfortunately very uncertain proof. Isauricus was consul in 48 and 41 BC; Broughton 
(1952) 272, 370-371. 
9 Dio, 48.41.7; Flor. 2.25; Horace, Carm. 2.1.15-6 (mentioning the Dalmatian triumph of Pollio); Vell. 
Pat. 2.78. The triumph can be dated anywhere between January 40 and November 38 BC; Insc. It. 13. 
1. 86. In addition, Porphyrio on Horace, Carm. 2.1.15 and Servius on Verg. Ecl. 4.1 claim that Pollio 
captured Salona. 
10 App. B Civ. 5.75. 
11 App. Ill. 13. 
12 App. Ill., 16; Bosworth (1972) 464-465; but this is only speculation. The Parthenetae (Parthini) are 
located amongst the south-eastern Illyrians; cf. Pliny, HN 3. 143; Wilkes (1969) 44, 155, 165. 
13 Flor. 2.25, a bit of exaggeration in light of their substantial fighting capabilities in 34 BC. It is 
interesting to recall Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) who notes the non-monetary nature of their economy, and 
Polyb. 23.18, who says the Delmatae took tribute in cattle from their clients. 
14 App. B Civ. 5.80, often overlooked by modern authorities, is important proof that the Romans had 
been militarily involved in Illyricum in the early 30s BC. 
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There are a couple of flaws in Syme’s argument. The first one is the dogmatic 
view that Pollio was sent to the province as a supporter of Antony. Bosworth made a 
strong case against this view, pointing out that it is equally possible that Pollio 
changed his allegiances before being sent abroad, or that he was simply neutral.
16 
The second flaw is the notion that the bellum Dalmaticum of Florus could refer to 
any place in the Illyrian world and therefore applicable to the Parthini who lived 
some 300 kilometers south of the Delmataean-controlled area. According to the same 
logic, Horace gave the honorific name Delmaticus to Pollio for a victory over the 
Parthini, instead of the more appropriate Parthinius.
17 It would be very surprising if 
Florus, referring to the Delmatae elsewhere in the same passage, had made such a 
mistake, especially bearing in mind that he made a precise distinction in passages 
dedicated to the Roman conflicts against the Iapodes and Pannonii and the wars 
against the Delmatae.
18 Also, regardless of all his high-profile connections, it would 
be quite unusual if Pollio earned a triumph fighting only against the otherwise 
irrelevant people, the Parthini.
19
 
 We have also the testimony of Vergil’s 8
th eclogue, which mentions Pollio’s 
return to Italy along the Dalmatian coast.
20 The return of a Macedonian governor to 
Italy via the insecure and tumultuous Dalmatian coast, instead of the short sea 
crossing from Dyrrachium to Brundisium, seems a very impractical route, if there 
was no job to be done in central Dalmatia. The problem of crossing inter-provincial 
                                                           
16 Bosworth (1972). Woodman (1983) 196, 231-234 made the alternative argument against Syme that 
Pollio, although disillusioned with Antony, did not openly embrace Octavian before Actium, 
remaining neutral between them. 
15 Syme (1937); Broughton (1952) 387-388; Wilkes (1969) 44-45. 
17 Flor. 2.25; Syme (1937) 42, supported surprisingly by Bosworth (1972) 466 who otherwise denies 
Syme’s argument. Wilkes (1969) on the other hand supports Syme elsewhere, but does not include 
this particular view in his argument. 
18 Flor. 2.23 (calling the Iapodes - Illyrians); 2.24 (Pannonian war). 
19 The last time they are mentioned, it is as Roman allies in 169-168 BC; cf. Livy, 43.23.6, 44.30.13.  
20 Verg. Ecl. 8.6-13  esp. 7-8. Syme (1937) 47-48 suggested Pollio’s return through Dalmatia. Contra 
Zippel (1877) 225 (arguing in favour of Pollio’s authority over two different armies, Illyrian and 
Macedonian); Patsch (1898) 169 n.2. In more recent times Bowersock (1971) argued that the 
addressee of the 8
th eclogue was Octavian after his 35-33 BC campaign, but he was criticized for that 
by Tarrant (1978) and Woodman (1983) 193 n.1. Nagy (1991) 58-59, gives more weight to the 
argument of Bowersock that Octavian (or his legate) campaigned in northwest Illyricum at the same 
time as Pollio. Unfortunately, there are no other sources to support this argument, see Chapter 5.3 n. 
33. 
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borders (as the Parthini were located in Macedonian province) is hinted at by 
Bosworth as a piece of practical political thinking in times of trouble, and the relaxed 
political atmosphere between Octavian and Antony after they reached (temporary) 
agreement in the treaty of Brundisium in 40 BC.
21 Thus it looks clear that Pollio in 
fact fought the Delmatae as well. 
 
The war of Octavian against Sextus Pompeius in 36 BC and the withdrawal 
of Roman troops could be an important cause for further neglect of the area and the 
subsequent reaction of natives.
22 Problems arose especially in the former north 
Adriatic sector, where the Romans were much more vulnerable because of intense 
Italian settlement and because of its geographic proximity to North Italy.
23 Dio’s 
source blamed the Iapodes not only for ceasing to pay tribute like the other peoples 
named there, but also singled out for repeating their devastating raids of 51 BC on 
the cities of Tergeste and Aquileia.
24 Taking into account the increased Roman and 
Italian settlement of the eastern Adriatic coast, it is understandable that when the 
situation in Illyricum took a turn for the worse in 35 BC, military action, at least in 
the northwest, became a pressing political task for Octavian. It was not merely a 
training field for his soldiers.
25 Illyricum required more lasting pacification.  
 
5. 3 General  political  circumstances  and the reasons for Octavian’s 
campaigns in 35 BC: “Illyricum – ein Land mit Reichtümern?”
26
Octavian’s campaigns can be divided into three distinctive phases, conducted 
in two separate expeditions. The first expedition in 35 – 34 BC was primarily 
focused on the north Adriatic and south Alpine area, although it is possible that some 
action was taken in the south Adriatic with the support of the fleet. In the first phase 
it was conducted against the Transalpine Iapodes and southern Alpine peoples like 
the Carni, Salassi and Taurisci, with additional supportive action by the fleet against 
                                                           
21 Bosworth (1972) 464; André (1949) 22 n.11 supported by Woodman (1983) 193-194 suggests that 
Octavian and Antony jointly gave Pollio a roving commission to pacify the Eastern Adriatic. Cf. 
Zaninović (1966) 31-32, who explains Pollio’s action in Dalmatia as a joint venture of Octavian and 
Antony, agreed in Brundisium in 40 BC. According to him Pollio’s route was Aquileia-Salona-
Parthini and, on the way back to Italy, he fought the Delmatae again. 
22 Cf. App. B Civ. 5.80. Suggested by Schmitthenner (1958) 194 n.5, following Syme, that Pollio was 
governor of Macedonia. 
23 Wilkes (1969) 48. 
24 Dio, 49.34.2; App. Ill. 18, see above p. 81. 
25 Rice Holmes (1928) 130-131 and Syme (1933a) 67, clearly recognising the pressing necessity for 
immediate action in Illyricum 35 BC. 
26 Schmitthenner (1958) 196. 
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small-scale Adriatic piracy. The first expedition, in the second phase, expanded 
deeper into the continent against the Pannonian people of the Segestani. The second 
campaign was waged in central Dalmatia against the Delmatae and their allies in 34 
– 33 BC. This chapter will point out that the primary reason for the campaigns of 
Octavian was the insecurity of the whole area caused by an inadequate 
constitutional/political framework. His primary objective was already achieved in the 
first phase with the pacification of the Iapodes and Alpine tribes. The incursion 
inland towards Segestica does not seem to be provoked by the Segestani at all, but it 
appears to be a strategic attempt to create a new buffer zone against the successors of 
Burebista,
27 to protect Roman trade with Pannonia and to expand Roman influence 
further into the Pannonian plains. The security and unity of the Norican kingdom, an 
important Roman ally, might also be endangered by the disturbances in the Alpine 
region, which were caused by the Carni, Salassi and Taurisci, and which might be 
used by the Dacians if they entertained any future offensive designs in the southern 
Alpine area. 
 
The second campaign, conducted against the Delmatae, was primarily aimed 
at the final pacification of this alliance, which was potentially dangerous to the 
growing Italian communities in Salona and Narona, as well as at the recovery of 
Roman honour – lost with the standards of Gabinius and the defeat of Baebius in the 
40s. There were other smaller campaigns, made by Octavian’s legati, but they remain 
obscure, since they were not included in the accounts of Dio and Appian. There is 
not much controversy about the chronology or the course of the campaigns. Appian 
and Dio were quite precise in describing the campaigns so that it is possible to 
reconstruct accurately the movements of Octavian on the map.
28 The main 
controversy is in fact the territorial extent of Octavian’s achievement. The view of 
Vulić and later Swoboda, restated by Josifović and Bojanovski, is that he established 
Roman control up to the River Sava and conquered the territory of the whole future 
province of Dalmatia in 33 BC. In fact, Vulić and Josifović argued the most extreme 
view that Octavian conquered even modern-day Western Serbia! However, Syme 
strongly opposed this idea and defended the earlier opinion of Kromayer, vigorously 
                                                           
27 The Dacian kingdom broke up after the death of Burebista; cf. Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304). 
28 Veith (1914), still provides the most complete geographical reconstruction of Octavian’s campaigns 
in 35-33 BC. 
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arguing that the extent of the conquest was more modest, and limited to just the 
immediate hinterland of the Adriatic coast.
29
 
There are several direct and indirect reasons why Octavian decided to begin 
an extensive military expedition in Illyricum in 35 BC. The sources mention three 
basic reasons behind this expedition. Dio is the most precise: after finishing with 
Sextus Pompeius and settling affairs in Italy, Octavian was intending to cross from 
Sicily to North Africa, when the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni and Iapodes not only 
failed to pay tribute but also the Iapodes threatened the security of the wider area.
30 
Appian repeated the reasons that Octavian himself gave to the Senate after the 
campaign: security of Italy from the raids from northwest Illyricum; revenge for 
Roman defeats in the 40s; and, in the background, a piece of well placed propaganda 
– the contrast with the slothfulness of Antony.
31 Military training and his desire to 
keep his legions together under arms are other possible reasons, but they are 
overemphasized in the modern works and sometimes treated as the main reason for 
Octavian’s expedition into Illyricum.
32 Velleius Paterculus indeed mentions the 
training of the army but in a very general context, and without having any knowledge 
of the potential threats the Iapodes represented to northern Italy. Furthermore, in 
Velleius’ account, the expeditions to Illyricum preceded the conflict between 
Octavian and Sextus Pompeius and probably referred to the pro-consulship of 
Asinius Pollio in 39 – 38 BC.
33 Dio on the other hand clearly connects the training of 
                                                           
29 See Schmitthenner (1958) n.1 for detailed bibliography of this debate up to 1958. The argument of 
Kromayer and Syme was later accepted by Wilkes (1969) 55-57; Nagy (1991) 65-66; Šašel-Kos 
(1997b) 31.Vulić was defended by Bojanovski (1988) 42-48 without important new arguments. 
30 Dio, 49.34.1-2 (see Chapter 5.4 n. 66 - the potential danger of the Iapodes). It is very doubtful 
whether the Liburni completely turned away from Rome, after two centuries of good relationships. It 
seems that individual communities who supported Pompey in the 40s, were forced to pay tribute after 
their defeat, see above p. 89. That is the only way to explain why the Liburni would pay tribute to 
Rome, because Liburnian communities had enjoyed immunitas for quite a long time; Suić (1981) 137-
138. Starac (2000) 17. Starac contradicts her previous argument, by stating that Tuditanus forced the 
Liburni to pay tribute; (2000) 15. 
31 App. Ill. 16; Schmitthenner (1958) 198-200 rightly emphasised that these are the only reasons given 
by ancient sources and that all the others are speculations of modern scholarship. 
32 E.g. Charlesworth (1934) 84; Schmitthenner (1958) 197; Wilkes (1969) 48, 49 n.1; Gruen (1996) 
172; Southern (1998) 88, 226 n.15. 
33 Vell. Pat. 2.78.2 Caesar per haec tempora, ne res disciplinae inmicissima, otium, corrumperet 
militem, crebris in Illyrico Delmatiaque expeditionibus patientia periculorum bellique experientia 
durabat exercitum, is quite a general statement and it does not relate to the 35-33 BC expeditions. 
Bosworth (1972) 467 suggests that Velleius refers to Asinius Pollio 39-38 BC, not Octavian 35-33 
BC, and explains why he placed these campaigns chronologically before the war with Sextus 
Pompeius in 36 BC. He is in agreement with App. B Civ. 5.80, who mentions the army in Illyricum in 
37 BC. It is worth noting the opinion of Nagy (1991) 57-59 that Velleius was describing campaigns in 
northwest Illyricum by Octavian or his legate in 39-38 BC.  
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the army only with the expedition against the Pannonians, which followed the 




What about the other motives? Modern scholarship has speculated about 
some motives, but only a few speculations can withstand serious criticism. The 
alleged grand strategy of Octavian makes the Illyrian expedition as a preventive 
move against the potential movements of Antony through Illyricum, but that does not 
seem a really valid reason.
35 However, the point made by Mirković, that Octavian 
strengthened his position in southern Illyricum in the fear that Antony would use the 
Apollonia/Dyrrachium - Brundisium sea-link for the invasion of Italy, looks a much 
more likely reason.
36 The opinion that there was no provocation from the Illyrian 
side and therefore no casus belli for the Romans in 35 BC is unconvincing.
37 The 
impression of Wilkes that the expedition was a continuation of Republican 
interventions in Illyricum, which had no actual connection with Illyrian affairs, 
makes a wrong strategic assessment of the contemporary situation.
38 It is important 
to underline once more the point of Dio, often overlooked in the modern works, that 
Octavian was intending to sail from Sicily to Africa, because affairs there required 
settlement. Only bad weather and a rapid deterioration of the security situation in the 
northern Adriatic sector made him change his plans.
39 The only source which 
suggests that Octavian had in mind an Illyrian expedition earlier is Appian, who 
mentions a mutiny of Octavian’s soldiers in Sicily in 36 BC and his promise of 
‘Illyrian spoils’ to an angry crowd in order to calm them.
40 Furthermore, there is a 
                                                           
34 Dio, 49.36.1. 
35 Swoboda (1932) 1-17; Syme (1971) 17 suggested the potential danger from Antony from this 
direction. Contra Vulić (1907) 24-26; Miltner (1937) 201; Schmitthenner (1958) 198-199; Wilkes 
(1969) 49 n. 1 questioning and refuting this as a mere modern construction. The idea of Josifović 
(1956) 147-148, 154 that Octavian was looking for new recruiting areas in this expedition is nonsense. 
36 Mirković (1968) 116, 126-127. 
37 Gruen (1996) 172-173; Southern (1998) 226 n.15 assume wrongly from Dio, 49.36.1 that there was 
no significant native provocation. Dio was referring to the expedition against the Segestani only. Cf. 
the same objection expressed already by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 190-191. 
38 Wilkes (1969) 49, 56-58; (1996b) 549. Interventionist it certainly was, but influenced directly by 
worsened Illyrian affairs. 
39 Dio, 49.34.1-2; recognised by Hanslik (1961a) 1239; Nagy (1991) 60; Coppola (1999) 196. 
40 App. B Civ. 5.128. It is amazing that Octavian could suggest Illyrian spoils and not be lynched by 
his soldiers who certainly were not so ignorant as not to know that it was a battlefield, which promised 
anything but rich booty. Dio writes of the same mutiny and does not mention any such a thing (49.13-
4). It might be that Appian here followed Augustus’ biography ‘filtrated’ for political and personal 
reasons, and Dio some other source. Augustus would naturally be interested in representing himself as 
someone who wanted to stop civil strife and begin war against barbarians, as we see in Appian. 
Comparison of Appian B Civ. 5.127 (Octavian granting pardon to Sex. Pompeian leaders after their 
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hint by Appian that Antony also thought of joining Octavian in the Illyrian 
expedition, which suggests the seriousness of the situation there.
41 Therefore, it is 
evident that the Illyrian expedition was not planned in advance, but that it was 
primarily caused by native attacks upon Roman interests in Illyricum and a threat to 
the stability of the Norican kingdom. 
 
There were other reasons in the background as well.
42 The personal 
reputation of Octavian and the opportunity to prove himself on the battlefield after 
his bleak performances at Philippi and Sicily cannot be disregarded as significant 
secondary motives. Antony’s military prestige was still much greater than that of 
Octavian, but this argument should not be overemphasized.
43 The success against 
Sextus Pompeius and the elimination of Lepidus from further power-sharing placed 
Octavian in a very strong position in Rome, and there was no immediate necessity to 
show himself as a great general.
44 Of course, Octavian well understood the 
importance of propaganda. One example is his hint that, as a good son and real 
successor, he was following the designs of his adoptive father on the Dacians with 
this expedition.
45 Keeping the army together for a final war with Antony is also an 
important additional reason,
46 which appears in the sources. However, a direct clash 
between them was not yet in sight. Keeping so many legions under arms was 
difficult, expensive and potentially troublesome. This note of Appian and Dio is 
obviously taken from the same source that anticipates a war with Antony, i.e. 
Augustus’ autobiography.
47 This seems an appropriate place in the autobiography 
                                                                                                                                                                      
defeat) and Dio, 49.12.4 (Sex. Pompeian senators and equestrians all executed, except a few, 
supported by Sen. Clem. 1.11.1) may be a good argument for such theory. Cf. Šašel-Kos (1986) 142-
144; Reinhold (1988) 17-19; Mondobeltz (2000) 175. 
41 App. B Civ.  5.132, of course only if we accept that Antony is the subject of the sentence and not 
Octavian; Schmitthenner (1958) 191 n. 5. 
42 It is difficult to agree with Coppola (1999) 195 who included economic reasons such as Dalmatian 
mines (after Flor. 2.25 12) because Octavian in 35 BC was not there to annex the territory, and he did 
not go into the Bosnian mountains where the best potential for mining existed. 
43 Like Schmitthenner (1958) 194-195; Wilkes (1969) 48-49; Gruen (1996) 172-173. 
44 Cf. App. B Civ. 5.130 ff.; Dio, 49.15-16. 
45 Vell. Pat. 2.59.4; App. Ill. 22-23. It is difficult to believe this; cf. Miltner (1937) 204-205; 
Schmitthenner (1958) 194-195; Mócsy (1974) 21-22; Coppola (1999) 203-204; Lica (2000) 91-92. 
Some preventive action against the Dacian king Cotiso might have been contemplated (only if we 
accept the less likely possibility, that Flor. 2.28.18 perhaps referred to a period as early as 36-35 BC, 
like Dacoviciu (1977) 909) but only on a very limited scale. Vulić (1907) 4-5 and Josifović (1956) 
154-155 make the interesting point that the Roman-Dacian relationship was actually quite good at that 
time. 
46 Schmittenner (1958) 196-197. 
47 Dio, 49.13.4; App. B Civ. 5.128; cf. App. Ill. 17 for the repeated motif of Octavian’s anticipation of 
future war with Antony, drawn from the autobiography of Augustus. 
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where he could emphasize his foresight and his expectation of Antony’s treachery 
followed by his own wise conduct, but it is highly questionable whether at that 
moment he really needed so many legions in one place merely as a preventive 
measure. 
 
5. 4  The Campaigns: strategic plans and realization
The first campaign was waged in 35 – 34 BC. There is no reason to see in it 
any special change in Roman policy. Octavian directed the campaign following the 
example of Aurelius Cotta and Metellus Diadematus from 119 BC, and possibly the 
unidentified Cornelius who made pre-emptive strikes into Iapodean territory in order 
to protect the security of Aquileia and the Alpine trade routes from Iapodean and 
Tauriscan threat.
48 The plan was simple and emphasized the final neutralization of 
the Iapodes as a goal, the strengthening of Roman influence in the southern Alps and 
the expansion of it towards the Sava, thus enabling the easier defense of North Italy 
and Noricum, in case of a potential hostile (Dacian) threat. At the same time it 
provided an opportunity to confirm and redefine relations with different Illyrian 
civitates in southern Illyricum. The peoples overcome by Octavian in both 
campaigns fell into three categories: “those overcome at one blow”; “those overcome 
by more prolonged effort”; and finally “those who gave him most trouble”. The 
peoples belonging in the first and second categories were settled on the south 
Adriatic coast and Adriatic islands, far away from the area of unrest in the northwest 
with only a couple of exceptions.  Amongst the latter no doubt were included not 
only those whom he fought, but also peoples who renewed or made formal 
submissions when threatened by movements of the Roman navy and army.
49
 
This was by far the largest and the most comprehensive Roman campaign in 
Illyricum during the Republican period. Octavian attacked on three fronts in 35 BC
50 
                                                           
48 See above, p. 68 ff. 
49 App. Ill. 16-17; Kromayer (1898) 4; Wilkes (1969) 49-50; Schmitthenner (1958) 201-207. Mirković 
(1968) 117 ff. does not make a strong argument in favour of her idea that Octavian’s operations in 
southern Illyricum were in Antony’s part of the empire. She also wrongly identifies Appian’s Βεσσοί 
with Strabo’ s 7.5.12 (C 318) Thracian Βέσσοι  located in Moesia; Mirković (1968) 123 ff.. 
Schmitthenner (1958) 206 is not right either to regard them as “möglicherweise thrakische 
Splittergruppe”, but he is without doubt right in locating them, from evidence provided by Appian, on 
the north-west, close to the Taurisci; cf. Wilkes (1969) 50 n. 2. 
50 Iapodean, Alpine and the fleet in the southern and central Adriatic. Šašel (1974a) 193-194; (1974b) 
731-732 argues that Octavian started the attack simultaneously from Aquileia (Alps), Pola (Liburnian 
pirates), Brundisium (Melitan pirates), Scardona/Burnum (Iapodes), Salona (Delmatae), Narona and 
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with some 40-50,000 soldiers,
51 leading the campaign against the Iapodes himself 
and leaving the other opponents to his legati.
52 He took this campaign very seriously, 
having with him in the field his best military commanders such as Agrippa, Statilius 
Taurus and Valerius Messala Corvinus.
53 Octavian’s route was probably similar to 
that taken in previous Roman campaigns against the Iapodes, i.e. approaching 
Illyricum via Tergeste, and starting in the Liburnian safe bases,
54 and going through 
the narrowest part of the Dinaric Alps up to the River Sava. The main army went 
from Italy via Tergeste and Senia.
55 Supporting Octavian’s main course of attack, 
from the Celtic north-west wing in the Alps, the legate C. Antistius Vetus was sent 
against the Salassi and although his achievement did not long last long, for the 
moment he completed his task with success.
56 However, after the defeat of the 
Salassi, the other Alpine tribes, like the Carni and Taurisci, who were named by Dio 
among the main troublemakers, conceded defeat and started to pay the tribute again, 
thus securing Octavian’s north-west flank, and enabling him to focus more closely on 
the Iapodes and Segestani. 
 
The Roman fleet operated in the eastern Adriatic as some minor piracy was 
successfully tackled on the islands of Melita (Mljet), Korkyra (Korčula) and the 
Liburnian islands.
57 The extent of piracy is doubtful because there are no other 
mentions of piracy in this period apart from Appian’s note taken from Augustus’ 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Dyrrachium (southern Illyrians). We can dispute Salona, as the operations against the Delmatae do not 
start before 34 BC, and Pola, as there was only one fleet sailing via Brundisium. The extent of 
operations in the south remains unknown, but it seems that they were low scale conflicts 
corresponding with the movements of the fleet. 
51 8-12 legions, i.e. 40-60,000 soldiers; Veith (1914) 108-109; Swoboda (1932) 46; contra Syme 
(1933a) 68. Still, these numbers are no more than speculation. See Brunt (1987) 500-501 for the 
number of Octavian’s legions before Actium. 
52 Dio, 49.35.1. 
53 Agrippa: App. Ill. 20; Dio, 49.38.3; Messala Corvinus: Tib. 3.7.106-117; Schmitthenner (1958) 
234-236. Perhaps Agrippa commanded the fleet in the Adriatic, and he is attested by sources as 
present in the campaign against the Iapodes and Segestani; Kromayer (1898) 4; Hanslik (1961a) 1240; 
Roddaz (1984) 142-145. 
54 Most probably Senia; Kromayer (1898) 4-5. J. Šašel, argues multiple routes of attack, see this 
section n. 50. The campaign against the Iapodes would be impossible without logistical support from 
and via Liburnia; thus Dio’s remark that the Liburni were part of the unrest cannot be applied to the 
majority of their mainland communities. 
55 Kromayer (1898) 4-5; Malevany (1977) 134. 
56 App. Ill. 17; Strabo, 4.6.7, it was certainly not “einem unverhüllten Misserfolg” as characterized by 
Kromayer (1898) 2. Messala Corvinus completed the conquest in the following year, App. Ill. 17; 
Dio, 49.38.3, or even shortly after the Actium if we accept that Dio was wrong; Schmitthenner (1958) 
210-211, 234; cf. Momigliano (1950) 40-41. 
There was no Illyrian Salassi as suggested by some scholars; Schmitthenner (1958) 207-208; 
Malevany (1977) 133. 
57 App. Ill. 16. 
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memoirs. Especially enigmatic is the sentence where it is stated that Augustus 
deprived the Liburni of their ships. The Liburni had not been mentioned as pirates for 
a couple of centuries,
58 and it is difficult to believe in the existence of endemic piracy 
in the eastern Adriatic, except for the period of Ardiaean state-sponsored piracy in 
the 3
rd century BC.
59 The wide spread political crisis in the Roman world had caused 
some small-scale piracy in some communities (the Liburnian islands and Velebit 
channel), which required the attention of the Roman fleet.
60 The young Caesar used 
his large fleet to make a show of full force and a lasting impression of military 
strength in this area not only to its inhabitants but also to the neighboring areas 
belonging to Antony’s part of the empire. The punishment of the Melitani, who were 
either slaughtered or sold into slavery, seems unusually cruel, taking into account the 
cautious and diplomatic approach towards other enemies in this campaign, but it is 
possible that the Romans encountered strong resistance, or maybe they just wanted to 
make an example. Pirates from Melite and Corcyra Melaina disrupted trade and 
important communications with Narona,
61 so it was necessary to deal decisively with 
the problem. The main role of the fleet in subsequent operations was to provide 
logistical support for the main army, especially in the campaign against the 




Octavian himself tackled the greatest problem – the Iapodes. They not only 
refused to pay the tribute that the others did, but were the only people Dio singled out 
as a real threat to northern Italy in 36 BC. Firstly, Octavian swiftly dealt with the 
Cisalpine Iapodes, whose individual civitates surrendered even before the Romans 
took their leading civitas, Arupini.
63 Later, Octavian encountered much stronger 
                                                           
58 Livy, 10.2.4, for year 302 BC, is the only source before Appian that ever mentioned Liburnian 
piracy, and he does so in a very general context. 
59 Dell (1967). 
60  Čače (1985) 313-317. This statement of Appian is often misunderstood by modern scholars. 
Although Octavian took away ships from Liburnian pirates, he did not confiscate the whole Liburnian 
fleet, because the Liburnian L. Tarius Rufus was commanding a squadron at Actium. Also, we should 
distinguish the terms Liburnian ships from liburnicae – a type of warship originated there and adopted 
by Romans in the mid 1
st BC; cf. Dzino (2003) 27 ff. 
61 Zaninović (1980) 177. 
62 It does not seem that the fleet was starting from Tergeste (as suggested by Hanslik (1961a) 1240), 
except perhaps for supply ships. It rather seems that some ships returned from Sicily via Brundisium; 
Kromayer (1898) 3-4. 
63 App. Ill. 16; Schmitthenner (1958) 234-236 suggests that Messala Corvinus completed the 
subjugation of the Arupini and Cisalpine Iapodes while Octavian was hastening away elsewhere. 
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resistance when attacking the Transalpine Iapodes, but relatively speedily defeated 
them, after taking and destroying their key civitas, Metulum (located southeast of 
modern Ogulin).
64 It is, nevertheless, possible that the siege of Metulum lasted longer 
than Appian suggested, and that he abridged his source at this spot.
65 The 
Transalpine Iapodes represented very real military danger for North Italy and Histria, 
because they were so numerous, well ordered and trained especially if acting in co-
operation with the other Alpine peoples. However, they were not able to defend 
themselves alone against disciplined, decisive and numerous Roman forces.
66
 
The second part of the first campaign, which reached into the land of the 
Pannonii is more controversial. Dio states that it was an unprovoked action,
67 so 
Octavian must have been driven by some other strategic reasons. Appian draws his 
information from Augustus’ memoirs, where the action is justified by Octavian’s 
intention to attack the Dacians and Bastarnae.
68 We can discard this as propaganda, 
or just accept that he changed his plans for some reason which remains obscure.
69 On 
the one hand, if he did indeed intend to attack, it would have been military suicide, 
because Roman lines of communications would stretch from the not yet pacified 
Segestica, through to uncontrolled territory open to attack from the hostile Pannonii 
from both banks of the Sava, such as the Breuci or Mezaei.
70 It is not impossible that 
Octavian wanted to finish his, so far, brief and successful campaign at some easily 
                                                           
64 Veith (1914) 29-50. 
65 Malevany (1977) 136 after Veith (1914) 37-38 observed that it is not really possible that the 
Iapodes surrendered a day after they had repelled the Roman attack and after Octavian was wounded. 
The splendid story of Octavian leaping on the walls of Metulum alone (App. Ill. 20) carries an 
obvious propaganda-driven resemblance to Alexander the Great; Wilkes (1969) 51 n. 3; Coppola 
(2000) 201 ff. 
66 The Transalpine Iapodes represented real, not only potential danger for Romans. The Metulan 
civitas alone was able to raise 3,000 well-trained warriors to defend Metulum, and they were able to 
use Roman fighting machines (taken from Decimus Brutus retreating after Mutina in 40 BC, Dio, 
46.52.2) against them successfully; App. Ill. 19. See Čače (1979) 61, 71 ff. on Iapodean military 
organization. 
67 Dio, 49.36.1. “This tribe actually inhabited a region too distant from Italy to have ever threatened 
it seriously; also they had never paid tribute to the Romans, thus in their case there was no just 
reason for war, …, and Dio’s statement is perfectly correct in so far as it refers merely to the 
Pannonians.”; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 191. 
68 App. Ill. 22. 
69 For the propaganda see above. If Octavian contemplated a limited expedition against the Dacians, it 
is possible that circumstances suddenly changed and that intervention was not necessary at that 
moment. (cf. Suet. Aug. 63.4, who suggested a marriage alliance between Octavian and Cotiso as a 
possibility). 
70 App. Ill. 23 mentions help sent to the Segestani by the other Pannonii, possibly the Breuci who 
dwelt in the valley of the Sava, or the Mezaei from northwest Bosnia. It seems obvious that they were 
not friendly to Romans. Whether they had been under Dacian influence is impossible to determine, 
but looks less likely. 
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defensible point where garrisons could be placed, such as on the banks of the Sava 
and Segestica.
71 Adding to this confusion about the intentions of Octavian in 34 BC, 
Appian and Dio give different and somewhat confusing accounts about the ships 
employed in the siege of Segestica.
72 Appian mentions ships being built on the Sava 
in order to bring provisions to the Danube during his planned campaign against the 
Dacians.
73 Dio, on the other hand, mentions ships constructed by some allies in that 
vicinity, which, after they had been towed through the Ister into the Sava and further 
in the Colops, helped Octavian to attack Segestica from the river as well.
74 It is 
relatively easy to accept that Dio or his source was wrong, and had mixed up 
information taken from Augustus’ autobiography. Precedence should be given to 
Appian as a source here.
75 The identity of those allies mentioned by Dio remains 
disputed; the Noricans and Taurisci seem the most likely candidates because they 
were located close to Segestica, just as Dio suggested.
76
 
Octavian’s approach was apparently more cautious at the beginning of this 
campaign, but as he encountered more resistance, he became more aggressive.
77 
However, Octavian did not encounter as much resistance as in his campaign against 
the Iapodes, except for the siege of Segestica, which lasted for 30 days, and finished 
with the full surrender of the Segestani. The siege of Segestica cost Octavian the life 
                                                           
71 Kromayer (1898) 6; Syme (1933a) 67. See Durman (1992) on the geo-strategic importance of 
Siscia/Segestica before and after Roman conquest. 
72 Octavian needed ships in order to take Segestica because the pre-Roman city (locality Pogorelec 
near Sisak) was surrounded by the river Colops (Kupa) on three sides; Faber (1972/73) 151-153; Šašel 
(1974b) 719-726; Nenadović (1986/87) 72-73, fig. 1. The other reason is clearly stated by Appian – 
the army needed supplies and it was too difficult to get them through the land of the Iapodes, which 
was not yet fully pacified. 
73 App. Ill. 22. 
74 Dio, 49.37.4-6. 
75 This idea is impossible for one basic reason: how could Octavian organise in such a short time for 
ships to arrive all the way from the lower stream of the Danube (in Antony’s part of the empire) 
through hostile territory? Patsch (1932) 59-61 thought that the Dacians of Cotiso supplied ships, and 
Papazoglu (1978) 337-339 recognized the Scordisci as the allies mentioned in Dio. Both of these 
hypotheses were rightly discarded by Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194, on account of their distance from 
Segestica. Nagy (1991) 61-62 is possibly right in his view that that Dio’s source was confused as to 
the geography. 
76 These allies could be from the Norican kingdom; Zippel (1877) 230; Šašel-Kos (1986) 140, or the 
Taurisci; Wilkes (1969) 53; Nagy (1991) 62; Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194. Wilkes accepts a less likely 
travel reconstruction of the voyage via Drava, Danube and Sava. It still seems too dangerous to 
undertake such a dangerous trip through hostile Breucian, Scordiscan and Dacian controlled territory. 
Šašel-Kos (1997a) 193-194 makes a more plausible synthesis of Dio and Appian and argues that the 
allies in the vicinity of Siscia (in Dio) were the Taurisci, and that they constructed ships on the Sava, 
(in Appian) and sent them downstream to Segestica. 
77 Or at least he presented himself in such way in his autobiography. Nagy (1991) 62 gives a good 
reason for such cautious behaviour on the part of Octavian – inadequate supplies for the army. 
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of his famous admiral Menodorus.
78 The settlement was pretty moderate, without 
unnecessary reprisals on the Segestani. Dio states that the remainder of Pannonia 
capitulated as well, but there does not seem to have been a capitulation of all the 
Pannonii; Dio must have been wrong here.
79 Octavian left 25 cohorts to garrison the 
place, and that actually proved to be a wise decision, as they put down a brief but 
serious revolt that winter.
80
 
The fall of Segestica signalled the end of campaigning for the year.
81 What 
Octavian’s intentions were, it is again difficult to understand. A Dacian invasion 
seems to have been abandoned, if there was ever any serious Dacian plan. Dio 
mentions Octavian departing for Gaul in order to reach Britain before returning to 
Illyricum to deal with the rebellion of the Segestani and the Delmatae, while Appian 
states that he intended to return to Illyricum in the spring and that he actually 
returned earlier on news of the uprising.
82 Despite Appian’s statement, it does not 
seem that Octavian planned the Dalmatian campaign much in advance, but rather that 
he was forced to return to Dalmatia.
83 The rebellion started again amongst the Alpine 
peoples, but it ended quickly and there were no serious consequences for the 
                                                           
78 For Menodorus see Münzer (1932). Appian is silent on this matter, but he does not suggest the 
existence of conspiracy between Octavian and Agrippa to eliminate Menodorus as suggested by Šašel-
Kos (1997a) 195. If there was conspiracy, Dio’s source would be informed of rumours. 
79 Dio, 49.37.6; Syme (1933b) 68-71; Schmitthenner (1958) 215-216. Perhaps some of the Pannonii 
who sent help to Segestani (App. Ill. 23) made deditio without fighting, being discouraged by the fall 
of Segestica, and gave hostages to Rome, or simply retreated. 
80 Dio, 49.37.1-2; App. Ill. 22-24. The Pannonian nobility was apparently friendlier towards the 
Romans than the rest of the population; cf. App. Ill. 23. The rebellion of the Segestani appears to be 
much more serious in Dio than in Appian. No source mentions what happened to the garrison in 
Segestica after 33 BC. Perhaps it was abandoned, or garrisoned with minimal forces, because 
unidentified Pannonii and Norici were able to launch raids into Istria in 16 BC; Dio, 54. 20.1, see 
below p. 131. 
81 Some authors think that Octavian sent detachments of the army to control the valley of Sava after he 
took Segestica; Zippel (1877) 231-232; Kromayer (1898) 7. It is difficult to believe this because the 
campaigning season was already over and no source confirms that any troops were sent from Siscia 
further north or east; cf. Nagy (1991) 64. 
82 App. Ill. 24; Dio, 49.38. There is a slight temptation to prefer Dio as a source for Octavian’s 
campaigns. Καîσαρ, appearing in Appian, is always presenting himself in a better light whenever 
contradicting Dio’s source, see Chapter 5.3 n. 40. He was not going to Britain, leaving the Illyrian job 
unfinished as Dio suggests, but intending to return to Illyria in the spring as a responsible general 
fighting barbarians. Coppola (2000) 200 suggested that the idea of campaigning in Britain was 
nothing but a piece of propaganda in his autobiography - aemulatio Caesaris. It would be plausible, 
but only if this story had been told in Appian, who follows Augustus, not in Dio (although it is not 
impossible that Augustus dropped it from the Autobiography).  
83 It is important to emphasise that the Delmatae were not singled out amongst the rebels who refused 
to pay tribute in 35 BC; Dio, 49.34.1-2 (overlooked by Coppola (2000) 197). However, this is one 
situation where an historian cannot support with confidence either of the offered possibilities. 
Thorough pacification of the Delmatae was after all a very important prerequisite for the formation of 
‘lesser’ Illyricum as a separate province. 
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Romans. The targets of Octavian in 34 BC were the Delmatae who meanwhile raised 
the army and fought Romans with more than 12,000 soldiers under the leadership of 
their princeps Οὐέρσου (Versus), and, after he perished, one Τέστιµου (Testimus) 
was elected as leader.
84 From the sources it appears that they made the first offensive 
moves in occupying the stronghold of Promona again, but after the Romans took 
Promona and Synodium, and secured the Roman community in Salona, the Delmatae 
capitulated and started to pay tribute again.
85
 
There is no valid or reasonable explanation why the Delmatae would provoke 
the Romans after Octavian had so decisively and successfully dealt with the Iapodes 
and Segestani in the previous year. Perhaps they tried to settle accounts with the 
Liburni and expected the Romans to be engaged elsewhere, as in 50 BC, and to 
recognize the de facto situation afterwards,
86 or maybe it was simply a pre-emptive 
reaction caused by their fear of further aggression.
87 The fast return of Octavian to 
Illyricum, whether planned or not, was a reasonable strategic move as he could not 
leave the Delmatae unpacified, bearing in mind Caesar’s unexpected troubles with 
them in the 40s. 
 
 
5. 5  Daisioi – Daesitiates: What happened to the rest of the Pannonii?
We should accept that the subjugation of the Segestani and Delmatae were 
the limits of Octavian’s expedition and that he never crossed into the Bosnian 
mountains with his legions.
88 There was no apparent danger to Roman interests in 
that area and certainly no need for Octavian to extend his lines of communication 
                                                           
84 According to Appian the army led by Verzo had 12,000 warriors, but the size of Testimus’ army is 
unknown. Čače (1979) 103-109 estimates that Testimus led an additional 8,000 warriors. 
85 App. Ill. 25-28. There was fighting around Salona, unreported by Appian and Dio, but mentioned in 
Strabo, 7.5.5 (C 315) where Σάλωνά is included amongst the cities burned by Octavian, and 
distinguished from the port Σάλων. It might be only the Delmataean Salona located near Klis in the 
hinterland and not the Italo-Greek Salona on the coast, see Chapter 3.3 n. 44. 
86 It is possible that they just wanted to change the peace terms enforced by Asinius Pollio in 39 BC. 
Their overall successful war record against the Romans in the 40s might be a good reason for 
overconfidence, and if it is true that Octavian left for Gaul, we have the circumstances so suitable for 
them to attack that they could recognize their window of opportunity. 
87 Vulić (1926) 49 thinks that taking Promona was a pre-emptive move on the part of the Delmatae 
who knew that the Romans would attack them anyway. 
88 Kromayer (1898) 11-12; Dobiáš (1921) 219-223; Syme (1933a); Schmitthenner (1958); Wilkes 
(1969) 55-57; Nagy (1991) 65-66. Still, there was nothing to imply that he did not receive nominal 
deditio from some neighbouring peoples, without actually fighting them, see Chapter 5.4 n. 79. 
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into hostile terrain, test his luck and risk resources once his operation had finished 
successfully. Thus large areas of today’s central and northern Bosnia and the valley 
of the Sava remained free of direct or indirect Roman control. There is a note in 
Appian mentioning the sickness of Octavian, which prevented him from subduing 
other peoples,
89 possibly referring to the Pannonii in the hinterland. Of course, it is 
impossible to determine precisely what was the real reason behind his decision to 
finish the campaign. Octavian was wounded in the knee during the siege of 
Synodium.
90 We can assume that this injury really was severe enough to prevent his 
continuing the campaign. On the other hand, it would be an excellent excuse to finish 
the campaign before reaching the potentially dangerous terrain in the hinterland and 
to start preparing for a much more important showdown with Antony. Statilius 
Taurus, Octavian’s legate was left to complete the campaign, and to mop up the 
remnants of the Delmataean resistance.
91  
 
An important but unclear question still remains: who are the ∆αίσιοί, people 
singled out together with the Salassi, the Iapodes, the Segestani and the Delmatae, as 
a people who gave Octavian the greatest problems. They are an otherwise unknown 
people. The overwhelming majority of scholars have suggested that Appian referred 
to the Daesitiates, a significant Pannonian people, who inhabited central Bosnia.
92 It 
is difficult either to accept or to discard this. If we accept that Octavian fought the 
Daesitiates so deeply inland, the question is why are there no other references in 
either Appian or Dio to such an important military incursion. An unsuccessful 
outcome of the operation, or deditio of the Daesitiates without actual fighting, might 
be a reasonable and suitable explanation for this problem.
93 On the other hand, if we 
                                                           
89 App. Ill. 28. 
90 App. Ill. 27; Suet. Aug. 20 (adding also the accident with the collapsing bridge not mentioned by 
Appian); Dio, 49.38.4. 
91 Dio, 49.38.4. 
92  CIL III 3201 and the more significant inscription from Breza T. F(lavius) Valens f. princeps 
D(a)esitiati(um); Sergejevski (1940) 141 n. 10 pl. 11.  
Vulić (1933) 14-17; (1934) 164-166; Josifović (1956) 144; Schmitthenner (1958) 213; Malevany 
(1977) 134. Dobiáš (1921) 216-218 is wrong in locating the Daesitiates south of Split, and alone in 
defending the original App. Ill. 17 δαίσιοί τε καὶ Παίονες instead of the reconstructed ∆αισιτιâται 
καὶ Παίονες. 
93  Kromayer (1898) 12 n. 4; Pašalić (1956) 273-276 say that Octavian or his legates fought the 
Daesitiates but without success, so that there is mention of them giving resistance but not being 
subdued in Octavian’s report to the Senate. Vulić (1907) 22 although opposed to this opinion, 
suggests that there is a lacuna in Appian where he described Roman (successful in his opinion) 
fighting with the Daesitiates. Dio is silent on the matter and in our opinion his silence confirms the 
argument of Kromayer and Syme. 
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discard the hypothesis that the Daesitiates were Daisioi, it is difficult to accept that 
the people who were such an obstacle to Romans, as the Daisioi apparently were, 
simply disappear from the map of Illyricum in all the later sources.
94
 
5. 6  Octavian’s campaigns: the assessment
The changes in the constitutional/political framework that Rome imposed on 
Illyricum during the period of Caesar's governorship and dictatorship affected the 
situation in Illyricum after his assassination. The emphasis of mid- and long-term 
Roman policy shifted from islands and isolated points on the coast to the whole 
length of the coast. Changed strategic priorities of Rome in the region were not 
followed by a changed strategic position and that seems to be the largest Roman 
problem at the time. Illyricum as a unified zone of operation was more difficult to 
protect, being a narrow strip without strategic depth and foothold in the hinterland, 
and preventative intervention was necessary to ensure the security of the Roman 
position on the seacoast and in the south Alpine area. Limited-scale interventions 
such as Pollio’s produced no lasting results. However, the wave of disturbances in 36 
BC was the necessary catalyst. It, rather than some preconceived plan, triggered the 
action. Octavian had an opportunity to gather his forces and coordinate their efforts 
like no other Roman general before him except Caesar or Pompey, and he had used it 




Internal and external Roman political problems played a significant, but 
secondary role in the Illyrian policy of the period. It cannot be determined precisely 
how dangerous to Roman interests was the rise of the Dacian state under Burebista 
and his successors, especially after Burebista’s death. However, no source suggests 
the existence of a direct danger to Italy from this area, and it is obvious that the 
Dacians were not threatening to cause a large wave of migrations, which would be 
harmful to Italy, such as those of the Cimbri and the Teutones had been. Their 
                                                           
94 Schmitthenner (1958) 213 is not certain about them either. Although it is difficult to accept that 
Octavian campaigned in Bosnia or the valley of the Sava, it seems that he received either deditio or 
made some kind of treaty with some of the Pannonii, certainly, the Varciani, maybe the Osseriates, 
and less likely the Daesitiates and Breuci recognizing nominal Roman suzerainty, without actually 
fighting them. That would explain why Romans regarded the wars in 12-9 BC as rebellions. 
95 Gaul also suffered from the neglect of Caesar’s, already outdated, laissez-faire approach, until 
Agrippa implemented a decisive and successful change of the political framework in 39 BC; 
Drinkwater (1985) 19-20, 120-121; Roddaz (1984) 66-75. 
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interest was focused on the eastern and southeastern Balkans. Nevertheless, the 
Roman internal crisis and civil wars were enough to weaken their position in 
Illyricum to some degree. We cannot overstate this assessment, as Italian settlement 
of the eastern Adriatic continued despite all the troubles and it was encouraged, as it 
helped defence and at the same time strengthened the base for inland military 
operations. 
 
Octavian’s campaigns should be seen as the beginning of a new phase in 
Roman Illyrian policy, completing all necessary prerequisites for a new 
constitutional framework that would be imposed by the establishment of Illyricum as 
a separate province. On the surface the campaigns do not appear to have produced 
radical change such as had occurred under the Republic and, which placed in the 
forefront the security of the Italian mainland and the protection of the allies.
96 
Octavian used more soldiers than previous commanders but his campaigns were 
defensive in nature, and aimed at the pacification of the region, the eradication of 
piracy and the security of North Italy and Noricum, as well as the communities of 
Romans and Italians on the Adriatic coast. This was not a continuation of ‘coastal’ 
Illyricum from Caesar’s time, as Romans had never showed any intention to deal 
with the area more decisively before Octavian. It was the thoroughness of the action 
and the final pacification of the Delmatae and Iapodes that eliminated the last 
obstacles to the establishment of Roman provincial arrangements in Illyricum. The 
garrisoning of Segestica seems to have been the greatest change in the policy, as the 
Roman army had never remained permanently in Illyricum before, especially as it 
was so far from the sea. 
 
  The settlement with the natives was far from a permanent annexation. 
Although there is nothing preserved of Octavian’s peace agreements with the 
defeated peoples of Illyricum, it was certainly a form of deditio, after which they 
became  socii of Rome. This type of settlement was very usual with non-Italian 
gentes at this time,
97 so we can assume that it was imposed in Illyricum as well. 
Already existing agreements were re-asserted, hostages were given and payment of 
                                                           
96 Contra Kromayer (1898) 1; Miltner (1937) 202 seeing it as a Totalitässtreben, a prelude to his 
future imperial policy of expansion. This would be acceptable if Octavian had fully conquered 
Illyricum, instead of just pacifying it. 
97 Timpe (1972); Lica (2000) 59-61. 
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retrospective tribute imposed.
98 Only the Transalpine Iapodes and Segestani are 
explicitly mentioned as being brought for the first time under Roman domination.
99  
 
 Previous security arrangements without any lasting commitment of Roman 
troops became outdated because Rome’s attitude towards Illyricum had changed and 
a stronger military presence was now a necessity for the security of new Roman and 
Italian settlers on the coast and the new position of Illyricum in the Empire. The 
proto-province established in 59 BC was Roman acknowledgment that the situation 
changed, but in just two decades ‘coastal’ Illyricum became outdated and 
dysfunctional. Octavian’s campaigns restored political stability in the area. It was a 
modest but thorough achievement, primarily aimed at and achieving pacification of 
some troublesome peoples from Illyricum and additionally acquiring some welcome 
military gloria for the young Caesar.
100 He created (whether by intention or not) 
conditions for the subsequent Roman political and military penetration towards the 
Danube. However, the changes in the Roman constitution, army and military 
strategy, and the completion of the municipalization on the coast, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, were necessary prerequisites for Roman conquest of 
the hinterland. 
                                                           
98 Cf. App. Ill. 16, 28 (the Delmatae and the Derbani). 
99 App. Ill. 21 (Transalpine Iapodes), 22 (the Segestani). 
100 Thus the objections of Veith (1914) 108-109 that Octavian could have done much better in these 
campaigns are unrealistic. 
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Nunc tibi Pannonia est, nunc Illyris ora domanda 




6. 1  First years of the Principate 
In 33 BC Octavian’s campaigns were finished and Illyricum was finally de 
iure a Roman province. In 30 BC the Roman civil wars ended and Octavian was 
finally supreme master of the Mediterranean. There is some symbolic connection 
between the fortunes of the first Princeps and Illyricum, as military victories in 
Illyricum in 33 and 9 BC mark the high points of his political career, and the bellum 
Batonianum AD 6 – 9 coincides with the darkest hours of his foreign policy. This 
chapter will analyze Roman – Illyrian political and social interactions in the period 
while Illyricum was the senatorial province or the phase of ‘lesser’ Illyricum and 
explore their significance in the internal context of Illyricum, and the changed 
external circumstances of a new regime. This chapter will also analyze the causes 
and reasons that influenced the change of the political/constitutional framework in 12 
– 11 BC and consequently through the Bellum Pannonicum, and together with 
Chapter 7 assess the consequences of that change. 
 
There is no space here to discuss in depth the great social and political 
changes in the Roman world that followed the victory of Octavian in the civil war. 
The battle of Actium and the new constitution from 27 BC finished the long socio-
political process of Rome’s transformation. Political power had already shifted from 
the Senate more than two decades before but this time, instead of two or three, there 
was only one unchallenged master of the empire – Augustus. However, the 
transformation was not yet completely finished in the first years of the Principate. A 
new system needed some time to consolidate, working by trial and error rather than 
following some pre-determined plan. Augustus implemented a series of reforms 
patiently and gradually during the whole of his long reign, carefully avoiding a 
definition of the exact extent of his non-constitutional powers, keeping the façade of 
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constitutional and traditional government, but concentrating all power in his hands 
and preserving it for members of his family.
1
 
The conduct of foreign policy changed as a consequence of the new system. 
The Princeps directly controlled most of the army and foreign policy. In 27 BC the 
provinces were divided into imperial, ruled by legates  appointed directly by 
Augustus, and senatorial, where governors were appointed in the Republican way, by 
the casting of lots among ex-magistrates. Imperial provinces were generally the 
troublesome parts of the empire, requiring a strong military presence, while the 
senatorial were more peaceful areas without imminent threat; they required able 
administrators, not soldiers.
2 An important change in foreign policy was that now 
military cooperation between the governors of different provinces was more likely 
than in the Republic. Under the new constitution the Princeps had power to override 
individual governors and co-ordinate their efforts, so that larger military operations 
became possible.
3 Even so, a need for internal consolidation, a reorganization of the 
army, and rest after the decades of civil unrest perhaps delayed the offensive in the 
West, before territory over the Rhine and up to the Danube was brought under 
Roman rule - the most impressive foreign policy achievement of the Augustan 
Principate. Augustan expansion remains a very controversial topic. The sources 
make it difficult to recognize the main reason for sudden Roman interest and a full-
scale military engagement beyond the Rhine into Germany, Pannonia and the mid-
Danube. It is unclear whether it was primarily an internally driven issue, such as to 
prove Augustus’ successors to be capable leaders and to give an impression of the 
new system’s vitality, or an externally influenced search for easy defensible borders 
in Europe, or a combination of both (Chapter 6.4). 
 
The sources for the first years of the Principate are often inadequate, 
especially for the history of Illyricum. Appian’s Illyrian monograph stops with the 
end of Octavian’s wars, so in this period we rely mainly on Dio’s dry annalistic 
account and excerpts from Suetonius’ Vitae, as well as contemporary sources such as 
                                                           
1 There is a large body of writing on this topic of transition. Particularly useful are: Syme (1939) 313 
ff.; Millar (1984b); Raaflaub/Toher (1990); Southern (1998) 100 ff.; Crook (1996) 113-146, etc. 
2 Dio, 53.12.4; Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840); Suet. Aug. 46-47 (In addition there was also an equestrian 
prefect of Egypt.). See also Bowman (1996). Still, we cannot be so naive as to understand the 
‘independence’ of senatorial governors under Augustus as anything more than propaganda; cf. Millar 
(1984a) 46 ff. 
3 Cf. Wilkes (1965a) 9 ff. on the development and for examples of this strategy. 
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Velleius Paterculus or Augustus’ own Res Gestae.
4 Secondary sources such as the 
epitomes of Livy (up to 9 BC), Florus or epitomizers drawing on Livy such as 
Eusebius and Rufus Festus, often make the reconstruction of events even more 
confusing. The inscriptions from Illyricum are not numerous in this period, yet 
epigraphy is a necessary tool of the Roman imperial historian, and is the only way of 
discovering anything about the scale of Italian colonization and the ethnic 
composition of the new colonies in the Dalmatian coast during this period.
5
 
6. 2  Illyricum in the first years of the Principate: the Pax Augusta 
There is not much information from Illyricum itself following Octavian’s 
campaigns. As we saw in the previous chapter, the extent of the conquest in 35 – 33 
BC was actually quite modest, but the fact that no new troubles were reported points 
to the area being pacified and secured to a reasonable degree. Illyricum was finally 
organized as an independent province. It is said in the sources that Illyricum was put 
under senatorial administration after 27 BC,
6 so many scholars believe that it was 
established as a regular province as a direct consequence of Octavian’s campaigns in 
35 – 33 BC.
7 However, we cannot point precisely to when in the period after the 
summer of 32 and 27 BC, that happened.
8 Neither is known where the administrative 
center of this province was, nor is there any mention of its governors in the first years 
of the Principate, apart from Tamphilus Vála who is mentioned in the inscription 
recently found in Iader, and P. Silius Nerva, proconsul in c. 16 BC.
9 There is also an 
                                                           
4 Gabba (1984a) is useful on the bias of different historians towards Augustus and his reign. See also 
Toher (1990); Reinhold/Swan (1990). 
5 Unfortunately, we are on very slippery ground here. The methodology used in the most important 
works on municipalization in Illyricum such as Alföldy (1962a); (1965a) 17 ff. and Wilkes (1969), so-
called “statistisch-epigraphische Methode”, has been subjected to damaging criticism by scholars 
such as Vittinghoff (1977). See an overview of the debate in Wilkes (1977) 746-751. 
6 Dio, 53.12.4 τὸ ∆ελµατικὸν; Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840) Ἰλλυρίδα. 
7 Wilkes (1969) 36; Nagy (1991) 67. 
8 Nagy (1991) 67 pointed out that Illyricum is missing from the list of provinces which swore an oath 
to Octavian in the summer of 32 BC (RG 25.2), so the establishment of the province of Illyricum must 
be dated after that event. The First book of Propertius’ Elegies which mentions the departure of the 
Illyrian governor was composed after 30/29 but before 27/26 BC; Prop. 1.8; cf. Butler/Barber (1933) 
xxv-xxvi; Camps (1961) 6-7. 
9 The earliest known proconsul of Illyricum is Cn. Baebius (f.) Cn. Tamphilus Vála Numonianus, and 
it is very possible that he was first governor of senatorial Illyricum when it was founded in 27 BC; 
Fadić (1986) 416-424; (1999); see Plate II. The other known name is the proconsul P. Silius Nerva; 
Dio, 54.20.1-2; CIL III 2973 from Aenona. Nagy (1991) 68 n. 87 and Wilkes (1996b) 551 express 
doubts that Silius was the governor of senatorial Illyricum. See discussion on Silius below p. 128. 
Wilkes (1996b) 567 also argues that Illyricum (excluding Liburnia) was administered in conjunction 
with Macedonia until 27 BC. It is difficult to accept that fact after 35 BC, because relations between 
Octavian and Antony worsened and their line of division was between Illyricum and Macedonia. 
Certainly Illyricum was under extraordinary command before it became a province. 
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unnamed love rival of the poet Propertius, who was governor of Illyricum.
10 Still, 
knowing that Illyricum had been given to senatorial administration is an important 
hint that the situation was under control and that no new military undertakings were 
necessary there for almost two full decades.
11
 
 The most important piece of information we have from this period derives 
from epigraphic sources. Augustus’ reign included a large program of Italian 
settlement in the coastal Illyrian cities, which consolidated and strengthened Roman 
rule. Those coastal cities, which already had conventus of Roman citizens and earlier 
had gained some municipal privileges from Caesar,
12 have their status advanced to 
the level of colonia Romana. The colonies were established in Iader
13 (c. 27 BC), 
Salona,
14 Narona,




cities, such as Scodra, Lissus, Tragurium, Issa or Aenona, perhaps acquired 
                                                           
10 Prop. 1.8, 2.16. Propertius calls him praetor in 2.16.1, but it might be a colloquialism. Fasces 
mentioned in 2.16.11 confirm that he was a magistrate; Butler/Barber (1933) 164; Camps (1967) 130.  
11 Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219; Betz (1938) 3; Nagy (1991) 67-68 believe that the northern part of 
Illyricum, where some army units were stationed, was organized as a separate province or the panon-
illyrischen Militärdistrict under an imperial legate. However, we do not have any evidence to confirm 
the existence of these legates;  Syme (1933c) 22 n. 55; cf. Papazoglu (1976) 207-208. That 
hypothetical ‘imperial Illyricum’ would be limited only by the Adriatic hinterland and southern Alps, 
(both inscriptions mentioning governors of senatorial Illyricum were found in Liburnia, confirming 
that it was part of senatorial Illyricum as well). It is after all very unlikely that Augustus would 
establish such a small province in a light of his fondness for large provinces (Dio, 53.12.8), and his 
reluctance to create new provinces; Braunert (1977). There was no external or internal reason why 
such an extraordinary command should exist; see this section n. 29. 
12 Above, p. 85. 
13 CIL III 13,264; Pliny, HN 3.140; Wilkes (1969) 207-208; Alföldy (1962a) 361-362; (1965a) 78-79; 
Salmon (1969) 160; Brunt (1987) 597 (C 73). The inscription mentioning the proconsul Tamphilus 
Vála suggests Augustus as a founder of the colony; Fadić (1986) 425-427; (1999) 51-52. 
Vittinghoff (1977) 11-13 criticises all the evidence for Augustan dating as vague. 
14 Pliny, HN 3.141; Archaeology has proved the existence of two settlements. Alföldy suggested that 
Salona was a double colony: Caesarian and Octavian in c. 33 BC; Alföldy (1962a) 359-361; (1965a) 
101-105, 110, but we lack evidence for the establishment of a Caesarian colony. See also Wilkes 
(1969) 221-224; Salmon (1969) 160; Clairmont (1975) 6, 18 ff.; Brunt (1987) 251-252, 597 (C 74). 
15 Pliny, HN 3.142; Alföldy (1962a) 357-358; (1965a) 135; Šašel-Kos (2000) 297 regard it as a 
Caesarian colony, Salmon (1969) 160 puts it after 27 BC and Wilkes (1969) 248 shortly before 27 
BC. 
16 Alföldy (1962a) 362-363; (1965a) 76; Wilkes (1969) 200. There is less evidence for the date when 
Senia and Epidaurum became colonies than there is for Iader, Salona and Narona; Vittinghoff (1977) 
18. 
17 Pliny, HN 3.143; Alföldy (1962a) 357-358; (1965a) 139; Wilkes (1969) 252; Šašel-Kos (2000) 297 
regard it as a Caesarian. Contra Vittinghoff (1977) 16, see previous note. 
18 Mommsen (CIL III, p. 489) followed by some authorities such as Wells (1974) 185-187; Keppie, 
(1984a) 77-78 suggested that Emona was established as a colony in the Augustan period. Majority 
opinion places its foundation in the early – mid Tiberian era; Saria (1938); Degrassi (1954) 109-111; 
Wilkes (1963); Šašel (1968) 564-565, but some scholars date it even after Tiberius; Sherwin-White 
(1973) 242 n.3; Šašel-Kos (1995) esp. 243-244, see this section n. 34. 
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municipal status in this period,
19 but this view, which assumes that Pliny’s oppida 
civium Romanorum were cities with municipal status, has been questioned recently.
20 
It is interesting that early Augustan colonists were not military veterans as in Gaul or 
Spain but civilians. That could be the reason why Augustus omitted Illyricum in the 
Res Gestae from the list of provinces to which he sent his discharged veterans.
21 
Some, if not the majority of these colonies, were probably of an agrarian nature.
22 If 
this is true, it can be regarded as an important sign that Illyricum was regarded as a 
safe area. This wave of colonization hastened the process of Italian settlement, which 
had already begun in the 2
nd – 1
st century BC, when Italian traders started to settle 
there. Epigraphy reveals that the settlement of the colonists on the eastern Adriatic 
coast corresponded with their places of origin across the Adriatic. Thus the majority 
of the settlers in Liburnia were of North Italian origin, central Italians settled in 
central Dalmatia, especially in Salona, and the settlers from southern Italy settled on 
the south.
23 Narona is the only exception, as it had an unusually high percentage of 
freedmen in the population. There are many freedmen attested by the epigraphy who 
worked for patrons in other cities in Dalmatia or Italy.
24 Epidaurum is the only 
colony where a substantial indigenous element has been attested.
25
 
It is not known what happened with Issa after its defeat in the Civil War. The 
Issaean κοινόν was dissolved in 46 BC but very soon Issa and its colonies gained 
Roman citizenship, and were joined to the Salonitan administration. They were not a 
part of the Salonitan conventus reserved for Illyrian peregrini, as was previously 
argued by Novak, but as full members of a wider Salonitan res publica. Salonitan 
territory enjoyed substantial autonomy, extending into the coast and islands 
previously belonging to the Issaean commonwealth.
26
                                                           
19 Brunt (1987) 606-607 (M 35-48). Alföldy (1962a) 363-365; (1965a) 141 regards some, if not all, of 
these cities as Augustan colonies. 
20 Čače (2001) 98-99. Cf. overview of the controversy in Papazoglu (1986) 215-219. 
21 Wilkes (1969) 231, 108 ff. The explanation of Mommsen (CIL III, p. 121; also Ridley (2003) 84) 
that Illyrian colonies were included in Italian colonies in the Res Gestae is thus not right. 
22 Suić (1981) 152-155 arguing that Iader was an agrarian colony. Perhaps some of 80,000 Roman 
poor resettled by Caesar were transferred to Illyricum; Suet. Iul. 42; Watkins (1979) 83. 
23 Alföldy (1965a) 185; Wilkes (1969) 300-306. 
24 Wilkes (1969) 306-307. A somewhat similar situation was in Magdalensburg – capital of Noricum; 
Kolosovskaya (1974) 44 ff, or in Corinth; Strabo 8.6.23 (C 381). For freedmen in colonies see 
Watkins (1979) 76-78. 
25 Alföldy (1965a) 140. 
26 Suić (1959) effectively refutes Novak (1949) 90 ff. who argued that Salona had two 
administratively independent parts, Roman and Issaean. Salona as res publica:  CIL III 12,922. 
Perhaps it is possible to suggest that the Salonitan res publica succeeded the Issaean commonwealth 
when Salona assumed leadership over Issa after the defeat of Pompeians in 46 BC. 
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The exact borders of the province of Illyricum in these early years of the 
Principate are not known. Some borders were determined by geography; essentially, 
Illyricum was the Dalmatian coastal strip with its immediate hinterland and islands, 
bordering in the south on Epirus.
27 In the north the boundary followed the limits of 
Octavian’s conquest in 33 BC, but as it was the frontier of the empire at that time, it 
does not seem that the border was fixed firmly. It was rather loosely determined, 
depending on Roman relations with individual peoples from the interior. Perhaps 
Romans regarded territory up to the Sava as being nominally part of the imperium 
Romanum without requiring any administrative tasks, but there is no evidence to 
either confirm or dispute that. In fact we can compare the situation on the northern 
frontier of Illyricum with Germany and other border areas in this period, where 
Romans used to exercise control far beyond their military strongholds.
28  
 
It would be reasonable to assume that the army was maintained close to the 
coast where it had secure lines of supply by sea and from where it could efficiently 
intervene in the case of any problem.
29 The role of the army appears in this phase to 
be entirely pre-emptive. There was no point in making some kind of defensive limes 
defending Illyricum without actually possessing any strategic depth in the narrow 
coastal area necessary for efficient defence. It is obvious that any defense of 
Illyricum would have to be performed far beyond its provincial boundaries with 
efficient and mobile forces.
30 Still, it is possible that a garrison in Siscia was 
connected to the coast by the network of small defensive points and speculae through 
                                                           
27 Strabo, 17.3.25 (C 840); Pliny, HN 3.145. 
28 Wells (1972) 248; Christ (1957) 425 ff. See Luttwak (1976) 13-20, 46-50 on that strategy in 
general. 
29 Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219 argued that the army of Illyricum was stationed on the northern 
boundary of the province commanded by an imperial legate and not a proconsul appointed by the 
Senate. Perhaps some forces were stationed in Segestica, but otherwise the argument of Ritterling is 
difficult to maintain due to the geographical position of Illyricum before the Bellum Pannonicum, as 
those forces on the border would be easily cut off in the case of native rebellion, see also this section 
n. 11. 
It is also not known how many legions were based in Illyricum at this time. Syme (1933c) 22-23 
counts two or three in the first decade of the principate (legion XI was amongst them - Ritterling 
(1925) 1691; Betz (1938) 17) and no less than three in the next decade. 
30 Wilkes (1969) 91-92 rightly refutes earlier views (Patsch (1898) 172 ff.; Veith (1914) 111; Dobiáš 
(1921) 222-223; Alföldy (1962b) 284 ff.; (1965a) 25, 171-172, defended by Šašel (1974a) 193-196) 
that Octavian created a limes of connected defensive military strong-points in the Dalmatian 
hinterland all the way from Burnum to Narona in 33 BC, or shortly afterwards. That was neither 
necessary nor Roman practice anywhere at that time; cf. Luttwak (1976) 19, 46-50. It is possible that 
this was a military communication network rather than a limes, see below p. 169. 
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the territory of the Iapodes.
31 It is very difficult to determine the position of legions 
placed in Illyricum at this time. It is possible that during this period the first military 
base in Tilurium for legion VII was established,
32 and later in Burnum to 
accommodate legion XX after it had been moved from Aquileia,
33 as well as bases in 
Poetovio, Siscia, and less possibly Emona for other legions during, or just after, the 
Bellum Pannonicum.
34 Auxiliary troops were also placed in Illyricum but it is even 
more difficult to locate them precisely in the period before AD 6.
35 Romans rebuilt 
and strengthened fortifications around coastal cities and ports and started to move 
some native cities from mountain sides overlooking the sea towards the coast.
36  
 
The western border of Illyricum with Italy moved in this period so that 
Histria was included in Italy on a permanent basis in c. 18 – 12 BC.
37 It remains a 
controversial issue as to whether it was fixed on the river Arsia, or whether it 
included Liburnia as well. Pliny the Elder is guilty of causing this confusion as he 
places the same Liburnian cities into regio X of Italy as well as in the province of 
Illyricum.
38 Modern scholarship is still divided as to whether Liburnia was part of 
Italy in the very late Republic or whether those Liburnian cities with ius Italicum 
were administered by Italian cities for census purposes because of their geographical 
                                                           
31 Patsch (1898) 172-173; cf. Šašel (1974a) 195-196, 199 who dates it in 35 – 10 BC. Unfortunately 
this defensive communication network cannot be dated precisely, so it might be a product of the 
Bellum Batonianum as well, or even later. 
32 Betz (1938) 8; Wilkes (1969) 94-95, and ff. suggest that legion VII was in Tilurium no later than 15 
BC. 
33 Location of Burnum and Tilurium; Zaninović (1967) 8-9, 16-17; (1986) 164-167. Legion XX at 
Burnum; Ritterling (1925) 1770; Wilkes (1969) 93 n. 4. Burnum was strategically placed in friendly 
Liburnian territory (in the place of the small Liburnian community which was possibly destroyed in 
the wars with the Delmatae; Čače (1989) 78-79, just next to the Delmatae; cf. Zaninović (1966) 41 
n.58; (1968) 120-121; Suić (1981) 227-228.  
Zaninović (1968) 119-122; Suić (1981) 232 date placement of Roman legions in Burnum and 
Tilurium as early as 33 BC. Unfortunately archaeology and epigraphy cannot verify exactly when 
these bases were established, since they are attested only after AD 9 (Wilkes (1969) 142-143; (1996b) 
570), except for legion XX, which was stationed in Burnum before AD 6, see Chapter 7.5 n. 61. 
34 The existence of these bases before AD 6 is highly speculative. The previously accepted view of 
Saria (1938) that legion XV Apollinaris was stationed in Emona came under the valid criticism of Kos 
(1986) 54-56. Numismatic evidence denies the existence of a military camp in Emona and questions 
its existence in Poetovio before the late Augustan period. Cf. also the same opinion in Šašel (1968) 
562-565; Wells (1974) 185-187; Šašel-Kos (1995) 231ff. 
35 Alföldy (1962b); Wilkes (1969) 139 ff. and 470-474. 
36 Faber (2000) 147 ff. Generally, this was not necessarily an aggressive and violent process; Hanson 
(1988) 56-58. 
37 Strabo, 7.5.3 (C 314); Pliny, HN 3.129; Degrassi (1954) 54-60. Thomsen (1947) 28 puts the border 
adjustment in AD 9, but Degrassi supplies weightier arguments. 
38 Pliny, HN 3.130, 139-140. 
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proximity to Italy.
39 It seems that Liburnia was after all part of Illyricum, despite this 
controversy, because both known governors of senatorial Illyricum were patrons of 
Liburnian cities, as we saw from the two inscriptions found there.
40 We do not know 
where the provincial capital was. It might have been Iader or, more probably, the 
later capital Salona. The administrative division of the province at this time is not 
known. The division is known from Pliny’s list of judicial districts - conventus and 
native communities – civitates, further subdivided into decuriae before the Bellum 
Pannonicum, which describes the situation in the later period.
41
 
A high degree of Romanization in this period is only apparent in Liburnia, the 
area closest to Italy. Some native Liburnian families progressed in importance and 
the first consul of Liburnian origin appears to have been L. Tarius Rufus, consul 
already in 16 BC.
42 In fact, the local elite in Liburnia seems to be mainly of native 
origin, unlike the rest of Illyricum where natives and the Greeks are very rarely 
enfranchised and hardly play any part at this time in the municipal life of Illyricum. 
 
Other aspects of Roman policy in Illyricum are obscure. Evidently, there was 
an economic boom in the northwest Adriatic. Some distinguished Roman and Italian 
families like the Calpurnii Pisones or the A. Caecinae were buying land and 
establishing a strong position at the head of the Adriatic.
43 The spread of vineyards in 
Istria certainly affected Liburnia as well and the economic enterprise of L. Tarius 
Rufus should be seen in that context.
44 Links between the Baebii family and 
Illyricum in the last years of the Republic and the first years of the Principate were 
also established.
45 There is no trace of any Roman road being built in this period, 
                                                           
39 Thomsen (1947) 26 ff. esp. 28-29 (Liburnia was part of Transpadana and enfranchised in 49 BC but 
included in Illyricum in 42 BC when Transpadana joined Italy); Kubitchek (1889) 105; (1925) 
(Liburnia part of Italy until the boundary was fixed on the river Arsia - Raša); Premerstein (1919) 
1246-1247; (1924); Suić (1967) 36; Wilkes (1969) 489-490 (Liburnian cities with ius italicum 
although provincial, were administered from Italy because of proximity); Wilkes (1996b) 551 (part of 
Transpadana after 27 BC and returned to Illyricum in 9 BC); Degrassi (1954) 94-100 (overview of 
different opinions). The problem is too complex to be dealt with here, but from archaeological 
evidence (the inscription mentioning Tamphilus Vála) it seems that Liburnia was part of Illyricum in 
the early Augustan period. 
40 See this section, n. 9. 
41 Pliny, HN 3.139 ff., see Chapter 8.4. 
42 Wilkes (1969) 330-331; Wiseman (1971) 264 no. 419. Syme (1939) 362 n.2 thought that he was 
Picene, because of his estates in Picenum. However, these estates were purchased, not ancestral, 
according to Pliny, HN 18.37. 
43 Wilkes (1969) 199-200, 331-332 n.6. 
44 Pliny, HN 14.60-61; Purcell (1985) 16, n.80. 
45 Fadić (1986) 417 ff.; (1999) 51. 
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which shows a lack of interest and perhaps lack of need, as the Adriatic was still a 
major communication link with Italy; large scale Roman road building in Illyricum 
starts only after the end of the Pannonian rebellion (Chapter 8.3). 
 
 From the scarce information available, we may conclude that Roman policy 
towards Illyricum in the 20s BC was intent upon consolidating Roman influence 
through the administration and organization of the province. Italian domination of 
the Dalmatian coast is now unchallenged. The territory was organized as a province, 
but direct Roman control did not penetrate any more deeply into the continent than in 
Republican times. The Iapodes and the Delmatae were now under firmer Roman 
control, and this period of peace can also be ascribed to the pacification of these 
troublesome peoples. Behind the coastal strip was a buffer zone made of 
disorganized and relatively harmless Pannonii and there were no outside factors, 
which would cause aggressive Roman treatment of the area. Thus, we can understand 
why Illyricum became a senatorial province in 27 BC, and why there was no reason 
for settling veterans there. Strategic thinking was still deeply Republican in essence, 
never ready to risk military engagements in the hinterland, unless the defensive needs 
of coastal settlements required the pacification of inland peoples. This, however, was 
in accordance with the generally defensive and inactive foreign policy mood in the 
West during that period. It would soon change. 
 
6. 3  The neighborhood of Illyricum in the 20s BC 
Regardless of the closing of the doors of Ianus’ temple, and the peaceful 
mood prevailing throughout the Empire, some military activities were evident in the 
20s. The new regime needed military success to establish itself more firmly; peace 
was just a political catchword.
46 There are two areas of military operations that are 
strategically important, if not crucial, for the destiny of Illyricum and the Illyrian 
policy: the Alpine passes and the wider region of Macedonia – Moesia. The Alpine 
area had been for centuries a potential threat to the security of northern Italy, and it is 
quite obvious why Augustus wanted to put this region under firm control as early as 
possible. The campaigns of Antistius Vetus and Valerius Messala Corvinus against 
                                                           
46 Wells (1972) 5, 8; Schmitthenner (1962); Gruen (1985); Woolf (1993). 
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the Celtic Salassi in the Alps did not fully pacify this people. The task was completed 
only by A. Terentius Varro Murena in 25 BC.
47
 
On the eastern frontiers of Illyricum, M. Licinius Crassus, grandson of the 
triumvir, fought successfully against the Thracians and the Getae in 29 BC, extended 
Roman influence towards Lower Moesia and earned a triumph.
48 He actually fought 
the Dacians and their allies and destroyed Dacian influence in Thrace and Moesia, 
but for propaganda purposes the facts were distorted and he celebrated a triumph 
over the Thracians and Getae.
49 These campaigns on the western and eastern borders 
of Illyricum brought peace in the next decade and extended Roman influence 
towards the lower Danube and Alps. They brought no spectacular results or advance 
in Roman power, but changed the strategic situation in the area. Crassus’ campaign 
removed Dacian aggressive designs (real or not) against Thrace, and enabled Roman 
influence rather than Roman direct rule to extend further. Murena subjugated a 
rebellious people, which potentially threatened northern Italy and established a 
significant foothold for future Roman expansion in this area. 
 
6. 4  The winds of change in the early 10s: the Bella Augusta 
The political situation in Rome and the Empire changed in this decade. Relative 
peace on the western and northern frontiers gave way to a sudden expansion of 
Roman power up to the Elbe and Danube. The theories emphasizing Augustus’ grand 
designs either for European (or ‘world’) conquest, or for the establishment of stable 
imperial borders are disregarded by some modern scholars who prefer to explain this 
expansion as a short-term reaction to a change in circumstances.
50 There were many 
factors influencing this renewed imperialism (and which prevented its appearance 
earlier) such as the need to prove Augustus’ successors capable leaders, false notions 
of European and Central Asian geography, the need to present the vitality of an ‘ever 
expanding empire’ for propaganda purposes, and perhaps for the economic benefits 
of the conquest.
51 This new approach also included Republican understanding of 
border-defence, essentially based on the idea that peace can be achieved only by 
                                                           
47 Dio, 53.25.3-5; Strabo, 4.6.7 (C 205-206). 
48 Dio, 51.23-27. 
49 Mócsy (1966); (1974) 23-24; Lica (2000) 124-129. 
50 Gruen (1996) 195-196; Southern (1998) 155, see above p. 34. 
51 False geographical notions: Moynihan (1985); Nicolet (1991) 57-84; propaganda: Gruen (1986); 
(1996) 188-194; internal reasons for postponement: Syme (1939) 328-329; Roddaz (1984) 480-481 
(including insufficient finances). 
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pacifying and subduing potentially dangerous neighbors. However, it also departed 
from this approach in that annexation was used only as a last resort. These peoples 
were incorporated into the empire and Roman influence was further expanded. It was 
nevertheless still the expansion of Roman power rather than full-scale occupation, as 
the Roman army did not impose reliable administrative control over conquered 
territories in the first years of the expansion. 
  
The Roman army was reorganized at that time. Veterans who had fought at 
Actium were demobilized and new recruits filled their ranks so that this new 
generation of soldiers, recruited 27 – 20 BC, reached its peak in 15 – 7 BC when 
Rome fought decisive wars in the Alps, Germany and Illyricum.
52 Augustan military 
strategy was simply and efficiently based on ‘economy of force’; large 
concentrations of forces were used in order to knock down opponents, which made 
possible the maintenance of only a relatively small army.
53  The push through the 
Alps during 16 – 13 BC was the first visible example of this renewed imperialism in 
practice, although we can also see the Alpine campaigns as a strategic necessity, 
because it was important to finally remove that permanent danger to North Italy. It 
was a relatively fast but also thorough process and it prepared the ground for long-
term Roman engagement in the affairs of central Europe.
54
 
The border with Macedonia was again insecure. The victories of Crassus did 
not make much impact on the Scordisci and the Dentelethae who remained 
untouched by his campaign in 29 – 28 BC.
55 The troubles with the Scordisci and 
Denthelethae arose in 16 BC, when they threatened the security of Macedonia and 
when the Sarmatians crossed the Danube at the same time.
56 However, the next time 
we hear of the Scordisci was in 12 BC, when they appear on the stage as close allies 
                                                           
52 The strong argument of Syme (1933c) 14-21 and ff. cannot be questioned, although we can ask to 
what extent Augustus deliberately built a new army and to what extent it was just a change of 
generations in the army. On the other hand it is impossible to believe that the Roman army did replace 
soldiers en masse rather than gradually, because a large number of inexperienced soldiers would 
present a security risk. Cf. Raaflaub (1980) on the wider political consequences of Augustus’ military 
reforms. 
53 Luttwak (1976) 15 ff. There were four army groups on the West at the time: two in Spain, one in 
Gaul and Illyricum; Ritterling (1925) 1218-1219 distinguishes the army group in Northern Italy from 
the army group in northern Illyricum. The argument of Syme (1933c) 22 n. 54 who recognizes only 
one army group in Illyricum, seems more likely, see this section n. 64. 
54 Wells (1972) 59 ff.; Christ (1957); Gruen (1996) 169-171; Wilkes (1965a) 10-13. 
55 Papazoglu (1978) 339. 
56 Or, at least that is what Dio, 54.20.2-3 reports. 
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of Rome in the war against the Pannonii.
57  There is an obvious problem for 
historiography in explaining why they suddenly changed sides and became Roman 
allies. Some unreliable sources
58 placed Tiberius in the vicinity of Thrace at this 
time, so some scholars have assumed that Tiberius accepted the Balkan command in 
15 BC and conquered the Scordisci, operating from Macedonia or Pannonia.
59 Syme 
cautiously pointed out the unreliability of the sources and showed that that the 
subjugation of the Scordisci before the Pannonii was geographically impossible. He 
concluded that northern Moesia was probably conquered by an unknown general 
operating from Macedonia who brought the Scordisci into the alliance with Rome, 
either by diplomacy or by force.
60  
 
At the same time troubles arose in the northwest of Illyricum. The governor 
of Gaul, M. Lollius, had unexpected problems with the Germans and the situation for 
a moment became serious enough to cause Augustus to travel to Gaul.
61 The clades 
Lolliana made Augustus rethink his Alpine policy, as any potential invader from the 
north would threaten Italy by passing quickly through the Alpine passes that were not 
under Roman control. The governor of Illyricum, P. Sulpicius Nerva, was conducting 
a campaign in Cisalpine Gaul against the Alpine peoples of the Cammuni and the 
Vennii, located around Val Trompia and Val Camonica.
62 Whether Silius extended 
his operations into the Alpine passes as far as the valley of Upper Rhine, as a 
beginning of the Alpine operations that were to be conducted by Drusus and Tiberius 
the following year, or whether it was just a preventative or a defensive action is 
difficult to say from the available evidence.
63
                                                           
57 Dio, 54.31.3; Suet. Tib. 9. 
58 Vell. Pat. 2.39.3 ; Euseb. Chron. 167f, 168b. Perhaps Eusebius confused Raetia and Thrace; Vulić 
(1907) 29-30. 
59 Zippel (1877) 246-247; Mócsy (1962) 540; Alföldy (1974) 52-53; Nagy (1991) 71-73; Wilkes 
(1996b) 551 (contradicting his earlier views in (1965b) 15-16). 
60 Syme (1934a) 127-129; Wilkes (1965a) 15-16; Papazoglu (1978) 343. Papazoglu also pointed out 
that it is doubtful whether the Scordisci were really conquered, as they appear in 12 BC as free allies 
of Rome; Papazoglu (1978) 341; Vulić (1907) 31 ff. Perhaps they were in the position of an ally, as 
described in Dio, 53.12.8-9, 54.9; Lica (2000) 138-144. Also doubtful is how Tiberius can be both 
with Drusus conquering the Alpine peoples and fighting on the borders of Thrace in 15 BC; cf. 
narrative of Levick (1976) 27-28, n. 51. 
61 Dio, 54.20.4-6; Vell. Pat. 2.97.1; Suet. Aug. 23.1; Tac. Ann. 1.10. Departing for Gaul, Augustus also 
enjoyed the company of Maecenas’ wife; Dio, 54.19.3. 
62 The location of the Vennii is still not precisely determined; see the bibliography given in Gruen 
(1996) 169 n. 106. 
63 Wells (1972) 63-66 allows the possibility that the campaign of Silius, which was much more 
extensive than as described by Dio, took more than a year, and started even before 16 BC. However, 
we think that the fact that the Illyrian governor was intervening in Italy suggests that this was a 
reaction to the defeat of Lollius. 
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When some scholars found the governor of Illyricum suddenly in Cisalpine 
Gaul they questioned whether he was governor of senatorial Illyricum at the same 
time, but the controversy can be explained. There was no army available 
immediately in Italy or its vicinity except the Illyrian army.
64 The army in Gaul was 
in a state of high alert after the defeat of Lollius and the Spanish armies were too far 
away, and partly engaged in the short-lived Spanish rebellion.
65 In light of Silius’ 
engagement in Cisalpina and the overstretched Illyrian legions, some Pannonians and 
Noricans, unidentified by Dio, plundered Histria in 16 BC, perhaps attracted by the 
area’s rising prosperity. However, it was nothing but a raid. Silius and his legates 
quickly repulsed them.
66 The Romans first defeated the Pannonians and afterwards 
they collaborated in the pacification of the Noricans, finishing operations before the 
end of the year.
67
 
 The subsequent annexation of Noricum remains very unclear because some 
of the sources contradict each other. The fact is that the old ally and client kingdom 
of Rome was suddenly annexed and made into a province, possibly under the pretext 
of the incursion of 16 BC. However, the sources do not mention the annexation 
specifically as an individual campaign, or in the context of the Alpine campaigns, 
when Tiberius and Drusus operated in the vicinity of Noricum. Most scholars accept 
15 BC as the date of annexation, but it could be any time from 16 BC to AD 6.
68 The 
annexation of Noricum is one more example of the way Roman policy changed and 
developed new strategies in changed circumstances. This antiquated ally, who had an 
important role in late Republican times, had no place in the renewed imperialism of 
the early Principate. On the other hand, this event was significant for Illyricum as the 
deserta Boiorum between Drava and upper Danube, including the important 
                                                           
64 When he departed for Gaul Augustus left T. Statilius Taurus in charge of Rome and Italy; Dio, 
54.19.6. If there was Italian army, Taurus would take charge of the fighting of the Camunii and 
Vennii. 
65 Brief revolt in Spain; Dio, 54.20.3. 
66 Dio, 54.20.1. The invading Norici were the people of Ambisontes who settled close to Histria, Šašel 
(1972) 136-144, esp. 143; Šašel-Kos (1997b) 32, and the most western of the Pannonii – the Colapiani 
and Latobici rather than the Breuci; Nagy (1991) 69-70, refuting Alföldy (1974) 58 who argued in 
favour of the Breuci. 
67 Silius began his campaign in Cisalpina in the summer, so there was enough time for him to return to 
Illyricum and deal with this incursion; Nagy (1991) 70. 
68 For an overview of different opinions, see Alföldy (1974) 52 n.2; Gruen (1996) 171 n. 114; Šašel-
Kos (1997b) 32. The annexation was peaceful, without any significant resistance, and it could easily 
be that at first the civil administration of the new province was performed by a local Vassalenfürst; 
Winkler (1977) 198, 200 n. 87. 
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settlement and stronghold of Carnuntum, was going to be joined to Illyricum and 
later Pannonia.
69 It is very possible that the annexation of Histria to Italy and the 
fixing of the Italian border on the river Arsia was made in the context of the new 
border arrangements in Noricum.
70
 
6. 5 The  Bellum  Pannonicum  12-9 BC: the reasons 
With the advantage of historical hindsight we can recognize that the Bellum 
Pannonicum was a decisive stage in the development and final shaping of Roman 
Illyrian policy. It was part of the new strategic approach that finally broke with 
traditional policy based on indirect control of the hinterland. This change finally gave 
Romans the benefit of strategic depth in Illyricum instead of the previous policy 
which just maintained a strategic buffer zone. The full conquest of Illyricum 
certainly was part of Augustus’ new western policy, or what we have previously 
termed ‘the new imperialism’. Nevertheless, there were local reasons behind this 
war. The area became a security threat again in the mid-10s and Rome, as usual in 
this kind of situation, decided to pacify the area, this time once and for all, to prevent 
any further complications.
71  Illyricum was dangerously close to Italy. The need for 
conquest was part of the need for security of Italy, as Roddaz puts it plainly: 
“Auguste et son étatmajor ont toujours été parfaitement conscients que la sécurité 
politique et militaire de l’Empire exigeait de nouvelles conquêtes.” 
72
 
  There is hardly any primary source material for these events, but the 
chronology can be reconstructed from Dio’s annalistic report. However, the main 
problems arise from the terminology used in Dio and Velleius Paterculus, our chief 
sources, as they persistently use the generic term ‘Pannonians’, which in fact 
encompasses many different peoples belonging to the Pannonii ethnic group north of 
the future Dalmato-Pannonian provincial frontier, such as the Breuci, Latobici, 
Andizetes, Colapiani, Amatini, etc.
73
 
                                                           
69 Tóth (1977) 283-284, fig. 2, see Chapter 8.2. 
70 Degrassi (1954) 59-60. 
71 As we saw the Romans often lacked decisiveness in Illyricum, but this time the existence of 
colonies and settlements on the coast was the decisive factor, which brought about an active response 
to these troubles. 
72 Roddaz (1984) 479. Cf. Šašel (1976) 84 also recognizing the protective role of Illyricum for 
Noricum and North Italy after the conquest. 
73 Cf. Syme (1934b) 356; (1971) 19-21. 
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 It is not necessary to repeat Syme’s argument, repeated and reinforced by 
Wilkes,
74 which sees behind this new approach a wider and more elaborate plan to 
open the overland route from Italy to Macedonia and Asia, as it was certainly not a 
contemporary concern in the 10s. Roman links with Asia functioned perfectly well 
through the Brundisium – Apollonia sea-link and further on by way of the Via 
Egnatia. If the land-link was desired, it would be natural to expect that the Romans 
would use the safety of the tightly controlled Dalmatian coast for land-
communications, rather than open a new communication line through the hostile and 
unknown interior.
75 “Not until the middle course of the Danube had been secured 
could Rome hold and exploit the overland route between Italy and her Eastern 
territories”, wrote Wilkes.
76 This happened at least three or four decades after the 
Bellum Pannonicum (Chapter 7.2). This was not a war for communications with the 
East, nor was it a war to establish links between the Danube and Rhine. These were 
the consequences rather than the reasons for the conquest. Perhaps more limited aims 
were in the mind of Augustus such as full control of the Sava valley, an important 
trade artery linking the Alps and lower Danube. The position of Illyricum remained 
awkward between the Moesian and Alpine advances, and the need for a change of 
policy arose. Furthermore, we cannot underestimate the need to secure Italy and the 
Dalmatian coast. The extension of Roman power and direct control of territory 
towards the Danube would ultimately solve this problem.
77   
 
As stated above, the year 16 BC marks a definite change in Illyrian policy. 
Illyricum was set on fire after enjoying a decade of relative peace. The incursion of 
the Pannonii and Noricans showed, once again, the geographical vulnerability of 
North Italy. After repelling this incursion P. Silius Nerva and his legates also 
renewed the subjugation of the western Pannonii around Siscia who had made 
deditio to Octavian in 35 BC, whether they were directly involved in the attack or 
not. In the same context is mentioned the rebellion of the Dalmatians, which was 
                                                           
74 Syme (1934b) 352-353; Wilkes (1965a) 13-14, recently strongly emphasized by Burns (2003) 196. 
75 Despite the objection of Syme (1934b) 352-353. The governor of Illyricum was crossing the 
Adriatic confortably in the middle of the winter sailing for Oricus, the harbour on the Macedonian-
Illyrian border, to resume his post; Prop. 1.8. See Rougé (1987) esp. 255-257 who convincingly 
underlines continuing significance of this sea passage for Rome. 
76 Wilkes (1996b) 545. 
77 The security of Italy; Roddaz (1984) 483. We should also note Velleius Paterculus’ awareness of 
how close to Italy the war was fought at 2.96.3 (bellum) … vicinium imminebat Italiae. The reason of 
security is given in the part of the Res Gestae, which justifies the conquest of Illyricum (RG 30.1-2) in 
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perhaps caused by these disturbances and an over-stretched army, and easily put 
down by the same proconsul or, more likely his legate whom he had left in 
Illyricum.
78 There is mention of another rebellion of the Pannonians in 14 BC but 
nothing significant is attached to it by our sources. The current governor of Illyricum 
and his legates, probably without extensive fighting or resistance, extinguished it.
79
 
6. 6 The Bellum Pannonicum: the conduct 
The decisiveness of Augustus can be seen in the initial choice of commander 
for this operation. No one else but Agrippa himself was entrusted with the command 
in Pannonia. It is difficult to believe that Augustus used him to extinguish a merely 
local rebellion. More elaborate designs were hidden behind his mission.
80 Dio gives a 
rough sketch of the chronology of the campaigns. Evidently, there were five separate 
campaigns in the Bellum Pannonicum, high intensity campaigns in 13 – 11 BC and 
the suppression of local rebellions in 10 and 9 BC. Agrippa set out on the first 
campaign in 13 BC and his approach initially calmed passions amongst the 
Pannonians, but his sudden death resulted in further native unrest. Since Dio does not 
imply that Agrippa was involved in any important military engagement, he might 
have preferred at first to quell unrest by means of his military reputation and 
diplomacy.
81 Velleius and Florus add valuable additional information: M. Vinicius 
was the other commander
82 and he was fighting the Pannonii who lived between the 




After the unexpected death of Agrippa, Tiberius carried on further operations 
in 12, 11, 10 and 9 BC as commander-in-chief. The first campaign seems to be the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contrast with the ‘civilizing factors’ which justify the conquest of the other Northern areas; Davis 
(2002) 261-262. 
78 Dio, 54.20.3. 
79 Dio, 54.24.3, but only those already under Roman power, i. e. those peoples who had invaded 
Histria two years earlier, unhappy with the new arrangements imposed by Silius; Nagy (1991) 73-74. 
Perhaps the governor in question was Vinicius; Roddaz (1984) 479 n. 12. 
80 Roddaz (1984) 478 ff. It was a war waged against a previously unconquered peoples; Nagy (1991) 
75. 
81 Cf. Dio, 54.24.6 for the similarly fast submission of Bosporans to Agrippa in BC 14. 
82 Vell. Pat. 2.96.2-3 states that Agrippa started the war and Tiberius finished it. Gruen (1996) 174-
175 and Roddaz (1984) 483 regard Vinicius as proconsul of Illyricum who started the operations in 14 
BC, prior to Agrippa’s departure. Nagy (1991) 74-75 puts the beginning of the campaign in 13 BC 
and suggests that Agrippa was called in only after Vinicius reached stalemate with the Breuci at the 
end of the year. 
83 Flor. 2.24 calling him wrongly Vinnius; Vell. Pat. 2.96.2-3. Career of Vinicius; Hanslik (1961a). 
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most important as he used the alliance with the Scordisci in order to defeat the 
Pannonians. The campaign was conducted against the Breuci – specifically named by 
Suetonius. They were the western neighbors of the Scordisci dwelling in the valley 
of the Sava. Tiberius disarmed the defeated Pannonians and sold prisoners into 
slavery, earning an ovatio for these exploits.
84 The disarmament of the Breuci and the 
enslavement of the prisoners of war appears an extraordinary measure compared with 
the usual Roman conduct against defeated subjects.
85 We can only guess why 
Tiberius used extreme measures. Perhaps the punishment was intended to be an 
example to the other Pannonii as to what could happen if they rebelled against Rome. 
Syme, and after him Wilkes, regarded the conquest of the Sava valley as a crucial 
step in the ultimate success of the operations in the Bosnian mountains and 
Dalmatian hinterland.
86 Tiberius campaigned in 11 BC from two directions, the 
Dalmatian coast and the valley of the Sava, and fought simultaneously on two 
fronts.
87 Unfortunately we do not know if he fought the same opponents as in 12 BC, 
or, more probably, the term Pannonians was only a generic term and Tiberius in fact 
fought different peoples. The most probable reconstruction is that he first fought the 
Breuci and their allies in Slavonia in 12 BC, but after they were defeated and 
seriously weakened, it seems that subsequent operations in 11 BC were carried out in 
Bosnia and the Dinaric Alps against the Daesidiates and Mezaei.
88 Dio suggests that 
                                                           
84 Dio, 54.31.2-4; Suet. Tib. 9. The alliance with the Celtic Scordisci supports the impression that 
Roman campaigns and reprisals were centred mainly on the Pannonii, without touching Celtic groups 
in the area such as the Boii or the Eravisci as Celtic peoples do not appear in the description of 
campaigns of 12-9 BC nor during the rebellion in AD 6-9; Wilkes (1996a) 417. Syme (1971) 22 does 
not exclude the possibility of a Roman general operating from Macedonia/Moesia together with the 
Scordisci.   
85 Brunt (1975) 260, 269-270. However, there were some similar situations such as Agrippa and the 
Cantabri in Spain 19 BC; Dio, 54.11.5-6. 
86 Syme (1934b) 355; (1971) 19, 21; Wilkes (1965b) 118-119; (1969) 62. Swoboda (1937) 296-305 
using geo-strategic and military factors strongly argued against any other advance in Bosnia except 
southwards from the valley of the Sava. He draws the ideas from Austro-Hungarian experience in the 
occupation of Bosnia in 1878 (dating the conquest of the Breuci wrongly in the context of Octavian’s 
expedition 35-33 BC). Contra Miltner (1937) 208 ff. who sees the Bellum Pannonicum waged north of 
the Sava, extending Roman conquest up to the Danube as early as 10 BC, but that opinion is 
effectively refuted by Tóth (1977); Fitz (1977). 
87 Dio, 54. 34.3-4; Wilkes (1965b) 118-119; (1969) 64. It is not necessary to insist, as Wilkes does, on 
Tiberius being able to manoeuvre himself through Iapodean and Liburnian country. It seems rather 
that some other legate commanded the forces from Dalmatia while Tiberius commanded those from 
the valley of the Sava. 
88 Syme (1971) 22; Nagy (1991) 78-79. Perhaps Mócsy (1962) 530, 534-536; (1974) 21 was 
overenthusiastic to see a united Pannonii as the political power, which replaced Dacian overlordship 
over Pannonia, (refuted clearly by Papazoglu (1978) 339 n.206). Certainly Romans fought one by one 
the Pannonian peoples (or a loose alliance led by the Breuci or Daesitiates) rather than faced a unified 
force. 
Pašalić (1956) 276, 297 is opposed to the idea that Tiberius entered the area of modern-day Bosnia 
during this period, for a lack of direct evidence. Regardless of whether Tiberius waged war there at 
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his subsequent campaigns in 10 and 9 BC followed the pattern of pacifying the 




In 11 BC the legal status of Illyricum changed from a senatorial province to 
on imperial one.
90 It marked a legal recognition of the important shift in Rome’s 
Illyrian policy. Wilkes argued that the imperial provincia Illyricum had come into 
existence already in 13 BC when Agrippa and Vinicius attacked the Pannonians, and 
that it encompassed the Sava and Drava region outside Dalmatia. He tried to explain 
the change in 11 BC as the union of Illyricum with Dalmatia because the military 
situation required coordinated military action from Pannonia and Dalmatia.
91 While 
the necessity for coordinated action, especially in light of the Dalmatian rebellion, 
seems quite reasonable as Tiberius’ tactic, the administrative part of the explanation 
is not. It is obvious that Dio was looking from his 2
nd century perspective, and 
distinguishing Dalmatia and Pannonia as separate provinces, when he states that 
Dalmatia was given to Augustus because of the neighboring Pannonians and due to 
potential problems in Dalmatia itself. He himself stated that at that time provinces 
were larger than in his time; on the other hand, Agrippa, when departing for 
Illyricum already had extraordinary imperium, overriding the imperium of the local 
governor.
92 Augustus used to hand out extraordinary commands in this period to 
members of his household, e.g. Tiberius and Drusus in the Alps. Agrippa, and 
Tiberius after him, were both sent to Pannonia to coordinate military efforts so that 
there would be no clash of authority with the local governor. There was already a 
governor of Illyricum – Vinicius, on the spot, fighting the Pannonians. Therefore, 
there is no reason to see a Pannonian command independent of Dalmatia before or 
after 11 BC. Augustus is clear in that respect; he extended already existing borders – 
                                                                                                                                                                      
this time (and he had), the fact is that the Daesitiates were under Roman political influence because 
they were obliged to supply auxiliaries for the army two decades later; cf. Dio, 55.29.2-3. 
89 Mócsy (1962) 540-541 was perhaps right in concluding that the Bellum Pannonicum lasted only one 
year 12 BC, and that all subsequent campaigns were actually to extinguish local rebellions, and mop 
up the resistance as Dio appears to say. ‘Dalmatians’ for Dio does not mean the Delmatae but the 
Pannonii south of the Sava; Nagy (1991) 77-78. 
90 Dio, 54.34.4; 53.12.7. Hanslik (1961b) 115 sees Vinicius as a first legatus Augusti pro praetore of 
Illyricum. 
91 Wilkes (1965a) 17-18; (1965b) 119. Nagy (1991) 79 following Ritterling (1925) 1218 explains this 
event as a merging of senatorial Dalmatia with panon-illyrischen Militärdistrict. Syme (1939) 394 n.2 
– Illyricum, an imperial province already in 12 BC. 
92 Dio, 53.12.8, in the early principate the provinces were administered together. Dio, 54.28.1 – 
Agrippa’s extraordinary imperium. 
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protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danui.
93 They were both part of the 
Illyrian command and Agrippa was commander-in-chief. In 11 BC Augustus 
regarded the situation as unsettled. He feared new rebellions and Dacian raids, so no 
wonder he formally transferred the command to himself.
94 On the other hand he 
transferred full command of the increased number of legions, who were concentrated 
in Illyricum, into the safe hands of an imperial legate. Finally, it was necessary to 
organize the newly annexed territory, a significant task that had to be controlled by 
Augustus. 
 
The danger from the Pannonians and Dalmatians in 11 BC was surely 
overestimated by Augustus and his advisors, but the Dacian incursion in 10 BC 
certainly made the Romans worry. However, it appears to have been just a raid. The 
Dacians were worried about the extension of Roman influence and used the 
opportunity to plunder disarmed and helpless Pannonians.
95 This provided a good 
opportunity for Romans to bind some of the Pannonians more tightly to themselves 
in view of the Dacian danger.
96 Tiberius had fewer and fewer problems in 
extinguishing the subsequent rebellions of 10 and 9. The rebels were newly subjected 
Pannonii in modern-day Bosnia. In the last campaign of 9 BC he had time in the 
summer of the same year to join his dying brother in Germany.
97 The reason for 
these rebellions lay in the very nature of Roman conquest; armies subdued new 
subjects and withdrew without imposing military or civilian control, so the 
conquered people rebelled as soon as the Roman army went to winter quarters.
98
 
6. 7  The aftermath of the Bellum Pannonicum 
The Belllum Pannonicum was a key event in the history of Roman relations 
with Illyricum. The old-fashioned Republican policy based on a buffer zone in the 
Dinaric Alps was finally and decisively replaced with imperial expansion towards the 
                                                           
93 RG 30.1, cf. 26.1. Certainly, the Danube in this context should be properly understood; Tóth (1977). 
94 Dio, 54.34.3-4 states that status of Dalmatia (i.e. Illyricum) changed after Tiberius’ campaign in that 
year. In fact, it is possible that the transfer of the province corresponds with the Dacian raid in 10 BC. 
The raid must have happened between two Roman campaigns, because the Romans did not meet 
Dacians on the battlefield.  
95 Dio, 54.36.2; Nagy (1991) 81-82. 
96 Miltner (1937) 213 ff. connects the Roman incursion of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus against the Dacians  
(Flor. 2.28 ff.; Tac. Ann. 4.44) suggested in RG 30 with 10 BC. The majority of modern scholars 
oppose this opinion but no precise date has yet been determined; Syme (1934a) 115 ff.; Mócsy (1962) 
543; Lica (2000) 129 ff. 
97 Dio, 54.36.3 (rebellion of the Dalmatians in 10 BC), 55.2.4 (Tiberius’ last campaign 9 BC). 
98 Seager (1972) 26. 
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Danube, which gave strategic depth and geo-strategic advantage to the Roman 
position in Illyricum. It was much easier to control the plains of Pannonia as a buffer 
zone rather than the Dinaric Alps, once the latter were under full Roman control. An 
enlarged Illyricum strengthened the imperial frontier and linked Illyrian-Pannonian 
advances with the advances in Moesia and the Alps. It is still doubtful whether this 
was a deliberate plan from the beginning, or just the most positive outcome of 
Roman intervention, but Agrippa’s presence in the first campaign at least showed the 
decisiveness of Augustus in dealing with Illyricum. It was a relatively brief and easy 
war, despite Velleius calling it magnum atroxque. Except for the campaign of 12 BC 
when the Romans were subduing the valley of the Sava, and possibly the next one in 
11 BC when they were subduing the interior of Bosnia, our sources do not speak of 
particularly large problems for the Roman army, although that would be expected 
considering the nature of the country. The sources do not mention conquered nations 
or conquered cities, which is strange in the light of the Roman passion for 
cataloguing conquered nations.
99 Their silence paints a picture of a sparsely inhabited 
country. Certainly, at this stage the Romans were not yet in a position to rule directly 
over these areas. After receiving deditio from individual peoples, they dealt with 
friendly chieftains who were in some measure Romanized and thus not particularly 
opposed to Roman rule.
100 The Bellum Pannonicum created a large zone of semi-
pacified client-states stretching from Drava to the hinterland of the Adriatic, who 
were now included in the provincial framework.
101
 
  Nevertheless, the final result is obvious – Illyricum expanded from the 
Dalmatian coast deeply into the continent, reaching over the banks of the Drava into 
the Pannonian plains. While the colonies and cities on the Dalmatian coast actually 
benefited from this war, gaining security and increasing prosperity, the Pannonian 
interior was devastated by the war and its consequences. Illyricum was extended far 
beyond its previous frontiers. It encompassed the Dinaric Alps and the valley of the 
Sava, and Roman influence stretched all the way to the Danube.
102 Roman policy 
                                                           
99 Cf. Mattern (1999) 162-168. Pliny’s description of Pannonia is also very brief. There is no mention 
of any Pannonian cities; HN 3.147. 
100 There was a certain degree of romanization amongst the Pannonian elite at this time; cf. Vell. Pat. 
2.110.5. 
101 Perhaps, the framework imposed to the Pannonii outside former ‘lesser’ Illyricum was not so 
different from the proto-provincial framework imposed to the coastal areas in times of Caesar. 
102 Again, it is difficult to determine precisely the northern boundaries of Illyricum in 9 BC. Res 
Gestae 30.1 mentions control of the Danube, a conclusion we can broadly agree with, from the 
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now turned to organizing new areas and advancing the northern borders; these huge 
spaces opened up to traders and colonists. The future looked bright in 8 BC and it 
must have seemed very improbable that Illyricum would ever require the special 
attention of Roman policy planners. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
evidence we have. Modern scholarship agrees that the advance to the middle Danube happened slowly 
and without much resistance after 8 BC when the elderly Sex. Appuleius was put in command of the 
Illyrian armies; Syme (1934a) 357-358; Wilkes (1969) 66. That ‘slow advance’ towards the Danube 
was perhaps much slower than previously thought, extending well into the 1
st century AD; Fitz 
(1977); Tóth (1977); Ridley (2003) 154-157, see Chapter 7.2. 
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7. 1 Introduction 
The great Pannonian Rebellion of AD 6 – 9 was one of the most significant 
events, if not the most significant one in the history of the political relationship 
between Rome and Illyricum. Its significance went far beyond local, provincial 
history; it shaped the future foreign policy conduct of the early Principate, and 
perhaps, combined with the aftermath of the clades Variana in the Teutoburg forest, 
caused a sudden end to Roman expansion in north and central Europe. This uprising 
considerably affected both systems in their interaction; it brought destruction and 
devastation to almost every corner of Illyricum, and for the first time in many years, 
even Italy feared the external enemy. This was the first rebellion of this kind after 
the end of the Republic that seriously undermined Roman confidence and Rome’s 
position in its newly occupied territories. 
 
These events were not a separate phase of Roman Illyrian policy, but we 
need to examine it in a more detail as a direct consequence of the political 
framework defined as Greater Illyricum. Although the final result was Roman 
victory and the ultimate establishment of Roman rule, the rebellion and its scale and 
ferocity is the result of the monumental failure of the previous policy. It made 
Romans seriously rethink their previous arrangements and devise new ones. The 
most important consequence was the post-rebellion division of Illyricum into the 
provinces of Illyricum inferius, later Dalmatia, and Illyricum superius, later 
Pannonia. This was an administrative-geographical, but not ethnic, division, which 
was to have long lasting consequences for the destiny of Illyricum, and which 
would stretch into the period of the later Empire with minor changes. These issues 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Modern scholarship tends to overlook the ethnic character of the rebellion 
and to avoid emphasizing its significance.
1 The bulk of the rebells belonged to the 
peoples known to ancient writers as the Pannonii.
2 No other neighboring ethnic 
group in Illyricum is said by our sources to join the Pannonii in the rebellion. The 
location of the main battles and movements of the Roman army and the rebels are 
limited to the areas inhabited by the Pannonii, as will be shown. 
 
The sources for the period between the Bellum Pannonicum and the Bellum 
Batonianum are extremely scarce. Dio’s account is preserved partially in dry but 
useful reports, and Velleius Paterculus seems to be not much interested in the period 
because his hero, Tiberius, was not on the stage. For the rebellion, these two writers 
still remain the key sources of information, with important additional bits and pieces 
found in Suetonius, Strabo and the elder Pliny. Both key sources have been 
criticized for inadequacy and partiality by modern scholars, especially Velleius 
Paterculus for his ignorance of the events of which he did not have a personal 
experience. Velleius relied too much on rumors and facts he heard from other 
people. He was uninterested in and took no particular care of things that did not 
exalt Tiberius’ deeds.
3 Dio’s otherwise continuous narrative breaks into two parts, 
and a lacuna in text omits events from the middle of AD 8. It has been suggested 
that he used an unidentified source heavily biased towards Germanicus, which often 
distorted facts in favour of the young prince and minimized Tiberius’ 
achievements.
4 Dio’s account also has its good and bad sides. Modern scholars have 
criticized him for confused chronology and lack of military knowledge, but have 




                                                           
1 Pašalić (1956) sensed a decisive ethnic component in the uprising even before linguistics 
established links between the Delmatae and Pannonii; cf. also Benac (1991). 
2 See above p. 53. 
3 See Vulić (1911) 201-202; Rau (1925) 316, Syme (1934b) 340; Mócsy (1983) 173-174 for 
criticism of Velleius Paterculus. Wilkes (1965b) 112-114 recognised Velleius’ failure to see the 
bigger picture behind his own experiences. He was especially unreliable in reporting events on the 
Moesian border, but still well informed of the events that took place closer to him on the western 
front. Köstermann (1953) 346 and Pašalić (1956) 253-256 are generally more positive about 
Velleius, as well as Woodman (1977) 153-183. 
4 Rau (1925) 314-315 recognized two sources of Dio: one, an eyewitness from Germanicus’ circle 
and a second secondary source hostile to Tiberius. 
5 Vulić (1911) 200-204; (1926) 62; Saria (1930) 92-93 (positive); Rau (1925) 314-315; Swoboda 
(1932) 34-36 (negative). Pašalić (1956) 256-267 gives a balanced opinion on Dio, with all the 
positive and negative sides of his account. 
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7. 2  Prelude to the rebellion (the Greater Illyricum 8 BC-AD 6) 
The renewed imperialism of the early Principate at first resulted in success 
on all fronts, one following the other. Romans imposed their overlordship over the 
Alpine area, over Germany up to the Elbe, Pannonia up to the Danube and Moesia, 
in the first two decades. Despite some personal problems with military leadership – 
the death of Drusus and the departure of Tiberius for Rhodes, Augustus still had a 
strong army and capable generals to command it. Two major focal points of Roman 
foreign policy after the Bellum Pannonicum and the expansion into Germany were 
the Dacian kingdoms and an even more formidable opponent – the kingdom of 
Marobroduus in Bohemia. In time Roman armies strategically encircled the 
Marcommanic kingdom in Bohemia and in AD 6 everything was ready for its final 
elimination.
6 As we noted in the previous chapter, Roman expansion into central 
and northern Europe was more an expansion of influence than a full annexation of 
these territories. Some scholars have assumed that Romans already overextended 
their forces with these conquests, but it seems more likely that the military system 
of the early Principate, defined by Luttwak as ‘the concentration of force’, was 




Not much is known about the situation in Illyricum after 8 BC. The evidence 
is scattered and rather uncertain. It is, after all, unclear where the northern frontier 
of Illyricum was at this time. Augustus claims in a famous line from the Res Gestae 
that his power reached the Danube, and the majority of scholars support the idea 
that Transdanubia (the plains between the rivers Drava and Danube) was joined to 
Illyricum in the Bellum Pannonicum or shortly after.
8 Still, some authors like Fitz 
and Tóth plausibly argue that the Romans had not yet established their frontier on 
the Danube at this time and there are a couple of strong arguments to support this 
view. No sources mention campaigns in Transdanubia north of the Drava, Pannonia 
had no significant economic or strategic value for Romans nor did its inhabitants 
                                                           
6 Syme (1934b) 364-369; Wilkes (1965a) 20-22; (1969) 67-69. For the political career of 
Marobroduus; cf. Dobiáš (1960) 155-159. 
7 Luttwak (1976) 7-50. Overextension is implied by Syme (1934b) 340. There are many works 
dealing with the sudden end of Roman expansion emphasizing different reasons, such as logistics; 
Fulford (1992), or socio-cultural differences; Cunliffe (1988) 174-177. 
8 RG 30, imperio populi Romani subieci protulique fines Illyrici usque ad ripam fluminis Danui; Fitz 
(1977) n.2 for earlier works written on the subject. 
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pose any threat to Roman interests. The native people of the Eravisci continued to 
mint their own coinage for a long time.
9 From this lack of evidence it seems 
reasonable to delay the dating of the conquest for a while, at least until the 
campaigns of Ahenobarbus, Vinicius and Lentulus, discussed below, or even later. 
Even then, it is not absolutely clear whether Romans formally annexed 
Transdanubia before Augustus died, or just exercised strategic control over the area, 
without providing any administration until the reign of Claudius.
10
 
Despite uncertainty over just where its northern frontier lay, imperial 
Illyricum was a huge province. Noricum was probably under the Illyrian 
administration for some time, especially in military matters.
11 Such a large area was 
very difficult to administer efficiently, and it does not seem that much 
administrative reorganization was done very far inland from the coast. Illyrian 
governors had more military tasks than administrative ones. Some military bases 
were established and colonies of military veterans were planted in the area after 9 
BC, probably at Poetovium and Siscia, and, as some scholars have speculated, there 
was an unnamed veteran settlement somewhere in central Bosnia.
12 It is possible 
that some military praefecti civitatum were already in position to control the most 
troublesome of the conquered peoples, but again, unfortunately, no epigraphic or 
written source exists to confirm this before the rebellion, so it is likely that most of 
them were introduced after the rebellion.
13 It is also certain that Romans tried to 
administer the province through the local nobility, retaining the pre-Roman political 
structure but slowly introducing elements of Roman administration (Chapter 8.2). 
While the Dalmatian coast and hinterland enjoyed the benefits of peace, the north 
remained a zone of military operations, which supported preliminary actions against 
the kingdom of Marobroduus. We can only assume the stronger economic presence 
of Roman/Italian traders and businessmen inside the continent from the fact that 
they were the first victims of the rebels in AD 6.
14 It is also significant that 
                                                           
9 This is an old opinion of Mommsen CIL III, p. 415 after RG 5.21 defended convincingly by Fitz 
(1977) 543-545 and Tóth (1977). Low economic value of Pannonia; Mócsy (1962) 541-542. 
10 Fitz (1977) 551-555 puts the final Roman conquest of the Transdanubia in the context of 
Sarmatian settlement in the mid-1
st century AD; cf. Tóth (1977). 
11 Emphasized strongly by Tóth (1980) 83-86, see below p. 162 
12 Poetovio, Siscia; Wilkes (1969) 63 n. 6. For a supposed veteran settlement, see Chapter 7.4 n. 33. 
13 Wilkes (1977) 742 assuming that they were in place after AD 9. 
14 Vell. Pat. 2.110.5, not unlike Italian traders in Asia Minor 88 BC. They were conducting their 
business in the Pannonian lowlands rather than in the Bosnian mountains; Köstermann (1953) 348-
349. 
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archaeology has not found any trace of the construction of major Roman roads built 
in Illyricum in this time. 
 
It is commonly assumed that the known legates for Illyricum in the period 8 
BC – AD 5 were, in chronological order (but perhaps not in unbroken succession): 
Sex. Appuleius, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16 BC), M. Vinicius (cos. 16 BC), 
Cn. Cornelius Lentulus.
15 We can accept Appuleius and possibly Vinicius with a 
caution,
16 and we can assume that Vinicius made a deep incursion, crossing the 
Danube with the army of Illyricum as a part of campaigns intended to encircle 
Marobroduus.
17 The role of Ahenobarbus and Lentulus as hypothetical legates for 
Illyricum is based on very questionable evidence. Dio states that Ahenobarbus, 
while ‘governing the districts along the Ister’ (not specifying upper or middle 
Danube), intercepted wandering Hermunduri, settled them in Marcomannian 
territory, crossed the river Albis, set up an altar to Augustus and transferred his 
headquarters to the Rhine.
18 For Lentulus, the situation is even more scattered and 
obscure. He intervened in Dacia, was engaged in fighting on the lower Danube, and 
received triumphal insignia for his victories against the Getae.
19
 
The situation throughout the empire immediately preceding the rebellion 
was generally tense: fiscal deficit, rebellions in Isauria and Africa, piracy in 
Sardinia, famine and fire in Rome and the conspiracy of Publius Plautius Rufus, 
which worried rather than seriously threatened the regime.
20 At the start of the 
rebellion the Illyrian army with its governor, praepositus Illyrico M. Valerius 
Messala Messalinus (cos. 3 BC), was stationed with Tiberius in Carnuntum, which 
was intended to be the southern operational wing for an approaching Roman 
                                                           
15 Syme (1934a) 128-134; (1934b) 364 ff.; Wilkes (1969) 67-69; Mócsy (1974) 35-36. Dobó (1958) 
16-20 (nos. 3-5) places Vinicius in 10-9 BC, Appuleius in 8-7 BC and Ahenobarbus in 6 BC-AD 1. 
16 The sources are the main problem. Of Appuleius we can be certain; Cassiodorus; MGH, Chron. 
Min. 1, 135 and for Vinicius a fragmentary inscription from Tusculum ILS 8965 mentions a certain 
…cius as the legate of Illyricum operating against the Bastarnae across the Danube. Syme (1933b) 
144 ff. makes strong arguments in favour of Vinicius as the unknown legate over the other 
candidates, although without providing a reliable answer as to why Velleius Paterculus omitted to 
mention this achievement of his patron’s grandfather; (1933b) 147. 
17 Klemenc (1961) 5-6 sees this action as prevention of Marobroduus’ expansion in the Hungarian 
plains and separation of the Quadi and the Dacians. 
18 Dio, 55.10a.2-3. 
19 Flor. 2.28-9 confirmed by RG 30-31; Strabo, 7.3.11 (C 304); Tac. Ann. 4.44. Syme (1934a) dates 
Lentulus as a legate in Illyricum in AD 1-4. 
20 Dio, 55.24.9-28.4. Publius Rufus; Dio, 55.27.2, Plautius Rufus; Suet. Aug. 19. 
   Chapter 7: Bellum Batonianum    143
invasion of the Marcommanic kingdom. Only minor forces were stationed in the 
rear, close to the Dalmatian coast.
21
 
7. 3  Reasons for the rebellion 
We do not know much about the reasons for this uprising apart from those 
given by our sources. The explanation of Velleius Paterculus that long years of 
peace made Pannonians suddenly restless and eager to rebel cannot be taken 
seriously.
22 Dio, on the other hand, suggested the large amount of tribute given to be 
the key factor in Dalmatian anger.
23 Since the exaction of tribute influenced the 
short-lived rebellion of the Pannonii in Dalmatia in 10 BC,
24 and since the economic 
situation throughout the Empire was generally serious in AD 5 – 6, Dio’s 
explanation sounds reasonable enough.
25 The other apparent external reasons are 
linked with the previous one: administrative cruelty and the incompetence of 
Roman administrators as well as the greed of negotiatores and publicani in the 
exploitation of the province.
26  
 
There was something else, much more difficult to see and define, and that is 
the growing resentment of the Pannonii. Dyson compared the situation in Illyricum 
before the bellum Batonianum with Vercingetorix’s Gaul in the late 50s BC and 
finds common reasons for both uprisings. His sharp observation deserves to be 
quoted in full: 
 
“The province was undergoing Romanization and the 
interior regions were getting the first real sense of what Roman 
                                                           
21 Vell. Pat. 2.109.5; Dio, 55. 30.1. It is commonly assumed that the army of Illyricum consisted of 5 
legions at that time: IX Hispana, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina, XV Apollinaris and XX; Syme (1933a) 
33; Wilkes (1969) 92. At the outbreak of the war the first four were with Tiberius and legion XX, 
insufficiently filled, semiplena, was in its base at Burnum, see below p. 151. 
22 Vell. Pat. 2.110.2 … universa Pannonia, insolens longae pacis bonis …. Velleius was following 
traditional political theories rather than just being contemptuous towards Tiberius’ enemies; 
Woodman (1977) 157. 
23 Dio, 55.29.1; Köstermann (1953) 346 n.3. We need to remember the different definition of 
Dalmatians and Pannonians used by sources, see Chapter 2.5.2 n. 115. For Dio, the Dalmatians and 
Pannonians are inhabitants of the administrative provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia, not the Delmatae 
and Pannonii, while for Velleius they are ethnic groups. Cf. Mócsy (1962) 547; (1983) 174-175. 
24 Dio, 54.36.2. 
25 Dio, 55. 24.9-25. 
26 Dio, 56.16.3. Maladministration in the provinces continued in the early principate e.g. Q. Varus in 
Syria quam pauper divitem ingressus dives pauperem reliquit Vell. Pat. 2.107.2-3. See Brunt (1961) 
216 ff. Some scholars emphasized simplistically the uncontrolled greed of Roman businessmen; 
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conquest meant for native customs and power structure. There was 
a native leadership class intact and this apparently had had some 
contact with Roman military skills. Like the Gallic assemblies, joint 
levies for armed service must have given the natives some sense of 
strength and unity. This plus the increasingly uprooted and 
desperate psychological state of a people undergoing cultural 
change, created the ‘nativistic atmosphere’ that helped to 
overcome local differences and produce a unity that completely 
surprised the Romans.” 
27
 
It is what Dyson calls “nativistic atmosphere” that played the role of catalyst in 
Illyricum. The Pannonii shared a common destiny after being conquered, in that 
shared a common frustration with sudden social change. This frustration was 
combined with a sense of ethnic unity, which in turn created ethnic homogenization 
and xenophobia resulting in a polarization between ‘us’ (Pannonii) and ‘them’ 
(Romans and all others collaborating with Roman government). Those elements 
united most conservative elements amongst the Pannonii and gave an impetus 
towards the rebellion. 
 
It has been pointed out that provincials often showed resistance to Roman 
rule in the early Principate, which sometimes turned into rebellion when Romans 
attempted to draft them into service in distant provinces.
28 This was indeed such a 
situation and it would be no surprise if the draft of Dalmatians for the war against 
Marobroduus
29 was the final spark needed to ignite an already explosive situation in 
Illyricum (Figure 3). 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Šašel (1974c) 8 (=Šašel (1992) 512), or the native wish for freedom; Bojanovski (1988) 49 as 
important causes of the rebellion. 
27 Dyson (1971) 253. 
28 Brunt (1974b) 104 ff. 
29 Dio, 55.29.2-3. Mócsy (1983) 173-174 goes too far in describing this revolt as a blunder of 
Tiberius, in that he insisted on using Pannonian auxiliaries against Marobroduus. Tiberius did not 
introduce conscription in Pannonia. The causes of rebellion were much more complex, see Figure 3. 
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7. 4  The beginning of the revolt: numbers, actors, aims
The most prominent peoples in this rebellion are, according to our sources: 
the Daesitiates, Breuci, Pirustae, Mezaei and Delmatae, no doubt with other 
unmentioned smaller peoples supporting, or being compelled to support them. 
Whether any other ethnic group supported the rebellion remains an unknown and 
highly questionable matter.
30 The names of three rebel leaders are known. They 
were the Daesitiate princeps Bato, his Breucian namesake, and one Pinnes.
31 
Evidently, the uprising was swift and a surprise for the Roman military, who did not 
expect it, just like Gaul in 52 BC or Britain in AD 60.
32 Romans sustained losses in 
the beginning; some citizens and traders as well as a detachment of veterans paid 
the ultimate price at the hands of the rebels.
33 The rebels were an incoherent mass of 
many Pannonian peoples, although some of them had already been trained in 
Roman methods of combat;
34 it is amazing how they achieved such a level of 
organization and relative unity in such a short time.
35 Dio is specific in describing 
the situation at the beginning. This rebellion was not planned in advance; it was just 
an emotional outburst which might have become a rebellion, or not. The initial 
                                                           
30 The Delmatae are not mentioned explicitly in the sources, but the swift movement of Bato the 
Daesitiate to the Adriatic coast and Salona would be impossible without support from the Delmatae. 
Also, he was captured in the territory of the Delmatae in AD 9, see Chapter 7.5 n. 61. Strabo, 7.5.3 
(C 314) adds Andizetes and Ditiones to the list of the Pannonii whose ἡγεµών is Bato. 
Köstermann, 1953: 346 n. 3 does not completely exclude the possibility that the Iapodes and Liburni 
may have joined the rebellion. While Iapodean involvement should not be regarded as a complete 
surprise (Patsch (1898) 171), bearing in mind the plan of rebels to threaten North Italy via Nauportus 
and Tergeste (Vell. Pat. 2.110.4), following the old route of Iapodean raids, we can not accept the 
involvement of the Liburni in the rebellion, as they were ethnically different and almost fully 
Romanized at this time. Rau (1925) 344-345; Alföldy (1965a) 29 n. 17; Suić (1991/92) 57, 62 n. 14 
are perhaps right decisively to deny that either of these two peoples were involved, after CIL V 3346, 
see this section n. 59. It is possible that the net of fortified positions linking the coast and Siscia, and 
stretching through Iapodean land (Patsch (1898) 172-173) prevented their involvement, or, that they 
at that time already enjoyed additional privilegies like immunitas and special status inside the 
province together with the Liburni (Suić (1975b) 112), so that there was no significant interest to risk 
their position and rebel. 
31 Vell. Pat. 2.110.4-5. Dio, 55.29.2-3, initially omits Pinnes, and mentions him only after Bato’s 
betrayal described in 55.34.4. Bato was a typical name amongst the Pannonii; cf. Katičić (1965b) 70; 
Wilkes (1969) 169 n.1; Mócsy (1974) 59. 
32 The walls and fortifications of Siscia were just a wooden construction before the rebellion; 
Nenadić (1986/87) 74-76, see Chapter 7.5 n. 85. 
33 Vell. Pat. 2.110.6. It has been suggested that this veteran settlement was in Central Bosnia; cf. Rau 
(1925) 323; Köstermann (1953) 348 n.1, or the Dalmatian coastal hinterland; Wilkes (1969) 70 n.2, 
but archaeology has not confirmed this hypothesis. 
34 Vell. Pat. 2.110.5. They were lightly armed and extremely mobile; Dio, 55.30.5. Cf. Mócsy (1983) 
171-173. 
35 Vell. Pat. 2.110.5-6 nulla umquam natio tam mature consilio belli bellum iunxit ac decreta 
paravit. Köstermann (1953) used to compare rebels with Yugoslav partisans whom he had the 
opportunity to fight in the Second World War as an officer of the Wermacht. Although tempting at 
first sight, this comparison must be taken with caution. Pannonians and Dalmatians in the 1
st century 
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defeat of a small Roman detachment by the Daesitiates, however encouraged other 
Pannonii to join the uprising.
36  
 
The numerical strength of the rebels is estimated by Velleius at 200,000 
colligebantur armis habilia foot soldiers, and 9,000 cavalry recruited out of a total 
population of 800,000.
37 Modern authorities have failed to criticize Velleius for this 
huge exaggeration, which is typical for ancient writers.
38 Modern scholarship 
estimates the population of the Roman province of Dalmatia to have been 700,000 
and, excluding Roman colonies and peoples like the Liburni, Iapodes or southern 
Illyrians, who did not take part in the rebellion, there were only 400,000 or even 
fewer inhabitants.
39 While these numbers are nothing more than approximations, 
even if we take into account the population of rebellious peoples from Pannonia,
40 
there is no way by any criterion that their total number could be much over 100,000 
men. In fact, according to the estimate given in Figure 4, it looks reasonable to 
estimate rebel forces at a maximum of 90,000 -100,000 foot soldiers, even if 
mobilization
41 was as high as two thirds of all militarily capable males (which we 
doubt)
42 and 9,000 cavalry. As previously noted, the account of Velleius is 
influenced by his own point of view as a contemporary witness of the events. Thus 
we should not be surprised if there really was at that time a rumor circulating in 
Rome that 200,000 savage and fierce Pannonians were ready to invade Italy at any 
moment. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
AD were not an ideologically led and motivated army. Cf. a slightly different line of criticism by 
Pašalić (1956) 269-270 n.40. 
36 Dio, 55.29.2-3. Velleius Paterculus blames Pannonians in general for starting the rebellion 2.110.2 
but that can be explained by his general approach (as Pannonia was the main battlefield in his 
account) rather than care for particular details as to whether the uprising started in Pannonia or 
Dalmatia. Cf. Köstermann (1953) 347. 
37 Vell. Pat. 2.110.3. 
38 Pašalić (1956) 246; Mócsy (1983) 177 n.46 have some doubts.  
39 Alföldy (1965a) 24, 29 n. 17 600-700,000 with 200-300,000 who did not rebel. Wilkes (1977) 
752-753 puts the total at 700,000. 
40 We need to count only peoples living between the valleys of Sava and Drava, not the whole of 
Pannonia. We cannot agree either with Köstermann (1953) 347, who maintains that Pannonians 
made up the bulk of the rebels, and that they supplied an equal number of rebels, as Alföldy (1965a) 
29 n. 17, suggests. The Dalmatians made up the bulk of the rebels; Mócsy (1962) 543. 
41 The Pannonians perhaps had a higher level of mobilization, as initially fighting was limited only to 
southern Pannonia, and they suffered famine (Vell. Pat.2.112.3), which also spread into Dalmatia; 
Dio, 55.33.1. Cf. Vell. Pat. 2.112.2, when Messalinus defeated Bato the Daesitiate and the bulk of 
the Dalmatian army is estimated at 20,000 men. Also App. Ill. 22 mentions only 100,000 Pannonii 
capable of bearing arms. 
42 According to Brunt (1987) 66, c. 50% of Roman citizens liable for service were drafted into the 
armed forces during the most dangerous years of the 2
nd Punic war. There were still plenty of slaves 
and proletarii remaining to produce essential food, a luxury the Pannonii certainly did not have. 
 




FIGURE 4 Approximate numbers of the Pannonian rebels
43
 
4.1 The peoples involved in the uprising and their approximate male 
population 
 
Civitates  Decuriae Involvement in the uprising Total (adult males)  
Delmatae  342 Confirmed  34,200  
Deures  25 Assumed  2,500  
Ditiones  239 Confirmed  23,900  Salona 
Mezaei  269 Confirmed  26,900  Conventus
Sardeatae  52 Assumed  5,200     
Cerauni  24  Confirmed (the Pirustae)
 44   2,400   
Daorsi  17 No  1,700   
Daesitiates  103 Confirmed  10,300  
Docleatae  33 No  3,300   
Deretini  14 Assumed  1,400  
Deramistae  30 No  3,000   
Dindari  33 No  3,300  Narona 
Glintidiones  44 No  4,400  Conventus
Melcumani  24 No  2,400   
Narensii  102 No  10,200   
Scirtari  72  Confirmed (the Pirustae)   7,200   
Ardiaei  20 No  2,000   















        
    Total adult males  206,700   
    Southern Illyrians and Dindari -30,300   
  (not  rebelling)  176,400   
                                                           
43 This table is based on Pliny’s list of peregrine civitates in Dalmatia and the number of their 
decuriae HN 3.142-144, on the assumption that 1 decuria of Pliny represents 100 adult males, 
Beloch (1886) 238 ff.; Wilkes (1977) 752-753, and on the assumption that only the Pannonii were 
involved in the uprising as argued above. This methodology might be questioned as Beloch might be 
wrong in assigning 100 adult males to one decuria, but taking in account population density of 10-12 
inhabitants/km
2 (like pre-Roman Belgic Gaul, Wightman (1985) 32-33) numbers should not be much 
different for the teritorry of 71,000 km
2 approximately inhabited by the Pannonii. 
44 The Pirustae were broken into the civitates of Cerauni, Scirtari and Siculotae after the rebellion, cf. 
Alföldy (1965a) 50-53; Wilkes (1969) 157, see Chapter 8.4. 
45 This is an assumption only, as Pliny does not give number of decuriae for the Pannonian civitates. 
The Breuci were broken into smaller civitates after the rebellion; Mócsy (1962) 606; (1974) 53-55, 
and we estimate that before the rebellion the Breuci were at least equal in numbers to the largest 
civitas in Dalmatia (the Delmatae – 342 decuriae) and, by the addition of the Amantini, Andizetes, 
Iasi and Colapiani, made a maximum of 600 decuriae. The figure for the Breucian population is also 
influenced by the fact that they were missing a large number of males in the age group of 35-45 
years, who had been sold into slavery by Tiberius in 11 BC; Dio, 54.31.2-4. 
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4.2 Adult male population   
Adult males in rebelling civitates 176,400 
Population older than 46
46 44,100 25% 
Adult population of military age  132,200  75% 
 
4.3 Mobilization rate
47   Incl. 5% margin of error 
Adult population of military age  132,200   
Rate of mobilization 66%  88,200  83,800-92,620 
Rate of mobilization 50%  66,600  63,270-69,930 
 
4.4 Final estimate (numbers rounded)   
Soldiers (total)    63,000-92,500 




It is uncertain what the initial aims of the rebels were, besides attacks on the 
nearest Roman settlements and garrisons in the area. The Daesitiates attacked 
Salona, and the Breuci Sirmium. Almost certainly they counted on the absence of 
the Illyrian army and did not anticipate the speedy return of Tiberius from 
Carnuntum with all the legions.
48 According to Velleius
49 the rebels divided their 
forces into three main armies: one to attack Macedonia; one to attack Italy; and the 
home army. This is a wrong and careless assessment and excellent proof that 
sometimes it is not good to be too close to the events as the bigger picture can be 
missed.
50 Velleius assumed this threefold division from reports arriving, initially, in 
Rome. In fact the rebel army had four operative groups at the start of the uprising.   
The first group was led by Bato the Daesitiate who attacked Salona with elite forces 
of the Daesitiates and Delmatae (possibly the Ditiones and Mezaei?). He sent some 
units (the second group) to pillage the southeastern coast, going as far as Apollonia 
                                                           
46 We estimate that the proportion of militarily capable males in the total adult male population was 
70 – 80%, so for calculation purposes we use the average value of 75%. According to the estimates 
based on Roman census figures, the iuniores, age 17 to 46, made 71-72% of the adult male 
population; Brunt (1987) 66-67; Lo Cascio (2001) 135-136. Frier’s table for the population structure 
of the Roman empire estimates that the proportion of those in the age group between 15 and 50 was 
52.44% of the total population, and therefore 81.56% of the population were older than 15 years, 
Frier (1982) 245 Table 5. 
47 More than 50% (close to 75%) of the iuniores, were conscripted into the legions during the most 
dangerous years of the 2
nd Punic war; Lo Cascio (2001) 135 Table 1B; Brunt (1987) 66. 
48 Köstermann (1953) 349. 
49 Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, was unaware of the Breucian movement to Sirmium; Dio, 55.29.3-4, cf. Wilkes 
(1965a) 113. 
50 Surprisingly many of the authorities believe Velleius Paterculus; cf. Köstermann (1953) 349-350; 
Wilkes (1969) 70 n. 3. 
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(possibly the Pirustae). The third operative group, commanded by Bato the 
Breucian, attacked Sirmium. Finally, there was a home army guarding the heartland 
of Pannonian country and providing reserves to the three operative groups. 
 
The aims and strategy of the rebels, beyond obvious intention to drive the 
Romans out, are obscure. Velleius Paterculus implies that the rebels planned to 
invade Italy, but according to Dio we see that Tiberius thought of that only as a 
possibility.
51 There is nothing the rebels would gain by attacking Macedonia or Italy 
except possibly plunder. The movements of Bato the Daesitiate were not obviously 
strategic; he spent precious time sending troops to plunder the Dalmatian coast as 
far as Apollonia, and personally led an unsuccessful attack on Salona.
52 There was 
no apparent danger threatening him from the south.
53 Modern scholars have 
suggested that a much better strategy would have been the immediate seizure of key 
Roman positions in Siscia. An even better strategy would have been immediately to 
cut off Roman troops from Italy by taking the passes in the Julian Alps after 
advancing northwest through the Adriatic coast and hinterland.
54 Apparently, the 
rebels were not under unified command in the first days of the war. The Daesitiates 
made common cause with the Breuci only after being beaten by Messalinus.
55  
 
Panic in Italy is well attested by the sources; Augustus’ speech in the Senate 
and conscription in Italy suggest this, but it is questionable how justified it really 
                                                           
51 Vell. Pat. 2.110.4, 111.1; Dio, 55.30.1. 
52 Velleius’ assessment that the rebels had already poured into Macedonia (2.110.4) actually refers to 
some units of Bato’s army who were making a raid on Apollonia, in Macedonia; cf. Dio, 55.29.4. 
Dio, writing much later never mentions this threefold division of rebels but rather only the Breucian 
and Dalmatian (Daesitiate) Bato. From the topography it is possible to speculate that the Pirustae 
made the raids into Macedonia. For the location of the Pirustae; cf. Wilkes (1969) 173-176. 
Alternatively, it is possible to side with Rau (1925) 319-320 (also Mócsy (1974) 36) who argued that 
there was no Moesia as a separate province at that time, and that the Macedonian command extended 
to the Danube, so that the attack on Sirmium was in fact an attack on the Macedonian provincia. 
53 Köstermann (1953) 351. Yet the Pannonii defeated some Roman units there, probably veterans or 
auxiliaries; Dio, 55.29.4. 
54 The importance of Sirmium and Siscia: Syme (1934b) 370; Köstermann (1953) 353-354; Wilkes 
(1969) 70; Hoti (1992) 140. Of course these are only speculations, but if we follow the 
reconstruction of Koestermann (see Chapter 7.5 n. 61) that Caecina Severus fought the Daesitiates in 
northern Dalmatia, it is possible that Bato tried to eliminate the garrison of legion XX in Burnum and 
cut the supply route for Roman forces from Italy via Nauportus. If true, that would give him much 
more credit than otherwise appears from his Adriatic adventure. Tiberius had problems with supplies 
for the army in Siscia; Suet. Tib. 16; Köstermann (1953) 353-354. 
55 Dio, 55.30.2. 
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was.
56 Syme points out the wider context of a potential Thracian rebellion, 
Marobroduus’ next move, and the already attested domestic problems. These made 
the rebellion more threatening and Augustus more despairing.
57 Dio does not 
mention panic in Italy, although he says that Tiberius thought that the security of 
Italy (probably Northern Italy) could be endangered, so he decided to return from 
Germany with all the Illyrian legions. Suetonius mentions the recruiting of slaves 
and freedmen in Italy only in the context of defending of the Roman colonies in 
Dalmatia, i.e. on the coast, without suggesting the contemporary panic that is 
described in Velleius Paterculus’ account.
58 Some emergency administrative 
measures are apparent, such as the grouping of the Liburni and Iapodi through a 




7. 5  Short overview of the campaigns
The course of the campaigns is difficult to ascertain due to the conflicting 
accounts of Dio and Velleius Paterculus.
60 After the first skirmishes and initial 
shock, the Romans tried to keep the rebellion in check and stop it spreading. The 
first clash with regular Roman troops happened between the Daesidiates and the 
governor of Illyricum, Messalinus, who commanded an insufficiently manned 
legion XX. Roman military success cut off the rebels from North Italy, which 
prevented any possible threat there and stopped their devastation of the coast.
61 The 
                                                           
56 Vell. Pat. 2.110.6-111.2; Sumner (1970) 272. It seems that Augustus’ panic was genuine, not a 
deliberate manoeuvre to introduce unpopular measures more easily, as Köstermann (1953) 349 
suggests, but we cannot fully exclude either possibility. 
57 Syme (1934b) 371, cf. Pliny, HN 7.149. It is doubtful whether Marobroduus would have had any 
hostile intentions after negotiating a treaty with Tiberius in AD 6; cf. Dobiáš (1960) 159-161. 
58 Dio, 55.30.1; Suet. Aug. 25. 
59 CIL V 3346. This was only a temporary measure; Patsch (1898) 177-178; Suić (1991/92). 
Suić (1991/92) 62-64 suggests that Romans established in Liburnia and amongst the Iapodes an 
independent administrative province during the war, but it appears that we deal here primarily with 
an emergency military command over one part of the province. There is no doubt that praepositus 
Iapudiai et Liburniai was under the supreme command of a legatus Augusti. Suić also confuses this 
incident with the transfer of Illyricum from the Senate to a legatus Augusti, which happened in 11 
BC, see above p. 134. 
60 Rau (1925); Köstermann (1953); Wilkes (1965a); (1969) 69-77, did this difficult task, often giving 
different interpretations. 
61 Dio, 55.30.1-5; Vell. Pat. 2.112.1-2. Perhaps this time Velleius was right; Köstermann (1953) 350 
and n.3; Mócsy (1962) 545, while Rau (1925) 317; Wilkes (1965a) 113; (1969) 70; Hoti (1992) 140 
and Syme (1934b) 370, believe Dio who said that Tiberius sent Messalinus from Germany to stop 
the rebels before Tiberius’ arrival, and fought them close to Siscia. Köstermann argues that the battle 
was fought in north Dalmatia, close to Burnum - the base of legio XX at that time. This opinion 
sounds more plausible, as Bato was already attacking Salona, so it would be strange if he suddenly 
turned towards Siscia (where Syme and Wilkes suggest was the battlefield) rather than continued to 
ravage the Dalmatian coast. 
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Moesian governor, A. Caecina Severus, strengthened by Thracian cavalry led by 
King Rhoemetalces, defeated the Breuci near the Drava, and prevented them from 
taking the stronghold of Sirmium. However, when he himself suffered heavy losses, 
he withdrew.
62 Meanwhile the Daesidiates, beaten by Messalinus, joined the Breuci 
on the Mons Almus (Fruška Gora), which continued the pressure on Sirmium, so 
that Caecina was compelled to return and fight them once more – this time without 
a clear result. The danger of the Sarmatian and Dacian raids from the north forced 
him to return to Moesia again.
63 When Tiberius reached Siscia with the Illyrian 
army in autumn AD 6 and met Messalinus, and when reinforcements of veterans 
from Italy led by Germanicus and including our source Paterculus arrived, it seemed 
that the Romans were already controlling the damage.
64
 
 However, Tiberius was cautious when he advanced against the rebels in the 
next year, and he managed to cut off and surround part of the rebel forces on the 
Mons Claudius (Moslavačka gora near Varaždin).
65 Dio’s source is very critical of 
Tiberius’ tactics in AD 7 when the Romans tried to divide the army into small units 
in order to cover more ground, apparently without much success.
66 In the late 
autumn/early winter five legions, three Moesian led by governor Caecina, and two 
                                                                                                                                                                   
The different accounts of Dio and Velleius can be reconciled if we accept that Messalinus returned to 
legion XX, already in Illyricum at the first news, where he was caught in the rebellion, as suggested 
by Velleius 2.112.2 … subita rebellione cum semiplena legione circumdatus hostili exercitu…. This 
did happen on the western front, where the reports of Velleius are generally considered reliable.  Cf. 
Köstermann (1953) 350; Wilkes (1965b) 112-114 - reliability of Velleius on the events from the 
western front. 
Pliny,  HN 3.142 suggests that Burnum had been a famous battlefield, Burnum, Andetrium, 
Tribulium, nobilitata proeliis castella. 
62 Dio, 55.29.3. Sirmium was garrisoned by auxiliaries; Klemenc (1961) 23, but it is less certain that 
legio I Adiutrix was then there, as Klemenc suggests. 
63 Dio, 55.30.2-4. 
64 Vell. Pat. 2.112.1-6. Germanicus dispatched; Dio, 55.31.1, mentioning also the ridiculous rumour 
that Tiberius was delayed in Illyricum, and deriving it from the source hostile to Tiberius; Rau 
(1925) 315; Köstermann (1953) 358; Pašalić (1956) 17-18. It is uncertain when they arrived, 
especially Germanicus. From Dio’s context it appears that he arrived in the year 7, but if he held the 
quaestorship in AD 6 perhaps his arrival should be dated to the winter of AD 6-7; cf. Sumner (1966) 
426; (1970) 272 n. 95. 
65 Cf. summarized evidence in Petru (1968) 364-365 (=Petru (1977) 484-485); contra Köstermann 
(1953) 360-361. It seems from Vell. Pat. 2.112.3-4, Pars exercitus eorum proposita ipsi duci … that 
the detachment of rebels sent to take Siscia retreated without battle to Mons Claudius after seeing 
Tiberius already there in full force. 
66 Dio, 55.32.4. On the other hand; Vell. Pat. 2.111.4, Quantis prudentia ducis opportunitatibus 
furentes eorum vires universas elusimus, fudimus partibus considers these tactics working. Roman 
legions were tactically inferior in counter-guerilla warfare, so Tiberius needed to rely much more on 
his auxiliaries; cf. Luttwak (1976) 41 ff. 
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arriving as reinforcements from the East led by M. Plautius Silvanus,
67 with the 
addition of Thracian cavalry and auxiliary troops, managed to reach Siscia, despite 
being ambushed and almost decimated by the strong forces of the united rebels at 
the Volcaean Marshes.
68 Thus Tiberius had in Siscia huge forces and he decided 
that there was no need to keep them all together. He personally escorted the eastern 
reinforcements back to Sirmium in the winter of AD 7 – 8.
69 Silvanus remained in 
charge of Sirmium and Caecina definitely returned to Moesia.
70 Dio reports that at 




The next year was decisive for the outcome of the rebellion as the 
Pannonians who were suffering from famine and disease surrendered to Tiberius in 
the summer at the river Bathinus. Their scorched earth tactics backfired during the 
severe winter of AD 7 – 8.
72 Breucian Bato supposedly laid down his arms, 
surrendered his fellow-leader Pinnes and, as a reward, got an amnesty from the 
Romans who left him in charge of his people and some other Pannonians.
73 That 
was the most decisive event in the course of the war, taking into account the large 
resources and population of the Breuci.
74 However, Pannonians required additional 
pacification by Silvanus despite the formal surrender at Bathinus when unrest 
                                                           
67 Those were VII, VIII Augusta and XI (Moesian legions) IV Scythica and V Macedonica (Eastern 
legions); Wilkes (1969) 92-93, seen slightly differently by Syme (1933c) 29-31. There is no 
foundation to support the claim of some scholars (e.g. Bojanovski (1990) 700, 704) that VIII 
Augusta was involved in fighting AD 6-9; cf. Alföldy (1989) 205-206. 
68 Vell. Pat. 2.112.3-4; Dio, 55.32.3. The Volcaean marshes are located in the area of later Cibalae 
(Vinkovci); Köstermann (1953) 362; Wilkes (1969) 72. 
69 Vell. Pat. 2.113.1-3: 10 legions, 70 auxiliary cohorts, 14 cavalry units, 10,000 veterans. It would 
be more than difficult and unnecessary to sustain such an army. The large numbers were due to the 
initial panic of Augustus (Köstermann (1953) 362-363; Sumner (1970) 272, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.110.6 as 
eye-witness … tantus huius belli metus fuit … Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret. It 
was not a tactic of ‘shock and awe’ as suggested by Gruen (1996) 177. 
Köstermann (1953) 363 n. 3 suggests that Tiberius chose the route through mountains south of the 
Sava to escort the Eastern legions, thus avoiding the main force of rebels. 
70 Silvanus is attested later operating from Sirmium; Dio, 55.34.6-7; 56.12.2, Caecina is not 
mentioned afterwards. 
71 Dio, 55.32.4. Perhaps it was only a raid (cf. Wilkes (1969) 73), purposely planned for raising the 
morale of the army; Pašalić (1956) 288, 291. 
72 Dio, 55.33.1. It is assumed that the surrender was on the 3
rd of August after CIL I
2 248. The date is 
questioned by Woodman (1977) 178, who suggests the earlier date. 
73 Vell. Pat. 2.114.4. Bathinus was either the river Bosut (Köstermann (1953) 366-367 n.4), or more 
likely Bosna; Saria (1930); (1933); Vulić (1933) 3-12; Wilkes (1969) 73; Bojanovski (1974) 192-
199. Mócsy (1962) 547-548 suggests that the Daesitiates held hegemony (under Roman protection) 
over the Pannonii before the rebellion, and that Bato was established as vassal king by Tiberius, also 
Rau (1925) 331. 
74 After the war the Breuci were able to supply 8 cohortes of auxiliaries; Bojanovski (1988) 364-366. 
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followed the murder of the Breucian Bato by his Daesitiate namesake.
75 Later in the 
year, Tiberius left M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. AD 6) in command of Siscia, Plautius 
Silvanus in Sirmium and he (possibly) went to Dalmatia before returning to Rome 
to give a report to Augustus.
76  
 
The last year of the war witnessed operations in the mountainous Dinaric 
area. The Romans apparently advanced in three columns led by Silvanus (southeast 
from Sirmium), Lepidus (northwest from Siscia along the Una valley towards 
Burnum) while Tiberius and Germanicus operated from the south in the Dalmatian 
hinterland.
77 Lepidus and Silvanus had no extensive problems in pacifying the 
Pirustae and Daesitiates. Germanicus encountered more problems. His campaign 
was covered in some detail in Dio; he took the forts of Splonum, ‘Ραίτινον and 
Seretium.
78 Tiberius pursued Bato until he finally captured him at Andretium, close 
to Salona after a brief siege, thus completing military operations.
79 There were 
significant numbers of Roman military deserters on the Pannonian side who, in fear 
of punishment, obstructed all peace negotiations and dragged out the war for a 
while.
80 These deserters were most likely from auxiliary units recruited locally 
                                                           
75 Dio, 55.34.4-7. Apparently not all Breucian subjects were happy with Bato’s betrayal of Pinnes; 
Dio, 55.34.4-5. 
76 Vell.Pat. 2.114.5. It is uncertain where Tiberius was after he gave up command to Lepidus in 
autumn AD 8. Wilkes (1965b) 114-116 suggests that Tiberius went to Dalmatia (accompanied by 
Velleius Paterculus’ brother as legate; Vell. Pat. 2.115.1) with Germanicus after the surrender of the 
Breuci, and there almost won the war on his own leaving his legates to finish the job and then 
returned to Rome in early AD 9; cf. Dio, 56.1.1. Rau (1925) 330 ff. and Köstermann (1953) 367-368 
suggest that Tiberius thought that the war was over after the surrender of the Breuci so that he 
returned immediately to Augustus, leaving Germanicus in charge. Cf. Suet. Tib. 16; Dio, 56.11-12. 
77 Dio, 56.12.2-3. Cf. detailed analysis of Pašalić (1956) 288-295. Köstermann (1953) 370 who 
assumes that Germanicus went from Siscia through the valley of Una was strongly opposed by 
Wilkes (1965b) who argues that Germanicus operated from the south. 
The route of Lepidus: Wilkes (1969) 75, wrongly assuming that base of legion XX in Burnum was 
established only then. Legion XX was attested to be part of the Illyrian army before the rebellion, 
and it was moved to Germany after AD 9; cf. Ritterling (1925) 1770; Tac. Ann. 1.39. 
78 Dio, 56.11.1-12.1. Splonum is identified with Pljevlja in modern day Montenegro; Wilkes (1965b) 
121-125, valley of river Sana; Pašalić (1956) 288-291 or Šipovo in Western Bosnia; Alföldy (1962c) 
3-12. There is a problem in identification of Dio’s ‘Ραίτινον with Raetinium placed near city of 
Bihać (as Bojanovski (1988) 314-315), because it was in the territory of the Iapodes who did not take 
part in the uprising. One explanation is that population of Raetinium were ethnic Pannonii. Marić 
(1975) suggests that the Iapodes only in 1
st century BC acquired control over the left bank of the 
river Sana, which was inhabited by the Pannonii. The another is that Wilkes’ location of Splonum in 
Montenegro is the right one because it is clear from the context (although Wilkes never noted that 
explicitly) that ‘Ραίτινον was located close to Splonum. See Šašel (1953) for location of Seretion. 
79 See Zaninović (1967) 7 for location of Andretium. 
80 Dio, 56.15. 
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amongst the Celtic population of Pannonia, and Germans who came with Tiberius,
81 
rather than Roman legionaries. 
 
7. 6  Errors in strategy: the assessment of the uprising 
This was the last historically recorded attempt at organized native resistance 
to Roman power in Illyricum. The Romans proved themselves reasonably tolerant 
towards the rebels. They did not exercise unnecessary violence after extinguishing 
the rebellion; their treatment of leaders seems decent and the population did not 
suffer to the same extent it suffered during the Bellum Pannonicum.
82 It was an 
extraordinary event, not comparable with problems Roman policy experienced in 
the region during the Republic. Instead of being a political periphery of the Roman 
world as before, where police actions and trustworthy allies could keep things in 
order, Illyricum now represented an important organic part of the imperium 
Romanum, its geo-political core necessary for supporting important military 
operations in central Europe. Thus, any trouble arising in Illyricum now 
significantly affected other parts of the empire, and it was a matter of the utmost 
importance to keep the area peaceful in the future. 
 
Rome’s Illyrian policy in hindsight seems reckless, inadequate and 
dangerous in the period preceding the rebellion. The constitutional framework 
imposed on Illyricum after the Bellum Pannonicum created a system that was too 
large, spatially and ethnically diverse and thus too complex to control. The 
imposition of high taxes, creation of local resentment in an insufficiently pacified 
country and transfer of almost all available troops far north against the Marcommani 
endangered their own strategic rear in Illyricum and made Italy vulnerable. Any of 
those elements would not have been fatal individually but combined they created 
                                                           
81 German cavalry: Dio, 56.11.2; Celts are not attested in the written sources, but as this uprising was 
not joined by any known Celtic people in the Pannonian basin, Celtic auxiliaries may perhaps be 
found in Tiberius’ army. The Liburni were involved in fighting on the Roman side as well; CIL III 
3158; Wilkes (1969) 289. 
82 Wilkes (1969) 139-140 suggests an almost total extermination of the most rebellious peoples; it 
was a bloody and cruel struggle, with grave consequences to all those who resisted; Vell. Pat. 
2.115.2-4; Dio, 56.14.6-7. However this statement should be understood generally. There are no 
mentions of large enslavement of the population or excessive Roman retaliation after the fighting 
was over; Dio, 56.16.4. The main strongholds of the rebels were besieged and destroyed with their 
population, but other settlements where the majority of the population lived mainly surrendered 
peacefully; Dio, 55.34.6 (Pannonians) 56.15.1, 3 (Dalmatians), and the lives of Bato and his 
followers were, after all, spared; Dio, 56.13-16; Suet. Tib. 20. Archaeology finds traces of 
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dangerous circumstances (see Figure 3). Ethnic policy also partly
83 failed in respect 
of the Pannonii who were able to form a strong ethnically homogeneous army and 
threaten the Roman position. In one respect, they had nowhere else to go they could 
not just leave and resettle out of Roman influence, as the Germans for example 
could do.
84 Also, they did not have a city-based culture as did the Gauls, or coastal 
communities on the Adriatic coast, not to mention the Hellenized East, so they were 
not used to an organized system of paying taxes and tribute. Therefore it was very 
easy to create resentment towards Roman rule. Furthermore, Romans lacked 
fortresses and strong garrisons in the Sava valley. There is nothing to suggest that 
the only known military strongpoints, Sirmium and Siscia, were militarily sufficient 
for that task in AD 6.
85 Before the rebellion no military roads
86 connecting the coast 
with the hinterland had been constructed.
87 It was a disaster waiting to happen. 
 
Looked at in isolation, the rebellion made Romans rethink their military and 
political arrangements in Illyricum. It exposed their weaknesses and resulted in 
many military improvements in the next decade, which will be discussed in depth in 
the next chapter. It became obvious that one large command was not enough to 
provide efficient security in the western Balkans, so it was divided into two separate 
commands. Three legions were placed in Pannonia and two in Dalmatia, as strategic 
reserves and at the same time to watch over the natives. Furthermore, they 
established a strong defensive line of legionary and auxiliary fortresses in the 
Dalmatian hinterland. The Romans also established efficient communications, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
destruction in the valley of the Sava in this period (Marić (1964a) 50-51, 73), but it is impossible to 
decide whether it was the product of the Bellum Pannonicum or the Bellum Batonianum. 
83 The more important element of Roman ethnic policy actually worked perfectly, as no other ethnic 
group in Illyricum joined the Pannonii in the uprising, and if that had happened, the Romans would 
have been in serious trouble. Romans also managed to divide the Pannonii internally and get Bato 
the Breucian on their side; Vell. Pat. 2.114.4. 
84 Vell. Pat. 2.108.2; cf. Strabo, 7.1.3 (C 290). 
85 Defence of Sirmium required troops from Moesia. Siscia was perhaps better secured, but there is 
nothing, which might confirm that. In fact, archaeology proves that Siscia was fortified by timber-
constructed fortifications (destroyed by fire) before the rebellion, and only after that was split stone 
coursed with mortar used as foundation for brick walls; Nenadić (1986/87) 74-76; Buzov (2001) 
141-142. 
86 Possibly the road Aquileia – Carnuntum had been repaired at in this time (the ancient amber road); 
Klemenc (1961) 9 n. 74. 
87 Pašalić (1956) 296-298 uses this fact to prove his argument that central Bosnia was not conquered 
before the rebellion. It would be strategically even more reckless if Romans had left that area 
untouched by their power. It was, and still is, extremely difficult terrain for road building, so it is 
understandable that the Romans saw no need to engage troops in road building before the rebellion. 
Furthermore, the Romans introduced conscription to the Dalmatian Pannonii, not to mention Dio, 
56.16 who mentions Bato’s pastoral political parallel of Pannonian sheep and Roman wolves. If they 
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which meant massive road building throughout these provinces. Romans learned 
fast from their errors and their policy in Illyricum in the next decades reflects 
experience gained from this rebellion.  
 
The Pannonian rebellion was extinguished just a couple of days before 
Varus lost his legions in Germany. How the Illyrian rebellion and the Varian 
disaster affected Roman plans to continue expansion in Europe is a matter for 
discussion. Their losses had been great but Roman military capabilities were not so 
difficult to restore. It was celebrated as a great victory and the exotic names of 
defeated Pannonii, such as the Pirustae or Andizetes, became more familiar 
throughout the empire and the victory celebrated as a triumph in a foreign war.
88 
However, psychologically and personally, it must have been a real disaster for 
Augustus in the last years of his life.
89 His successor was certainly not too keen to 
continue wars of conquest after all the campaigns he had endured, especially hard 
fighting in the snow and mud of Illyricum. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
were not under Roman influence, there would have been no conscription, no taxation and thus no 
reason for the rebellion. 
88 Suet. Tib. 16. The personifications of the Pirustae and Andizetes (and Iapodes) were amongst those 
represented in Sebasteion at Aphrodisias; Smith (1988) 55 ff., see Plate IV. 
89 Tac. Ann. 1.11; Dio, 56.33. 
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8.  Iulio-Claudians in Illyricum: The tale of two provinces 
 
“If the empire was to outlast its founder and be proof 
against intruders, it had to have something to offer its 
conquered peoples, something that would persuade them 
that their way of life under the conqueror would be 
ultimately better than that which they had enjoyed 
before.” 




8. 1  Introduction and sources 
The division of Illyricum, which takes place after the Bellum Batonianum 
represents the beginning of the end of Illyrian policy as such, because it broke the 
administrative and political unity of Illyricum into two parts, creating an entirely 
new geo-political situation. The northern part, soon to become Pannonia, was 
formed as a frontier province to defend against (potential) hostile forces threatening 
from beyond the Pannonian plains. The Dalmatian coast was, geographically and 
culturally already part of the inner cultural core, and its hinterland was rich in 
mining resources. Therefore it was natural to expect that Dalmatia would be 
separated from Pannonia. The Bellum Batonianum exposed all the weaknesses of 
the Roman policy of Greater Illyricum and the Romans were compelled to make 
decisive changes in their long-term policy if they wanted to maintain their position 
and avoid further troubles. The most important elements of the changed Roman 
Illyrian policy were extensive road-building, resettlement of some natives, removal 
of excessive native youth through conscription in auxiliary units, military 
administration of the most troublesome civitates and additional military measures.
1 
Certainly, these changes cannot be observed in isolation as Illyricum was part of a 
wider imperial system, so this chapter will also try to place them into the more 
general context of provincial transformation that took place in this period 
throughout the empire. 
                                                           
1 See Alföldy (1965a) 171 ff. who defined these measures for Dalmatia. He also considers amongst 
these measures the completion of three lines of defence protecting the Dalmatian coast, the so-called 
Dalmatian limes, the existence of which is disputed, see Chapter 6.2 n. 30 and below p. 169. 
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 The chapter will look at the first decades of this new, and - as time showed - 
more permanent political framework that Rome imposed over Illyricum. Roman 
internal matters connected with the area, such as the mutiny of the Pannonian 
legions in AD 14, or the rebellion led by the Dalmatian governor L. Arruntius 
Camillus Saturninus against the emperor Claudius in AD 42 are beyond the scope of 
this thesis and will be disregarded.
2
 
Unfortunately, the sources are extremely scarce for the period, even by the 
perpetually modest standards of Illyricum, so we need to rely more on information 
provided by archaeology and epigraphy. Inscriptions are helpful in matters such as: 
boundary settlements between peregrine communities; origins and extent of Italian 
emigration to Dalmatia; composition of legions and auxiliary units; building of 
roads; and involvement of native aristocracy in administration, etc. Written sources 
have no interest in Illyricum in this period. Velleius Paterculus and Dio supply 
limited information for the years immediately after the rebellion, but Tacitus 
remains our chief historical authority for the period. Lack of political and military 
events in Illyricum usually kept the province out of Tacitus’ Rome-focused sight. 
Nevertheless, on occasion he supplies useful information on the movements and 
positions of individual legionary camps and road building.
3
 
8. 2  The foreign and provincial policy of the early 
Principate
In this period Rome’s Illyrian policy should be seen in the context of its 
foreign and provincial policy, as it was a province with a potentially troublesome 
frontier. Foreign policy during the Iulio-Claudian era is sometimes obscure in 
respect of individual regions or periods, but some general models of Roman action 
can be recognized. A decisive shift from Augustan aggressive and imperialistic 
foreign policy is obvious, whether it was intended by Augustus himself after the 
Pannonian rebellion and the Varian disaster, or was a political program developed 
                                                           
2 Tac. Ann. 1.16-32; Schmitt (1958); Wilkes (1963) – mutiny of AD 14. Dio, 60.15; Suet. Claud. 
37.2 (AD 42); Jagenteufel (1958) 19-21 (no. 5); Plate III – Saturninus 
3 This is not a surprise. Tacitus and people of his class who produced historical accounts of the 
principate knew and cared almost nothing for military and provincial affairs; Cornell (1993) 164-
168. 
   Chapter 8: The tale of two provinces  160
entirely by Tiberius.
4 The new approach was almost Republican in its essence. It 
was focused on the control of frontiers and the space behind them without 
establishing formal boundaries, as well as an apparent reluctance to annex new 
territories, except when necessary. Regardless of this general shift in policy, strong 
emphasis continued to be laid in literary sources on the continuing expansion of the 




 Provincial policy in this period is also very heterogeneous and depends on 
the cultural, historical and geographical context in the individual province and for 
the degree of its inclusion in the Mediterranean world.
6 Larger provinces like Gaul 
or Illyricum were divided into smaller parts and thoroughly reorganized and so the 
efficiency of their administration increased and the power of their governors 
decreased.
7 There were two opposite approaches to provincial policy in the early 
Principate. Tiberius, who was more conservative and Italy-centered, maintained the 
policy of Augustus and hesitated to spread Roman citizenship and assimilate the 
provinces, while Claudius implemented a more inclusive approach towards the 
provincials. Essentially, he returned to the policy developed by Iulius Caesar and 
with that approach brought about a significant social change in provinces.
8
 
Modern scholars are divided in their assessment of provincial policy during 
the long reign of Tiberius. Some follow the positive and enthusiastic assessment of 
Velleius Paterculus, and see his involvement in the provinces as generally more 
constructive and beneficial for the provincials.
9 However, there is also the more 
recent, and more accepted, view that Tiberius used the provinces as a source of 
income only, that he stopped all juridical and social progress in the provinces and 
                                                           
4 Cf. Ober (1982). 
5 See the general coverage by Bowman (1996) 344-350; military strategy in Luttwak (1976) 13-50. 
Mócsy (1974) 39-52 is a useful overview of Iulio-Claudian frontier policy in the middle Danube, 
also Conole/Milns (1983) for policy in the middle and lower Danube. Roman propaganda: Wells 
(1972) 1-13; Lintott (1981); Moynihan (1985); Brunt (1990) 433 ff.; Nicolet (1991) 15-56; Whittaker 
(1994) 33 ff.; Mattern (1999) 89. 
6 See Abbot/Johnson (1926) (municipal system); Bowman (1996) 351-370 (administration of 
provinces); Burns (2003) 141 ff. (general relation with ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ barbarians). 
7 See the observation of Goudineau (1996) 487, and 467-469 that the division of Gaul was arbitrary 
and based on rudimentary geographic knowledge. The division of Illyricum was based on completely 
different premises, as it was the product of a carefully planned and executed policy, see Chapter 8.3. 
8 Sherwin-White (1973) 237-250; Levick (1990) 163-186. Cf. Alföldy (1974) 78-105 how the 
Claudian change of policy affected Noricum. 
9 Vell. Pat. 2.126.3-4.; Smith (1942) 233-256; Kornemann (1960) 236-240. 
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improved their administration for the sole purpose of improving the efficiency with 
which they were exploited.
10
 
8. 3  The administrative division of Illyricum 
The logical consequence of the rebellion and the failure of the political 
framework of Greater Illyricum was that the province was broken into two parts 
which could be more easily controlled and fitted into the imperial system of 
provinces. The division was a decisive political move and carried the most 
significant consequences for Illyricum.  In the long run it broke up the whole geo-
political system of Illyricum, creating two different regional political systems, and 
even three economic sub-systems.
11 The southern part, Illyricum superius, the future 
Dalmatia and Illyricum inferius, the future Pannonia and their destinies started to 
separate and to follow different paths for a moment, but in the later Empire 
Illyricum was re-invented as a artificial cultural concept through the rise of Illyrian 
soldier-emperors (Chapter 8.7). 
 
Modern scholarship has accepted the fact that Illyricum was divided after the 
rebellion, but the point of disagreement is the exact date when it actually happened, 
as the sources are in conflict. The majority of scholars place the date of the division 
in the period from the start of the rebellion to shortly after its ending, mainly 
arguing in favor of AD 8 and the Breucian capitulation at the river Bathinus.
12 Very 
intriguing is the minority view that dates the division of Illyricum much later, after 
the second mission of Drusus the Younger to Illyricum, therefore after c. AD 19 – 
20, but still before Claudius’ reign.
13 This argument is very convincing as it can 
explain the inconsistency in the sources, so that the division should be dated to early 
Tiberian times. If this is true, then it seems obvious that Augustus himself 
                                                           
10 Alföldy (1965b); Orth (1970) summarized 124-126; Seager (1972) 170-173; Levick (1976) 129-
141. 
11 According to Hopkins’ classification of provinces by their role in the political macro-economy of 
the empire, Pannonia is a military, frontier province, while Dalmatia can be placed among tax-
exporting provinces as it is neither grain-producing nor a frontier province; Hopkins (1980) 101 ff. 
modified by Garnsey/Saller (1987) 95-97. However, Dušanić (1991) recognizes that metalla Illyrici, 
the mining district organized in the 2
nd century in the Dalmatian hinterland, parts of Noricum and 
Upper Moesia, as a separate, third economic sub-system in imperial Illyricum, between the 
Dalmatian coast and the military-frontier economy of Pannonia, see also Škegro (1991) 81-114. 
12 Alföldy (1965a) 26-27 (AD 6); Ritterling (1925) 1236; Jagenteufel (1958) 9-10; Dobó (1968) 11; 
Bojanovski (1988) 56 (AD 8), Nagy (1970); Fitz (1977) 545 (AD 9, but Fitz later altered his opinion, 
arguing in favour of a much later date, see next note); Betz (1938) 5 (AD 10). 
13 Fitz (1988); Novak (1966); Braunert (1977) 215-216 (Illyricum was divided into two separate 
commands, but still remained a single province after AD 14). 
   Chapter 8: The tale of two provinces  162
contemplated the division of Illyricum before his death, and that only his death and 
a change of princeps delayed it.
14
 
The division of Illyricum was geo-strategic rather than ethnic (although 
ethnic considerations played a very significant part in determining the boundary 
between the provinces – see below), and it was part of a larger reorganization of the 
northern provinces. Initially, all the troops in the area of Illyricum and Noricum 
were under a single command, and it is possible that even the whole area was under 
a common military administration, constituting the “Provinzkomplex Dalmatia-
Illyricum (i.e. Pannonia)-Noricum” as Nagy called it.
15 Some parts of eastern 
Noricum such as Carnutum and deserta Boiorum were later joined to Pannonia, so 
that all legions in this central-Danubian frontier section were de facto under the 
single command of the Pannonian governor.
16 Pannonia was formed as a frontier 
province and included in a trans-provincial imperial system that comprised the 
Danubian provinces, regardless of whether it included Transdanubia in this period 
or not. Most changes happened in the western parts of the new province where the 
old political contexts of regnum Noricum were replaced for new imperial strategic 
benefits, such as unified control of the Amber road.
17 The legions positioned in 
Pannonia were equally defensive as they could be used at any time for offensive 
tasks across the Danube if the need arose. There were possibly other reasons for the 
reorganization. The mutiny of the legions in Pannonia after Augustus’ death 
exposed the potential danger for present and future principes of keeping all five 
Illyrian legions together, under a single command.
18
 
Although there are still some uncertainties in detail in the determination of 
the administrative boundary between Dalmatia and Pannonia, it is possible to 
                                                           
14 Tiberius was going to Illyricum when he heard that Augustus was on his deathbed, Vell. Pat. 
2.123.1, ad firmanda paci quae bello subegerat; cf. Tac. Ann. 1.5. There were no obvious reasons 
why the successor of Augustus would go to Illyricum at that time, but reorganisation and the census, 
which Germanicus was doing in Gaul, seems the most likely one; Ann. 1.31, agendo Galliarum 
censui tum intentum. Cf. Nagy (1989) 64 n. 18. 
15 Nagy (1989) 68. Tóth (1980) 84-86 says that the unity of the entire Illyro-Norican administration, 
not only in the area of army command, lasted until the era of Claudius. 
16 Alföldy (1974) 57 placed this event in AD 14 but it is possible that it happened later; see this 
section n. 15. Alföldy (1974) 60-61 – eastern frontier of Noricum. 
17 Fitz (1977) 549 ascribes the reorganisation to fear of the Marcommani, but that looks exaggerated, 
especially if we date the reorganisation to the mid- to late- reign of Tiberius. 
18 Fitz (1988) 23-24. 
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position it roughly in the space south of the Sava and north of the Dinaric Alps.
19 
The division of Illyricum divided the Pannonii into two parts: the Breuci, 
Colapiani,
20 Andizetes, Osi and Amantini were in Pannonia; and the Mezaei, 
Ditiones, Pirustae and Daesidiates in Dalmatia. The reasons are obviously strategic; 
to destroy the potentially dangerous ethnic unity of the Pannonii, counterbalancing 
them with the Celts in Pannonia and Italian settlers, southern Illyrians, the Iapodes 
and Liburni in Dalmatia. Some Pannonii were in turn resettled to counterbalance 
Celtic ethnic unity in north Pannonia (see below). Also, a frontier between the 
provinces fixed on the Dinaric Alps looked more natural in the eyes of Romans. The 
mountainous chain presented a significant and easily defensible buffer with only a 
few easily defensible passages. This natural position would give time to the 
Dalmatian command to act against any attack from the north, because such an attack 
might circumvent or neutralize the Pannonian army, which was intended as the first 
line of defence. Dalmatian legions were also handy as strategic reserves, which 
could be employed elsewhere if need arose.
21
 
8. 4   The administration of Illyricum
The administrative organization of Illyricum must be dated to the late 
Augustan/early Tiberian era, regardless of whether the province was in fact divided. 
Tiberius carried out initial arrangements in the last weeks of the rebellion just before 
the capitulation of Daesitiate Bato. He was supposed to complete them in AD 14 but 
the task was interrupted by the death of Augustus.
22 The primary purpose of the 
second mission of Drusus to Illyricum (AD 17 – 20) was meant to organize 
defences against the Marcommani,
23 but we cannot exclude the possibility that he 
carried out some other arrangements, not only in the context of his mission but in an 
attempt to organize the administration of the provinces.
24
 
The most prominent role in the organization of Illyricum was given to its 
governors. The governors in both parts of Illyricum continued to be appointed as 
                                                           
19 Bojanovski (1988) 325-330; Šašel (1953) and especially Dušanić (1977) 64-65 are in agreement in 
drawing the frontier between Dalmatia and Pannonia further south than Wilkes (1969) 78-80. 
20 The civitas Colapiani succeeded the Segestani who are known from the later Republic. 
21 Cf. Luttwak (1976) 27. 
22 Dio, 56.14.7-15.1, see Chapter 8.4 n. 13. 
23 Tac. Ann. 2.44, 46; Syme (1979) 324; Nagy (1989) 64; contra Mócsy 
(1974) 40. The first mission of Drusus was to calm the legions in AD 14, Tac. Ann. 1.24-1.30. 
24 Cf. Tac. Ann. 2.46 Missus tamen Drusus ut rettulimus, paci firmator. 
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legati Augusti pro praetore, but the term praepositus is sometimes used in the years 
immediately after the rebellion.
25 Their terms of office lasted substantially longer 
than before, in accordance with the policy introduced by Tiberius and followed by 
his successors. Twelwe governors of Dalmatia are attested by name in the period 
between AD 9 – 68, and in addition there is the possibility that one or both of 2 
anonymous legati can be dated before Flavian times.
26 For Pannonia, 11 different 
legati can be attested in the same period from preserved written sources and 
inscriptions.
27 One of the most significant governors of Illyricum superius that we 
know of was P. Cornelius Dolabella.
28 During his term important building activity 
was carried out as well as administrative tasks, especially the fixing of boundaries 
between individual civitates. A map of the province (or perhaps only Liburnia – 
opinions differ) forma Dolabelliana was also made during his term.
29 The 
delimitation was performed under the supervision of military personnel and under 
direct orders from the governor himself.
30
  
The old, late Republican administrative scheme based in Narona and 
mentioned by Varro became obsolete for the administration of a new province. 
Urban coastal communities with substantial Italian immigration or Greek 
populations were already organized, or in the process of being organized as 
municipia and enjoyed significant autonomy inside the province, like the Salonitan 
res publica or the Liburnian communities  (Chapter 6.2). For the interior of the 
future province of Dalmatia and for Pannonia as a whole the Romans used a system 
based on peregrine civitates, the system generally used in less urbanized western 
provinces. Pliny mentions the division of Dalmatia into three conventus iuridici for 
the administration of peregrine communities based on the coast, Scardona, Salona 
and Narona.
31 He also provides the names of individual civitates and even the 
number of their sub-units, decuriae (but only for the Salonitan and Naronitan 
conventus).
32 Although we are informed about the administrative scheme of 
                                                           
25 E.g. Vell. Pat. 2.116.1. 
26 Jagenteufel (1958) 12-30, 63-66 (no. 1-12, possibly 39 and 41). 
27 Dobó (1968) 23-31 (no. 9-19). 
28 Governor in AD 14-20, see the sources in Jagenteufel (1958) 14-17 (no. 3). 
29 Rendić-Miočević (1968) 64. 
30 Condurachi (1969) 150-152 and ff.; Wilkes (1974). 
31 There are some indications that the conventus based in Scardona (14 civitates of the Liburni and 
the Iapodes) enjoyed privileged position inside the province; Suić (1975b) 110-114. 
32 Pliny, HN 3.141-144, see Figure 4.1. 
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Dalmatia, the early administrative picture of Pannonia remains largely obscure. 
Pliny mentions only administrative civitates, without providing information on the 
number of their decuriae or any other details.
33
 
In general, a conventus was divided into civitates, which were organized on 
a regional and ethnic basis. Roman military personnel, praefecti civitatum, mainly 
ruled civitates, and in some instances ruled several civitates jointly.
34 The praefecti 
civitatum were initially appointed in order to keep close control over the most 
troublesome of the conquered peoples.
35 However, praefecti  were merely 
superimposed upon previously existing social structures and organizations. In some 
communities the Romans exercised power through local chieftains, principes and 
praepositi,
36 often holders of Roman citizenship, who essentially kept the pre-
Roman structure and the local political systems and slowly introduced elements of 
Roman administration.
37 Civitates were further divided into decuriae, which were 
governed by decuriones or duumviri. The decuriones  of the municipal decuriae 
were, in almost all known cases, of native stock, often adding the Roman titles to 
native title, which was the equivalent of princeps.
38
 
In practice, a peregrine civitas did not have much direct Roman influence 
over everyday matters. Everything except foreign policy, tax payment and military 
matters remained in the hands of the local elite as they were before the Roman 
arrival. In a way, imperial administration treated civitates like client-states, only 
with tighter control, payment of tax instead of tribute, and the compulsory 
conscription of youth into the auxiliary units. Civitates also played a significant 
buffer role, surrounding and protecting Roman provincial strong points such as 
colonies and legionary camps.
 39
                                                           
33 Pliny, HN  3.147. 
34 CIL V 3346; IX 2564; IX 5363. 
35 Wilkes (1977) 742. 
36 Patsch (1899) 176-179 (the Iapodes) followed by Rendić-Miočević (1962) 329-330 (the Delmatae) 
believes that municipal principes formed an advisory council helping the praepositus chosen 
amongst the principes to administer the area; cf. CIL III 14,324, III 14,326 praepositus et princeps 
Iapodum. 
37 Many of these inscriptions are dated to the later 1
st century AD, but they reflected the earlier 
period; cf. Rendić-Miočević (1962) esp. 330-331; (1975c) 53-55; (1989) 419-420; Zotović (2002) 15 
ff. There is also no reason whatsoever to see the first years of Roman rule in Illyricum exclusively as 
a direct military occupation, which continued almost to the Flavians (as Bojanovski (1988) 60 ff.). 
Roman rule always required a friendly native elite for administration on a local, municipal level. 
38 Rendić-Miočević (1962); (1975c) 53-55, relying on epigraphic material dated to a later period. 
39 Burns (2003) 210-212 (for Pannonia, but can be applied to the interior of Dalmatia as well). 
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The Romans made some surgical administrative interventions in Illyricum. 
The Breucian alliance in the valley of the Sava and the Drava was broken into 
smaller administrative units after the rebellion.
40 It is not certain when this 
happened, probably after the rebellion was extinguished. The same destiny awaited 
the Pirustae in southeastern Dalmatia, who were broken into three smaller 
administrative units, thus providing an easier task for military administrators.
41 We 
need to take into account the fact that the Scordisci might also have been broken 
into different civitates and dispersed between the provinces of Moesia, Pannonia 
and Dalmatia.
42 The resettlement of some Delmataean communities in the eastern 
parts of the Dalmatian province is also possible, and, if it happened as Alföldy 
claims, no doubt it took place at this time.
43 The resettlement of the Pannonian Azali 
on the banks of the Danube separating the Celtic Boii and Eravisci also took place 
in the Iulio-Claudian era but it is difficult to determine exactly when.
44 The other 
solution, the grouping of smaller, ethnically similar communities into larger 
administrative units, took place in some instances, such as the civitas of Docleatae, 




8. 5  Military commitments and strategic measures
The Roman military had several roles in Illyricum. Keeping an eye on 
natives was the most obvious one, and the defence of frontiers and the building of 
roads were equally significant additional tasks. Legions VII and XI were initially 
stationed in Dalmatia and legions VIII Augusta, IX Hispana, XI Apollinaris in 
Pannonia. It is uncertain where Pannonian legions were positioned. It is usually 
assumed that legionary camps were based in Poetovium, Emona and Siscia, but 
                                                           
40 The Breuci were broken into the three civitates, Oseriates, Breuci and Cornacates, mentioned by 
Pliny, Mócsy (1962) 606; (1974) 53-55. Mócsy dates this reorganisation after the Bellum 
Pannonicum, but this dating remains uncertain. 
41 Wilkes (1969) 173-176; Alföldy (1965a) 56-59. 
42 Alföldy (1964b) 109, 123-127; contra Katičić (1965b) 63-69; Papazoglu (1978) 171-178. 
43 Alföldy (1965a) 56, 173. 
44 Mócsy (1974) 55, 59, dating it after the bellum Pannonicum. It seems that it took place later, as the 
Romans annexed Transdanubia much later as previously thought, see above p. 140. 
45 Wilkes (1969) 166-167; (1996b) 578. In Gaul, for example, Romans grouped natives into large 
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Emona as a legionary camp remains controversial.
46 Legion VII was moved from 
Dalmatia to Moesia under Claudius or Nero between AD 42 and 67; the exact date 
remains uncertain, probably 56 – 57.
47 It is much easier to trace the Dalmatian 
legions. They were placed in camps at Burnum (Šuplja crkva) and Tilurium 
(Gardun), strategically placed close to the coast but also able to keep an watchful 
eye on the interior.
48 In addition to the legions, significant auxiliary forces were 
stationed in Illyricum. However, modern scholars dispute their exact number and 
position, especially those stationed in Dalmatia.
49
 
The situation on the northern Pannonian frontiers showed unexpected 
stability throughout this period. The most significant event appears to be the 
settlement of the Iazyges, one branch of the Sarmatians, allegedly expelled from the 
lower Danube by the Dacians.
50 They settled on the north Pannonian plains with the 
approval of the Roman government before AD 50, probably between AD 17 and 20. 
It seems to be a significant strategic measure of Rome, in that it was trying to 
establish a protective barrier against the Dacians and the Marcommani.
51 A similar 
measure was the establishment of a vassal Germanic (Quadi) king Vannius on the 
northern banks of the Danube on the Hungarian plains in the Tiberian era, as a 
buffer against the Germans.
52
 
Tiberius was generally very conservative in the enfranchisement and 
expansion of colonies. He returned to the Republican policy of granting citizenship 
to provincials and peregrine communities very selectively, and not encouraging the 
establishment of colonies in the provinces.
53 Still, despite the general attitude of 
Tiberius, Illyricum profited in some ways in his reign. Some Liburnian communities 
gained the ius italicum and completed the process of their cultural incorporation in 
                                                           
46 Šašel-Kos (1995) 236-237 strongly objects to Emona as a legionary camp, and suggests a site for a 
camp closer to the frontier, also Mócsy (1974) 42-43, see Chapter 6.2 n. 34. 
47 Ritterling (1925) 1619; Wilkes (1969) 96-97. 
48 Wilkes (1969) 97-98; Zaninović (1968) (Burnum); (1984) (Tilurium); (1985) (both camps). See 
also Sanader (2003) for up to date results of most recent excavations of Tilurium. 
49 Dalmatia: Alföldy (1962b); Wilkes (1969) 139-144, 471-474; Bojanovski (1988) 355-357. 
Pannonia: Mócsy (1974) 48-51. 
50 Pliny, HN 4.80-81. 
51 These events still remain unknown except in outline; Alföldy (1936) 85; Mócsy (1977a); Wilkes 
(1983) 259. 
52 Mócsy (1974) 57; Nagy (1989). 
53 Alföldy (1965b) 836-840. 
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Italy.
54 The reign of Tiberius saw the planting of the first veteran colonies in 
Illyricum such as pagus Scunasticus near Narona, and possibly the establishment of 
the colony in Emona.
55
 
A couple of inscriptions suggest important building activity in Dalmatia 
after the rebellion of AD 6 – 9 was under way. There is an interesting inscription 
from Issa mentioning Drusus the Younger and the governor, Dolabella, dedicating 
campus for military exercise in AD 20.
56 The inscription from an architrave of the 




Road building became an extremely significant part of the policy after the 
rebellion. Learning from their painful experiences, the Romans understood the 
importance of linking the Dalmatian coast and Pannonia with roads of sufficient 
quality. During the governorship of Dolabella, five major roads were built in 
Illyricum inferior, linking the provincial center Salona with strategically important 
parts of the province.
58 In AD 16 - 17 two roads had already been completed: 
Salona – ... ad fines provinciae Illyrici extending towards the northern 
administrative border on the Sava; and the via Gabiniana from Salona to 
Andertium, extending later to Burnum. In 19 – 20 another three roads were 
completed: from Salona to the castellum Hedus in Daesidiate country (central 
Bosnia), a second linking Salona and the land of the Breuci leading towards the 
river Bathinus, along the valley of Bosna;
59 and a third in the direction of Siscia. It 
is possible that the route linking Salona and the Via Egnatia in the direction of 
Dyrrachium was built in this period.
60 It is easy to recognize their strategic and 
primarily military purpose, which was to connect the legionary camps in Burnum 
and Tilurium, Salona as the administrative centre of the province and the lands of 
                                                           
54 Alföldy (1965a) 68 ff., 200-201; Wilkes (1969) 107-115 (places municipalization in this period). 
However, Vittinghoff (1977) 21 ff. seriously questions the methodology used by Wilkes and Alföldy 
in dating it to the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius. 
55 Pagus Scunasticus: ILJ 113-114; Emona, see Chapter 6.2 n. 34. 
56 ILJ 257; Rendić-Miočević (1952) 43 ff. dates it plausibly in the second consulate of Drusus. 
57 ILJ 123; Rendić-Miočević (1950/51a) 170-175. 
58 CIL III 3198-3201; ILJ 263 Bojanovski (1974) gives the most comprehensive study of Dollabella’s 
roads in Dalmatia so far. 
59 Unfortunately this road is the most difficult to locate, and it seems that it is identical with the 
previous one; cf. Bojanovski (1974) 199-202. 
60 Garašanin/Garašanin (1967) 169-175; Bojanovski (1973) 171-172. 
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potentially troublesome peoples like the Daesitiates, Delmatae and Breuci, as well 
as to establish a vital communication link with Pannonia and the Via Egnatia.
61
 
Romans also built roads in Pannonia at this time. The road between Aquileia 
and Emona had either been built during the last years of Augustus’ reign or just 
prior to this.
62 The Romans used an almost entirely new network of roads in this 
part of Pannonia, disregarding previous native settlements and connecting only 
those points they considered necessary.
63 The main strategic concerns, both 
offensive and defensive, were to link Carnuntum with Aquileia via Emona, 
Poetovium and Sabaria, following the ancient Amber road.
64 It was a link crucial for 
keeping efficient watch over the middle Danube, and for bringing reinforcements 
from Italy. It was also necessary to protect it with a network of fortifications and 
military colonies, as this was the shortest and easiest way for any attacker to reach 
Italy.  
 
An important new feature was the strengthening of defences around military 
camps. The walls of Siscia were strengthened significantly.
65 Probably it was the 
governor Dolabella who ordered additional fortification of the camps of Burnum 
and Tilurium in Dalmatia.
66 The strategy towards Dalmatia shows much more 
confidence and careful planning. There was no Dalmatian limes stretching from 
Salonae to Siscia as some authors used to suggest.
67 The link in question was the 
system of defence designed for multiple purposes such as keeping the province 
under control, enabling the exploitation of necessary resources and, the most 
important factor, keeping communications with Pannonia open.
68 In fact, modern 
scholarship has never considered this Rochadestraße as a line of communication 
rather than as a defensive limes.
69 The way between Salona and Siscia followed the 
                                                           
61 Bojanovski (1974) 26 ff. rightly emphasised the military purpose of these roads, which followed 
the shortest route rather than linked commercial and otherwise significant pre-Roman sites. 
62 Tac. Ann. 1.20. 
63 Šašel (1977) 158-159. 
64 Burghardt (1979) 7-8; Burns (2003) 208, 213. 
65 Nenadić (1986/87) 74-76. 
66 Zaninović (1976) 165. 
67 Some modern scholars have dated the origins of the alleged Dalmatian limes to the period of 
Lesser Illyricum, see Chapter 6.2 n. 30. 
68 Paškvalin (1986) 153 ff. Zaninović (1986) 167 rightly points to the advantages of this position, 
such as easy supply of troops through eastern Adriatic ports. 
69 Šašel (1974a) 195 is right when he states that “Es wäre ein militärischer Nonsens, wenn sie nicht 
mit einer Rochadestraße ausgestattet gewesen wäre.” However, further in his argument, he mixes up 
the terms, presenting this communication as a supposed Dalmatian limes. 
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fortified points Tilurium-Andetrium-Promona-Burnum, and further linked with the 
Amber road and Carnuntum. It appears to have been a heavily defended line of 
communication between Dalmatia and Pannonia, rather than a defensive limes. This 
communication was strategically significant, as a potential attacker could use it in 
order to circumvent fortification on the Amber road and reach the coast.
70 Legionary 
camps remained close to the coast, as in the phase of Greater Illyricum, because, if 
moved further into the hinterland, they would be vulnerable and easily cut off. 
 
8. 6  The rewards of Illyricum: conscription, mining, 
trade 
Illyricum became more and more a field for recruiting new soldiers. 
Although conscription was one of the reasons for the AD 6 – 9 rebellion, it 
continued in Illyricum after Augustus. In a way, it was a repressive measure of the 
occupying forces, aimed at removing some of those of military age.
71 It is very 
difficult to determine the real demographic impact of the dilectus on the native 
population of Illyricum and the popular attitude to conscription. Warrior values 
were an important part of cultural values amongst some peoples in Illyricum, and 
after the Pax Romana took away the opportunity to wage independent war, service 
in auxiliary units could be a way for some to prove themselves.
72 A few native 
auxiliary units are attested in the later Iulian-Claudian period in inscriptions such as 
VIII cohortes Breucorum, VII cohortes Delmatarum, I cohort of the Liburni, and 
the mixed cohort Pannoniorum et Delmatarum.
73
 
Increasingly, an important aspect of Roman activities was the mining and 
exploitation of other natural resources, especially in Dalmatia. The Dinaric Alps in 
modern-day Bosnia are very rich in metals, but the pre-Roman level of exploitation 
                                                           
70 Šašel (1974a) table 1. 
71 Šašel (1974c) 6; Bojanovski (1988) 53. 
72 The impact of dilectus on provincial populations is difficult to assess and varies in different parts 
of the Empire; (Haynes) 2001. 
Still, it is doubtful how significant was demographic impact. One cohors peditata in the Augustan 
period numbered only 480 soldiers; Holder (1980) 5-13, so that we are looking at total of 3,360 
auxiliaries from Dalmatia (VII cohors Delmatarum) and 3,840 from the Pannonian Pannonii (VIII 
cohors Breucorum). 
73 CIL X 5829. For native auxiliaries see Holder (1980) 112, 114, 224-226; Kunić-Domić (1988). 
Cohortes Delmatarum denotes provincial rather than ethnic origin, as there are a number of other 
peoples attested; Kunić-Domić (1988) 104 n.90. 
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was not efficient enough to satisfy Roman needs.
74 There were three main mining 
areas in the Dinaric Alps, corresponding with the areas of modern-day Bosnia (the 
division of Pašalić): the central region providing gold and copper; the western 
region providing iron; and the eastern region, rich in silver, lead and copper.
75 
Written sources from the early Principate give us a hint that gold mining in 
Illyricum was the most famous and most interesting characteristic of Illyricum that 
was known to the Romans,
76 but inscriptions and archaeology confirm that silver 
and iron were dug there too. Their real importance, however, significantly increases 
in the 2
nd century AD.
77 Perhaps the Roman state first concentrated on exploiting 




Trade and Italian imports into Illyricum increase rapidly in the period 
following its final pacification, but it was mostly intended for the coastal 
settlements, while in the hinterland archaeology has not detected any extensive 
change in the trade patterns for the period. There were significant customers for 
Italian goods in Dalmatia, especially for building materials like roof tiles, pottery, 
glass, but also olive oil and wine were needed by Italian settlers and Roman 
soldiers. The demand, according to archaeological evidence, peaked in the mid-later 
1
st century AD, but later gradually declined as the links with Italy lessened. In 
exchange, Dalmatia produced food and timber for export.
79 We cannot say that trade 
or economic interests ever significantly influenced Rome’s Illyrian policy; they 
should rather be regarded as its consequence. Nevertheless, trade was an important 
tool of integration. It ultimately helped to open the Dalmatian hinterland and 




                                                           
74 The tradition of mining in the northwest Balkan begins a long time before the Romans; Pašalić 
(1954) 64-67; much better documented in Čović (1980); Škegro (1991) 79-80) but the efficiency and 
profitability of mines before the Roman arrival is doubtful. 
75 Pašalić (1954) 49 ff., Bojanovski (1982); Škegro (1991) 79-114. 
76 Flor. 2.25; Stat. Silv. 1.2.153; 3.3.90; 4.7.14; Pliny, HN 33.21, Martial, Ep. 10.78.8. Gold was 
extracted in central Bosnia: Pašalić (1954) 50-54, but epigraphic sources confirming gold mines are 
unfortunately very scarce, Škegro (1991) 81 ff. 
77 Cf. Bojanovski (1982) 92 ff; Dušanić (1991). 
78 Bojanovski (1982) 107. 
79 Wilkes (1969) 407 ff; Škegro (1999) 286-300. 
80 See (amongst others) Hopkins (1980); Garnsey/Saller (1987) 20-40, 95-97; Duncan-Jones (1994) 
30-48, 187-198 on the macro-economy of the Roman empire. 
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8. 7  The end of Roman Illyrian policy
The aims and the consequences of Roman policy in this period are 
surprisingly clear, though we do not have many sources to rely on. Keeping the 
status quo inside Illyricum and effectively controlling and preventing any challenge 
to it seems the primary aim of the policy. Keeping a check on activities beyond the 
Danube, and even intervening directly in some cases, remains a dominant element 
of Pannonian frontier policy. The reasonable assumption is that military 
administration seems eventually to be replaced through time with a native civilian 
administration. The social dimension of Roman policy is not so significant as it was 
to be under the Flavian dynasty. Enfranchisement was very rare, the planting of 
colonies significant only in Pannonia, and only Liburnia witnessed a significant 
level of municipalization. The silence of the sources tells at least something, that the 
security measures show a high level of efficiency because no other troubles with 
natives are reported, and frontiers remain stable. Ethnic policy is the more dominant 
part of Roman policy in this period. It tried to break the ethnic unity of the Pannonii 
in particular, and establish a provincial system that would make future uprisings and 
internal disruption more difficult. 
 
The hold over Pannonia was the ultimate result of Roman Illyrian policy, 
which was always significantly driven by the urge to enable a more efficient geo-
strategic position for the defence of the Italian homeland. Romans recognized that 
Pannonia might have become a weak spot in the new, realigned imperial geography, 
because of its natural defencelessness. The occupation of Pannonia was a more 
efficient solution when we take into account the situation in Dalmatia where the 
Romans now fully controlled the Dinaric mountains and the passes through them. 
The legions in Pannonia thus provided only a first line of defence, while the 
Dalmatian legions provided strategic reserves and reinforcements. The 
establishment of the Flavian limes and the demilitarization of Dalmatia are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but they suggest that measures taken in the Iulio-Claudian 
period worked. Dalmatia was ultimately pacified and the attention of Romans 
shifted further north, to keep watch over the Danube. 
 
This is the most obscure period of Roman Illyrian policy and also the most 
one-sided, as it provides information only about the elements of the Roman system, 
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the Roman army, administration, trade, ethnic policy, etc. All the peoples of 
Illyricum are left entirely in almost impenetrable darkness for any historical 
enquiry. For the peoples of Illyricum, this was a period of adjustment, a period of 
accepting new realities and dealing with them; they were now a structural part of the 
imperial system. Roman Illyrian policy as such ceased to exist as Illyricum ceased 
to exist as a separate geo-political system and became part of a wider imperial 
system. After AD 9 Romans showed that they had learned from their mistakes and 
that they were serious in keeping Illyricum and incorporating it as an essential 
territorial part of the Empire, rather than just keeping it as a buffer zone. 
Incorporating its peoples would require time and a change of attitude amongst both 
Romans and natives, but that is a different story. 
 
Roman Illyrian policy ceased to exist but Roman-Illyrian interaction 
continued, and as time passed by it became increasingly significant for both 
systems. To return to the passage of Pagden quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 
Rome not only did plenty of things to offer Illyricum, Illyricum also had something 
to offer Rome. Who would assume that three centuries after Bato capitulated, a 
Roman writer would write that the emperors born and bred in Illyricum would be 
optimi rei publicae?
81 Tiberius and Bato fighting each other through rugged Illyrian 
landscapes could not have imagined that Rome and Illyricum would develop a 
symbiosis in many ways depending on each other in order to preserve their very 
existence. The Roman empire needed Illyrian mines and Illyrian soldiers for its 
survival, and Illyricum needed the shade of the Roman cultural umbrella in order to 
define itself.
82 Illyrian soldier-emperors defended the empire as long as they were 
able to but once the empire was destroyed, Illyricum and its peoples (culturally and 
ethnically rather than physically) slowly ceased to exist as a geo-political system.
83 
The Roman world-empire contracted and Illyricum remained abandoned in the 
political vacuum, infested and ultimately overwhelmed by the Sclaviniae - Slavic 
chiefdoms. The destruction of the Roman empire caused the disappearance of 
                                                           
81“… his sane omnibus Illyricum patria fuit, qui quanquam humanitatis parum, ruris tamen ac 
militiae miseries imbuti satis optimi rei publicae fuere.” Aur. Vic., Caes. 39.26. See Alföldy (1939) 
200-202; Mócsy (1974) 183 ff.; Wilkes (1992) 254-265 for soldiers from Illyricum and their impact 
on the empire. 
82 It was overwhelmingly through Roman culture and Latin language that Illyrian soldier-emperors 
culturally defined themselves; cf. Mócsy (1974) 259-263, 358; Alföldy (1952a) 121-124 
(Valentinian I); Toynbee (1973) 556-558. Their ethnicity was another matter, and cannot be always 
regarded as native; Syme (1973); Mócsy (1977b) 570-571. 
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Illyricum as a living and functioning spatial concept, as Illyricum was after all, a 




The disappearance of Illyricum, the “missing link of the Empire”, brought lasting 
consequences to the wider world, such as the division of the church, and the 
increasing isolation of Byzantium from the rest of Europe.
85
                                                                                                                                                                   
83 Wilkes (1992) 265-280 the end of Roman Illyricum. 
84 Mócsy (1974) 263 looks into the superficiality of Romanization in Illyricum as a reason for its 
disappearance. His argument is valid in some respect, but it should be supplemented with the 
superficiality of Illyricum as a spatial concept, something close to “der Sammelbegriff Illyricum” 
that according to him appears only in the later Empire; Mócsy (1977b) 571. 
85 Dvornik (1956) 43-45 warns that the destruction of Illyricum had a much more significant impact 
on the separation of the Roman East and West and the division of Christianity, than the majority of 
modern historians are ready to admit; cf. Wilkes (1996a) 418. 
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9. The  Conclusion 
 
 
“… the Roman conception of the place to be 
conquered and the process of conquest are 
so closely related as to be the aspects of the 
same mentalité, and there is no need to 
disjoin them or seek more elaborate 
explanations.” 
Purcell (1990) 21 
 
 
9. 1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have examined in detail Roman Illyrian policy from 168 
BC – AD 68 as depicted in the sources and as interpreted by modern historians, 
trying to see it as an interaction of two systems, Rome, the archetypal ‘world-
empire’ of Wallerstein, and the regional geo-political system of Illyricum. This final 
chapter will try to extract the most significant elements of that interaction and the 
mechanisms that characterized and determined it. In other words, it will try to see 
how Rome as a hegemonic, dominant political power in the Mediterranean macro-
system affected the regional geo-political system of Illyricum. As stated in the 
introduction (Chapter 1.4.2), there are some elements that emerge from the analysis 
of Roman policy, the Roman operational policy mode, the political-constitutional 
framework imposed by Rome over Illyricum, the geo-strategic emphasis of Roman 
interests, and finally the particularities of ethnic policy (Chapter 1.4.2 and 9.3). This 
chapter summarizes the impact of these elements of Roman policy on the situation 
in the regional system of Illyricum. It will also examine how Roman Illyrian policy 
reflects upon the wider picture of Rome’s impact on the Mediterranean macro-
system. Finally, its ethnic policy and some economic and cultural factors will be 
examined. 
 
9. 2   Illyricum as a geo-political system and the Roman 
impact on the system 
Chapter 1.5 defined chronological phases in the Roman-Illyrian political 
interaction and the transformation of the political/constitutional framework Rome 
imposed upon Illyricum. This section will analyse how the change of 
constitutional/political framework impacted on Illyricum as a geo-political system. 
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In the first phase of Illyrian policy 230 – 168 BC (not discussed in the thesis, 
see Chapter 3.2), Rome dealt with an unstable, transitional geo-political system. Its 
policy worked towards establishing essentially two different political frameworks 
that in the end achieved stability in the system as a whole. In many ways Romans 
did not yet consider Illyricum as a single system. The northern area was in a process 
of rapid political transition and Roman interests were chiefly concerned with the 
extension of political influence and control of northern Italy. Rome’s interests 
encompassed the Histrian peninsula, and its aims were ultimately achieved by the 
foundation and survival of Aquileia. Roman conduct was a combination of force 
and diplomacy, but overall we can see that it was implemented by a means of 
aggressive Roman action. The greatest problem was the hostility of the Histrian 
kingdom that was caused by Rome’s extending its political influences, and the 
ultimate solution was its destruction and dissolution for the sake of achieving 
Roman control and securing Aquileia. 
 
Southern Illyricum was initially a buffer zone against the other hegemonic 
power in the area – the Macedonian kingdom. Rome tried to establish a political 
framework based on a network of allies, which controlled and prevented aggressive 
Macedonian designs. The greatest problem was the unreliable policy of the Illyrian 
kingdom and its rulers, who although often working in the Roman interest, also 
represented a danger to Rome when they allied themselves to Macedonian 
ambitions. The only way to achieve stability in the system and secure Roman 
influence was by the imposition of a new political framework through the 
dissolution of the Macedonian and Illyrian kingdoms and the fragmentation of the 
political map of southern Illyricum. There are similarities in Roman political 
solutions in the north and south of Illyricum with the significant exception that, in 
the south, Rome had the full support of the regional power, the Issaean 
commonwealth. The operational mode in the northwest was a combination of 
passivity and aggression, but it became increasingly aggressive towards the end of 
the phase. Geo-strategic emphasis in this period is clearly maritime, as Rome did 
not show even the slightest interest in the hinterland. 
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Roman policy in this period is ambiguous, mostly because Rome was still 
not established as sole hegemon (or a ‘world-empire’) in the Mediterranean system, 
and the imposition of a political framework was affected by the simultaneous and 
more important wars against Carthage and Macedonia. Although the period is 
regarded as an initial phase of Illyrian policy, a consistent Roman view of Illyricum 
as a geo-political system was far from being established, and the political 
frameworks that were established at the end of the period are influenced by the 
political frameworks established in the neighboring regional systems of 
Macedonia/Epirus and North Italy/Alps. 
 
The second phase of Illyrian policy, 167 – 60 BC, dealt with a stable geo-
political system that had been established during the previous period, and the 
imposition of a political framework was projected bifocally onto the eastern 
Adriatic coast. The northern focus was preventative defense and the protection of 
North Italy through a mixed political approach: the extension of client-states and the 
annexation of critical territories. The Liburni, Taurisci and Iapodes (at least the 
Cisalpine Iapodes) were included in the network of Roman allies/clients through 
war or diplomacy, and the entrance to Italy from the Pannonian plains was closed, 
in alliance with the Norican kingdom that kept control over the eastern Alps. A 
preventative but unsuccessful raid was made towards the Segestani, most likely with 
the aim of extending the network of clients to the north. Histria and the western part 
of the Tauriscan territory were annexed. This policy was complemented with the 
southern framework, composed of a fragmented mosaic of client states, both Greek 
and native, and which had been established in the previous phase. The significance 
of the Roman alliance with the Issaean commonwealth as a regional hegemon (after 
the Illyrian kingdom was dissolved) was enormous, as it created stability without 
direct Roman military involvement for a whole century. This system was 
occasionally under threat from Ardiaean piracy or the aggressive policy of the 
Delmataean alliance or the Transalpine Iapodes, and the Romans were forced to 
intervene and pacify them in order to preserve the system. Despite those occasional 
conflicts, the system remained stable. 
 
The third phase, 59 – 33 BC, dealt with the initially stable system that turned 
into a transitional one when Illyricum became one of the battlefields of the civil 
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war. New requirements appeared in changed circumstances (the increasing 
economic interest and migration of Italians on the eastern Adriatic coast), so that a 
proto-provincial framework became established in 59 BC to smooth the transition 
from bifocal hegemony to the provincial system. It was Rome’s acknowledgment of 
the political and social change that had taken place in eastern Mediterranean, rather 
than its attempt to impose rapid political change on the system. The change in the 
political/constitutional framework did not correspond with any change in the 
operational mode initially. The system remained stable in the first decade despite 
the political framework changing. 
 
The Roman civil war was an external factor that changed the situation inside 
Illyricum and it was the civil war rather than the establishment of a proto-province 
in 59 BC that made the system unstable. The dissolution of the Issaean 
commonwealth, after supporting the losing side in the intra-Roman conflict, threw 
the system into further instability. This event opened the way for the establishment 
of the Delmataean alliance as a hostile regional power in the central Adriatic and 
thus the most significant threat to Roman interests and the whole proto-provincial 
framework. The Romans did not change their operational mode in this phase; they 
remained passive and aimed only at the pacification of the Delmatae. Continual civil 
strife inside the Roman system, as well as the Roman refusal to change the political 
framework extended this phase and in the mid-30s BC almost brought about a 
collapse of proto-provincial political structures in the northwest. The extension of 
the network of client-states and the re-assertion of Rome’s authority were necessary 
in order to secure its interests.  Octavian included the Transalpine Iapodes and 
Segestani in the network of client-states and thoroughly pacified the Delmatae. This 
campaign enabled the establishment of the constitutional framework of a senatorial 
province in the next phase. Although Octavian’s operation against the Segestani was 
aggressive and briefly extended into the continent, it was only a brief excursion. 
Overall, we can see the operational mode in this phase as predominantly passive and 
the geo-strategy still with a maritime emphasis. 
 
The fourth phase dealt with a stable system. The sources are scarce but the 
process of the municipalization of the coastal cities and the absence of further 
substantial political troubles show that the 27 – 12 BC political framework of 
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‘lesser’ Illyricum was a functioning system. Increased municipalization and the 
establishment of colonies in the native settlements with a substantial Italian and 
Roman population completed the establishment of a functional provincial core that 
was able to uphold Roman power and at the same time strongly influence the 
inclusion of the periphery into the system. However, the crisis of 16 BC reveals 
serious problems with the Norican kingdom and the whole regional system that 
encompassed the Alps. That instability in the neighbouring regional system also 
affected Illyricum. The constitutional framework required change and the only 
possible solution was the annexation of unstable Noricum and a sudden change of 
policy towards continental Europe. The annexation of the Norican kingdom was 
followed by an extension of direct Roman power in the direction of the Pannonian 
plains, which affected Illyricum directly. 
 
In the fifth phase, 12 BC – AD 9, Illyricum was a transitional system. The 
most significant feature of the policy was that the geo-strategic emphasis shifted 
decisively to the continent. Through aggressive operations the Romans first 
included the Pannonian states of the Mezaei, Breuci, Daesitiates into the network of 
client-states. This, in theory, enabled much better functioning of Illyricum as a 
regional system incorporated into the empire because the coastal provincial core 
was joined with a provincial periphery, which brought the establishment of the 
regional economic system under full Roman control. However, the great weakness 
of the Roman position was lack of communications between the coast and frontier, 
and the absence of firmer provincial structures in the Bosnian hinterland and the 
Pannonian north ultimately resulted in the initial success of the great Pannonian 
rebellion. 
  
Finally, the last phase of Illyrian policy created and maintained an 
overwhelmingly stable system, established through the division of the territory into 
two provinces that could be more efficiently administered. The two provinces in 
time became two different regional systems. Firstly, Dalmatia belonged more to the 
cultural core of the Empire. Secondly, Pannonia remained as semi-peripheral, 
keeping relations with the peripheral peoples outside of the empire, and also 
enabling a strong and impenetrable frontier by means of Danube, which was a 
strategic link with other frontier provinces.  
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FIGURE 5 Phases of Roman Illyrian policy 
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9. 3   Roman Illyrian policy in a wider context: Rome 
and the Mediterranean macro-system 
Roman Illyrian policy was one of many political interactions inside a larger 
Mediterranean system and it is important to see how it fits into the global picture of 
Roman interactions with other regional systems and the state of the Mediterranean 
macro-system. Roman foreign policy had a major impact on degree of stability of 
the system, especially after Rome became the sole hegemon, a ‘world-empire’ in the 
Mediterranean system in 168 BC. The criteria we used in assessing Illyrian policy 
can also be applied to the macro-system as a whole. The mode of operations that 
imposed the political/constitutional framework is determined by whether the 
Romans sought to expand their power (aggressive mode) or to keep the status quo 
and engage in regional wars, without expanding on a large scale (passive mode). 
The geo-strategic emphasis was maritime and/or mixed before Caesar,
1 and 
continental afterwards (Figure 6.1).  
                                                           
1 Although Caesar clearly shifted the Roman geo-strategic emphasis into the continent, the strategy 
of both the civil wars was without doubt developed in a maritime context.   
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FIGURE 6 Impact of Roman foreign policy on regional and global 
levels 
 
FIGURE 6.1 Roman foreign policy and the Mediterranean 
macro-system 
 
  Period Mode  of 
policy 
Geo-strategic emphasis State of the 
Mediterranean macro-
system 
1.  229 –168 BC  Aggressive  Maritime  Transitional/Unstable 
2.  168 – 70 BC  Passive  Maritime  Working/Stable 
3.  70 – 31 BC  Aggressive  Maritime (70-59 BC) 
Mixed (59-31 BC) 
Transitional/Unstable 
4.  31 – 16 BC  Passive  Continental  Working/Stable 
5.  16 BC – AD 9  Aggressive  Continental  Transitional/Unstable 
6.  AD 9 – 68  Passive  Continental  Working/Stable 
 
FIGURE 6.2 Roman foreign policy and the Illyrian regional 
system 
  Period  Mode of policy  Geo-strategic 
Emphasis 
State of the Illyrian 
regional system 
1.  229 – 168 BC  Aggressive  Maritime  Transitional/Unstable 
2.  168 – 60 BC  Passive  Maritime  Working/Stable 




4.  33 – 12 BC  Passive  Maritime  Working/Stable 
5.  12 BC – AD 9  Aggressive  Continental  Transitional/Unstable 
6.  AD 9 – 68  Passive  Continental  Working/Stable 
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These figures contain some interesting features. The periods when the 
Mediterranean was in an unstable/transitional state are generally characterized by an 
aggressive mode of Roman policy while during periods when the system was 
stable/working, the mode of Roman policy was passive. Thus it is obvious that 
Romans, generally speaking, used an aggressive policy when the whole macro-
system became unstable in order to make it stable again. It seems that the Romans 




In Illyricum, the first phase corresponds with the macro-system, but in the 
second and the early third phase (168 – 50 BC), stability lasted two decades longer 
than in the macro-system. The length of the other phases is roughly the same. 
Increased stability in Illyricum can be attributed to the Issaean commonwealth and a 
very cautious Roman policy towards Illyricum that did not cause increased 
resentment in the native population. The change of political framework in 59 BC 
was not initiated by any crisis in Illyricum but rather it was the acknowledgment 
that political circumstances changed. An interesting feature is the passive 
operational mode in phase 3. One reason is the civil war. It is also evident that the 
instability of the system that occurred after the dissolution of the Issaean 
commonwealth was much more severe than previously thought. Although Roman 
citizens regrouped and firmly entrenched themselves in some strongholds on the 
coast, nothing was done to modify the ambitions of the Delmataean alliance and to 
make a new political framework until the system collapsed in 35 BC. Thus, we can 
see more clearly that Octavian was forced to act in Illyricum to prevent disaster, and 
not only to increase his auctoritas. 
 
The geo-political emphasis of the Republican system was basically 
maritime-oriented and had no interest in Illyricum, except the coast and the areas 
bordering North Italy. This was one of the most significant reasons why Illyricum 
remained outside the main focus of Roman foreign policy. There was a changed 
                                                           
2 The shift in 70 BC was triggered by the general instability of the system in the decade after Sulla’s 
death. In the eastern part of the system piracy paralysed significant parts of the system, and there was 
a war in Thrace, and a renewed threat from Mithridates VI that introduced instability into the whole 
East. In the west, there was the Sertorian rebellion and also the third Dalmatian war, 78-76 BC. 
In 16 BC the instability of the Norican kingdom and problems on the German frontier were a 
significant impetus towards a shift in policy. However, there were strong domestic reasons for the 
shift of policy as well (see Chapter 6.3), so that this phase can perhaps be treated as an exception. 
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position in the early Principate after a new political system was established, and 
foreign policy concentrated on the continent as more peripheral systems were 
tightly bound with the Mediterranean macro-system. Military advances in the 
regional systems of the Alps and Moesia forced the Romans to their change policy 
towards Illyricum and advance towards the Drava and later the Danube. The policy 
towards Illyricum shifted accordingly with the realignment of imperial geography. 
Pannonia needed mobile forces and colonies of military veterans to protect it, but on 
the other hand the creation of Pannonia made a buffer zone separating the coastal 
core and mountainous semi-periphery of Dalmatia and the outer periphery of 
Danubian frontier. The creation of Pannonia was in a way the ultimate achievement 
of two centuries of Roman strategic attempts to protect and secure northern Italy. 
 
Thus, we can say that the phases of Roman Illyrian policy mainly, but not 
always, corresponded with the phases and the mode of Roman interaction with the 
Mediterranean macro-system. The establishment and contractions of the Roman 
‘world-empire’ significantly but not exclusively affected Mediterranean macro-
system. Roman Illyrian policy was influenced by regional political and social 
fluctuations in Illyricum, but also affected by fluctuations in the macro-system. 
Therefore, Roman Illyrian policy should be understood only as a joint product of the 
fluctuations in the Mediterranean macro-system and regional fluctuations inside 
Illyricum. 
 
9. 4   Ethnic dimension of Illyrian policy 
In dealing with an ethnically diverse and heterogeneous area where ethnicity 
was intimately connected with the development of proto-state formations, such as 
Illyricum, the Romans were compelled to develop different relationships with 
different peoples in order to assert their authority with more success. To some 
extent they developed a rudimentary ethnic policy, as some ethne were generally 
treated in a friendlier manner than others, for different strategic reasons, or because 
of specific cultural, historical, geographical circumstances. Ethnic policy was an 
opportunity to fine tune the general course of Roman regional policy and adjust it in 
the light of different political factors that existed inside the geo-political system of 
Illyricum. In general, Roman ethnic policy concentrated on establishing more 
friendly relationships with the peoples who were culturally more attuned to the 
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Mediterranean cultural/social system, such as those ethne who inhabited the Eastern 
Adriatic coast. Romans also sought to look upon and ally themselves with weaker 
against stronger ethnic groups, encouraging the separatist ambitions of individual 
south Illyrian civitates from the Illyrian kingdom, or gaining personal support from 
native principes like Bato the Breucian who was bribed with the promise of rule 
over all the Pannonii in AD 8. 
 
The Romans had more problems in the hinterland of the Adriatic, and the 
importance of ethnic policy increased. The main troublemakers were not entirely 
included in the Mediterranean system (Iapodes, Pannonii, Delmatae). They either 
had political aspirations of their own (Delmatae), were a threat to political stability 
with their raids (Iapodes), or were frustrated by their rapid inclusion into the Roman 
empire and into the Mediterranean macro-system after the initial Roman conquest 
(Pannonii). In addition, the Delmatae and Pannonii represented a homogeneous 
ethnic block that was most hostile to the expansion of Roman influence. Romans 
counteracted the Pannonian-Delmataean block by establishing alliances with their 
Celtic neighbors (Scordisci, Taurisci), who themselves had also opposed Rome in 
the earlier phases of Roman Illyrian policy, but were successfully pacified and won 
over as valuable allies. Roman ethnic policy succeeded in keeping the Pannonii 
isolated from other ethnic groups during the Bellum Batonianum, and finally the 
administrative arrangements, after the uprising was crushed, enabled Rome to 
achieve stability in the system and prevent further unrest. 
 
9. 5  Economic and socio-cultural interactions 
The economic aspect of Roman Illyrian policy does not fit the model of 
aggressive, profit-driven imperialism. If the policy was aggressive and profit-driven, 
Romans would have been much more militarily and politically involved in 
Illyricum. There were large metal deposits in the Dalmatian hinterland, which they 
were aware of but they did nothing to acquire them for a long time. The protection 
of maritime commerce and navigation in the Adriatic against piracy had some 
impact on the course of the policy, especially in its initial phases. There is a link 
between the economic penetration of Italian citizens and the establishment of proto-
provincial structures in 59 BC, and certainly they played some limited influence on 
Roman Illyrian policy later as their protection became one of the factors that 
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impacted upon policy-making. Despite these factors, it seems clear that economic 
matters played a secondary role to political considerations in the making of Roman 
Illyrian policy and so helps explain long periods of Roman inactivity in Illyricum. 
 
Culturally, parts of Illyricum were in very different stages of inclusion in the 
Mediterranean world. The coastal areas and the immediate hinterland were 
culturally close and relatively easy to incorporate into the Mediterranean cultural 
core, if not already part of it. This coastal core had a strong cultural impact on the 
mountainous hinterland of Dalmatia even before Roman conquest; nevertheless the 
hinterland remained semi-peripheral in relation to the Mediterranean. Pannonia, on 
the other hand, was exposed to strong cultural inlfuences from Italy for a long time, 
and the concentration of the Roman army and colonies made it easier to absorb into 
the empire. 
 
9. 6   Final  remarks 
Insufficient evidence remains a great, almost unbeatable curse Clio cast 
upon Illyricum and its history. It is the main reason why the peoples of Illyricum 
still remain the ‘people without history’, to paraphrase the title of E. Wolf’s book.
3 
Thus, the historian working in this field must remove him/herself and see matters 
from a distance, dealing with structural changes that occur through passages of time 
rather than get too immersed in the detail of events. 
 
This thesis has attempted to present Roman Illyrian policy as an interaction 
between two systems. It has shown that in their political considerations Romans 
were aware of and accordingly treated Illyricum from the 2
nd century BC as 
something we could call a regional geo-political system, developing a regional 
policy that was fine tuned, mainly through the means of ethnic policy. The regional 
policy was not too sophisticated. It included a basic understanding of the territory 
and the peoples inhabiting it and Roman conduct towards that territory and its 
peoples followed an overwhelmingly artificial political conception of Illyricum. In a 
way, we may say that the creation of Illyricum as a spatial concept was a product of 
the Roman need to create Illyrian policy. By examining Illyricum we can see 
(especially during the Republic) the Romans as perpetually conservative policy-
                                                           
3 Wolf (1982). 
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makers, uneasy with any changes in political frameworks. In sharp contrast with 
that old-fashioned stubbornness, we must acknowledge, even admire the practical 
ingenuity of the Romans who were able to overcome all obstacles, and ultimately 
devise and implement decisive changes in their policy. They dealt with other geo-
political systems in the way that was most advantageous to them, but at the same 
time they found a way that also achieved stability in this system and satisfied the 
minimal requirements of the native population. 
 
Roman Illyrian policy is the interaction of two systems, Rome and Illyricum. 
Interaction was influenced by the consequences of Roman interaction with the 
Mediterranean macro-system and by the state of affairs in Illyricum. The view that 
Illyrian regional system and events in Illyricum have nothing to do with Illyrian 
policy must therefore be abandoned (see Chapter 3.1), in the same way as views that 
the conquest of Illyricum was a Roman search for a land-link with the East or a 
fixed frontier at the Danube. They are nothing but responses to a much wider 
question, oversimplified answers to a complex question. We asked at the beginning 
(Chapter 1.6) whether an Roman Illyrian policy existed, and whether it would be 
worthwhile to examine it. The first part of the question is answered without doubt, 
tabking in account historical circumstances. Illyrian policy had its beginning, its 
successive phases and its end. This thesis provides answers to the other part of the 
question. The Illyrian policy of Rome was distinct, as it was influenced by a clearly 
defined space with its natural and cultural specifics. On the other hand, it shows that 
Illyricum was a part of the wider Mediterranean world, that it was affected by the 
changes and fluctuations in that wider system, and that it could in turn affect them. 
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